Manuale Thomistarum

Volume One: On the Sacred Doctrine, and the One God

Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P.

Sonnet 5 Translation

MANUAL OF THE THOMISTS

OR

A BRIEF COURSE OF THEOLOGY

Published for the Benefit and Convenience of Students

By the Right Reverend Father

FRIAR JOHN BAPTIST GONET

of Béziers, of the Order of Preaching Friars,
of the Province of Toulouse, Former Regent of the Stricter Observance
in the Academy of Bordeaux

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Introduction

Jean-Baptiste Gonet was born around 1616 in Béziers, in the Languedoc region of southern France, and entered the Dominican Order there at the age of seventeen. He was sent for his studies to the University of Bordeaux, where he distinguished himself in philosophy and theology, taking every honor available in the course of his examinations. On receiving his doctorate he was appointed to the chair of scholastic theology at Bordeaux, a post he held, with one significant interruption, for most of his working life, and in which he earned a reputation as both a formidable theologian and an unusually gifted teacher.

That interruption came in 1660, when Gonet was one of three Bordeaux professors who judged Blaise Pascal's Lettres provinciales free of the taint of Jansenist heresy. When the University of Paris and a number of bishops disagreed and had the work condemned, the crown suspended Gonet and his colleagues from teaching for three years — an early sign of the doctrinal turbulence that would mark his entire career. He returned to his chair once the suspension lifted, and in 1671 was elected provincial of the Dominican province of Toulouse. On completing his term he resumed teaching, continuing until 1678, when failing health obliged him to retire to Béziers, where he spent his last years correcting and refining his writings until his death on 24 January 1681.

Gonet's reputation rests chiefly on his Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae contra Novos Ejus Impugnatores — The Shield of Thomistic Theology Against Its New Assailants — a vast systematic exposition and defense of the theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, published at Bordeaux between 1659 and 1669 and later revised by the author for a sixth, definitive edition printed at Lyons in 1681, the year of his death. In composing it Gonet drew heavily, and by his own admission gratefully, on the then-unpublished lecture manuscripts of the Spanish Dominican Pedro de Godoy; the two men stand together, alongside John of St. Thomas, among the principal architects of the great Thomist synthesis of the seventeenth century, that current of Dominican theology which set itself the task of defending Aquinas's system whole and entire against Scotists, nominalists, and the newer theological parties of the age alike. Gonet pursued that task with an energy that did not always spare even his fellow Thomists: on questions touching predestination and reprobation in particular, his positions were severe enough to draw criticism from within his own school. Already in 1669 he had entered the moral-theological controversies of the day with a treatise defending the Thomistic doctrine of probabiliorism, aimed in one direction at the laxity he perceived in certain casuists and in the other at the rigorism of the Jansenists — a controversy he prosecuted,

characteristically, without much quarter given to the opposing doctrine of probabilism.

The Clypeus itself, in its mature form, runs to five substantial volumes, organized topic by topic very much as Aquinas's own Summa Theologiae is organized: God's nature, unity, and trinity, and His work in creating the angels; the nature of man, his final end, and his beatitude; human acts, the virtues, the gifts, and the vices; law and grace; and the theological and cardinal virtues, together with justification and merit — the whole crowned, in a later addition, by a sixth volume on the sacraments. It is a work meant for the specialist and the advanced student, comprehensive to the point of being formidable, taking up every objection its author could find in the theological literature of his time and answering each in turn according to the mind of Saint Thomas as Gonet and his Salamancan and Toulousan colleagues understood it.

It was precisely this comprehensiveness that made a shorter, more manageable companion volume desirable, and the Manuale Thomistarum translated here is that companion. Issued together with the revised Clypeus in 1681, it distills the argument of the larger work into a single handbook organized, as the Clypeus is, by treatise, chapter, and section, but reduced to what a student or working theologian most needed to have ready to hand: the thesis to be held, the chief reasons supporting it, and brief responses to the standard objections. The present volume, the first part of the Manuale, corresponds to the opening matter of the Clypeus itself — the treatise on God, one in nature and three in person, and Creator of the angels and of man — and takes up in turn the existence and unity of God, the divine attributes, God's knowledge and will, and the intertwined questions of providence, predestination, and reprobation that so exercised Gonet and his contemporaries.

The volume carries the customary apparatus of a Dominican book of its age: a dedication to Hyacinthe Serroni, a fellow Dominican who had recently become the first Archbishop of Albi, and a series of approbations from the theological faculty of Bordeaux and from the superiors of Gonet's own order, down to the Master General in Rome. These pages, translated in full ahead of the text proper, are of more than antiquarian interest: they show a work of technical theology moving through the institutional channels — academic, religious, and royal — that eighteenth-century France required of it before it could reach a reader's hands, and they preserve, in the process, the genuine enthusiasm with which Gonet's contemporaries received his labors.

The aim of the Manuale, then, is a practical one, and it is worth taking Gonet and his Dominican approvers at their word about it: not to replace the Clypeus, whose full arsenal of authorities and arguments remains indispensable for the specialist, but to place

its conclusions within reach of the student and the working preacher, in a form compact enough to be carried, consulted, and, as one of the approving censors of the original edition rather charmingly put it, turned over by night as readily as by day. For the modern reader it offers something further: a clear, organized window onto the high Thomist synthesis of the seventeenth century at the moment of its fullest confidence, defending itself in careful and combative detail against Jansenists, Molinists, and the other rival schools of its day. It is in the hope of making that synthesis more available to English-language readers that the present translation has been undertaken.

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TO THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PRINCE OF THE CHURCH, LORD HYACINTH DE SERRONI, FIRST ARCHBISHOP OF ALBI, ABBOT OF CASEDEI, COUNSELOR TO THE KING.

I had composed the Thomistic Theology, MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PRINCE AND PRELATE OF THE CHURCH, which, marked with the name of a Shield, I had called by the name of Saint Theresa, so that it might stand, if not by its own strength, at least by another and heavenly protection. But since my Shield extended rather broadly, so much the more was it exposed to the fiery darts of enemies, the wider it was, the weaker in proportion to its diffuseness. Therefore, on the advice of many devotees of Thomistic doctrine, I have contracted the Shield, and out of the Shield I have made a Little Shield, and the theological matters which had been discussed there in a more expansive style, I have gathered into a Compendious Manual, so that the strength of the whole of Thomistic Theology, being made more compact, might be displayed more robust for its very frequency of use — especially under the auspices of YOUR EMINENCE, and of that innate inclination of yours toward those who love letters, which among your illustrious and outstanding virtues raises and shines forth as if from some lofty watchtower, so that nature seems to have brought you into being for this one virtue, the will to have exercised it, and fortune to have preserved it. To you, therefore, the impoverished Thomistic Theology will owe the greatest benefit, if you allow it to take refuge in your bosom, where your Saw, furnished and fortified, will break the enemy in triumph, just as King David once sawed through the sons of Ammon, defeated and routed in battle. But by what means can Thomistic Theology fly into your bosom, when it is already established there, when it has already for many years struck root there, and has produced marvelous fruits? It can be received into the bosom of YOUR EMINENCE as something contracted, where it has already long been poured out in immense abundance. Truly all Thomistic Theology is yours, since you have so successfully acquired it by diligent labor that you have made it your own; yours, I say, is that which has made you what you are. Boldly perhaps, yet more truly will I say, this is what has bestowed upon you that stupendous eloquence in pleading, worthy of Apostolic times, which from your earliest years Italy received with the highest applause; and now our own Occitania, especially in the public Assemblies, indeed all of Gaul admires. This is what furnished you, as if a Queen of the sciences, with that supreme moderation of mind, faith, and integrity, while you were Supreme Administrator of the armies of the Most Christian King, both among the Provençals and among the Catalans. This, finally, is what taught you the art of arts, namely of governing the Churches of God — first that of Orange, then that of Mende — so happily did Louis the Great, most equitable appraiser of things, after your zeal for Religion, your faith toward the Prince,

your piety toward the people, and your singular skill in governing all things had been rewarded with public offices, not hesitate to advance you, the most vigilant of Pastors, to the Metropolitan see of Albi, first among all, and as head and exemplar of those who would come after. See, therefore, MOST ILLUSTRIOUS ARCHBISHOP, how wisely this little Shield of mine invokes the Shield of your protection, how generously it seeks the aid of your wisdom's Saw, so that by the one's office it might elude the repeated attacks of enemies; by the other's sharpness it might saw through and grind down the teeth of detractors, and against all the ill-tempered, sustained by your patronage, it might prevail. Farewell, MOST DISTINGUISHED OF PRELATES; may Christ preserve you unharmed as long as possible, for the restoration of piety, for the fostering of letters, and for me.

Most Illustrious Prince of the Church, Of Your Eminence the most obedient and humble Client and Servant, Friar JOHN BAPTIST GONET of the Order of Preachers.

APPROBATION Of the Theological Faculty of the Academy of Bordeaux.

We, the undersigned Chancellor, Doctors of Theology, and Professors of the Academy of Bordeaux, have diligently examined the book entitled MANUAL OF THE THOMISTS, published by the Reverend Father John Baptist Gonet of Béziers, of the Order of Preachers, Professor and Regent of this same Academy, and we have found absolutely nothing in it contrary or dissonant to the orthodox faith or Christian morals; rather, as a genuine offspring of its Author's talent, ever consistent with itself and most firm, we have judged it most worthy, in expounding and defending the difficulties of the Most Sacred and Angelic doctrine, of being sent to the press as quickly as possible. Given at Bordeaux, the 16th day of May, in the year 1688.

JOHN FONTENEL, Chancellor. FRANCIS ARNALD, Augustinian. ANGELUS LATRIE, Carmelite. PETER LAHAYE, Doctor of Theology.

APPROBATION.

Father Gonet had published an immense Shield of Thomistic Theology, but not because he had experienced, among the contests of disputations, opponents who would hurl dangerous and truly formidable weapons, has he contracted the Shield, and in place of the great Shield lately published by him, has fashioned this Little Shield, and that a very brief one, against those same adversaries. Yet nothing whatever is taken from it by its brevity; rather its strength is increased, being all the stronger the more closely the weights of its opinions and the arguments of its matters cohere with one another, and are not scattered over long distances, but are bound together in closer intervals; so that with Tertullian one may say, the more it is contracted in words, the more it is diffused in meanings. Let, therefore, that old proverb depart, that a good book always has a bad Compendium; for this Compendium is without loss, being with brevity clear, with subtlety solid, most worthy of its Author's fame, and so complete in every respect that it seems to have nothing of a Compendium except the title. Thus I judge, at Béziers, the 19th day of December, 1679.

JULIAN JOSEPH GOURGAS, Doctor of Sacred Theology and Canon Law of Paris.

LICENSE.

Of the Most Reverend Father General.

I, Friar ANTHONY DE MONROY, Professor of Sacred Theology, and humble Master General and servant of the whole Order of Friars Preachers: Greetings.

BY THE PRESENT LETTERS, and by the authority of our Office, we grant license and faculty to you, Reverend Father Friar John Baptist Gonet of Béziers, of the Order of Friars Preachers, former Provincial of the Province of Toulouse, and Regent in the Academy of Bordeaux, to have printed the MANUAL OF THE THOMISTS, provided that such a work shall have been approved by three Professors of Theology to be designated by the Most Reverend Father Provincial of the Province of Toulouse, and other requirements of law being observed. In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. In witness of which, etc. Given at Rome, the 31st day of July, 1677.

Friar ANTHONY DE MONROY, Master of the Order. Registered on folio 2. Friar ANTONINUS CLOCHE, Master's Secretary.

COMMISSION,

Of the Reverend Father Provincial.

I, Friar ANTONINUS MASSOULIÉ, Prior Provincial of the Province of Toulouse of the Order of Friars Preachers, and servant: By these presents we designate and appoint the Reverend Fathers John Leonard Geay, Prior of Béziers, Louis Bancel, and Jerome de Grasse, Professors of Sacred Theology, as censors of the book entitled MANUAL OF THE THOMISTS, which the Reverend Father John Baptist Gonet, formerly public Professor in the University of Bordeaux, is about to bring to light. Given at Valence, the 29th day of October, in the year 1679. In witness of which, we have subscribed with our own hand, these letters being fortified with the seal of our office.

Friar ANTONINUS MASSOULIÉ, Provincial as above. Registered on folio 2. Friar JOHN LAPEIRE, Secretary.

APPROBATION.

Of the Reverend Father Leonard Geay, Professor of Sacred Theology, and Prior of the Convent of Béziers.

The Shield of Thomistic Theology has shone forth from God, so that all the mountains of the Church gleam with its unaccustomed brilliance. But just as the sun, at its first rising, surveying the mountain peaks, does not disdain in its progress to pour the rays of its light upon the lowliness of the valleys, so the Author of the Shield, after having illuminated with his solar Shield the minds of the more sublime Doctors, now hastens with his Theological Manual toward the illumination of even the lowliest of Scholastics. For in this Manual, all the secrets of Scholastic Theology are seen reduced, as it were, to a single mass, and this in such order, with such solidity, brevity, and clarity, that it is not undeservedly said of this Manual of the Disciple what is sung of the Summa of the Master: The style is brief, the eloquence pleasing, lofty, clear, the judgment firm. Let, then, this Theological Manual come forth into the light; let it come forth for the relief of Masters, let it come forth for the comfort of Students, let it come forth for the more convenient use of all scholars. May this Theological Manual be handled by the hands of all, just as all the Sacred Doctors have spoken with the mouth of one Saint Thomas; so now also, in this Manual, may all Professors of Sacred Theology explain in the Schools the conclusions of the Theological Summa with the mouth of one most wise Disciple of Saint Thomas. These are my wishes, this my sentiment, this the endorsement which I gladly append to this Manual. Given at Béziers, the 20th day of November, in the year 1679.

Friar JOHN LEONARD GEAY, Professor of Sacred Theology, and also humble Prior of the Convent of Béziers of the Order of Friars Preachers.

APPROBATION.

Of the Reverend Father Bancel, of the Order of Preachers, Doctor incorporated and Perpetual Professor of Sacred Theology in the School of Saint Thomas in the University, examiner for the diocese, for the whole legation of Avignon, and also Definitor General of the Province of Toulouse of the same Order.

I have always admired the work of our Most Reverend Father Gonet, a Doctor most celebrated everywhere. For with such clarity has he brought forth the whole of Theology into the light that he seems to have written it with the rays of the sun. And with such care and industry has he gathered into it the choicer testimonies of the Holy Fathers, and

the more solid and subtle arguments of the Doctors, which lie scattered in the books of others, that it may rightly be said, whoever knows Gonet, knows everything. This one thing remained to be desired, that the Author himself should reduce his own works into a compendium, for the greater convenience of all scholars. This he has happily achieved in this his Manual, in which I have no doubt that nothing is found contrary to the faith or good morals, since it is nothing other than the very doctrine of his Thomistic Theological Shield. Let, then, this work come forth into the public, most complete in every respect, so that all may be able:

To turn it over by night, to turn it over by day.

At Avignon, the sixth day of December, in the year 1679.

Friar LOUIS BANCEL, of the Order of Preachers.

APPROBATION.

Of the Reverend Father Jerome de Grasse, Professor of Sacred Theology, and Vicar General of the Holy Office at Avignon.

The Shield of Thomistic Theology, comprised in five volumes, was published some years ago by the Most Reverend Father John Baptist Gonet, to the greatest benefit of the whole theological enterprise. This outstanding work, consonant in every part with the holy faith, remarkable for its profound and solid doctrine, and delightful with the flowers of the Holy Fathers scattered abundantly throughout, not only all Professors of Sacred Theology privately, but also the most celebrated Sacred Academies of the whole of Europe, have zealously embraced and venerated. This Theological Manual has been fashioned by the labor of the same Author. Concerning which, being asked to give judgment (by order of the Most Reverend Father Antoninus Massoulié, Provincial of the Province of Toulouse of the Friars Preachers), I would say nothing other than that this Theological Manual is the true and genuine Epitome of the Theological Shield: in which the purity of doctrine, in complete accord with the faith and pronouncements of the Holy Apostolic See; the selection and elegance of opinions; the flowers of the Holy Fathers, which shine forth abundantly on all sides in the Theological Shield, may be admired in the Manual more concisely and compactly indeed, but also, in fact, more preciously. Thus I judge, at Avignon, the 3rd day of December, 1679.

Friar JEROME DE GRASSE, Professor of Sacred Theology, and Vicar General of the Holy Office at Avignon.

EULOGY.

Let the most learned men of Europe heap countless praises upon GONET; let the Spaniards proclaim his depth, the Italians his charm, let the Germans marvel at his labor, the French at his clarity, and let the rest extol the various gifts of his genius with various encomiums; as for me, and insofar as it is permitted to a kinsman, I shall extol his modesty and his sense of shame. This virtue, the rarer it is among the more learned, the more praiseworthy is it in this most learned man, in whom it is greatest. By this chief ornament of soul, and by the other riches of his genius, he is most similar to the Angelic Thomas; not inappropriately, then, will GONET be called the Second Hope of the great Order of Preachers. It is not enough for him to have illuminated, by his own wondrous clarity, the minds of all short of the sun; by this Epitome he brings it about that scholars in a short time all become theologians. Spare yourself, Most Reverend Father, you who are remarkable for excessive clarity, and who labor too much to write Theology laconically; by your lucid speech you have made plain to all the hidden secrets of this science; by this brevity of your speech you lay open all things as if at a single glance; you were accessible, you will be more accessible; in short, your Manual will be handled in the hands of all. But proceed, I beg, Reverend Father; the knowledge of God can never become known too much, nor too quickly. Hail, then, new light of Thomistic Theology; hail, Thomas of our Age, most humble Son of Dominic and richest Heir of his virtue, unconquered Assailant of Innovators, pillar of the Order, glory of your country, honor of your race, and glory of the Christian world.

CHARLES LEPVL, Doctor of Both Laws, and also Royal Counselor, and Censor of the annual taxes.

SUMMARY OF THE ROYAL PRIVILEGE.

It is enacted by the authority of the king that no one, in the kingdom or in other places subject to his rule, within the next six years, shall print or sell the book entitled The Shield of Thomistic Theology against its new impugners, with additions and corrections, or a compendium of it, authored by the Reverend Father JOHN BAPTIST GONET of the Order of Preachers, without the permission of the said Reverend Father, under penalty of the fine imposed, as is more fully contained in the royal decree. Given the 14th day of December, 1679. Signed DALENCE.

The Reverend Father Gonet transferred his rights to Henry Martel, and Martel himself made ANISSON AND POSUEL, booksellers of Lyons, partners.

Part One of the Manual of the Thomists

On God, One and Three, and Creator of Angels and men.

Preface

It was wisely said by Seneca that not many things are needed, but effective ones; that precepts are to be scattered like seeds, which, although small, when it has occupied a suitable place, unfolds its powers and from the smallest is diffused into the greatest fruits. Wherefore it will perhaps be no small work of merit, if the things which we have handed down in the Shield of Thomistic Theology, but more diffusely than may be of use to beginners in the schools, are conveniently reduced into a compendium, and the more useful things are separated from the less useful.

Moreover, in this work we shall adhere to the same method and order which Saint Thomas observed in the Summa Theologica; for it is an angelic order by which the motion of the Angels is imitated, by which he earned for himself the name of the Angelic Doctor. By a threefold motion (says the Areopagite) the Angels are moved: circular, straight, oblique. Circular indeed, while around God, as the center of all creatures, they are turned in continual and unending cognition, and perform, as it were, a choral dance. Straight, while they know the lower things, passing through all things in a straight line. Oblique, which is mixed of both, while they join together the knowledge of God and the knowledge of creatures. These are the motions of the heavenly and blessed minds; this is the motion of the Angelic Doctor, by which he progressed in that golden work which is called the Summa Theologica. For in the first part he is wholly occupied with divine things, and is turned by a circular motion around that divine center, while he disputes concerning God, the Attributes, and the Divine Persons. Then he is moved by a straight motion toward the lower things, while he discusses God as the efficient cause of things, and the end of the intellectual creature. And in the third part finally, uniting God to man, and joining together the knowledge of both, he is moved by an oblique motion. Following, then, this same order in this Manual of the Thomists, in its first part we shall treat of God as One and Three, and as Creator of Angels and men. In the second, of God as the last end, and the means leading to Him. The third, finally, will be on God incarnate and the Institutor of the Sacraments. But lest we enter and search into His hidden things as an unwelcomed guest, before we discuss these matters, we have judged it necessary to premise here briefly something on the nature and qualities of Theology.

PROEMIAL QUESTION ON THE NATURE AND GIFTS of Theology

Chapter I

On the nature of Theology.

I say first, although Theology, as it is in us wayfarers, lacks the actual evidence of its principles, namely the Articles of faith, which it knows only through faith and obscure revelation, it is nevertheless truly and substantially a science. Both because it is a habit attaining infallibly to truth through discourse: but a habit attaining infallibly to truth through discourse cannot belong to any other of the five intellectual virtues assigned by Aristotle than to science, or wisdom; for it cannot be the habit of first principles, since that attains truth immediately and without discourse; nor prudence, nor art, which concern only things to be done or made. Also because it suffices for the notion of science that through it the intellect firmly adheres to truth; for since truth is the end of all sciences, then a science is judged to have its essential perfection when through it one attains infallibly to truth, and adheres to it firmly; indeed, evidence is required for the perfection of science only for this reason, that through it the intellect is aided to attain truth more easily and quickly, and to have a more certain and unshakeable assent to truth. Hence if such certitude could be had without evidence, the true and essential nature of science would be obtained even without it. Since, therefore, our Theology is a certain cognition, and discourses concerning divine things with greater certainty and firmness than any natural science concerning its object — because it reduces its conclusions to revealed principles, exceeding all natural certitude — it is equivalently evident; and although it lacks the formal evidence which the Philosopher seems to require for the natural sciences, it nevertheless has virtual evidence, situated in the certitude by which it surpasses all other sciences, and a radical or aptitudinal evidence, because it postulates being joined with the light of glory and the science of the blessed, to which we shall say later it is subalternated.

You will say, there is no science of singulars and contingents: but Theology treats of singulars, e.g., of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin, of the Antichrist, and the like; and of contingents, such as sins, and human acts: Therefore it is not a science.

I answer that although the natural sciences cannot be concerned with singulars and contingents, Theology can indeed; because the natural sciences depend on the light of the first principles, which are concerned only with universals and necessary things, whereas Theology depends on the supernatural light of faith and divine revelation,

which extends to singulars and contingents. See other objections in the Shield of Thomistic Theology.

I say secondly, our Theology is subalternated to the knowledge of God and of the Blessed. Thus Saint Thomas here, art. 2, in the body, where he discourses thus: There is a twofold kind of sciences; some indeed proceed from the natural light of the intellect, such as Arithmetic, Geometry, and the like; others proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science, just as Perspective proceeds from principles made known through Geometry, and Music from principles known through Arithmetic: and in this way sacred doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science, namely the science of God and of the Blessed. By these words he plainly teaches that our Theology is subalternated to the science of God and of the Blessed, just as Perspective is subalternated to Geometry, and Music to Arithmetic.

Reason also persuades this; for in order that some science be said to be subalternated to another, it is required and suffices that it depend on it as regards the evidence of its principles, and that it add to the object of the subalternating science some accidental difference; thus Music is subalternated to Arithmetic, because its principles are made manifest through it, and beyond number, which is the object of the latter, it adds the difference of the harmonic or the sonorous: and likewise the principles of our Theology, which are the articles of faith, are made manifest through the science of God and of the Blessed, and Theology adds beyond the object of that science an accidental difference, namely virtual revelation; for it is accidental to the knowable God that He be known through the light of glory, or through the light of faith: Therefore our Theology is properly subalternated to the science of God and of the Blessed. From which

it is gathered, first, that although Theology, as it is in us wayfarers, is truly and substantially a science, as was shown in the preceding conclusion, it is nevertheless not a perfect science, or does not have a perfect and connatural state; just as a boy, although he is substantially a man, is nevertheless not a perfect man because of the lack of the use of reason and liberty. For in order that a subalternated science have a perfect and connatural state, it must be conjoined with the subalternating science, and from it have actual evidence of its principles. Whence Saint Thomas, question 14 of On Truth, art. 9, says that every science is perfected in the vision of the thing present. But Theology, as it is in us wayfarers, is not conjoined with the science of the blessed, to which it is subalternated, whence it does not receive from it the evidence of its principles, but depends per accidens on faith, taking the place of the light of glory: Therefore it is not in a perfect and connatural state.

It is gathered, secondly, that our Theology remains in the homeland (heaven); both because every subalternated science naturally seeks to be conjoined with its subalternating science, so that by it the principles which it believes may be made manifest to it; and also because our Theology is not essentially obscure, as faith is, but per accidens, by reason of the state which it has in us wayfarers, in which it is regulated by faith and obscure cognition. Whence it passes from obscure to evident, when man changes the state of wayfarer into the state of comprehensor. Just as, with the coming of the blessed vision, charity of the way does not cease, according to the Apostle, but passes from free to necessary, because liberty does not belong to its essence, but is a certain accidental mode, befitting it accidentally, and by reason of the state of the way.

It is confirmed: The gifts of wisdom and of knowledge, although as they are in us wayfarers they depend on faith, and are regulated through it, nevertheless remain in the homeland, as Saint Thomas teaches, I-II, q. 68, art. 6. Why then might not our Theology likewise remain in the homeland, although here it depends per accidens on faith and obscure cognition? Whence that saying of Jerome to Paulinus is well known: Let us learn on earth that knowledge which will persevere with us in the heavens. Since, therefore, the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 13, that in heaven tongues shall cease, and knowledge shall be destroyed, this must not be understood of destruction as to substance, but only as to the mode of obscurity and non-evidence, which it now has; or as to the imperfect mode of operating, namely through conversion to phantasms, and species received from things, which now belongs to it; for each of these modes of knowing will be destroyed in the homeland, because, as Saint Thomas teaches on this passage of the Apostle, conversion to phantasms then will not be from necessity, but from choice.

I say thirdly, that the formal object which of Theology is God, and its formal reason under which is virtual and mediate revelation.

The first part is proved by the reasoning of Saint Thomas here, art. 6. That is called the formal object which of some science, which is principally sought by it, to which all the other things treated in it are reduced: but the knowledge of God is per se and primarily sought in Theology, since it, as the very name sounds, is a consideration or discourse concerning God and divine matters. Likewise, whatever things are treated in it are either God Himself, or are reduced to Him, as properties to essence, such as the attributes; or as effects to cause, such as creatures; or as means to an end, such as human acts, virtues, laws, grace, incarnation, and the sacraments: Therefore God is the formal object which of Theology.

It is confirmed from the same Holy Doctor in the same place: The object of the principles is the same as that of the whole science, since the whole science is contained in its principles: But God is the object of the principles of Theology, namely of the articles of faith, since faith is a theological virtue, it regards God as its proper object, as we shall say in the Treatise on faith: Therefore God is the object of Theology, not insofar as He is Savior, as Durandus holds, nor insofar as He is Glorifier, as Gregory holds, but according to Himself, as Saint Thomas in the place cited, and others most commonly teach; for many things are treated in Theology which indeed befit God according to Himself, in the manner explained above, but not precisely as Savior, or as Glorifier.

That the formal reason under which of Theology is virtual and mediate revelation is established from this, that Theology is a habit distinct from faith, and from metaphysics, and the other natural sciences, and is, as it were, a middle between them: but it could not be distinguished from them, nor mediate between them, unless it had as its formal reason under which virtual and mediate revelation; for if its formal reason under which were formal and immediate revelation, it would coincide with faith, which relies on immediate divine revelation; but if it did not depend on virtual revelation, and proceeded from principles known by the natural light alone, it would not be distinguished from the natural sciences, especially from metaphysics, which considers God as knowable from creatures, and by the natural light of the human intellect: Therefore the formal reason under which of Theology is virtual and mediate revelation.

That this may be better understood, it must be observed that something can be said to be revealed in two ways: First, formally and immediately, as it is revealed that God is triune, that the Word is incarnate. Secondly, virtually and mediately, when, namely, in the thing immediately revealed, another thing is virtually contained, either as an effect in a cause, or as a property in an essence, which is deduced through discourse: in which manner, in this proposition, Christ is man, this, Christ is capable of laughter, is considered virtually and mediately revealed; and this virtual and mediate revelation we say is the formal reason under which of Theology.

From which it is gathered, first, that in heretics there is no true Theology; because since in them there is no faith, there is neither formal nor virtual revelation; whence their Theology is only human faith, or opinion, by which they assent to certain theological truths, from their own judgment, or from the choice of their own will, and not from the motive of divine revelation; otherwise they would give assent to all revealed truths.

It is gathered, secondly, that Theology is not composed of several partial habits, but is one simple habit, extending to all Theological conclusions. Thus Saint Thomas here, art.

3, where he insinuates this fundamental reason: Habits are not distinguished, nor multiplied, except according to the distinction of formal objects, and according to the diverse reason under which they attain them, as is the common doctrine of the Philosophers: but Theology has a single formal object which in species, namely God, under the aspect of Deity, and a single formal reason under which in species, namely virtual and mediate revelation, under which it attains all the partial objects which it considers: Therefore it is one simple habit, extending to all the conclusions contained within the sphere of its object; just as faith extends to all things believable, charity to all things lovable, prudence to all things to be done, and sight to all things visible. Although, therefore, in Theology there are given several diverse demonstrations concerning diverse partial objects, because nevertheless all pertain to the same formal object, and not to a diverse one, not every one of them produces its own partial habit, but the first alone generates the habit of Theology, and the second only extends it to a different conclusion, and so of the rest; just as the soul is extended to inform diverse parts of matter, not by addition of itself, but by increase of the matter to which it is applied, or just as a predicamental relation is carried to several material terms, remaining unvaried. From which is resolved the chief foundation of the opposing opinion.

I say fourthly, that Theology is a habit entitatively natural.

This is proved by a twofold reason: The first is that no habit entitatively supernatural is acquired by our acts, but is immediately infused by God, as is established by induction; for the theological and supernatural moral virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, are not acquired by our acts, but are immediately infused by God: but Theology is not an infused habit, but one acquired by human study and labor, as is established by experience, and as Saint Thomas expressly teaches, II-II, q. 54, art. 1, ad 2, where he places this distinction between wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and Theology, which also, as we shall say below, has the character of Wisdom, namely that the former is had through infusion, and comes down descending from the Father of lights, whereas the latter is acquired by human study: Therefore Theology is not an entitatively supernatural habit, but a natural one.

Nor is it valid what certain Recent authors say, that this is proper and special to Theology, that it be entitatively supernatural, and yet be acquired by our acts: both because Theology presupposes faith, from which it can be caused as from a habit of first principles; and also because this distinction intervenes between the infused virtues and Theology, that the infused virtues are properties of grace, from which they flow, and consequently require to come about through the same action by which grace is produced, but Theology does not, since it is not had by all the just. This response, I say,

is not valid: for if from the fact that Theology presupposes faith, it could be inferred that it, although entitatively supernatural, could nevertheless be acquired by our acts, by the same reasoning it could be said that all the morally infused virtues are acquirable by our acts; for they presuppose charity, through which the will adheres to the last end, which relates to operable matters with respect to the choice of means, just as first principles relate to speculative matters with respect to conclusions. From the same response it would also follow that infused prudence would be acquirable by our acts, since it likewise presupposes faith, in which it is virtually contained as in a seed. Nor is it valid what is added, that faith and hope are infused by God, and yet are not properties inseparable from grace, since they are found in sinners: Therefore from the fact that Theology is not a property of grace, it is not rightly inferred that it, although entitatively supernatural, is not infused by God, but acquired by our acts.

The second fundamental reason for our conclusion can be briefly proposed thus: Sciences do not derive their specification from the formal object which, except insofar as it underlies the formal reason under which; whence also, if the reason under which of some science is natural, that science cannot be entitatively supernatural: but the formal reason under which of Theology is entitatively natural: Therefore so also is the habit of Theology itself. The major is established from the common doctrine of the Philosophers; the minor is shown thus. The formal reason under which of Theology, distinguishing it from faith and from purely human and natural sciences, is virtual revelation, as we showed in the preceding conclusion: but virtual revelation (since it includes the discourse of the human intellect, and is concerned with revealed principles, not precisely and formally as they are revealed, but as they underlie the light and skill of the natural human intellect, and insofar as from them, through discourse, certain non-revealed truths can be elicited) is intrinsically and entitatively natural, and supernatural only extrinsically and presuppositively, insofar as it presupposes the principles of faith formally revealed: Therefore so also is the formal reason under which of Theology. Whence it is false what certain Recent authors say, that discourse does not belong to the reason under which of Theology, but is a pure condition applying the revealed principles, just as fire is applied to combustible material through approximation. For that belongs to the specificative and formal reason under which of some habit which essentially distinguishes it from others: but Theology is essentially distinguished from faith through discourse, since faith is not discursive, but immediately believes the truths revealed to it by God: Therefore discourse belongs to the formal reason under which of Theology.

You will object, first: The specification of sciences is taken from principles, as the Philosophers teach: but the principles of Theology are supernatural, for they are the very articles of divine faith: Therefore Theology itself is also supernatural.

I answer, granting the Major, by distinguishing the Minor: the principles of Theology are supernatural, formally and reduplicatively, I deny. Materially and specificatively, I grant. For the articles of faith are the principles of Theology, but they do not enter into the Theological demonstration except insofar as they underlie the natural light and discourse of the human intellect, by the mediation of which they illuminate the Theological conclusions which are virtually contained in them. Whence the articles of faith can be considered in two ways: first, insofar as they are absolutely true, and insofar as they express an order to the first revealing truth, and thus they are formally revealed and belong to the habit of faith; secondly, insofar as they express a relation to conclusions and truths not revealed, which can be inferred from them through the discourse of the human intellect; and under this aspect they are not formally, but only virtually revealed, and pertain to the habit of Theology, which accordingly is not formally and entitatively supernatural, but only radically, insofar as it presupposes the principles of faith, in which it is contained as in a seed or root, just as the natural sciences are contained in the habit of first principles. And in this sense Saint Thomas here, art. 1, calls Theology a revealed science, and divinely inspired.

You will object, secondly: The certitude of Theology, which is its essential predicate, is supernatural, for it surpasses the certitude of all natural sciences, as we shall say in the following chapter: Therefore so also is the habit of Theology itself.

It is confirmed: Theology, as we shall show there, is eminently speculative and practical: but the practical and the speculative, since they are opposite differences, cannot be united and eminently and formally contained, except in a supernatural science and habit: Therefore Theology is an entitatively supernatural habit.

To the objection I answer by denying the Antecedent; for just as Theology mediates between faith and the natural sciences, so also does its certitude; wherefore it is neither purely natural, as is the certitude of the natural sciences, nor formally supernatural, as is the certitude of faith, but only virtually so, since the formal reason under which from which it is taken is not formal and immediate revelation, but only virtual and mediate; whence such certitude is indeed inferior to the certitude of faith, but superior to the certitude of all natural sciences.

To the confirmation I say that the speculative and the practical can be united and eminently and formally contained, not only in a science entitatively supernatural, but

also in a science only radically supernatural, because that is radically and virtually contained in faith, which is eminently speculative and practical, and regards an infinite object, namely God, who, since He is the first truth and the last end, is simultaneously the rule of speculation and of practice. More on this in the following chapter.

Chapter II

The chief gifts of Theology are briefly explained.

I say first, Theology is more certain than every natural habit and science: for it relies on a firmer medium, namely the light of divine revelation, which is more certain and more infallible than the media on which the natural sciences rely. Whence Augustine, Confessions 7, chapter 2: I would more easily doubt that I live (which nevertheless is the truth of all natural things best known and most sensible) than that the things I have heard are true.

It is confirmed: The assent to first principles and to natural truths comes from nature moving us to it; but the assent of faith, on which Theology relies, comes from the motion and impulse of the Holy Spirit, exciting a pious affection to believe, as is taught in the Treatise on faith: but the Holy Spirit moving us to believe and to assent to revealed truths is a firmer and more infallible cause than nature moving us to the assent of first principles and natural truths: Therefore Theology has a greater and firmer cause of its certitude than the natural habits and sciences.

Nor is it an obstacle that the Theologian sometimes suffers certain motions of doubt, both concerning the principles of faith, and concerning the conclusions inferred from them, which one having natural science, whose intellect adheres quietly to truth, does not experience. For those wavering motions of the mind do not proceed from the weakness of the motive on which Theology relies, but from the infirmity of the human intellect, which is wont to be restless, until it clearly beholds the truth. Whence Saint Thomas, when here in art. 5 he had first objected to himself that other sciences, concerning whose principles one cannot doubt, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine, whose principles, namely the articles of faith, admit of doubt, thus responds: To the first it must be said that nothing prevents that which is more certain according to nature from being less certain to us, on account of the weakness of our intellect. Whence the doubt which occurs in some concerning the articles of faith is not on account of the uncertainty of the thing, but on account of the weakness of the human intellect.

I say secondly, Theology is formally at once speculative and eminently speculative and practical. For it has as its formal object which God under the aspect of Deity; and as its

formal reason under which, virtual revelation, as we showed in the preceding chapter: but from each of these heads it follows that it is at once speculative and practical: Therefore it is a habit eminently speculative and practical. The Minor is proved: since God under the aspect of Deity is the first truth and the last end, He is also the first rule of speculation and of practice, being greatly both speculable and operable; operable, I say, not physically, but morally, insofar as He is attainable by our meritorious acts, under the aspect of last end. Likewise, virtual revelation presupposes faith, which is eminently formally speculative and practical, since it not only adheres to and relies on the first revealing truth, but also extends to operation and to love, according to that saying to the Galatians 5: Faith works through love. Whence nothing so inflames the heart of man to the love of God as Theology, as Abbot Antiochus says, Oration 128. Which words his interpreter, expanding, adds this in the margin: Theology generates the love of God.

It is confirmed: Metaphysics is speculative, because it treats of God as the first principle; Moral philosophy, however, is practical, because it treats of the last end, and of the means leading to it: Therefore since Theology accomplishes both, and contemplates God under the aspect of first principle and last end, and treats of the means leading to Him, it will be at once speculative and practical. I add that Theology, as Saint Thomas teaches here, art. 3, ad 2, is as it were a certain impression and participation of the divine science, which is eminently speculative and practical, and which not only directively, but also effectively concurs to the production of things; as we shall show in Treatise 3.

From these things you will understand that although the speculative and the practical are divisive differences of the natural sciences, this does not hold for science as such, insofar as it is the supreme genus with respect to Theology and the natural sciences: whence, although they cannot both belong to any natural science, they can indeed belong to Theology, which is of a higher order, and holds a middle place between faith and the purely natural sciences, as we declared in the preceding chapter: for those things which are dispersed in the lower things can be united in the higher; just as the visual and the auditory are united in the common sense, and the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective are united in the rational soul. By which the chief foundation of the opposing opinion is overturned.

I say thirdly, our Theology is truly and properly wisdom. For wisdom is the knowledge of things through their highest causes, whence in the genus of a building, the craftsman who designs the form of the house is called wise and the master builder, with respect to the lower craftsmen who hew wood or prepare stones; and in the moral order, the prudent man who orders his acts to the last end is called wise: but Theology judges of things through the highest of all causes, namely God, and through the highest reasons,

namely through the articles of faith: Therefore it is truly and properly wisdom. Whence, just as wisdom judges of all things, according to that saying of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 2: The spiritual man judges all things, so also does Theology, which not only infers conclusions from the principles and articles of faith, which is proper to science, but also judges of the principles and conclusions of the other sciences, and whatever is found in the other sciences repugnant to the truth of this science is entirely condemned by it as false, as the Holy Doctor says here, art. 6, ad 2. Wherefore Theology is, as it were, a touchstone, by contact with which the true is discerned from the false, the pure from the impure, and sincere doctrine from vitiated and adulterated doctrine. See other gifts and prerogatives of Theology in the Shield of Thomistic Theology, Proemial Disputation, art. 12.

Treatise I

ON THE EXISTENCE, unity, and nature of God, and His chief attributes.

Since the existence and unity of God are the basis and foundation of all things treated in Theology, before we discuss the nature of God and His attributes, and take up the other questions and Theological difficulties, we must treat of the existence of God, and His unity.

Chapter I

On the existence of God.

§ I

Is the existence of God self-evident?

I say first, this proposition, God exists, is self-evident in itself. It is proved by the reasoning of Saint Thomas here, q. 2, art. 1. That proposition is called self-evident in itself whose predicate belongs to the essence and intrinsic nature of the subject; for since nothing is prior to the essence and quiddity of a thing, such a proposition cannot be demonstrated or made known through anything prior: but existence belongs to the essence and intrinsic nature of God, for God is His own being, as the same Holy Doctor proves, q. 3, following, art. 4: Therefore this proposition, God exists, is self-evident in itself.

You will say, this proposition, God is triune, is not self-evident in itself, since it cannot be known by any created intellect by its own powers, and yet the Trinity of Persons belongs

no less to the essence and intrinsic nature of God than existence does: Therefore, although existence belongs to the quiddity and intrinsic nature of God, it does not follow that this proposition, God exists, is self-evident in itself.

I answer by denying the Antecedent, with Bañez and the other Thomists, who teach that God being Triune is self-evident in itself. Nor is it an obstacle that it cannot be known by a created intellect by its own powers, for this only proves that it is not self-evident to us, but not that it is not self-evident in itself. I add that, although the Trinity of Persons is not immediately knowable by a created intellect by the powers of its own nature, it can nevertheless be known immediately by it, elevated by the light of glory, and thus it is in fact known by the Blessed; which suffices for the notion of a proposition self-evident in itself, as Saint Thomas teaches concerning this proposition, God is, q. 10 of On Truth, art. 3, in the body.

I say secondly, this proposition, God exists, is not self-evident to us.

It is proved: That proposition is called self-evident to us which is known by us immediately, without discourse, and from the mere apprehension of the terms, as is established in first principles: but this proposition, God exists, is not known by us immediately without discourse, and from the mere apprehension of the terms; for the signification of this term "God" is not self-evident to us, since in the state of the way we do not know Him quidditatively: Therefore this proposition is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated through things that are more known to us, namely through creatures, and through the motions of sensible and corporeal things.

Nor is it an obstacle that several of the Holy Fathers teach that the knowledge of God is naturally implanted, innate, and, as Damascene says, On the Orthodox Faith, book 1, chapter 1, "in-seeded" in us. For some speak of God under some common and confused aspect, namely under the aspect of beatitude in general; for since men naturally desire to be happy, they naturally know that there is some beatitude. Others only mean that God is naturally known to us (as Saint Thomas observes, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 2) on account of the custom by which men from the cradle are accustomed to hear and invoke the name of God; for custom, especially that which is from the beginning, has the force of nature, and those things with which the mind is imbued from childhood are held as firmly as if they were naturally known.

You will object, first: We assent to this proposition, God exists, without discourse, and from the mere apprehension of the terms: Therefore it is self-evident to us. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. By this name "God" is understood, among all, a being than which nothing greater or better can be conceived: but without

discourse, and from the mere apprehension of the terms, it is established that a being than which nothing greater or better can be conceived exists; because if it did not exist, it would not be better than all things which can be conceived, for it would without doubt be much better if it actually necessarily existed: Therefore without discourse, and from the mere apprehension of the terms, it is established that God exists.

I answer with Saint Thomas here, art. 1, ad 2, and Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 11, that although God is that than which nothing greater or better can be conceived, this nevertheless is not self-evident to all; for some have said God to be a body, as the Anthropomorphites, ascribing human members to God, and yet a body is not that than which nothing better can be conceived. Indeed, those who deny that God exists necessarily conceive something to be greater and more excellent than God, since a being is better than a non-being. The Holy Doctor adds that, granted even that everyone understands by this name "God" that than which nothing better can be conceived, it does not follow from this that what is signified by this name exists in the nature of things, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Or as others say, from this it only follows that such a name imports existence in the signified act, but not in the exercised act, but this is left to be demonstrated through discourse.

You will object, secondly: This proposition, God is to be worshiped, is self-evident to all, and is a common conception of all, for it is a first principle of synderesis: Therefore since such a proposition includes this one, God exists — for what does not exist cannot be worshiped — this proposition, God exists, is also self-evident to all.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence; for although practical cognition presupposes speculative cognition, it is not necessary that if practical cognition is immediate, the speculative cognition included in it is likewise immediate. For this principle, parents are to be honored, is immediate, although we do not know immediately who our parents are, but through discourse, or the report of others. So likewise, although we do not know immediately that there is a God, but through discourse, or through the observation of creatures, nevertheless this proposition, God is to be worshiped, is immediate, and a first principle of synderesis.

§ II

Atheism is refuted, and the existence of God is demonstrated by five reasons of Saint Thomas.

Just as of old David, to lay Goliath low, chose for himself five smooth stones from the brook, and put them into his shepherd's bag, as is said in 1 Kings 17, so the Holy Doctor here, art. 3, adduces five outstanding reasons to demonstrate the existence of God, by which, as by five stones, the forehead of atheism is struck. The first demonstrates that one first mover, entirely immobile, must be admitted. The second, that there is one first efficient cause, which is the cause of others. The third, some necessary being from which all contingent beings participate their existence. The fourth, some being supremely perfect, by approach to or departure from which, by imitation of or falling short of which, the perfection of others is measured. The fifth, finally, one supreme provider and governor, who governs and directs all creatures to their ends.

But in order that the first two reasons may be more clearly perceived and more firmly established, three things must be briefly premised here. First, it must be supposed that the first mover, entirely immobile, is God. For by the name of God we understand that than which nothing greater or better can be conceived: but the first mover entirely immobile is such: Therefore it is God. The Minor is proved: The first mover entirely immobile must be pure act, because it must lack all potentiality; for a thing is mobile insofar as it is in potency; whence that which is in no way mobile is in no way in potency, but is pure act: but that which is pure act, lacking all potentiality, must have every imaginable perfection, because if some perfection were lacking to it, it would be in potency to that: Therefore the first mover, entirely immobile, is that than which nothing greater or better can be conceived.

Secondly, it must be supposed that, in the series of movers and agents, one can be subordinated to another in two ways, namely accidentally and essentially (per se): it is subordinated to another accidentally when it receives its being from it, but need not await its application or influx in order to act: thus a son is subordinated to his father, from whom indeed he received his being, but he does not need his application or influx whenever he acts. But it is subordinated essentially (per se) when it cannot act unless it is moved and applied to acting by another agent to which it is subject: thus an instrument is subordinated per se to the craftsman, because it is only moved and acts by his moving and applying it.

Thirdly, it must be supposed that although a process to infinity can be admitted in causes and movers accidentally subordinated, it cannot be admitted in those

subordinated per se, as Saint Thomas teaches below, q. 46, art. 2, ad 7, in these words: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se, but it is not considered impossible to proceed to infinity per accidens in agent causes. Whence it is not impossible that man be generated by man to infinity: but it would be impossible if the generation of this man depended on man, and on an elemental body, and on the sun, and so to infinity. Reason also persuades this: for since, among movers subordinated per se, the last mover does not move unless moved and applied by a prior one, and that by another, and so on: if in these there were a process to infinity, no motion or action could occur in the lower things, unless simultaneously infinite influxes and motions of the higher causes and movers concurred; whence, since the infinite is not traversable, no motion or action would ever occur in the lower causes. This can be declared and illustrated by the example of a clock, in which, if there were infinite gears, each depending in its motion on a higher one, and unable to move unless dependently on that prior mover, there would be none that could ultimately move and strike the hours; because one could never arrive at the first one which would move all the others, since that infinite multitude of gears would never be traversable. These things being premised,

The first reason of Saint Thomas can be briefly proposed thus: There is given one first mover entirely immobile: but that is God: Therefore God exists. The Minor is established from the first supposition; the Major is shown thus. Everything that is moved is moved by another: but a process to infinity cannot be given among movers and things moved subordinated per se, as we showed in the third supposition: Therefore one must necessarily come to rest in a first moving and immobile principle. The Major is proved: what moves is in act, for each thing acts insofar as it is in act; what is moved is in potency, whence motion is physically defined as the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency: but the same thing, according to the same, cannot be in act and in potency with respect to the same form, since being in act denotes the possession of the form, whereas being in potency denotes its privation: Therefore the same thing, according to the same, cannot be mover and moved, and consequently whatever is moved is moved by another.

The second reason of Saint Thomas is formed thus: Everything that comes to be and is caused is caused or comes to be by another, such that nothing can make or cause itself, because thus it would be before it was: for in order that something effect, it must have being, because that which is nothing effects nothing; but in order that it be effected, it must not have being, for that which is, does not come to be, but has come to be: but there are several effected things in this universe: Therefore they are effected and caused by another. Whence, since a process to infinity cannot be given in efficient causes

subordinated per se, as was shown above, one must necessarily arrive at some first cause, which can be caused by none, and hence which is a being from itself, and independent, which we call God.

The third reason is: There is given some necessary being, from which all contingent beings participate their existence: but such a being is God, as is clear: Therefore God exists. The Major is proved: If there were not given some necessary being, but all beings were contingent, and possible to be and not to be, no being at all would be actually given on the part of reality: but this is contrary to sense and manifest experience: Therefore etc. The consequence of the Major is proved: Those things which of their own nature denote only possibility toward something cannot be reduced to act, except through some cause which contains it; just as, because air is in potency to light, and water to heat, the former cannot be illuminated except by a luminous body, nor the latter be heated except by something hot: Therefore if all beings were contingent and possible to be and not to be, and no necessary being were given from which all being flows, no being at all would in fact be given on the part of reality.

Nor is it valid to say that although each contingent being needs to have its being from another, which reduces it from possibility to the act of existing, nevertheless the whole collection of them, since it is infinite, does not, since in an infinite multitude the inference from the singulars to the whole is not valid; for, positing infinite, e.g., revolutions of the heavens into the future, after any one there would be another, not after all; and positing infinite generations from eternity, before any one there would be another, not before all. This response, I say, is not valid, which is the chief refuge of Atheists: for although in an infinite multitude the consequence from the singulars to the whole is not valid in predicates taken from continuous or discrete quantity, as is established in the examples adduced, it is otherwise in all other cases, especially if they are quidditative and essential predicates; for because individual men, e.g., are rational and capable of laughter, it is true to say that the whole multitude and collection of them is likewise rational and capable of laughter: but the impotence of being from oneself, or the need to receive being from another, in a contingent thing, is not a predicate of continuous or discrete quantity, but essential, belonging to it absolutely, and from the limitation and imperfection of its essence, which is not for it a sufficient foundation of being: Therefore this must belong not only to the individual contingent beings taken distributively, but also to their whole collection, and the inference is good, that whatever contingent being, taken singly and in particular, needs to receive being from another: Therefore so does their whole collection.

The fourth reason: Some being supremely perfect must be admitted. But that is God: Therefore God exists. The Minor is established, for, as we have often said, by the name of God we understand a being than which nothing more perfect or better can be conceived. The Major is shown thus. We see in this world some beings to be more or less good or perfect than others; whence, since more and less are said of diverse things according as they approach something which is maximally such, just as that is called more hot which approaches most to what is hot, there must be given in the nature of things some being supremely good and perfect, which is the cause and measure of the goodness and perfection of others. For the first in any genus is the cause of the rest, either efficiently, pouring forth and distributing goodness to things, or exemplarily, by approach to or departure from which, by imitation of or falling short of which, the perfection of others is measured.

The fifth reason of Saint Thomas is taken from the governance of things, and from the necessity of one supreme provider and governor, who orders and directs individual creatures to their ends. For we see that those things which lack cognition operate for an end, because they always or more frequently operate in the same way, and attain their ends through fitting means: whence, since those things which lack cognition cannot intend an end which they do not know, unless they are directed by a knowing cause, just as an arrow cannot hit the mark unless directed by the archer, it is evident that in this world there is given some most wise governor, and some supreme intelligence, directing all things to their ends, which we call God.

We have pursued this reason at length in the Shield of Thomistic Theology, disp. 1, art. 2, and in the digression appended to it, in which we demonstrated the existence of God from the great and small world, that is from the artful structure of the world, and the marvelous composition of man, by seven reasons.

You will ask, can there be given invincible or inculpable ignorance of the existence of God?

I answer negatively, against Molina who holds the opposite: for in Romans 1, those who are ignorant of God are called inexcusable, which could not be said, if they were invincibly ignorant of Him; for invincible ignorance excuses from sin, as we shall show in the treatise on sins. The Holy Fathers also everywhere teach this same truth: for Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, book 1, chapter 1, says: Knowledge of God is implanted in all by nature, nor can anyone using reason be ignorant of it. Gregory the Great, Moralia, book 17, chapter 3, explaining that saying of Job, "All men see him," adds: Every man, by the very fact that he is created rational, ought from reason to conclude

that He who created him is God. Augustine, on Psalm 74, beautifully adds: God is everywhere secret, everywhere public; whom none is permitted to know as He is, and whom none is permitted to be ignorant of. Minucius Felix in the Octavius says: It is no less a crime to be ignorant of the common Parent of all than to harm Him. And Saint Cyprian, in his book On the Vanity of Idols: This is the sum of the offense, to be unwilling to acknowledge Him whom one cannot be ignorant of. Jerome, Epistle 3, to Nepotian: The Persian, the Goth, Egypt, the Turk acknowledge Him: the savagery of the Bessi, and the throng of skin-clad peoples, have broken their harsh dialect into the sweet melody of His name, and the whole world with one voice says, "God exists." Finally, Tertullian, book 1, Against Marcion, calls the knowledge of God the first endowment of the rational soul, and in his book On the Testimony of the Soul, calls the recourse which we have to God in sudden events a testimony of the soul naturally Christian.

Nor did this escape the notice of the pagan Philosophers, of whose various testimonies, omitting the rest, it pleases to transcribe only the words of Plutarch: To those who travel widely it happens to come upon many cities without walls, without literary studies, without kings, without the use of gold and silver, to whom theatres and gymnastic exercises are utterly unknown; indeed to whom there are no houses, but only huts and hovels: but there never exists a city or town in which there is no God, no oaths, no prayers, no sacrifices to procure goods and avert threatening evils. Such a city no one has ever seen, nor indeed could see, and one would sooner see a city without a sun than one without religion.

Reason also supports this: First, because the precepts of the natural law cannot be invincibly ignored, as we shall show in the treatise on laws: Therefore neither can God, since He is the author and end of such precepts. Secondly, if man could inculpably be ignorant of the true God, he could also inculpably worship a false god; and thus he could be excused from the sin of idolatry by invincible ignorance, which is most absurd. Thirdly, if man invincibly were ignorant of God, none of his sins would be mortal: but this is absurd: Therefore so is that. The consequence is proved, for the reason and malice of mortal sin is derived from the injury to God: but God cannot be affected by injury unless He is known: Therefore if man invincibly and inculpably were ignorant of God, he would never sin mortally.

You will say with Molina: The knowledge of God is not immediately implanted in us by nature, as is the knowledge of first principles, as was shown above, but is had only through reason and discourse: Therefore since there are some men so dull, uncultivated, and, as it were, leaden, as to be incapable of demonstration and discourse (such as those

raised in forests, and unknown lands, or mountains), in them at least there can be given invincible and inculpable ignorance of the existence of God.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence; for as we noted above, to remove invincible ignorance, evident and demonstrative knowledge is not necessary, but probable and conjectural knowledge suffices, or that which is had through the report or instruction of others; wherefore since in no one, however stupid, are all the rays of reason so extinguished that, upon observing this universe, so perfectly ordered, there does not occur to him some probable thought and knowledge that some supreme moderator and governor presides over it, to whom obedience is due, following the honorable good and the dictate of reason, he is bound to inquire who this may be, and by what manner He is to be worshiped. But if he spurns this, he will not have invincible and inculpable ignorance of the existence of God, but vincible and culpable ignorance. Whence, although there can be given negative infidels (that is, those inculpably ignorant of the mysteries of our faith), as Saint Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 10, art. 1, there cannot nevertheless be negative Atheists, that is, those who invincibly and inculpably are ignorant of the existence of God, for as it is said, Wisdom 9: From the greatness and beauty of created things their creator could knowably be seen. And as is had in Romans 1: The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, etc.

Chapter II

On the unity of God.

It is of the same sacrilege to deny God, and to bring in many gods; whence after atheism has been vanquished, polytheism must be refuted, and the plurality of gods shown to be impossible, against the Gentiles and pagans, whose blindness and madness was so great that Hesiod admitted thirty thousand gods, as Eusebius testifies, Preparation for the Gospel, book 5, chapter 15. Indeed (as Tertullian wittily objects to them, Apology, chapter 5) divinity would be granted or denied at the arbitrary will of men: Among you (he says) divinity is weighed by human judgment: unless a god has pleased man, he will not be a god: man will now have to be gracious to god.

To refute this error we adduced eleven reasons in our Shield, but now, studying brevity, we shall set forth only three here. The first is: God is that than which nothing better can be conceived: Therefore He is one. The consequence is proved, because that nature is better in which the fullness of being is so eminently and unitedly contained, that outside it nothing exists except what is derived from it and participated in it, than one outside of

which something is found altogether independent and unparticipated.

The second, akin to the preceding, can be proposed thus: By the name of God we understand a being supremely and infinitely perfect: but it is repugnant that such a being be multiplied: Therefore also that a plurality of gods be given. The Major is clear; the Minor is proved. If there were given two beings supremely and infinitely perfect, either that by which they would differ from each other would be some perfection, or some imperfection? Not the latter, since it is repugnant to give or conceive of any imperfection or defect in a being supremely and infinitely perfect. Nor the former, since such a being contains every imaginable perfection, and consequently no perfection could be lacking to it.

The third reason is: God is the supreme ruler and governor of the world: Therefore He is one. The consequence is proved, for as Saint Thomas teaches below, q. 11, art. 3, things which are diverse and divided do not come together into one order, unless they are directed and ordered by some one thing, for many things are better reduced to order through one than through many. From which Aristotle infers, in the Politics, that of all forms of governance the most perfect is monarchy, or the rule of one; and in Metaphysics 12, he celebrates this saying of Homer, "The rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler"; and hence, ascending from human to divine rule, he concludes that the unity of the divine Prince is necessary, just as of the earthly one; and he adds that just as the good of a family and of an army requires one leader and father of the family, so also the good of the universe requires one ruler. In the same manner Jerome, discoursing with his Rusticus, argues: Among bees (he says) there is one leader, all the cranes follow one in literary order. One emperor, one judge for his province, one pilot in a ship; in the fabric of the world, one craftsman, and one governor.

To these reasons can be added the natural instinct of men who, even amid the errors of paganism, in common speech have always acknowledged one God. For as Lactantius says, Institutes 2, chapter 1: When they swear, and when they give thanks, they name not many gods, but God; so does truth itself, nature compelling, burst forth even from unwilling breasts.

Chapter III

On the constitutive of the divine nature.

The question here is not of the real and physical constitution of the divine nature, that is, of the constitution of God according as He is in Himself really, for in this way all the formalities of God, whether absolute or relative, really constitute Him. This is clear, for constitution so understood is by real identity: but all the formalities, whether absolute or relative, formally belonging to God, are really identical with Him: Therefore all of them really and physically constitute Him. Here, therefore, we treat only of the metaphysical constitutive of the divine nature, insofar as it is imperfectly conceived by us wayfarers in this state, after the manner of created nature, in which there is always found some perfection or predicate, which is first conceived in it, as the source and origin of the rest, as rationality in man. Whence in the present question we inquire what is first understood in God, with foundation in reality, which stands as the root and source of the rest, especially of the divine attributes and operations. Whence those do not seem to touch the point of this most celebrated and grave difficulty who say that the divine nature is constituted by the collection of the attributes; for although this does physically and really constitute the divine nature, it does not do so formally and metaphysically, since in it there is not first conceived the collection of the attributes, but some one formality and perfection, which is the root of the others. This opinion being set aside, three other celebrated and quite probable opinions are usually cited, of which the first teaches that the divine nature is metaphysically constituted by the notion of being from itself and by essence. The second, by the notion of immaterial and intellectual substance radically. The third, by the actual intellection of God; and this last is the more common in the school of the Thomists, and seems more probable.

Whence,

I say first, the nature of God is not metaphysically constituted by the notion of being from itself and by essence.

It is proved, first, from Saint Thomas below, q. 13, art. 11, ad 1, where he teaches that this name "God," as regards the thing signified, is more proper to God than the name "He who is": but this would be false, if the nature of God were constituted by the notion of being from itself and by essence, for this name "He who is," or this name "being by essence," would be the name of God's nature and essence: Therefore according to Saint Thomas, God's nature is not constituted by the notion of being from itself and by essence. Whence Cajetan there, explaining his doctrine, says that this name "God," as regards the thing signified, is more proper to God than the name "He who is," because

Deity imports the nature of God as it were according to the ultimate specific difference, but not so the name "He who is."

It is proved, secondly, by a fundamental reason. The notion of being from itself, uncreated, and by essence, transcends every divine formality or perfection; for it is found in the attributes, and in the relations, and in everything that is divine, just as the notion of created being and by participation is included in everything that is created: but predicates transcending every divine formality or perfection cannot constitute the nature of God as we speak in the present of its constitution: Therefore neither can the notion of being from itself and by essence. The Major is clear; the Minor is shown thus. In the present we do not speak of the constitution of the divine nature under that aspect and concept by which it is distinguished from creatures, but under that aspect by which it is distinguished from the attributes and other divine formalities. But predicates transcending every divine formality and perfection, although they distinguish God from creatures, do not however distinguish nature from the attributes and other divine formalities, since nature, and the attributes, and the other divine formalities agree in them: Therefore they cannot constitute the nature of God, under that aspect under which it is virtually distinguished from the attributes.

The conclusion is proved thirdly: The divine nature is constituted by the degree of understanding: Therefore it is not constituted by the notion of being from itself and by essence, belonging to the degree of being. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved, first: The degree of understanding is more perfect than the degrees of living and of being, as Saint Thomas teaches below, q. 93, art. 2: but the divine nature is constituted by the most perfect of all degrees: Therefore it is constituted by the degree of understanding. Secondly, the same Antecedent is proved from another doctrine which the Holy Doctor delivers in the same place, where he teaches that only intellectual creatures are made to the image of God, and in them alone is imperfectly found the notion of the image of God, because only intellectual creatures imitate God, and are assimilated to Him in intellectuality, which is, as it were, the ultimate difference of God. Cajetan holds the same doctrine there, for he teaches that only intellectual creatures are assimilated to God in the quasi ultimate difference, because they alone are assimilated to God insofar as He is intellective: Therefore they hold that the divine nature is constituted by the degree of understanding, not by the notion of being from itself and by essence.

It is confirmed: If the notion of being from itself constituted the divine nature as its ultimate difference, not only intellectual creatures would be to the image of God, but this would also belong to other creatures, indeed to all, since all are similar to God in the

degree of being: but this is against Saint Thomas as cited: Therefore so is that.

You will say, not all creatures are to the image of God, because although they agree with Him in the degree of being, they do not agree in the mode of being from itself. But on the contrary: Because intellectuality by essence, and from itself, constitutes God as ultimate difference, an intellectual creature is said to be to the image of God, because it is assimilated to Him in the notion of intellectuality, although it is not similar to Him in that it is intellectual from itself: Therefore if the notion of being by essence constitutes God as ultimate difference, non-intellectual creatures, similar to God in the notion of being, will be to the image of God, although they are not similar to Him in the notion of being from itself.

I say secondly, the divine nature is not constituted by the root or proximate power of understanding, but by the very act of understanding itself.

There is a twofold fundamental reason for this assertion: The first, which is taken from the supreme purity and actuality of the divine nature, can be briefly proposed thus. The divine nature, since it is the purest act, and devoid of all potentiality, must be constituted in the purest and most actual manner, and consequently by that which within the intellective degree expresses the greatest actuality: but to understand is that which within the intellective degree expresses the greatest actuality, indeed is its ultimate actuality, and stands in the intellective order as existence does in the entitative order, as Saint Thomas teaches, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 45, second reason, where he says that to understand is compared to the intellect, as being is to essence: Therefore the divine nature is constituted by the very act of understanding, not by radical intellectuality, which is as it were potential to the act of understanding, nor by the power of understanding, which is conceived by way of first act, but not by way of ultimate actuality.

The second reason, taken from the Treatise on the Trinity, is formed thus: The divine nature is formally constituted by that which the second Person of the Trinity, by virtue of His procession, receives: but He receives the very act of understanding: Therefore that is the constitutive of the divine nature. The Major is clear, because the second Person of the Trinity, by that which He receives from the Father, by virtue of His procession, is constituted the Son, as the Theologians teach in the same Treatise; for the Son cannot be constituted except by the communication of nature. The Minor is proved: The second Person of the Trinity proceeds by way of word: but the being of a word, since it is the terminus of intellection, is nothing other than to be understood, or to exist through the very act of understanding: Therefore the second Person of the Trinity, by virtue of His

procession, receives the very act of understanding.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: Just as God alone perfectly knows Himself, so also He alone can explain His essence: but God, questioned by Moses as to what He was, said, Exodus 3, as if declaring His constitutive, "I am who am," and enjoined him to say to Pharaoh: "He who is has sent me to you." Therefore the notion of being from itself and by essence is the constitutive of the divine nature.

It is confirmed: The proper name of anyone is that which signifies the ultimate difference by which he is distinguished from others: but this name "He who is" is proper to God, as Saint Thomas teaches below, q. 13, art. 11, and as Hilary elegantly declares, On the Trinity, book 1, chapter 4, explaining the aforesaid words of Exodus: I marvel greatly (he says) at so absolute a signification concerning God, for nothing is understood to be more proper to God than "to be": Therefore such a name expresses the ultimate difference by which God is distinguished from others.

To the objection I answer, with Saint Thomas here, art. 1, ad 2, and Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 11, that God only wished by those words of Exodus to declare that by which He is chiefly distinguished from creatures, which is the notion of being from itself and by essence, not that by which His essence differs from the attributes, and is their root and origin, in which chiefly consists the concept of nature, as nature is defined by the Philosophers as the principle of motion and rest in that in which it is. Whence...

To the confirmation I distinguish the Major: the proper name of anyone adequately is that which signifies the ultimate difference — I grant the Major concerning that which is proper inadequately; I deny the Major concerning what is adequately proper, and under the same distinction of the Minor, I deny the Consequence. For that name is properly adequate by whose signification a thing differs from all others. But that by whose signification a thing differs from some, but not from all, is proper only inadequately: God, however, although by the notion of being from itself He differs from creatures, His essence does not by that differ from the attributes and relations, because it belongs essentially to all of them. Whence although this name "He who is" is proper to God by inadequate propriety, it is not proper by adequate propriety. And in this sense are to be understood Hilary and Saint Thomas, because they speak of God as He is distinguished from creatures, not of the nature of God as it differs from the relations and attributes.

From these things is resolved another argument of the Adversaries, which they propose thus: That is the constitutive reason of something which is first conceived in it, and by which it is distinguished from others, since the constitutive and the distinctive are the same: but the notion of being from itself and by essence is first conceived in God, and is

that by which He is first distinguished from all others: Therefore it is constitutive of the divine nature. I answer, first, that it does not suffice for the notion of constitutive that it be prior, or that it be first conceived in the thing, if it stands by way of a transcendent or common predicate; otherwise the notion of being, or the degree of substance, of living thing, or the notion of body, which are conceived prior in man than "rational," would constitute him: But the notion of being from itself and by essence stands in God by way of an uncreated transcendent, since it is included in the essence, the attributes, and the relations, and in all the divine formalities. Whence I answer, secondly, granting the Major, denying the Minor as to its second part; for although the notion of being from itself distinguishes God from creatures, it does not distinguish His essence from the attributes and relations, since it is a predicate common to them, and transcending them.

You will further object against the second conclusion: To understand is essentially an operation, indeed is the most perfect of all operations, by which the intellectual nature lives: but the divine nature cannot be constituted by an operation, since that requires proceeding from a principle, and consequently presupposes that which is constituted: Therefore the divine nature cannot be constituted by the act of understanding.

To this most difficult objection the defenders of our opinion respond in two ways. First indeed, the most learned Salmanticenses Fathers, in the Treatise on the knowledge of God, disp. 4, doubt 2, say that although created and finite operation, involved with imperfections, requires proceeding from a principle, and presupposes that which is constituted, uncreated and infinite operation does not, and that which has the notion of operation formally and eminently; because it identifies with itself, without virtual distinction, whatever pertains to the first intellectual line, and consequently the very intelligent principle itself, from which it therefore cannot be conceived, with foundation in reality, as proceeding.

Secondly, Gonzalez responds, disp. 36, concl. 3 and 5, that the understanding of God can be considered in two ways, namely by way of action, and under the concept of subsisting actuality; and although under the first consideration it cannot constitute the nature of God, it can indeed under the other. Which solution and doctrine he explains and proves by this example and discourse: Although it is repugnant to the divine relation to constitute a person under the explicit concept of "toward" (ad), it is not repugnant under the concept of "in," and of the hypostatic form pertaining to the line of relation, as the Thomists commonly teach in the Treatise on the Trinity: Therefore likewise, although it is repugnant to divine intellection to constitute the nature of God under the express concept of "from" (ab), and as it is conceived after the manner of an action, it can nevertheless constitute it under the concept of subsisting actuality. The consequence is

proved: It is no less of the concept of relation to presuppose a foundation and a person or subject, than it is of the notion of action to presuppose a principle: Therefore if the divine relation, because it is subsisting, although it presupposes a person under the explicit concept of "toward," constitutes it under the concept of "in," or of hypostatic form, likewise divine intellection, because it is subsisting, will indeed presuppose, under the explicit concept of "from" and of proceeding, a constituted nature, but not under every concept, but will constitute the nature under the concept of actuality and degree.

From what has been said you will understand how habitual grace is a formal participation of the divine nature; for although it does not participate in the understanding of God as it has the notion of operation and actuality — for under this concept and formally it is participated by the beatific vision — it nevertheless participates in it as it is, in a certain eminent way, the root of the divine operations and attributes, under which concept it formally has the notion of nature, as is established from what has been said above. For sanctifying grace is the root of the knowledge and love of God, and from it emanate, as properties from essence, the theological and infused virtues, which are participations of the divine attributes.

Chapter IV

On the divine attributes in general.

An attribute is an absolute and necessary perfection existing formally in God, supervening upon the essence already constituted. In which definition, by the first two particles, free acts and relative properties are excluded from the notion of an attribute; by the third, the perfections of creatures according to a certain respect, which are not formally but only eminently in God; finally, by the last words it is declared that the attributes do not pertain to the constitutive of the divine nature, but are, as it were, its affections and properties, modifying it, as it were, and drawing it to another line.

These are called by the Hebrews Sephirot, that is, as it were Sapphires, as Rabbi Moses testifies in his commentaries on the first book of the Yetzirah, because by these, as by sapphires and gems and precious stones, the divine nature and substance is wondrously adorned and decorated, although they make absolutely no composition with it, as will be established from what is to be said in the following section.

§ I

By what kind of distinction are the divine attributes distinguished from the essence, and from one another?

Scotus and his Disciples admit between the divine attributes and the essence a certain formal actual distinction, which they call "from the nature of the thing," and hold that it precedes every operation of the intellect, as the Subtle Doctor clearly explains himself, Book 1, dist. 8, question 4, where he says that such a distinction "precedes the intellect in every way." The Nominalists, however, placed at the other extreme, assert that the divine attributes, both among themselves and from the essence, are distinguished only by reasoning reason, or only by a certain connotation to created things; such that the same uncreated entity of God, as it connotes effects produced by itself, is called omnipotence, but as it connotes things objectively present to it and known by it, is called wisdom or knowledge. Finally, other Theologians commonly teach that the attributes are distinguished from the essence and from one another by a distinction of reasoned reason, and with foundation in the thing; but some hold that such a distinction stands by way of the excluding and the excluded, just as genus is distinguished from difference; others, however, think that it is only by way of the explicit and the implicit, just as being is distinguished from its properties.

I say first, the divine attributes are not distinguished from one another, nor from the divine essence, by the formal distinction, or from the nature of the thing, which Scotus and his Disciples posit.

It is proved, first: Those things which from the nature of the thing and formally really are distinguished from something ought not to be predicated of it absolutely, but rather denied absolutely: whence in the opinion distinguishing relation from foundation by a real formal distinction, these propositions are considered absolutely false: "whiteness is similarity," "generation is paternity": but according to the Holy Fathers, the divine attributes, not only in the concrete but also in the abstract, are predicated of the essence: Therefore they are not distinguished from it by a real formal distinction, or from the nature of the thing. The Major is certain; the Minor is established from the Holy Fathers who assert that God is not only good, but is goodness itself, is not only wise, but is wisdom itself, as Saint Bernard declares, Sermon 80 on the Song of Songs, and book 5 On Consideration. Whence in the Council of Reims, when he was required to write down his propositions, it was said: Let it be written (he says) with an iron stylus, and engraved with an adamantine nail, and carved on rock, that the divine essence, form, nature, deity, goodness, wisdom, virtue, power, greatness, is truly God.

It is proved, secondly: The divine attributes enjoy no less identity with the essence and divine nature than do the relations: but these are not distinguished by a real formal distinction from the essence: Therefore neither are those. The Major is clear; the Minor is usually demonstrated in the Treatise on the Trinity, and is clearly gathered from the Council of Florence, sess. 15, 18, 19, and 24, where it is said that relation is the same in reality with nature, and differs only according to the mode of our understanding. Likewise, that the paternal hypostasis is separated from the substance not in reality, but only by reason. Which words plainly exclude the Scotist distinction, since that, according to Scotus cited above, "precedes the intellect in every way."

It is proved, thirdly: God, from the Lateran chapter "Firmiter," is a substance entirely simple: but He would not be such, if His attributes were distinguished from His essence by a real formal distinction: Therefore etc. The Minor is proved: For just as, if there were an entitative distinction between the divine essence and its attributes, a real entitative composition would result from them, so, if they are distinguished by a real formal distinction, a real formal composition will result from them.

It is confirmed and further illustrated by this reason: Composition is the union of distinct things: Therefore just as the union of things distinguished by a real entitative distinction is a real entitative composition, so the union of things distinguished by a real formal distinction is a real formal composition.

The Scotists respond that it is not sufficient for composition that the extremes be distinguished from one another, but it is furthermore required that they be compared to one another by way of act and potency, which does not happen in the present case. But (besides the fact that this seems entirely arbitrary, since the definition of composition only says that it is the union of distinct things, and since there are some composites in which the extremes do not stand by way of act and potency, as is clear in a composite of integral parts) by this very fact that the divine essence is posited as really and formally distinct from the attributes, by this very fact it is posited as formally actuable and perfectible by them: Therefore by this very fact it is compared to them as potency to act, and as perfectible to perfective; whence, although this comparison would be necessary for a true composition, this would nevertheless not prevent there being composition in God, if His nature were really and formally distinguished from His attributes.

It is proved, fourthly: Just as God is supremely simple, so also supremely one, and, as Saint Bernard says, "most-one" (uniissimus): but He will not be supremely one, if His essence is distinguished formally, from the nature of the thing, and before every operation of the intellect, from His attributes: Therefore etc. The Major is clear; the

Minor is shown thus. It is no less repugnant to supreme unity that there be any real distinction than it is repugnant to supreme simplicity that there be any real composition: but if there were in God any real composition of essence and attributes, however small, God would not be supremely simple; for as Saint Bernard says, book 5, On Consideration: That is not simple which has been subject to even one form, as neither is a virgin who has been known by even one man. Therefore likewise, if there is any real distinction, however small, between the essence and the attributes, God will not be supremely one.

Finally, the conclusion can be persuaded from this, that the formal notion of the divine essence is no less simply infinite than its entity: but the entity of the divine essence, by reason of its infinity, requires not to be distinguished in act, prior to the operation of the intellect, from the entity of an attribute: Therefore also the formal notion of God's nature, by reason of its infinity, requires not to be distinguished, apart from the operation of the intellect, from the formal notion of an attribute.

I say secondly, the divine attributes are distinguished from one another and from the essence by a distinction of reasoned reason.

It is proved, first: A distinction of reasoned reason is that which has foundation in the thing: but such is the distinction between the essence and the divine attributes, and among the attributes themselves: Therefore it is of reasoned reason. The Major is clear. The Minor is proved. The virtual multiplicity of a thing is a sufficient foundation for the intellect to distinguish it virtually: but the divine essence and its attributes, although they are formally, on the part of reality, one thing, that thing is nevertheless virtually multiple, as being equivalent to several created perfections really distinguished even from their own genus or formal reason: for it is equivalent to the absolute and the respective, the communicable and the incommunicable, the principles of understanding and willing, of punishing and having mercy: Therefore etc. I said "equivalent to several things distinguished from their genus in created things," because to found a virtual distinction in the divine perfections, it does not suffice that they be equivalent to created perfections really distinguished, if these do not belong to diverse genera, or, as some say, to diverse lines: for divine knowledge is a single attribute virtually undistinguished, and yet is equivalent to all created sciences really distinguished among themselves. Similarly, the understanding of God is equivalent to the radical and proximate power of understanding, to the impressed species, and to the intellectual operation, and yet is not virtually distinguished from those formalities, because indeed they belong to the same intellectual line.

It is proved, secondly: The names of the attributes and of the divine essence are not synonymous, like "Marcus," "Tullius," "Cicero," but are of diverse notion: Therefore although they all signify the same perfection, entity, and formality, they do not signify it under entirely the same aspect, and consequently, corresponding to these names, there correspond in God diverse notions objectively. But the reason for this diversity is taken not only from our intellect, but is founded partly in the eminence of the divine perfection, partly in the weakness and imperfection of our intellect, unable to conceive it by one concept, nor consequently to name it by one name, as Saint Thomas excellently declares, Book 1, dist. 2, question 1, art. 3, in these words: The plurality of these names is not only on the part of our intellect forming diverse conceptions of God, which are called diverse notions, but also on the part of God Himself, insofar, namely, as there is something in God corresponding to all these conceptions, namely His full and complete perfection. Therefore the distinction of the attributes among themselves, and from the essence, is not of reasoning reason, but of reasoned reason.

I say thirdly, the distinction of reasoned reason, which is between the attributes and the essence, or among the attributes themselves, is not by way of the excluding and the excluded, but only by way of the explicit and the implicit.

It is proved by a fundamental reason: The divine essence cannot be conceived, with foundation in the thing, except as including, at least implicitly, the attributes; nor can one attribute be conceived except as including implicitly the others: Therefore between the essence and the attributes, or among the attributes themselves, there cannot be given, with foundation in the thing, a distinction of reason by way of the excluding and the excluded, but only by way of the explicit and the implicit. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. God's essence, or His attribute, cannot be conceived, at least with foundation in the thing, except as pure act, and as simply, or in the genus of being, infinite: Therefore since it belongs to the notion of pure act that it cannot be conceived as perfectible by the addition of something else, and in potency to that; and since it belongs to the notion of the simply infinite, or in the genus of being, that it formally include in itself every notion of being which does not involve limitation and imperfection — for nothing can be added to the infinite in that genus in which it is infinite — it is manifest that the divine essence cannot be conceived, with foundation in the thing, except as including, at least implicitly, every perfection and entity of an attribute, nor can one attribute be conceived except as including implicitly the perfection and entity of the essence, and of all the other attributes.

§ II

The chief objections are resolved.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: Since a definition explains the nature of a thing, those things which differ by definition ought to be distinguished from the nature of the thing: but the nature of God and the attributes, and the attributes themselves among one another, differ by definition — for nature is defined as that by which God is the radical principle of His operations and attributes; intellect as that by which God understands; will as that by which God loves, and so of the other attributes, which are distinct definitions: Therefore the nature of God and the attributes, and the attributes themselves among one another, are distinguished from the nature of the thing.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: Those which differ by definition, given of the thing as it is in itself, are distinguished from the nature of the thing — I grant the Major. Given of the thing not as it is in itself, but as it is conceived by us — I deny the Major, and under the same distinction of the Minor, I deny the consequence. The divine nature and the attributes, therefore, can be defined in two ways, namely by a definition given of them as they are in themselves — which way they can only be defined by God, or at most by the intellect of the blessed; or by a definition given of them, not as they are in themselves, but as they are conceived by us wayfarers, imperfectly and through borrowed species. If they were defined in the first way, they would not have diverse definitions, but one; but in the second way they are defined by diverse definitions; from which, however, it does not follow that they are distinguished, prior to the consideration of our intellect, by a real formal distinction, or from the nature of the thing, because since the definition is given by us of them, not as they are in themselves, but as they are conceived by us, it suffices that they be distinguished by our reason, so that they enjoy diverse definitions.

You will object, secondly: Those things are distinguished in act prior to the operation of the intellect, at least formally and from the nature of the thing, of which contradictories are verified in act, prior to the operation of the intellect: but of the divine intellect and the divine will, prior to the operation of the intellect, contradictory propositions are verified, namely that the intellect is the principle of the generation of the Word, and the will is not the principle of the generation of the Word: Therefore they are distinguished in act prior to the operation of the intellect, by at least a formal distinction, and from the nature of the thing, such as Scotus and his Disciples admit.

I answer by denying the Major; for in order that contradictories be verified in act of certain things prior to the operation of the intellect, it suffices that they be distinguished

virtually among themselves; because just as virtual heat in the sun can accomplish that whole thing, imperfections being set aside, which formal heat accomplishes in fire, so a virtual distinction can accomplish everything that an actual distinction does. For that is founded in the eminence of a thing virtually multiple, and its equivalence to diverse perfections; whence just as the rational soul, because it is eminently vegetative, sensitive, and intellective, equally well confers the vegetative, sensitive, and rational degree, as three really distinct souls, to which it is equivalent, would provide. So a virtual distinction can as well found contradictory predicates as can a formal distinction and one from the nature of the thing, which Scotus admits among the divine attributes.

You will object, thirdly, against the second conclusion: There is not given in God a composition of reason with foundation in the thing: Therefore neither is a distinction of reason. The Antecedent will be established from what is to be said in the following chapter. The consequence, however, is proved: A distinction, even of reason, does not seem less opposed to the supreme unity of God, than a composition of reason is to His supreme simplicity: Therefore if a composition of reason with foundation in the thing cannot be given in God, neither can there be found among the divine attributes a distinction of reason having foundation in the thing, which is usually called reasoned reason.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence and the parity. Both because a composition of reason is founded in the potentiality of an object, in which there must be two formalities or objective concepts, one of which stands to the other as potency to act and perfectible to perfective: whereas the distinction of reason among the divine attributes is founded in the supreme perfection and eminence of the uncreated entity of God, equivalent to several created perfections, which are dispersed in the lower things, as we declared before. Also because a composition of reason must be from several concepts mutually excluding one another, since it belongs to the notion of a metaphysical part to exclude from its concept another part, as is established in the composition of genus and difference: whereas the distinction of reason which is between the divine essence and the attributes, or among the attributes themselves, does not require this mutual exclusion of concepts, but it suffices for it that one not be explicitly included in the other. The same thing occurs in being and its properties, which differ virtually and by reasoned reason among themselves, although they mutually include one another, and there cannot be given between them a perfect precision.

From what has been said it is gathered that the distinction of reason of the attributes from the essence is not made by the intellect of God and of the blessed, who see God as He is in Himself. For this distinction is founded partly in the eminence of the divine

entity, virtually multiple, partly in the limitation of our intellect, unable by one act to equal the whole perfection of the divine essence; and partly in the medium by which we know God, by analogy to creatures, and species received from them; but although God knows the distinction of His attributes, virtual in reality and formal in our intellect, He nevertheless does not distinguish by that reason, since by one most simple act He comprehends all things as they are in themselves by way of one simple perfection, altogether indivisible in every mode. Similarly, the blessed, by one indivisible concept, behold God as He is in Himself, because they know Him by one and most simple species, namely the divine essence, taking the place of both the expressed and the impressed species in the beatific vision: Therefore neither God nor the blessed, within the Word, form a distinction of reason of the divine essence from the attributes, or of the attributes among themselves. This reason Saint Bernard excellently and elegantly expounds, book 5, On Consideration, where he thus discourses: To us, because we cannot contend with the simplicity of God, while we strive to apprehend one thing, there occurs, as it were, a fourfold thing; this a mirror and an enigma brings about; but when we shall see face to face, we shall see Him as He is. For then no longer will the fragile keenness of our mind, however vehemently it strives, in any way recoil, or fall away into its own plurality; it will rather gather itself, unite itself, and conform itself to that unity, or rather to that unity, so that one face may correspond to one face. He said that the blessed do not form, within the Word, a distinction of reason of the divine essence from the attributes, or of the attributes among themselves, because it is quite probable that they can effect such a distinction outside the Word, since the cognition of the blessed outside the Word can be not one but manifold.

Chapter V

On the simplicity of God.

That God is a substance entirely simple, and altogether devoid of composition, not only faith teaches, and the Lateran Council, cited in the preceding chapter, expressly defines, but reason also plainly demonstrates. For as Saint Thomas discourses, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 18: In any genus, a thing is the nobler the more simple it is; just as in the genus of the hot, fire, which has no admixture of the cold; therefore that which is at the summit of nobility of all beings must be at the summit of simplicity; but that which is at the summit of nobility of all beings, we call God: therefore no composition can befall Him.

Likewise, God is the purest act, and devoid of all potentiality: but every composition imports some potentiality: Therefore in God there is no composition. The Minor is

proved: Every composition is either physical, namely either of matter and form, or of subject and accident; or metaphysical, namely either of essence and existence, or of suppositum and nature; or logical, which is made of genus and difference: but none of these compositions fails to denote potentiality; for matter is potency to substantial form, and subject to accidental form with which it is composed: likewise essence composing with existence must be distinguished from it by way of excluding and excluded, and consequently be in potency to it; which must also be verified of nature composing with subsistence, or with suppositum. Finally, the composition of genus and difference, although it is only by reason, must nevertheless have foundation on the part of the thing known: but the foundation of the generic degree is potentiality in the nature which is denominated genus: Therefore every composition imports some potentiality.

Thirdly, whatever is composed of several things is compounded of imperfect things, as Damascene says, On the Orthodox Faith, book 1: but in God there can be nothing imperfect: Therefore neither can there be anything composite. Which reason Hilary elegantly expresses, On the Trinity, book 7, in these words: Nor does God, who is life, subsist of composite and inanimate things; nor He who is virtue, of weaker things; nor He who is light, is confined by dark things; nor He who is spirit, is formable out of disparate things; the whole that is in Him is one.

This divine and supreme simplicity is not opposed by the mystery of the Trinity, although faith acknowledges in it three persons really distinct, and intimately joined in the same essence; nor by the mystery of the Incarnation, in which the person of Christ is composed of the personality of the Word and humanity. For as Saint Thomas rightly notes, Book 1, dist. 8, question 1, art. 1, ad 4, in order that the three Divine Persons produce a composition with the essence, they would have to be united among themselves, under that aspect by which they are distinguished, or be distinguished under that aspect by which they are united, since composition is the union of distinct things: but the Divine Persons, under that aspect by which they are distinguished, are not united; for they are distinguished by relations, which are not united but opposed; they are united, however, in the essence, from which they are in no way distinguished. In the mystery of the Incarnation, however, the Divine Word does not come into composition by way of a material part or of an informing and inhering form (for this would involve the greatest imperfection), but by way of a completing, actuating, and perfecting terminus of the humanity, which denotes a pure perfection in it. But more on this at length in the Treatises on the Trinity and on the Incarnation.

Chapter VI

On the perfection of God.

Saint Thomas here, question 4, art. 2, proves by a twofold reason that the perfections of all things are in God, and consequently that He is supremely and infinitely perfect. The first is: Whatever there is of perfection in an effect must be found in the efficient cause, either according to the same notion, if it be a univocal agent, or in a more eminent way, if it be an equivocal agent: but God is the first efficient cause of things: therefore the perfections of all things must pre-exist in Him, and consequently He is supremely and infinitely perfect: for although the perfections of creatures which actually are, or will be, or have been, are finite, and in some determinate number, nevertheless the possible creatures which lie hidden in divine omnipotence, and their perfections, are infinite, at least in potency, and syncategorematically, as the Philosophers say; for God, whatever has been produced, can produce another more perfect and yet more perfect, to infinity.

The second reason of Saint Thomas can be briefly proposed thus: God is being itself, subsisting through itself and by essence, and consequently containing in Himself every fullness of being: whence in Exodus 3 He said to Moses: "I am who am," and by Nazianzen is called πέλαγος οὐσίας ("an ocean of being"): Therefore He contains in Himself the perfections of all things. The consequence is proved: for every perfection is sought according to some being; for justice gives the being of just, power the being of powerful, wisdom the being of wise: Therefore where there will be the whole fullness of being, and the whole breadth of being, there will be every perfection. This reason Saint Bernard insinuates, book 5, On Consideration, chapter 6, in these words: If good, if great, if blessed, if wise, or whatever such thing you say of God, it is comprised in this word, "is." For this is His "being," to be all these things. If you add a hundred such things, you have not departed from "being," if you say them, you have added nothing; if you do not say them, you have diminished nothing.

It is confirmed: That which is infinite in some genus contains all the perfections of that genus; e.g., if there were given an infinite heat, it would contain every perfection of heat; if an infinite line were posited, it would occupy every length: but being subsisting through itself and unreceived is simply, and in the genus of being, infinite, as we shall show below when we treat of the infinity of God: Therefore it contains in itself all the perfections of all beings. Whence it is said, Psalm 49: "The beauty of the field is with me." Which words Augustine, expounding in the same place, adds: For what is not with Him? With Him is the field, with Him the beauty of the earth, with Him the beauty of the sky, with Him all the birds, because He Himself is all things.

Two things, however, must be briefly observed here: The first is, that there are two kinds of perfections in created things; some are called simply simple, and these are those which in their formal concept include no imperfection. Or as Anselm says, Monologion, chapter 14: Those which are better than what is not themselves, that is, which it is better to have than to lack. Of this kind are wisdom, life, understanding, etc. Others are called perfections in a qualified sense, and these are those which in their concept so include some imperfection that they can never be separated from it; whence it is not absolutely better for every being to have them than to lack them, such as to be moved, to reason, etc. Perfections of the first kind are contained formally in God, for God is formally understanding, wise, just, merciful; the others only eminently, and with the imperfections set aside which they have in creatures. Whence Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter 13, teaches that all things are affirmed and denied of God in a certain manner, and calls Him πάντων θέσιν καὶ πάντων ἀφαίρεσιν, that is, the positing of all things, and the removal of all things; because He eminently posits all things, as containing all things; and formally He removes all things, because He excludes from Himself every created and limited formal notion.

Secondly it must be observed that the perfections of all creatures are contained in God in a much more perfect and eminent manner than are animals and plants in the power of the Sun, and other heavenly bodies; for the Sun and heavenly bodies attain in the lower things, per se and primarily, only the notion of living thing or corruptible body, which, since it is potential and generic, is not included in their ultimate differences, and thus they do not contain the lower things, except by a certain imperfect eminent containment, extending only to common and generic notions. God, however, by His causality and omnipotent activity, attains per se primarily in created things the notion of producible being, which corresponds per se primarily to the most universal cause; whence, since that notion is transcendent, and is included in all the modes and differences of creatures, God contains their perfections, in a certain most perfect eminential manner, extending not only to common and generic notions, but, just as the Sun's eminential containment extends also to atomic and individual notions, as Saint Thomas teaches below, q. 14, art. 6, where he thus says: All things pre-exist in God, not only as regards that which is common to all, but also as regards those things by which things are distinguished.

From which you will understand that just as time added to eternity does not increase or extend its duration, because all durations inferior to it are contained in it in a most eminent manner: so God and creatures are not something more perfect, even extensively, than God alone; because likewise the whole perfection of creatures, even numerically, is

most perfectly contained in God.

It is confirmed: Every creature, however perfect, adds nothing above the divine perfection, except dependence, limitation, and imperfection: but from the addition of dependence, limitation, and imperfection, the divine perfection cannot be augmented or extended: Therefore creatures added to God cannot make something greater or more perfect, even extensively; just as a point added to a line, and an instant to eternity, do not make something greater, nor increase or extend their length or duration. Whence Augustine, Tract. 11 on John: If you were without God you would be less; if you were with God, God will not be greater: not by you is He made greater, but you without Him are less.

Chapter VII

On the goodness of God.

A fourfold kind of goodness can be distinguished: The first is called absolute and fundamental, and consists in the integrity and perfection of a thing, having all things due to it; thus water is said to be absolutely good, when it has all the accidents, and all the qualities due to it, e.g., color, flavor, coldness, etc. The second is called relative, or transcendental, and consists formally in agreement with the will, from which arises appetibility by way of a passion, as is taught in Metaphysics. The third is called moral, and consists in rectitude of morals, and consequently coincides with sanctity. The fourth, finally, can be called the goodness of beneficence or diffusion, by which someone, through the bestowal of gifts and goods, diffuses himself into others; for good is diffusive of itself, as Dionysius teaches, On the Divine Names, chapter 4. In order, then, that it be clearly demonstrated that God is perfectly and in all ways good, it must be proven that those four kinds of goodness belong to Him.

That the first is found in God is manifest, since He is supremely and infinitely perfect, and has all perfections and all attributes due to His nature, as is established from what has been said above. Of the second, it is no less evident, since God has the perfection maximally suited to Himself, and is fitting to all creatures, as their efficient, exemplary, and final cause, and to some specially; for to the just He is fitting as a friend; to the blessed, as one to be enjoyed; to the studious, as the exemplary cause of all justice and sanctity; to penitents, as the author of remission and grace, according to that saying of Lamentations 3: "The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him." Moral goodness also belongs to Him, since in Him is the perfection of morals, without any defect or imperfection, as Saint Thomas demonstrates in the Opusculum

On the Divine Morals, and since He is "just in all His ways and holy in all His works," as is said in Psalm 144. Finally, He does not lack the goodness of diffusion and beneficence, for He is so full and superabundant with all goods, that, as an inexhaustible fountain, by perpetual and unceasing bestowal of gifts, He overflows into all creatures, according to that saying of Psalm 103: "When Thou openest Thy hand, all things shall be filled with goodness." Whence Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter 4: As the sun, by the very fact that it is, illumines all things which are able in their own way to receive light, so the good itself, of itself, sends forth the rays of its whole goodness. This divine outpouring appears both in internal emanations and in external productions, in the fourfold order of nature, grace, glory, and hypostatic union, which is the most perfect of all communications of God ad extra, as we shall show in the Treatise on the Incarnation, chapter 1, § 2.

Chapter VIII

On the infinity of God.

That God is simply, and in the genus of being, infinite can be proved by a twofold a priori reason, and a third a posteriori. The first a priori reason is: The being of God is subsisting through itself and unreceived: Therefore it is simply infinite. The Antecedent is certain, since the being of God is not even virtually distinguished from His essence, it cannot be received in it. The consequence, however, is proved: That is simply infinite which lacks every term, and every limiting factor: but being subsisting through itself and unreceived lacks every term and limiting factor: Therefore it is simply infinite. The Major is clear; the Minor is proved. Only a twofold limiting factor can be given, one material, namely the subject receiving the form; the other formal, namely the difference contracting the genus, or the form determining the potentiality of matter to a certain species: but being subsisting through itself and unreceived lacks both limiting factors: Therefore it is altogether unlimited. The Minor as to the first part is established, since being subsisting through itself is not received in any subject, it cannot have a material limiting factor. As to the second part it is proved from the fact that, since being is the ultimate actuality of a thing, it cannot be actuated by another further one, nor consequently have any formal limiting factor. Whence if it is unreceived, and lacks a material limiting factor, it will be altogether unlimited.

The second a priori reason is sought from this, that God is a being from Himself, and independent of every efficient cause; for just as every act and perfection is formally and intrinsically limited by the subject in which it is received, so it is efficiently and extrinsically limited and finite by the cause producing it: but for a being from itself there

is no cause: Therefore neither is there any limitation of its perfection.

The third, a posteriori reason, is taken from creation; for that requires infinite power in the creating cause; for if so much greater power is required in the agent, the less the potency in the subject, for the effecting and eduction of the form, where there will be absolutely no potency required, there will be infinite power; since, therefore, creation is the production of a thing from nothing, and from no presupposed potency, it requires in the creator infinite power and potency.

From what has been said in the first and second reason it is gathered that no creature can be given infinite according to essence, since every creature has being received in another, and from another. From which it further follows that there can likewise be no possible creature which is infinite according to accidents: for an infinite accident requires a subject of infinite capacity, since there must always be a proportion between act and receptive potency, and between the perfective and the perfectible: Therefore if no infinite substance can be given, having infinite capacity, no infinite accident either will be possible.

Chapter IX

On the immensity of God.

That God is everywhere, and intimately and substantially present to all creatures, Saint Thomas proves here, q. 8, art. 1, from His operation in all things produced: for God operates in all things, insofar as He either produces them, or preserves them, or moves them: Therefore God is intimately and substantially present to all things. The consequence is proved from this, that every agent must be joined with the patient, either through itself, or through its power; but the power of God is the very substance of God, since there are no accidents in Him: Therefore the very substance of God is immediately joined to and infused into all things.

Scripture and the Holy Fathers use the same reasoning, for the Apostle said to the Athenians, Acts 17: "He is not far from every one of us," and immediately assigns the reason: "for in Him we live, and move, and are." And Anselm, in the Monologion: Since (he says) nothing can be or be preserved without God, we are compelled to say that God is everywhere and always. Likewise Hugh of Saint Victor, book 7, On the Instruction of Theology, chapter 19: Since we perceive the effects of divine power to be lacking nowhere, why do we doubt that the same power of God is in all things? But if the power of God is everywhere, since the power of God is nothing other than God, it is established that God is lacking nowhere.

You will say: God can act through some power diffused from Himself, and thus extrinsic to Himself, and really distinct from Himself: Therefore it is false that the power of God is the very substance of God. But on the contrary: Granted that God can act, and produce certain effects in things, through some power diffused from Himself, it is nevertheless repugnant that He should cause and preserve being in things, except through an intrinsic power, really identified with Himself: for every power diffused by God is finite, being caused by Him, and received in some finite subject; but the creative and preservative power of things, since it is productive of the whole of creatable being, is infinite, and consequently really identified with the substance of God.

From which you will understand a notable distinction which is found between the contact of divine power and angelic power: the contact of divine power is intimate and pervasive in things, insofar as it produces and preserves in them their being, which is most intimate in them. Whence Saint Thomas, Book 1, dist. 8, question 1, art. 5, ad 3: Into the essence nothing enters, except He who gives being, namely God the creator. The contact, however, of angelic power, since it is not productive and preservative of existence, but presupposes it in the subjects concerning which it operates, is not intimate and pervasive, but extrinsic and superadded, nor is it within the bounds of the essence, but only within the bounds of place and quantity.

You will understand also from what has been said, that the reasoning of Saint Thomas is not a posteriori, but a priori, because the formal reason by which God is actually present and existing in things is His virtually transient operation, by which He produces or preserves being in them, or moves and applies them to acting. Whence the same Holy Doctor, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 68, thus says: Everything that is in a place touches it in some way; for a corporeal thing is in something as in a place, according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but an incorporeal thing is said to be in something according to the contact of power. This contact, however, occurs only through the application of power, or a virtually transient action: Therefore through that God is present and existing in things. Whence Gregory the Great, Homily 8 on Ezekiel: God is everywhere and everywhere whole, because He touches all things, although He does not touch them equally. For He touches some things so that they may exist, yet not so that they may live and feel, as all insensible things. Some things He touches so that they may exist, live, and feel, but not so that they may discern, as brute animals. Some things He touches so that they may exist, live, feel, and discern, as human and angelic nature.

It is confirmed: The essence of God is absolute and independent of every creature, and consequently is not in it, except insofar as He makes it depend on Himself, which indeed He accomplishes through His action, by which He produces, or preserves, or moves all

things: Therefore such action is the formal reason by which He is actually present and existing in things. Whence that, insofar as it is formally the reason of acting, pertains to omnipotence; but insofar as it is the reason of attaining creatures and pervading them, constitutes the attribute of immensity.

It is further confirmed: God is not in things as contained by them, but rather as containing them; whence Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter 10: He Himself is the seat which contains all things, and embraces, and confirms, and founds, and holds together, etc. But God does not contain things, except by reason of His power and operation, by which He produces or preserves them in being, according to that saying of the Apostle to the Hebrews 1: "Upholding all things by the word of His power": Therefore He is not in things, except by reason of His operation, by which He produces, or preserves them in being.

You will say, first, if this were true, it would follow that the attribute of immensity does not belong to God necessarily and from eternity, but freely, and in time; since such operation is free to God, and belongs to Him only in time. But the sequel is denied, for the attribute of immensity does not consist in the actual presence of God in things, but in the aptitude and power which He has for existing in them, or in the repletive power of every place existing or possible: whence since such power and aptitude belongs to God necessarily and from eternity, the attribute of immensity is necessary and eternal, although the actual presence of God in things is free and temporary.

You will say, secondly, it is understood prior that something is in a place, than that it operates there, for just as to operate follows upon to be, so to operate in a place follows upon to be in a place: Therefore God is not formally present to a place through His operation.

I answer that just as in corporeal things, although substance is prior to quantity, and to "where," yet corporeal substance is not prior in place, than there is in it quantity, or "where," because it is not in place except through quantity, so likewise in spiritual beings, although in them being absolutely is conceived prior to operation, it is not prior in place, because they are not in it, except through operation, as Cajetan excellently and learnedly declares below, q. 52, art. 1, whose doctrine we shall expound in the Treatise on Angels, chapter 5, § 2.

From what has been said is also gathered, against the Recent authors, another corollary worthy of note, namely that God does not really exist positively and in act in the spaces which we imagine to be beyond the heavens, and which are called by the Philosophers imaginary spaces. For God, as we have already shown, is not in act in things, except

through His virtually transient operation: but in the imaginary spaces nothing is really operated, since there is no creature there, nor any effect produced by God: Therefore He does not exist in them positively and in act, but only negatively and in potency, insofar as the divine substance is not limited nor confined within the boundaries of the universe, and is able to found new worlds in those spaces which we imagine to be above the heavens; and this only is what the Holy Fathers mean, when they say that God is above the heavens, and outside the world, and that He diffuses Himself outside this universe; as is established from Augustine, Confessions, book 7, chapter 1, expressly teaching that this imagination, by which God is thought through infinite spaces, is false. And so God is outside the world in exactly the same way that He was in this world before it was created: for He, before the city was founded, did not inhabit the empty spaces corresponding to the world, but was only in Himself, and to Himself was place, temple, and all things, as Tertullian says, Against Praxeas, chapter 5, and Minucius Felix, in the Octavius. Whence Saint Bernard, book 5, On Consideration, thus has it: Where was God before the world was made? Where He is now. You need not seek further where He was: besides Himself there was nothing, therefore He was in Himself. Therefore likewise, God is not in act in the imaginary spaces. For it is foolish (says Saint Bonaventure, Book 1, dist. 37, q. 2, art. 3) to say that God is in that which is nothing.

You will say that from our doctrine three inconveniences and absurdities follow: The first is, that God could be changed; because by producing a body beyond the heavens, He would begin to be where before He was not, namely beyond the heavens. The second, that the substance of God could be divided from itself and, as it were, discontinued, because if God destroyed all creatures which are between heaven and earth, He would not exist actually in that middle body which would be supposed to be empty; whence, just as in that hypothesis the two extremes, namely heaven and earth, would be divided from one another, so the substance of God would be divided into two parts, of which one would be in heaven and the other on earth. The third inconvenience finally is, that God could at least be moved per accidens, because to be moved per accidens is to be moved to the motion of another, as nature is moved to the motion of a ship: but God, in our doctrine, could be moved to the motion of another, namely by the drawing of this universe outside the convex sphere of the first orb.

I answer that none of these inconveniences follows from our doctrine. Not indeed the first: for just as when God in time created the world in this space in which He now is, He was not changed by acquiring a new presence to it, but the whole change was on the part of the creature which passed from non-being to being: so likewise, although He were now to produce anew some body in the imaginary spaces, and become present to it

according to His substance, He Himself would not be changed, but the whole change would rest on the part of the effect newly produced. Nor the second, because although bodies cannot be in divided places, unless they themselves are also divided, because they are in place through commensuration to it: spiritual things, however, which are in place through operation, just as they can operate in the extremes, without operating in the middle, so they can exist actually in them without their own division, without existing in the middle. But more on this at length in the Treatise on Angels. Nor finally the third, namely that God could be moved per accidens to the motion of this universe; for to verify this it would be necessary that, just as one who exists on a ship depends locally on the ship which is moved, so God would depend locally on this universe, as on a definitive or circumscriptive place; since indeed one of the conditions for motion per accidens is that the mobile thing, by that motion, circumscriptively, or at least definitively, be in a body, to whose motion it is said to be moved locally.

Chapter X

On the immutability of God.

That God is entirely immutable, Saint Thomas proves here, art. 9, by a reason which is virtually threefold, for it is taken from three attributes, which are the proper foundations of divine immutability, namely from the notion of pure act, from the simplicity of God, and His infinity, which remove three conditions which are essentially required, or at least some of them, for true change. For change requires, first, potentiality, or the privation and lack of some form, which stands as the term from which; secondly, a mutable subject is required, susceptible of diverse forms; thirdly, a term to which is necessary, or a form newly produced, and coming to such a subject. Thus, therefore, Saint Thomas proves by three reasons the total immutability of God. First, because He is pure act, and consequently lacks privation of form, which is held on the part of the term from which. Secondly, because He is most simple, and consequently a subject incapable of motion; for that must of necessity admit composition, since it must receive in itself some form which it did not have before. Thirdly, because He is simply infinite, and contains all perfections in Himself, and thus nothing new can come to Him, nor can He be moved to any term, or to any form and perfection which He did not have before. Whence James 1 says: "With whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration." Which words Saint Gregory expounds, Moralia, book 12, chapter 17, saying: For mutability itself is a shadow, which would, as it were, obscure the light of God, if He changed it through some vicissitudes: but because in God mutability does not come, no shadow of vicissitude falls upon His light. To this attribute can be referred these words of Saint Bernard, Sermon 80 on the Song of Songs: God claims for Himself this wonderful and singular simplicity of His essence, that He is not found now one thing and now another, not now here and now elsewhere, but not even now in one way and now in another; remaining indeed in Himself, what He has, He is, and what He is, He always is, and in one way: in Him many diverse things are reduced into one, so that He takes on neither plurality from the numerousness of things, nor alteration from variety.

From these things you will understand that just as from God a threefold foundation of immutability is given, namely the notion of pure act, simplicity, and infinity; so also in any created being there is a threefold root of mutability. The first, because it is from non-being, and tends by continuous flux toward non-being. The second, because it is composite, either of matter and form, or of subject and accident, or of essence and existence. The third, because it is finite and imperfect, to which something can always be either added or taken away. Whence Seneca, Epistle 18: These things flow, and are affected by diminution and addition. None of us is the same in old age as he was a youth.

No one is the same in the morning as he was the day before. Our bodies are swept along, like rivers. Whatever you see runs along with time. Nothing of what we see remains. I myself, while I speak, am changed, have changed. But man, above other creatures, is exposed to mutation, and, as someone elegantly says, is entirely spherical and revolving, for since he is mutable by his nature, he becomes far more mutable through sin. Whence Zeno of Verona, Sermon on Patience: Daily he rejoices in mutabilities, is zealous for varieties, thinks himself wretched, if he remains himself. And Bernard, On the Interior House, chapter 2: I cannot adequately explain how many modes of alternation I am accustomed to undergo, with momentary perturbations, and how manifoldly I am wont to vary by the motions of alternating vicissitudes. Now I raise myself into confidence, now I fall into diffidence; now I am fixed by constancy, now I am shaken by sudden terror. Now anger disturbs me, now huge fury agitates me. Rightly, therefore, is man compared to the Peacock, whose (says Tertullian) plumage is a garment, many-colored, discolored, versicolored; never itself, but always another, even though always itself, when it is another; as often, in short, to be changed, as to be moved.

Chapter XI

On the eternity of God.

It is established from what has been said in the preceding chapter that God is eternal, and that eternity belongs to Him alone properly; for just as time follows upon motion, so eternity follows upon perfect immutability. Whence Fulgentius, On the Faith, to Peter, chapter 7: Believe firmly and doubt in no way, that God, just as He is immutable, so alone is He truly eternal.

In a type of this matter, Ezekiel saw the throne of God, not in the firmament, or under the firmament, but above the firmament, from whose uniform motion all time takes its origin; so that by this it might be signified that God, by reason of His eternity, is above all times, and before all times, and consequently lacks beginning and end. Wherefore Tertullian excellently says, book 1, Against Marcion: The living and genuine divinity is judged neither by novelty, nor by antiquity, but by its own truth: God, if He is old, will not be; if He is new, He was not; novelty testifies to a beginning, antiquity threatens an end: but God is as alien from beginning and end, as He is from time, the arbiter and measurer of beginning and end.

Eternity is defined by Boethius as the total, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life. It is called "possession," to designate its stability, for we are said to possess that which we hold firmly and quietly, and from which we cannot in any way be

dislodged. "Total and simultaneous" is added, that by this it may be distinguished from time, whose essence is not total and simultaneous, but is acquired through succession and through parts. It is added that the possession is of "perfect" life, to exclude the "now" of time, which, although it is total and simultaneous, and lacks parts, is nevertheless not absolutely something perfect, nor in it is anything perfectly possessed. It is said to be a possession of "life," rather than of "being," because being (as Saint Thomas says here, q. 10, art. 1, ad 2) does not extend to operation, as does "to live," which is predicated not only of operation, but also of being in living things, since in living things to live is to be, as is said in On the Soul 3, text 37. Finally it is said that eternity is a possession of "interminable" life, to designate that it altogether lacks every term, nor has, nor can have, beginning or end: in which it is distinguished from time, which has beginning and end, and from aeon (aevum), which, although it lacks an end, nevertheless has a beginning.

Treatise II

On the vision of God.

Four things especially must be considered concerning the vision of God, namely its impossibility by the powers of nature, and its possibility through the aid of grace; the two principles concurring toward it, namely the species and the light of glory; the objects to which it is terminated; and the measure by which its duration is measured. These matters must be briefly treated in this treatise. Let us ascend, then, with Moses onto the mountain of God, Horeb, and let us behold this great vision, which, as Augustine says, can be longed for, can be desired, but cannot be explained in words. Let us say with the Bride in the Song of Songs: "Tell me, whom my soul loveth, where thou feedest, where thou liest at midday." For here (says Bernard, Sermon 33 on the Canticle) Thou feedest, but not to satiety. Nor is it permitted to lie down, but one must stand and watch, on account of the terrors of the night. Alas, neither clear light, nor full refreshment, nor a secure dwelling; therefore tell me, where thou liest at midday. I seek Thy face, O Lord. Thy face is midday. Midday is the clear and intuitive vision of Thee. O truly midday, fullness of ardor, of light, the sun's standstill, the extermination of shadows, the drying up of marshes, the driving away of noxious things! O perpetual solstice, when the day will no longer decline! O midday light! O vernal tempest! O autumnal abundance! And lest I seem to have passed something by, O rest and wintry leisure!

Chapter I

On the impossibility of the beatific vision by the powers of nature, and its possibility through the aid of grace.

I say first, no created or creatable intellectual nature or substance can, connaturally, or by its own powers, see God as He is in Himself. This is established from Scripture, for in 1 Timothy 6, God is said to inhabit light inaccessible: which words, absolutely stated, sufficiently indicate that God, on account of His supreme elevation, is invisible and inaccessible to any creature, and that to none foreign to God can, per se and by proper powers, the increate light of divinity, that is, the essence of God, be apparent and manifest. Whence Isaiah 6 says: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated," as if transcending the proportion and powers of any created intellect, however elevated. And Dionysius, chapter 1, On the Divine Names, attributes it to an elevation above nature that angelic minds see God, and says that they are constantly and immovably raised up to the ray shining upon them, and by a fitting love of the illuminations granted to them, are, as it were, lifted aloft on wings. Finally, Augustine, City of God, book 11, chapter 2, thus discourses: Although not every creature can be blessed — for wild beasts, rocks, wood, etc. do not attain this gift — nevertheless that creature which can be blessed cannot be so of itself, because it was created from nothing, but from Him from whom it was created. Since, therefore, it is repugnant that any creature be given which is not from nothing, it is manifest, according to Augustine's doctrine, that none can be given which is naturally blessed, and consequently which connaturally sees God as He is in Himself.

Reason also persuades this, for as Saint Thomas discourses, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 52: What is proper to some higher nature cannot belong to a lower nature, except from elevation and subordination to it; just as water cannot be hot, except through the action of fire upon it: but to see God as He is in Himself is proper to God: Therefore it cannot belong to any creature, except from the action of God elevating it to so sublime and divine an operation. The Minor is proved: To operate according to one's own form is proper to any operating thing, as is clear in fire and other agents: but to see God as He is in Himself is to operate through the divine essence, as through a form or intelligible species, since for that vision any other species distinct from the divine essence is impossible, or at least useless, as will be clear below: Therefore it is proper to God.

He assigns another reason here, question 12, article 2, which can be proposed in this form: A substance or intelligent nature, and the object connaturally and quidditatively understood, must agree in the same degree of immateriality: but no created or creatable substance or nature can agree with God in the degree of immateriality: Therefore it

cannot see Him connaturally. The Minor is clear, for divine immateriality is set apart not only from physical matter, which is a part of a material composite, but also from metaphysical matter, which consists in potentiality; but the exclusion of all potentiality, as well as of all composition, is repugnant to a creature. The Minor, however, in which lies the difficulty, is proved by induction. There are only three degrees of immateriality given: The first is that of the rational soul, which is immaterial and incorporeal as to substance, but not as to mode, since it is the form of the body, and depends on it as to its operations. The second is that of angelic nature, which is independent of matter and body, and has being subsisting through itself, yet has a being distinct from its essence and nature. The third and supreme is that of the divine nature, which is its own being, and pure act, and excludes all potentiality and composition. There must, therefore, be preserved a proportion between the intelligent nature and the object connaturally known, as regards these three degrees of immateriality; so that a nature which is in the lowest degree of immateriality cannot connaturally and by its own powers know that which is in a higher degree, nor can that which is in a higher degree know that which is in the supreme degree. From which it is manifestly gathered that if the disproportion or excess in immateriality, which is found between the rational soul and angelic nature, prevents the soul from being able naturally to see an Angel, a fortiori that excess, and that disproportion, which is between the divine essence and the human or angelic intellect, will prevent man or an Angel from being able naturally to see God.

You will object, first, against this reason: A lower Angel connaturally knows a higher one, and yet is of lower immateriality than it. Likewise the separated soul, although it is of lower immateriality than an Angel, can nevertheless connaturally know it. Finally, the created intellect, suffused with the light of glory, is not of the same immateriality as God, since it is not, like God, pure act, and yet it sees God as He is in Himself, connaturally, since such light is a participation of the divine intellectuality, which has the divine essence as an object altogether connatural to itself: Therefore between the intelligent nature and the object connaturally known, there is not always required agreement in the degree of immateriality, and thus the chief foundation of our conclusion collapses.

To the first instance I answer by distinguishing the Antecedent: A lower Angel connaturally knows a higher one, and yet is of lower immateriality than it, specifically — I grant the Antecedent; generically, as to degree — I deny the Antecedent, and its consequence. And so all Angels agree in the degree of immateriality, because all are devoid of composition of matter and form, even though within that degree one Angel is more perfect than another; and the former suffices for one to know another connaturally and quidditatively.

To the second I likewise deny the Antecedent, for as Bañez teaches, I, question 89, article 1, doubt 2, the mode of knowing of the separated soul, through infused species, is not connatural to it, but preternatural; and hence to know Angels quidditatively is not connatural to it.

To the third it must be said that since the beatific vision does not proceed from our intellect, even suffused with the light of glory, according to the exigency of our nature, but above it, it is false that the intellect illumined by the light of glory sees God altogether connaturally; for the total connaturality of an elicitive principle of some operation, with such operation, is not sufficient that this operation, however it may be owed to it, or however it may influence it, but it is required that this operation proceed from it according to the exigency of its nature. Whence Saint Thomas, Part 3, question 9, article 4, expressly teaches that the beatific vision is altogether connatural to the divine intellect alone.

You will object, secondly: God can, by absolute power, make a created intellect equivalent to one composed of intellect and the light of glory, since that is of finite and limited power, and, given any finite thing, God can produce another more perfect, and consequently equivalent: but to such an intellect, by reason of itself, the beatific vision would be owed and connatural: Therefore God can, at least by absolute power, produce an intellect which connaturally sees God.

I answer by denying the Major, for that which is composed of intellect and actual intellection is limited and finite, and yet it implies that God should produce an intellect, by reason of itself, without an intellection distinct from itself, perceiving the object. Likewise that which is composed of created intellect and prophetic light is of finite and limited perfection, and yet there cannot be given a created intellect which by its natural power is equivalent to it; otherwise there could be given a creature which naturally, and apart from God's revelation, would foreknow future contingent and free things, which is repugnant to Scripture and the Holy Fathers, who assert that foreknowledge of future things is the most certain and chief argument of divinity.

From what has been said it is gathered that it implies a contradiction that a complete substance be created which is supernatural. For it implies a created substance whose intellect the beatific vision would be connatural to: but if a supernatural created substance were possible, to its intellect the beatific vision would be connaturally owed: Therefore it implies a contradiction that such a substance be created by God. The Major is established from what has been said above; the Minor is proved from the fact that such a substance would be proportioned to seeing God: Therefore the vision of God would

be naturally owed to its intellect.

It is confirmed: If a supernatural created substance were given to which the beatific vision would be connatural, the light of glory, which is one of the principles required for it, would have to be connaturally owed to such a substance: but this is repugnant: Therefore so is that. The Major is established; the Minor is proved from Saint Thomas here, article 5, ad 3, where he thus says: The disposition to the form of fire cannot be natural, except to that which has the form of fire; whence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature, unless the creature were of the divine nature, which is impossible. From which words this reason can be formed: It is repugnant that the ultimate disposition to some form be connatural except to that which has such a form: but the light of glory is the ultimate disposition to the divine essence, as it is an intelligible form: Therefore it is repugnant that it be connatural, except to Him to whom it is natural to have such a form, namely God.

It is confirmed further: If the light of glory were connaturally owed to such a supernatural substance, it would not be supernatural absolutely and simply: but this cannot be said: Therefore neither can that. The consequence of the Major is proved: It belongs to the notion of a being absolutely and simply supernatural that it exceed the exigency of every created and creatable nature: but if the light of glory were connaturally owed to a supernatural substance creatable by God, it would not exceed the exigency of the whole creatable nature: Therefore it would not be absolutely and simply supernatural. The Minor is clear; the Major is shown thus. If, for something to be absolutely and simply supernatural, it sufficed to exceed the exigency of some nature, and it were not required that it exceed the exigency of every created and creatable nature, it would follow that the species owed to a higher Angel would be supernatural absolutely and simply, since they are above the exigency of a lower Angel: The consequent is false: Therefore etc.

You will object, first: Every accident denotes an order to some subject connatural to it: but the connatural subject of the light of glory, and of other accidents of the supernatural order, cannot be other than a created supernatural substance: Therefore that is possible. The Minor is proved: Supernatural accidents, such as charity, the light of glory, and the like, do not regard any created substance of the natural order as their proper and connatural subject; since between potency and act, the perfective and the perfectible, there must be a proportion; nor do they regard the uncreated substance of God, since that is pure act, and incapable of receiving accidents: Therefore those accidents cannot have any other connatural subject than a created substance of the supernatural order.

I answer by denying the Major; for although every accident denotes an order to some subject, it does not essentially regard some subject connatural to itself, as is established in accidents which are educed from the violent potency of a subject, or which are introduced through art. Whence in created things the Philosophers usually distinguish a threefold receptive potency: one natural, in which connatural accidents of the subject are received; another violent, in which accidents contrary to and repugnant to that nature are subjected, as heat stands with respect to water; another finally obediential, by which any agent is subjected to God for receiving forms of the supernatural order. Supernatural accidents, therefore, regard the substance or natural potency, not as it is natural, but as obediential, and subject to God, or capable of receiving the influx of a supernatural agent.

You will object, secondly: No less is the substance of God participable in the supernatural order, than His wisdom: Therefore just as there is given a created supernatural and infused wisdom, so there is given, or at least is possible, a created supernatural substance.

I answer by distinguishing the Antecedent: No less is the substance of God participable in the supernatural order, by accidental participation, than His wisdom — I grant the Antecedent; by substantial participation — I deny the Antecedent, and its consequence. Just as, therefore, created supernatural wisdom participates in the notion of divine wisdom, which is substance, although it does not participate in the mode of being substantially: so sanctifying grace is a participation of the substance of God, but accidental. For "that which in God is substantial, in the soul becomes accidental," says the Holy Doctor, I-II, question 110, article 2, ad 2. Whence that is not a substance, but an accident, belonging to the genus of quality.

I say secondly, the created intellect, human or angelic, can be supernaturally elevated to see God as He is in Himself. This conclusion is of faith, defined at Florence in the letters of the holy union, where it is said that souls fully purged behold God clearly, triune and one, as He is in Himself. By which words is proscribed the error of the Armenians, who said that men are beatified in a certain clarity and splendor of God, yet do not attain to the vision of His substance: which certain others also asserted, whom Saint Gregory mentions, Moralia 18, chapter 18.

Since the possibility of the beatific vision is supernatural, our conclusion cannot be demonstrated by a natural and evident reason, but can be probably persuaded by a twofold congruence of Saint Thomas here, article 1. The first is: Man, through the grace of God, can attain his beatitude, otherwise he would be of worse condition than other

creatures, each of which can attain its own end and beatitude: but the beatitude of man consists in the vision of God, as He is in Himself, according to the more common and truer opinion; or in an act of the will, which presupposes the vision of God as He is in Himself: Therefore such a vision is possible. The Major is clear; the Minor is proved. The supreme felicity of man consists in the most perfect conjunction with his first principle and last end: but such conjunction occurs through the vision of God, or through an act of the will presupposing it, since one of these is the supreme operation of man: Therefore in one of these the supreme felicity of man must be constituted.

The second congruence of Saint Thomas is formed in this manner: Having seen natural effects, man desires to see the cause: Therefore having seen the effects of God, he desires to see Him as He is in Himself: but the natural appetite of man cannot be frustrated: Therefore the vision of God, as He is in Himself, is possible to man supernaturally aided. This reason Saint Augustine insinuates, Against Julian, book 4, chapter 3, where he thus says: By natural instinct we would not wish to be blessed, unless we could be.

You will object, first, that God in Scripture is said to be invisible, and to be unable to be seen by any man; He is also said to inhabit inaccessible light; Therefore no created intellect can see Him as He is in Himself, and approach His infinite light.

But it is easily answered that when God in Scripture is said to be invisible, and unable to be seen by any man, this must be understood either of corporeal vision, or of intellectual vision had by the powers of nature, or of comprehensive vision, or finally of the vision which may be had in this mortal life. But for Him to be said inaccessible, it suffices that no creature can approach Him by natural powers, although God can grant it access to Himself, and make Himself visible to it, by the aid of His omnipotence; just as a city would not cease to be called absolutely inaccessible, if none could approach it except by its own will and aid. Whence Anselm excellently says: Although God is inaccessible to our powers, He is approached by His own gifts.

You will object, secondly: Chrysostom, Homily 14 on John, explaining that saying of John 1, "No man hath seen God at any time," adds: For that which God is, not only the Prophets did not see, but not even the Angels, nor Archangels, etc. By which words he seems to deny the blessed Angels the clear vision of God. Whence of them it is said, 2 Peter 1: "Into which the Angels desire to look."

I answer, with Saint Thomas here, article 1, ad 1, that Chrysostom only denied the blessed Angels the comprehensive knowledge of God, not the intuitive and quidditative; for he was disputing against the Anomoeans, who asserted that God could be comprehended by a created intellect. Nor is it valid what Vasquez objects to the contrary, namely that it

is not likely that those heretics were so stupid and insane as to arrogate to themselves the comprehensive knowledge of God. For that they really arrived at this madness is established from Theodoret, book 4, Heretical Fables, chapter 3, from Jerome on chapter 11 of Matthew, and from Socrates, book 1, History, chapter 7. On this see Baronius for the year 366. Whence Chrysostom himself everywhere calls them stupid and mad, and, Homily 69 to the people, plainly teaches the possibility and existence of the clear and intuitive vision of God; for he says that the Blessed behold the King Himself, not through an entrance, not through an enigma, not through a mirror, but face to face.

But as to that which is said of the blessed Angels in 2 Peter 1, namely that they desire to look into God, I answer that the beatific fruition which the blessed Angels enjoy is called desire, to indicate that it generates no weariness, but continual delight and joy, as Saint Gregory excellently explains, Moralia, book 18, chapter 29, in these words: They desire without labor, because satiety accompanies desire, and they are satiated without weariness, because that very satiety is always kindled from desire. Thus also shall we be, when we shall come to the very fountain of life: there will be impressed on us delightfully thirst together with satiety; but far from this thirst will be necessity, far from satiety weariness, because both, being thirsty, we shall be satiated, and, being satiated, we shall thirst.

You will object, thirdly: God is more distant from a created intellect, than an Angel is from a corporeal eye: but on account of this distance a corporeal eye cannot be elevated to see an Angel: Therefore a fortiori neither can a created intellect be elevated to see God.

Saint Thomas responds, Book 4 of the Sentences, dist. 49, question 3, article 1, ad 7, that indeed there is more distance as to entity, but not as to the proportion of the relation of the power to the object; for an Angel is not contained within the specificative object of corporeal sight, which is the luminous or colored; but God, clearly seen, is contained under the specificative object of the created intellect, which is being as being, as is taught in Metaphysics.

You will say, any power can naturally be carried toward all that is contained under its specificative object, for the eye can naturally see all colors, and hearing perceive all sounds: Therefore if God, clearly seen, is contained within the specificative object of the created intellect, it will be able, not only from the elevation of God, but also connaturally, to see God as He is in Himself.

I answer by distinguishing the Antecedent: A power can naturally be carried toward all that is contained under its specificative object, when proportioned — I grant the Antecedent; when disproportioned — I deny the Antecedent, and its consequence. For

God, clearly seen, although contained within the specificative object of the human intellect, which, as we said, is being as being, is nevertheless not contained under its connatural and proportioned object, which is being knowable through conversion to phantasms; and therefore, in order to see God as He is in Himself, it must be elevated by God, and strengthened by the light of glory. This is the solution of Saint Thomas, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 54, where at the very beginning of the chapter he raises a similar argument to himself, to which he thus responds: The divine substance is not so outside the faculty of the created intellect as something altogether foreign to it, as sound is to sight, or an immaterial substance to sense (for the divine substance itself is the first intelligible, the principle of all intellectual cognition), but it is outside the faculty of the created intellect, as exceeding its power, just as excellent sensibles are outside the faculty of the senses; the created intellect therefore needs to be strengthened by some divine light, in order that it may be able to see the divine essence.

From what has been said it is gathered, first, that a corporeal eye cannot be elevated to see God, since God clearly seen is altogether outside the object, not only proportioned, but also specificative, of the visual or sensitive power, which is material or corporeal being; and no power can be carried outside the breadth of its specificative object, otherwise it would be carried outside its own species and quiddity, which is repugnant.

It is confirmed: God, as He is in Himself, is more distant from all sensible objects, than one sensible object is from another, e.g., than sound is from color, but it is repugnant that sound be seen by a corporeal eye, Therefore also God. Nor is it an obstacle that the fire of hell is elevated by God to torment demons and rational souls, which are purely spiritual beings. For it is elevated as a pure instrument, which can be carried outside its specificative object, provided that that on which it acts is contained within the object of the principal agent, in whose power it operates: but the power seeing God, being vital, must act as a principal cause, which cannot be carried outside its proper specificative object.

It is gathered, secondly, that there is not given in man an innate appetite to the clear vision of God; for an innate appetite is a certain weight of nature toward some good connaturally owed to it, and attainable by its own powers: but in man there is not given a weight of nature, but only an obediential potency, toward the clear vision of God; since it is not connaturally owed to him, nor attainable by the powers of nature, but exceeding and disproportionate, as we showed in the first conclusion: Therefore there is not given in man an innate appetite toward it.

Nor is it valid what a certain Recent author says, in his Theology of Mind and Heart, page 181, that the human intellect can be considered in two ways, namely according to its specific notion, and according to the common notion of intellect as such, insofar as it abstracts from angelic, human, and divine, and under the former consideration does not have an innate appetite to the beatific vision, but does indeed under the latter, just as it is repugnant to a mole, according to its ultimate difference, to see, although under the common notion of animal, it requires having a visual power. This doctrine Martinez considers probable, I-II, question 3, article 8, doubt 2, conclusion 7, and Herrera expressly teaches it in his manuscripts of the treatise on the beatific vision. But it does not please other Thomists, and can be briefly refuted by this reason: that which positively belongs to a common, transcendent, or generic degree cannot be repugnant to the specific, since all essential things of the genus descend to the species; wherefore the notion of animal cannot be contracted by some difference to which it is repugnant to feel, nor substance by something to which it is repugnant to be through itself: Therefore if an innate appetite to the clear vision of God be repugnant to the specific degree of the human intellect, it cannot belong to the common concept of intellect as such. Whence to the example of the mole I answer, either that the notion of animal does not positively require a visual power, but only permissively, in some of its inferiors, or if it inclines positively toward it, it is not repugnant to the mole to see, according to its essential difference, but only by reason of some accidental indisposition of an organ. Nor is it an obstacle to the first, if you say that the mole is called privatively blind: but privation is the lack of a form owed: Therefore a visual power is owed to it: but not according to the differential notion: Therefore according to the generic notion. I answer that this is not a rigorous privation, but loosely taken, for which it suffices that a visual power be owed to the generic degree of animal, not according to itself, but only in some of its inferiors.

It is gathered, thirdly, that from the powers of nature there cannot be given in man an efficacious elicited appetite to the clear vision of God, but only an inefficacious and conditioned one.

The first part is proved: An efficacious elicited appetite is that which is carried toward a good attainable by its own powers, and by force of that desire: but we cannot attain the beatific vision by the powers of nature, as we showed in the first conclusion: Therefore neither can we have toward it, by the powers of nature, an efficacious elicited appetite. The second part is established from the distinction which is found between an efficacious and an inefficacious appetite; for the former is carried toward the good as actually attainable, and to be obtained by certain means; but the latter is carried toward the goodness of the thing considered absolutely and nakedly, whence by an inefficacious

and conditioned appetite impossible things can be desired; just as many desire to live forever, to have infinite riches, and other such things. Of this inefficacious and conditioned appetite must be understood what Saint Thomas says here, article 1, namely that there is in man a natural desire to know the cause when he beholds the effect. Nor is it an obstacle if you say that the Holy Doctor proves the possibility of the beatific vision from such an appetite, whereas from an inefficacious and conditioned appetite the possibility of the thing desired cannot be concluded, since an appetite of this kind is often carried toward impossible things. I answer that although an inefficacious appetite can metaphysically be frustrated, it cannot morally, when it is found in so many wise men, whom it is morally impossible, though not metaphysically, should unanimously err in a judgment governing the aforesaid appetite. Whence the reasoning of Saint Thomas is not demonstrative, but only a certain congruence: for the mysteries of our faith cannot be demonstrated, but can only be persuaded by probable congruence. In this manner the same Holy Doctor, below, question 27, probably shows the procession of the divine Word, from the fact that every intelligent being produces in itself a Word and conception of the thing understood. And Part 3, question 1, article 1, he proves the incarnation of the divine Word from the notion of the supreme good, to which it is connatural to communicate itself in the supreme manner.

Chapter II

On the species concurring toward the beatific vision.

I say first, God is not seen by the blessed by the mediation of any created impressed species; indeed, such a species is impossible.

The first part of this assertion is against Giles of the Presentation, an Augustinian, who not only affirms that such a species is in fact given, but also that without it God cannot be clearly seen. The opposite is commonly taught by other Theologians, following Saint Thomas, whose doctrine (as Giles of Rome, of the same order of Saint Augustine, says in his defense, article 1) was divinely inspired, and confirmed by heavenly revelation.

Nevertheless this part is proved by a fundamental reason: A species is required in the created intellect for knowing some object, because that object is either not present, or united to the intellect itself, or is not intelligible, on account of its materiality; whence in an Angel there is not given an accidental impressed species for the knowledge of itself, because its substance, being intimately present and united to its intellect, and altogether immaterial, supplies the place of a species, as we shall show in the Treatise on Angels, chapter 7. But God is supremely immaterial, and consequently intelligible in the most

perfect manner, and intimately present and united to the intellect of the blessed: Therefore He is not seen by the Blessed by the mediation of any created impressed species, but the divine essence itself immediately, through itself, supplies the place of a species. And certainly if created and corporeal light is not seen by the eye through any species, because it is itself visible, and intimately present to the eye; much more the increate and incorporeal light of the divine essence is seen by the Blessed by itself, and not by the mediation of any created species.

By the same reason is proved, first, the second part of the conclusion, which asserts that such a species is impossible: For a species is a vicar of the object, and a form per se ordered to supplying some defect on the part of that object, namely either of proportion with the power, or of union with it: but a defect of proportion with the intellect illumined by the light of glory, or of union with it, is repugnant to God, as is clear of itself: Therefore a species per se ordered to supplying any of these defects is repugnant.

It is proved, secondly, by the reason which Saint Thomas gives, Quodlibet 7, article 1: The formal effect of an impressed species is to render the object proximately intelligible: but it is repugnant that God be made proximately intelligible through some created form distinct from Himself; since He is per se intelligible, indeed His own intelligibility, being supremely immaterial; just as from the fact that He is wise through Himself, indeed His own wisdom, it is repugnant that He be made wise through created wisdom: Therefore it is repugnant that a created impressed species be given, representing God as He is in Himself.

It is proved, thirdly, by another reason of Saint Thomas here, article 2, which can be proposed in this form: The species and the object must be constituted in the same degree of immateriality: but no created or creatable form can be of the same immateriality as God; otherwise it would be pure act, and its own being by essence, as God is: Therefore no created or creatable form can have the notion of an impressed species, quidditatively representing God.

It is confirmed, first: Any created or creatable species is more distant from God, than a sensible species is from the quiddity of a material thing, and than a species abstracted from phantasms is from the quiddity and substance of an Angel: but it is repugnant that the essence and quiddity of a material thing be known through a sensible species, and that an Angel be seen quidditatively through a species abstracted from phantasms: Therefore a fortiori it is repugnant that God be seen quidditatively through any created species.

It is confirmed, secondly: A species must have no less proportion, nor agree less in the degree of immateriality with the thing it represents, than the intellective power with the object which it connaturally understands: Therefore just as it is repugnant that a created intellect be given which connaturally sees God, because no created or creatable intellect can be of the same immateriality with Him, as we showed in the preceding chapter, conclusion 1; so for the same reason, and on account of the same excess of immateriality and purity, by which God immensely surpasses any created and creatable form, it is repugnant that any created species be given which represents God quidditatively. The instances usually raised against this reasoning of Saint Thomas remain resolved from what was said in the place cited, in the response to the first objection against the first conclusion.

Finally, the same second part can be persuaded, and the impossibility of a created species in the beatific vision more demonstrated, by another reason which the Holy Doctor insinuates, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 49: A species quidditatively representing some object must have with it a similitude and specific agreement, at least in intentional and intelligible being: but this agreement is repugnant to every created and creatable being, in comparison to God: Therefore it implies that a created species be given, representing God quidditatively. The Minor is certain, both because nothing can be of the same immateriality as God, and also because nothing can be identical with Him, nor have with Him a univocal and specific agreement according to some real and non-fictitious being: but intentional and representative being in an intelligible species is not some fictitious being, or some extrinsic denomination, but a true and real intrinsic being, which is founded in immateriality. The Major, however, is shown thus: A species is given for this purpose, that the object which is outside the soul may be placed within it in intelligible being, so that together with it it may concur to intellection, fecundating the intellect for the intellectual birth of the word: Therefore it must contain the nature of the object, at least in intelligible and representative being, and consequently be assimilated to it in such being, and have with it a similitude or specific agreement. Whence Saint Thomas, below, question 14, article 1, by this distinguished intelligent beings from non-intelligent ones, that the former can become all things, and receive the forms of other things intelligibly. And question 55, article 2, for this reason he taught that the nature, e.g., of Gabriel, cannot serve by way of a species for the understanding of all things, because being limited it cannot intentionally contain all beings of other genera, or be assimilated to them, and Aristotle, On the Soul 3, text 37, for the same reason asserted that the soul in a certain way becomes all things, namely in intentional and representative being.

I say secondly: it is also repugnant that in the beatific vision there be given a word or created expressed species.

This conclusion follows manifestly from the foundations established in the preceding: for since an expressed species is a more perfect and actual similitude of the object than an impressed one, and that very thing which the impressed species represents in first act, the expressed represents in second act; if the first must be of the same immateriality with the object, and have with it a similitude and specific agreement, at least in intentional and intelligible being, much more must the second have it. Whence if it implies that a created impressed species representative of God as He is in Himself be given, because no created form can be of the same immateriality with Him, nor be perfectly assimilated to Him, or have with Him a similitude and specific agreement in intentional and intelligible being; a fortiori it will be repugnant that a created expressed species quidditatively representing God be given. I add that God, since He is pure act in the intelligible order, is His own intelligibility, not only in first act, and by way of a motive object, but also in second act, and by way of a terminated object: Therefore just as the divine essence cannot be made proximately intelligible through any created impressed species, so neither can it be actually understood, through a word expressed by the Blessed, and produced by them.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: It belongs to the notion of an intelligible species to inhere in the intellect, and to inform it: but this, since it involves imperfection, cannot belong to God's essence: Therefore it cannot take the place of a species in the beatific vision, and consequently in it there is given some created impressed species.

To this objection can be answered in two ways: first, by absolutely denying the Major, for the divine essence, with respect to the divine intellect, is a true intelligible species, and yet does not inhere in it, nor inform it. Likewise the substance of an Angel (as the more common opinion of the Theologians holds) is an impressed species by which it understands itself, and yet does not inhere, but subsists through itself. Whence Cajetan excellently observes here, article 2, that three things can belong to an impressed species by accident, and as many others per se. The first, which belongs by accident, is that it be, according to its natural being, substance or accident, and consequently that it inhere or subsist through itself; for in an Angel, as we said, with respect to knowledge of itself, it is substance, in us it is an accident. The second, that it have natural or intentional being: in God and in an Angel, with respect to knowledge of themselves, they have the former, in us the latter. The third by accident is that it be identical in natural being with the power, or distinct from it. But the first thing which belongs to a species per se, is that it be the formal similitude of its object, and identical with it in intentional and representative

being. The second, that it enjoy as much immateriality as the object itself. The third, that it be identical with the intellect, according to intelligible being.

Secondly it can be answered that although the divine essence cannot take the place of a formal cause in natural and entitative being, it can indeed in intentional and intelligible being: for since a physical form, such as the light of glory, stands on the part of the subject, as perfecting it, it is limited and contracted by it, and is subordinated to it, and depends on it. On the contrary, an intelligible form, since it does not stand on the part of the subject, or the intellect, but of the object, as its similitude, is not subordinated to the subject, or intelligible thing, nor is it contracted or limited by it; as is clear in the species representing human nature, which although in entitative being, insofar namely as it is an accident, is contracted or individuated by its subject, yet in representative being is equally universal as human nature, representing none of the singulars determinately, but the nature itself according to its whole universality. There is also another disparity between the natural and intentional form, consisting in this, that whereas a natural form tends to this, that from its union with matter one complete thing may result, it must necessarily be something incomplete: but an intelligible form, because on the contrary it is not ordered to composing, from its union with the intellect, some third thing, but only to perfecting and completing it, and this the better it does, the more complete and actual is the form perfecting and completing it, the intelligible species can be a total and complete form, and consequently the divine essence can take its place, although it cannot furnish the office of a natural form.

You will object, secondly: The impressed species necessary to see God as He is in Himself can be finite: Therefore also created. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved: For a finite effect infinite power is not required: but the beatific vision, toward which the impressed species concurs as a power, is something finite: Therefore it does not require an infinite species.

It is confirmed: To represent an infinite object, in a finite manner, infinity is not required in the representing species: but the quidditative species of God would not represent Him in an infinite manner, and comprehensively, because it would represent Him to a finite intellect: Therefore it should not be infinite.

To the objection I answer by denying the Antecedent, and to its proof, I distinguish the Major: For a finite effect infinite power is not required, if it stands on the part of the power — I grant the Major. If it stands on the part of the object, by way of similitude to it, I deny the Major universally taken; for if that object is infinite, as God is, that similitude must be of the same nature with Him in intelligible being, and agree with

Him in entitative being as to the degree of immateriality, and consequently be of infinite perfection, as is established from what has been said above. Or secondly I distinguish the Major: For a finite effect infinite power is not required, per se primarily — let the Major pass; per se secondarily — I deny the Major, and, the Minor being granted, I likewise distinguish the consequent. Just as, therefore, Authors who hold that mortal sin, in the notion of an offense, contains a malice only extrinsically and objectively infinite, say that it per se primarily requires only satisfaction enjoying a similar extrinsic infinity: because, however, it is repugnant that there be given a satisfaction which has infinity, unless it proceed from an infinite person; and by the very fact that it proceeds from an infinite person, it cannot but enjoy intrinsic infinity, therefore per se secondarily it demands intrinsic infinity in the satisfaction. So likewise I say that although the beatific vision per se primarily only requires an impressed species of an infinite object; because, however, it is altogether repugnant that such a species be given which is not in itself intrinsically infinite, being of the same perfection and immateriality with it, it requires, at least per se secondarily, intrinsic infinity in the species.

To the confirmation, the Major being granted, I deny the Minor; for it is repugnant that an impressed species representing God quidditatively be given, which does not represent Him in an infinite manner, and comprehensively; for since it would be of the same immateriality with God, and identified with Him, at least in intentional and intelligible being, it would be repugnant to it to represent God in a finite manner, and consequently it would comprehend Him.

You will object, thirdly, against the second conclusion: Saint Thomas, I, question 27, article 1, says that every intelligent being, by the very fact that it understands, forms a word: Therefore he holds that the blessed, in the beatific vision, produce a word.

I answer that Saint Thomas is not speaking of every intelligent suppositum, by a complete distribution as to intellection, but by an accommodated distribution, so that the sense is, every intellectual suppositum, in some intellection, forms a word. From which he infers that also the uncreated intellectual suppositum, namely God, in some knowledge of Himself, produces a word. Which inference, although not demonstrative, is nevertheless probable; for the mysteries of our faith, among which the production of the divine Word holds a chief place, cannot be evidently demonstrated, but can only be probably and congruently persuaded.

You will object, fourthly: The word is not distinguished from the intellection; but in the Blessed there is necessarily given a created intellection, and produced by them: Therefore also a created word. The Minor is established; the Major is proved: intellection and the

word have the same formal effect, namely to render the intellect understanding in second act: Therefore they are not distinguished.

I answer by denying the Major; for the word is the terminus of intellection, but not intellection itself, as our Thomists teach in Philosophy. To the proof to the contrary I say that although intellection and the word render the intellect understanding in second act, they nevertheless accomplish this in different ways: intellection renders the intellect understanding in second act by way of operation, just as heating renders heat heating; but the word accomplishes this by way of a terminus produced through intellection, and as a medium in which the very intellection, as contemplation, contemplates the object.

You will say, if intellection and the word are compared to one another by way of an action, and a terminus produced through it, it follows that in the beatific vision there is given a word produced through it, since it is repugnant that an action be given without a terminus distinct from itself and produced through it. Whence beatific love produces a terminus called impulse, and the eternal Father forms the word in the notional knowledge of the essence, why then would not the Blessed likewise, in that vision and knowledge, produce a word?

I answer by denying the inference, and to its proof I say with Saint Thomas, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 100, that although to have a terminus produced from itself belongs to the notion of a transient action, which is not for its own sake, but for the sake of its terminus, as heating is for the sake of the heat produced by it, it does not belong to the notion of an immanent action; for although this sometimes produces a terminus, namely when it needs it, it does not belong to its essential concept to have a terminus produced distinct from itself; because since it is not for the sake of the terminus, but rather the terminus is ordered to it, as is clear in the word, which is for the sake of intellection and to serve it, it only produces a terminus when it needs it; whence because the beatific vision does not need it (since the divine essence is intimately present and united to the intellect of the Blessed, not only by way of a principle, but also by way of a terminus of actual intellection) no word is produced through it. Beatific love, however, produces an impulse, because the impulse, which is the terminus of the will, is not the ultimate actuality of the beloved object, but is posited so that it may completely and perfectly incline the will toward the object; whence however perfect the beloved object may be, still an impulse of the will is admitted: but the word is posited as the ultimate actuality of the understood object, wherefore when the object is in ultimate actuality (as happens in the beatific vision) the word is not produced. The eternal Father, however, forms the Word in the notional knowledge of the essence, not from need, but from fecundity; for He does not produce it in order that the divine essence be understood, but because His

knowledge is fecund ad intra for the production of the Word.

You will object, lastly: It belongs to the notion of a word to be always actually known, since it is an intrinsic terminus of actual intellection: but the divine essence is not always and from eternity actually known, at least by a created intellect: Therefore it cannot have the notion of a word or expressed species, with respect to it.

I answer that the divine essence, as far as it is concerned in itself, has always been actually knowable by a created intellect, that is, has of itself had sufficient immateriality and actuality to terminate a created intellection and beatific vision; it has not, however, been in fact always actually known, from a defect of the connotated thing, that is, of the created intellect, which has not always and from eternity existed. Just as the divine personality, as far as it is concerned in itself, has always terminated the humanity, that is, nothing was lacking on its part to terminate it; although in fact it has not always terminated it, on account of a defect of the connotated thing, namely the humanity, which was to be terminated.

Chapter III

On the necessity of the light of glory for seeing God.

It is certain of faith that the created intellect, in the ordinary way, needs the light of glory to see God; for this is defined in the Council of Vienne, in the Clementine "Ad nostrum," against the Beghards and Beguines, who thought that the created intellect could naturally see God. Reason also persuades this, for a power which by its nature is insufficient for eliciting some act, needs to be strengthened and elevated by some power received into itself. But the created intellect (as was shown in chapter 1) is of itself and by its nature insufficient and disproportionate to see God as He is in Himself: Therefore for this it needs some supernatural power superadded to it, which is called by the Theologians the light of glory. Nor is it valid if you say that for this the divine essence, united to the intellect of the Blessed by way of a species, suffices; for a species, supplying the place of an object, does not give the power a power to see it, but presupposes it, as is clear in one who has an injured or weak visual power; for however perfect and efficacious the visible species of an object may be placed in the eye, its sight is not healed nor strengthened: Therefore the defect of power which is in the created intellect for seeing God cannot be sufficiently supplied by the divine essence, in the notion of an intelligible species united to it.

It is confirmed: The disproportion which is in the intellect for eliciting an act of faith is not supplied by the mere species of the credible object, but furthermore the light of faith

is required: Therefore a fortiori the insufficiency and disproportion which is in it for seeing God as He is in Himself cannot be supplied by the mere union of the divine essence in the notion of a species, but must necessarily be strengthened and elevated by the light of glory, which furnishes two offices in the beatific vision: the first is to dispose the created intellect for union with the divine essence by way of an intelligible species, as Saint Thomas teaches here, article 5; the other, to strengthen and elevate it for eliciting the beatific vision. This being premised,

The Theologians here ask, whether the created intellect could, by absolute power, elicit the beatific vision, without a created light of glory? The affirmative part is held by several Recent authors, among whom some think that God, in the notion of light, can be united to the created intellect, just as He is united to it in the notion of a species, and by such union render it capable of eliciting the beatific vision. Others teach that God can accomplish this by a special assistance, or simultaneous concurrence. Others recur to some obediential potency, proximately and immediately active and productive of supernatural acts and effects, which they say is naturally congenital to individual created things, and completed by God's simultaneous concurrence of the supernatural order.

The negative opinion, however, seems truer and more probable; for since the created intellect is intrinsically insufficient and disproportioned to elicit the beatific vision, it cannot elicit it, unless first, at least by nature, it becomes intrinsically capable and proportioned to it: but it cannot become intrinsically capable of eliciting it without a created light of glory: Therefore without it, it cannot, even by absolute power, elicit the beatific vision. The Major is established, for first act is essentially presupposed to second, whence there is that celebrated rule in topics, "from act to potency is the best inference." The Minor, however, is proved by refuting those three ways by which the Adversaries assert that the created intellect could be rendered capable of eliciting the beatific vision without a created light of glory. And first, that God, in the notion of the light of glory, cannot be united to the created intellect, as He is united to it in the notion of an intelligible species, seems manifest from the principles established above; for there is a great disparity between an impressed species and the light of glory, for an impressed species is an intelligible form, standing on the part of the object, and of the same perfection and immateriality with it; whence for it there is not required inherence or informing, but only agreement and similitude with the object; for inherence or informing belongs to the physical genus, and stand accidentally with respect to the intelligible genus: but the light of glory is a physical form, standing on the part of the power, wherefore it requires inherence and informing: whence since the divine essence cannot inform the created intellect, nor inhere in it, it cannot be united to it in the

notion of light, but only in the notion of species and intelligible form.

But that by special assistance of God the created intellect cannot be rendered capable of eliciting the beatific vision, is shown thus. Either from such assistance some intrinsic power is derived into the created intellect, or none is superadded to it? If the former be said, we have what is intended, for such a superadded power must be a certain participation of divine intellectuality, and consequently the light of glory. But if the latter be affirmed, from such assistance the created intellect cannot become intrinsically capable of eliciting the beatific vision; for it is impossible that that which is of itself impotent and disproportioned to elicit some operation, be rendered capable and proportioned to produce it, unless it be intrinsically changed, and consequently unless it receive into itself some form or intrinsic power which it did not have before; for a cause being capable of operating is not some extrinsic denomination, but intrinsic, sought from some power and internal principle.

What we have said of God's special assistance, must be said of His simultaneous concurrence; for since such concurrence is not into the cause, but into the action, or effect, it does not intrinsically change it, and consequently does not render it, from being incapable, capable of eliciting some operation of a higher order, to which, as Saint Thomas teaches, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 53, no created power can become capable and proportioned, except through the acquisition of some new form; just as the diaphanous cannot illumine, unless it become actually luminous, through the form of light newly received in it.

Finally, that the created intellect cannot be made proximately capable of eliciting the beatific vision, through an obediential potency, proximately and immediately active, and productive of supernatural acts and effects, and implanted in all things, is proved briefly against Suárez, Meratius, and other Recent authors: First, because such a potency is expressly against Saint Thomas saying, I-II, question 109, article 1: A form cannot go beyond its natural efficacy, except through some superadded form. And, Part 3, question 62, article 4, admitting in the Sacraments of the new law an intrinsic power for producing grace, which he says is incomplete and fluent; for this power would be altogether useless and superfluous, if in the Sacraments of the new law there were given an obediential potency productive of grace. Whence Suárez, and others who admit such a potency, deny that the Sacraments of the new law are elevated by a fluent and transient power.

Secondly, such a potency, if it were given, would be natural, being congenital to individual created things by nature, and supernatural, as ordered to acts exceeding the

powers of nature. Likewise it would be finite, because it would be identified with the entity of any created thing, which is finite; and infinite, because it would be productive of any producible thing, which is infinite, at least in potency; for given any effect produced, a more and more perfect one can be produced to infinity.

Thirdly, by that potency the whole order of grace is destroyed, and all things which pertain to it are rendered altogether useless and superfluous; for it is done in vain by many things what can be done by fewer; if, therefore, by that potency and simultaneous concurrence man can elicit supernatural acts, the infused virtues will be useless for eliciting them, the character in Priests will be useless for consecrating, the light of glory in the Blessed for seeing God will be superfluous. Nor can it be said that such habits are required to operate connaturally, for since this potency would be innate and natural, man would operate more connaturally by means of it, than by mediate forms and adventitious qualities, infused by God, and superadded to him.

You will object, first: Saint Thomas, Book 4, dist. 49, question 2, article 7, thus says: It can happen miraculously that some intellect, having only the dispositions of the way, be elevated to see God through His essence: but the light of glory is not a disposition of the way, but of the homeland: Therefore he thinks the intellect can, without it, see the divine essence, as Saint Paul in fact saw it in rapture, for since he was then a wayfarer, his intellect was not elevated to such a vision by the light of glory, which is granted only to the comprehensors.

I answer that Saint Thomas, asserting that the intellect can, by absolute power, see God without the light of glory, must be understood of the light of glory habitually communicated; he does not, however, exclude the light of glory granted by way of a transient state, as it was in Saint Paul, when in rapture he saw the divine essence. Whence the same Holy Doctor, II-II, question 175, article 3, ad 2: The divine essence cannot be seen by a created intellect, except through the light of glory, which can be participated in two ways. In one way by way of an immanent form, thus it makes the blessed in the homeland; in another way by way of a certain transient passion, and in this way that light was in Paul, when he was rapt.

You will say, Saint Thomas, in the place adduced in the objection, says it can happen miraculously that some intellect, having only the dispositions of the way, be elevated to see God through His essence: but the light of glory transiently communicated is not a disposition of life (the way): Therefore according to Saint Thomas, God can be seen, by absolute power, without the light of glory, whether permanently or transiently communicated.

I answer that although the light of glory transiently communicated is not a disposition of the way positively, that is, exacted from the state of a wayfarer, it is nevertheless a disposition of the way permissively, that is, not incompatible with the state of a wayfarer; in distinction from the light permanently communicated, which is incompatible with the state of a pure wayfarer.

You will object, secondly: The same Angelic Doctor, I, question 105, article 2, thus says: It is erroneous to say that God cannot do through Himself all the determinate effects which are done through any created cause. But God, by means of the light of glory, makes the created intellect elicit the beatific vision: Therefore He can furnish this through Himself, and take the place of the light of glory, just as He takes the place of the intelligible species.

I answer that Saint Thomas must be understood of the effects of a created cause, purely efficient, but not when the genus of a formal cause is involved; whence since the light of glory concurs to the beatific vision not only in the genus of an efficient cause, but also of a formal cause, God cannot make the intellect elicit the vision without it; just as He cannot bring it about that man understand without an intellect, or live without a soul. Nor can the divine essence take the place of the light of glory, as it takes the place of an impressed species, on account of the reason of distinction assigned above, in impugning the first way of speaking of the Adversaries.

You will object, thirdly: Of two men drawing a ship, each taken separately is incapable and disproportioned for such drawing, and becomes capable and proportioned by the mere simultaneous concurrence of the other, without an intrinsic change of himself: Therefore likewise the created intellect could become capable of eliciting the beatific vision, without an intrinsic change of itself, and infusion of the light of glory, by this, that God specially assist it, and simultaneously concur with it.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence, and the parity, on account of a twofold reason of distinction. The first is, that in two men drawing a ship, the incapacity and disproportion for such drawing arises only from an intensive excess of the effect, whence by multiplication of power or concurrence of the same species, a perfect proportion can be achieved: but the disproportion which is between the created intellect and the beatific vision arises from the fact that such an operation is of a higher and divine order; whence such disproportion cannot be overcome, except by the addition of a form of the divine and supernatural order, namely the light of glory, permanently, or at least transiently, communicated. The second disparity is, that the two men drawing the ship are partial causes of the drawing: but the intellect and the light of

glory do not concur to the beatific vision as partial causes; for as Saint Thomas says, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 79: The same effect is not thus attributed to a natural cause and to divine power, as if it were done partly by God, and partly by a natural agent.

You will object, fourthly: There is given in God a most perfect and most absolute dominion over all creatures: Therefore also in creatures a perfect subjection, and obediential potency to effect all that God has willed, and consequently that the intellect elicit the beatific vision, without the light of glory. Whence Saint Thomas, Book 4, dist. 8, question 2, article 3, ad 4: Just as there is in a creature an obediential potency, that whatever the creator has disposed be done in it; so also that it be done by its means, which is the notion of an instrument. By which words he seems to admit not only a passive obediential potency, to receive whatever God wills, but also an active one, to cooperate with Him in all that He wills.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence; for the notion of full and perfect dominion in God requires indeed that God be able to use creatures at will, but not that He be able to produce supernatural effects or operations by their means, without their elevation and change, through the reception of some supernatural form or quality; because this implies a contradiction, as is established from what has been said above. Just as, therefore, the full power of divine dominion does not require that a creature act without action, be able without power, know without intellection; so it does not demand that supernatural effects be produced without supernatural power, nor consequently that the intellect elicit the beatific vision without the light of glory. Whence to the place of Saint Thomas adduced in the objection it must be said that he wished by those words only to declare that in any creature there is a passive obediential power for receiving power from God, by which it instrumentally cooperates with Him toward supernatural and miraculous effects; not, however, that there is in a creature a proximately active obediential potency, which requires no superadded power, but only God's simultaneous concurrence, as the Adversaries contend.

You will say, if there is not given in the created intellect an active obediential potency to see God, it will not influence actively, but will stand merely passively with respect to the beatific vision, just as water stands with respect to heating. But the inference and parity are denied, for heat in water presupposes no power, even radical, for heating, whereas the light of glory presupposes in the created intellect a radical and remote power for seeing God.

Chapter IV

On the inequality of the beatific vision.

It is certain that one of the Blessed sees God more perfectly than another; for it pertains to a just rewarder that for unequal merits unequal rewards be granted: but here in the way the merits of the just are unequal: Therefore also in the homeland their rewards are, or will be, likewise unequal. Whence John 14 says: "In my Father's house there are many mansions." And 1 Corinthians 15: "Star differeth from star in glory," where the Apostle speaks of the unequal glory of bodies in the resurrection, which, since it flows from essential glory, must be unequal, as that is. Finally, the Council of Florence, in the decree on Purgatory, defines that the Blessed behold God as He is, yet according to the diversity of merits, one more perfectly than another.

There is, therefore, a difficulty and controversy among the Theologians, whence arises that inequality which is found in the beatific vision, whether from the light of glory alone, or also from the natural perfection of the created intellect; such that a more perspicacious intellect, with equal light of glory, sees the divine essence more clearly than a less perspicacious one?

The more common and probable opinion holds that the inequality of vision must be reduced to the inequality of the light of glory alone. The reason is, because the inequality of the beatific vision must be reduced to a proximate and immediate power, not to a radical and remote one; for that does not act except according to the proportion of the proximate power, and as elevated by it: but the light of glory is a power proximately and immediately influencing the beatific vision, whereas the intellect influences it only radically and remotely, and as elevated by the light of glory, as is established from what was said in the preceding chapter: Therefore the inequality of the blessed vision must be reduced to the light of glory, not to the natural perfection and perspicacity of the created intellect. Whence Saint Thomas here, article 6, ad 3, says that the diversity of seeing God will be through the diverse faculty of the intellect, not indeed natural, but glorious.

It is confirmed, first: The inequality of the blessed vision arises from the fact that the divine essence is more or less perfectly united to the created intellect in the notion of an intelligible species: but that the divine essence, in the notion of form and intelligible species, is more or less perfectly united to the created intellect, arises from the greater or lesser intensity of the light of glory, since that is the ultimate disposition to such union, as Saint Thomas teaches here, article 5, not from the greater or lesser natural perfection of the created intellect: Therefore the inequality of the blessed vision arises from the greater or lesser intensity of the light of glory, not from the greater or lesser perfection of the

intellect. Otherwise there would be given some degree of beatitude which would not correspond to grace, but to nature; for the greater activity and perspicacity of the created intellect, since it is something of the natural order, is a benefit of nature, not of grace, and proceeds from God as creator, not as glorifier. Nor is it an obstacle that Saint Thomas, Part 3, question 10, article 4, ad 2, says that the degrees of the divine vision are to be attended to more according to the order of grace, than according to the order of nature. For "more" is not taken comparatively, but exclusively, so that it means the same as "rather." Just as when Paul says of Moses, "rather choosing to be afflicted with the people of God, than to have the pleasure of sin for a time."

You will object: When two causes concur to the same effect, it increases in perfection when one of them increases in power and activity; thus because the visual power, and the species of the visible object, concur to corporeal vision, if the power and perspicacity of the power be increased, or if a more perfect species of the object be placed in it, a more perfect vision is elicited: but to the blessed vision not only the light of glory, but also the created intellect efficiently concurs, since it does not stand toward it merely passively: Therefore just as a more intense light, so also a more perfect and perspicacious intellect elicits a more perfect vision.

I answer that the Major is true, when the more perfect cause influences per se as more perfect, or as it has a proximate and immediate power, into the effect; but not when it concurs only according to a radical power, and its greater perfection stands materially and per accidens, as happens in the case at hand, since the created intellect concurs to the blessed vision, not according to its natural aptitude, but according to the obediential aptitude which it has to be elevated by the light of glory, which is equal in all created intellects. From which the disparity to the example adduced is clear, for a strong power, and species, proximately and immediately influence corporeal vision, and have proximate power to act, at least partial and incomplete: but the created intellect only radically concurs to the blessed vision, nor does it confer separately activity and proximate power to act, but subjects the power it has to the light of glory, as elevable by it, and thus there is rendered only one power proportioned and proximate to vision.

You will say, if this is so, the created intellect will be a pure instrument in the blessed vision, since it does not act except as elevated by the light of glory, just as an instrument does not act except as elevated by the principal cause.

But I deny the inference: first, because an instrumental cause is so moved by some extrinsic agent, that it nevertheless does not move itself from an intrinsic principle, as is established in a saw, a hammer, a paintbrush, and other artificial instruments: but the

created intellect is not so moved by God to the beatific vision, that it does not move itself from an intrinsic principle; since in it it operates vitally, and lives an eternal life, and it belongs to the notion of a vital cause, and one operating vitally, that it move itself from within, as the Philosophers teach in the books On the Soul. Secondly, because it belongs to the notion of an instrument properly taken, that it be elevated outside the breadth of its adequate object, as is established in baptismal water, which is elevated to produce grace, which is outside the breadth of the adequate object of any created agent: but the created intellect, although in the beatific vision it is elevated outside the breadth of its proportioned and connatural object, is not, however, elevated outside the breadth of its adequate and specificative object, as we declared in chapter 1, conclusion 2. Thirdly, an instrument properly taken has neither proximate nor radical power for the effect of the principal cause; for water, e.g., has no radical power to produce grace, nor a saw to cut artfully: but the created intellect has power, at least radical and remote, to see God, as is established from what has been said above: Therefore it does not stand as a pure instrument with respect to the beatific vision. I said "pure instrument," because it is not inconvenient to grant that the created intellect, suffused with the light of glory, is an instrument of God in order to the beatific vision, improperly, and in a broad manner, and in a certain general acceptation, which does not withdraw it from the notion of a principal cause; for as Saint Thomas says, question 24 of On Truth, article 1, ad 5: An instrument is spoken of in two ways: in one way properly, namely when something is so moved by another, that no principle of such motion is conferred on it by the mover; as a saw is moved by the carpenter, and such an instrument is devoid of liberty. In another way, instrument is spoken of more commonly, whatever is moving, moved by another, whether the principle of its motion be in it, or not.

From what has been said it is gathered that the blessed visions of Angels and men are of the same species: For their diversity arises solely from the diversity of the light of glory, as was shown: but all lights of glory are of the same species, since they regard the same formal object, namely God, knowable as He is in Himself, and tend toward Him in the same essential manner, namely clearly and in a finite way: Therefore also all the beatific visions of Angels and men. Nor is it an obstacle that such visions proceed not only from the light of glory, but also from the angelic and human intellect, which are essentially distinguished from one another in species. For they do not proceed from them by reason of natural power, but of obediential, radical and remote potency, in which the angelic and human intellect agree in species.

Chapter V

On the object of the beatific vision.

I say first, the Blessed in fact see the divine essence, the Trinity of persons, and all the attributes; indeed it is repugnant that the divine essence be seen without the attributes and persons being seen.

The first part of this assertion is established from Florence, in the letters of union, where it is said that God, one and three, is seen by the blessed, and from that saying, 1 John 3: "When He shall appear we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is": but God is in Himself one and three, omnipotent, just, merciful, etc.: Therefore as such He is seen by the Blessed. Reason also supports this, for since the blessed vision is the reward of our faith, through it we clearly know in the homeland what is here in the way obscurely revealed to us through faith: but through faith there are obscurely revealed to us those things which pertain to God's nature, and His attributes, and persons: Therefore these are made manifest to us in the homeland through the species and clear vision.

The second part, which Scotus, and his Disciples, and also some of the Recent authors deny, is proved from a threefold gift or prerogative of the beatific vision, which is quidditative, intuitive, and beatifying knowledge: For in the first place it is repugnant that something be seen quidditatively, according as it is in itself, without seeing the predicates which quidditatively belong to it, as it is in itself: but of the quiddity of the divine essence, as it is in itself, are the attributes, and relations, as is established concerning the attributes from what was said above, chapter 4, and concerning the relations we shall show in the Treatise on the Trinity, chapter 4, § 2: Therefore it is repugnant that the divine essence be seen quidditatively as it is in itself, without the attributes and relations being seen.

The same is gathered from the notion of intuition, for intuitive knowledge differs from abstractive in this, that the latter apprehends the object proportionally to the capacity of the intellect, but the former sees and intuits the object as it is in itself on the part of reality: Therefore since God is in Himself one and three, and includes in Himself essence, attributes, and relations, it is repugnant that He be seen and intuitively known, without the relations and attributes being seen. I add that intuitive knowledge is not terminated only at the nature and quiddity of the object, but is carried to the thing, as it is in itself subsisting and existing on the part of reality; whence since the divine nature subsists and exists in three persons, it is repugnant that it be seen or intuitively known without them.

The same repugnance is demonstrated from the third prerogative, for beatifying knowledge must perfectly satiate and quiet the appetite of the blessed, since beatitude is the rest and satiety of all desires: but if the blessed vision attained only the divine essence, and did not extend to the attributes and persons of the most holy Trinity, it would not perfectly satiate nor quiet the intellect of the blessed: Therefore it would not be perfectly beatifying knowledge. The Major is established; the Minor is thus proved. Since we naturally desire, having seen the essence, to see its properties, and having seen the subsisting nature, to see the mode of its subsistence, and the attributes are properties of the divine essence, and the relations modes of its subsistence; if the blessed, seeing the divine essence, did not see some of its attributes, or some of the divine relations, there would remain in him a desire to see that attribute, or that relation: Therefore his appetite would not be fully satiated and quieted.

You will object, first: The divine essence is communicated to the Son by eternal generation, without the paternity being communicated: Therefore likewise it can be seen by the beatific vision, without the paternity being seen. The Antecedent is certain with the certainty of faith. The consequence, however, is proved from this, that the whole reason why the essence in the divine persons is communicated to the Son, without the paternity being communicated, is their virtual distinction, which accordingly seems to suffice, that the essence can be seen, without the relations and attributes being seen.

I answer by denying the consequence, and its proof; for that the divine essence can be communicated to the Son, without the paternity being communicated, does not arise precisely from the fact that it is virtually distinguished from it (otherwise, indeed, since it is distinguished virtually not only from the relations, but also from the attributes, it could be communicated to the Son, without the attributes being communicated), but arises furthermore from the fact that paternity and filiation are relatively opposed in the notion of the communicable; whence for the truth of the consequent and the parity it would be necessary that they also be relatively opposed in the notion of the visible, which however is clearly false, otherwise the Father and the Son could never be seen together by the same vision. I add that, although the essence and paternity are distinguished virtually, in the notion of the communicable, they are not, however, in the notion of the visible; because in the beatific vision the divine essence takes the place of the intelligible species, not only with respect to itself, but also with respect to the attributes, and relations, without any virtual distinction.

You will object, secondly: The primary object can be seen without the secondary: but the divine essence is the primary object of the beatific vision, whereas the attributes and relations belong only to the secondary object: Therefore the divine essence can be seen,

without the relations and attributes being seen.

I answer, first, by distinguishing the Major: The primary object can be seen without the secondary, when it does not have a necessary connection with it — I grant. If they are connected with one another, and one is transcendentally included in the other — I deny. Whence since the divine essence is necessarily connected with the relations and attributes, and is intimately included in them, although it be granted that the attributes and relations belong to the secondary object of the blessed vision, it does not therefore follow that the divine essence can be seen without them.

I answer, secondly, by denying the Minor; for the relations and attributes are not properly secondary objects of the beatific vision, but essential modes of the primary and specificative object, without which it cannot be seen; just as a proper sensible cannot be seen without a common one: e.g., color without extension and figure; from which several Theologians infer, in the treatise on the Eucharist, that the body of Christ cannot be seen in it, because although it is luminous and colored, it nevertheless lacks local figure and extension.

I say secondly, the Blessed see some of God's decrees: for as we shall say below, some see those things which pertain to their own state, among which are some of God's decrees, especially those which regard their predestination and salvation. They do not, however, see all things, otherwise all the objects freely willed by God, and all future things, would be known by them, which cannot be said, as is established concerning the last day of judgment, of which it is said, Matthew 24, and Mark 13: "But of that day and hour no one knoweth, no, not the angels in heaven."

But if you ask, how are those things known by the Blessed? I answer that some things are known by them in the Word, and through the light of glory, which eminently contains the prophetic light, by which God's free decrees and future contingent things are revealed. Others are known outside the Word, through God's immediate or mediate revelation; for God immediately, through Himself, illumines the higher Angels, but the lower ones by the mediation of the higher, as we shall show in the Treatise on Angels.

I say thirdly, the Blessed see possible creatures in the divine essence as in a cause and medium previously known. For the knowledge of the blessed is exemplified from the knowledge by which God knows Himself, and is its imitation and participation: but God, in knowing Himself, knows possible creatures in His essence as in a cause, as we shall show in the following treatise: Therefore likewise the Blessed, seeing the divine essence, know them in it as in a cause. And the same, proportionally, must be said of existing and future creatures, namely that they are known by the Blessed in the divine

essence, not taken nakedly, but as determined by the free decree of God. Whence Augustine, Confessions, book 13, chapter 15, says that the Angels always see the face of God, and there read whatever His eternal will wills. And Bernard, On Consideration, book 5, chapter 4, asserts that the Blessed see in God the thoughts of peace, the mysteries of good will; by which it is plainly signified that creatures, even as existing, or future, are seen in the Word. The arguments which are usually raised against this conclusion will be more conveniently proposed and resolved in the following treatise, when we shall treat of the knowledge of possible things, which is called the knowledge of simple intelligence.

I say fourthly, the Blessed clearly and distinctly know the mysteries of our faith, the heaven, the elements, and the principal parts of this universe, and those things which pertain to their own state.

The conclusion is proved by this discourse: Beatitude must perfectly satiate every just appetite of the rational creature: But the blessed can be considered in three ways, first as elevated to the order of grace, secondly as a part of the universe, thirdly insofar as he is such a particular person, and insofar as he was constituted in such a dignity, for instance, King, Supreme Pontiff, Patriarch of religion, father of a family, etc. And according to this threefold consideration, he desires to know diverse objects. In the first way, indeed, he seeks to know the mysteries of the faith, such as grace, the light of glory, his predestination, the mystery of the Incarnation, of the Eucharist, etc. In the second way he seeks to know the species, and natures, and the principal parts of this universe, such as the Angels, the heavens, the elements, etc. In the third way he seeks to know those things which pertain to his state: e.g., Saint Gregory, because he was Supreme Pontiff, desires to know those things which pertain to the present or future state of the Church; Saint Dominic, those things which pertain to the state of his Order; Saint Louis, those things which pertain to the state of the kingdom of France: Therefore the Blessed know, through the beatific vision, the mysteries of our faith, the principal parts of this universe, and those things which pertain to their own state.

Chapter VI

On the measure of the beatific vision.

I say briefly, the beatific vision is not measured by time, nor by aeon, nor by essential eternity, but by participated eternity.

The first part is clear, for time is the measure of successive things: but the blessed vision is total and simultaneous, because the blessed see all things which they see in the Word, in the single species of the divine essence; but those things which are seen in a single species,

are seen simultaneously, and not successively. This reason Saint Bernard touches, Sermon 30 on the Canticle, in these words: That vision stands, because the form stands by which it is then seen: for it is, and undergoes no mutation from what it was, is, or will be.

It is confirmed: The principles of the beatific vision, namely the light of glory, and the divine essence taking the place of the intelligible species, are not measured by time, as is established: Therefore neither is the beatific vision itself.

The second part does not seem less certain, for since the beatific vision is a participation of divine intellection, it renders the soul, as it were, deiform, and operating in a divine manner, and consequently in a simpler and more immutable manner, than an Angel is in its being; whence since the diversity of the measure of the duration of things is taken from their diverse degree of immutability, as Saint Thomas teaches above, question 10, article 5, the beatific vision requires to be measured by some nobler and more uniform measure than is the aeon, which measures the substance of the Angels.

It is confirmed: The aeon, although it is in itself immutable and total simultaneously, admits some succession, and some accidental variations in an Angel, whether as to local motions, or as to diverse acts, as we shall say in the Treatise on Angels: but the beatific vision, since it constitutes the intellectual creature in its ultimate term and end, and supreme beatitude, which cannot grow any further, admits no succession or variation, even accidental, in the notion of vision. Whence Augustine, On the Trinity 15, chapter 16, speaking of the blessed vision, says: Our thoughts will not be volatile, going from one thing to another and returning, but we shall see all our knowledge simultaneously in one concept. And Bernard, On Consideration 5: For then the fragile keenness of our mind, however vehemently it strives, will not in any way fall away or recoil into its own plurality: it will rather gather itself, unite itself, and conform itself to that unity, or rather to that unity.

You will say, the aeon is the measure of a thing immutable in its being, and mutable according to the operations adjoined to it: but the beatific vision, although it is immutable in its being, is nevertheless mutable as to the operations adjoined to it, namely as to the illuminations and revelations which the blessed receive successively outside the Word; since at the very beginning of beatitude they do not see all things which pertain to their state, but are illumined about these gradually and successively: Therefore the beatific vision is measured by the aeon.

I answer that when it is said that the aeon is the measure of a thing immutable in its being, and mutable according to operations, this must be understood of operations

adjoined to it per se, but not of those adjoined to it only per accidens: but the illuminations and revelations which occur outside the Word do not per se pertain to the blessed vision, nor emanate from it, as love, fruition, and delight do, but only per accidens; for they pertain to another genus of knowledge, which the Theologians call infused knowledge, which follows upon the beatific vision only per accidens.

The third part, finally, of the conclusion, asserting that the blessed vision is not measured by essential eternity, but by participated eternity, is established from the fact that that which is measured by essential eternity must be altogether immutable, both extrinsically and intrinsically; for just as time follows upon motion, so eternity follows upon total immutability: but the beatific vision, although intrinsically it is invariable and indefectible, nevertheless admits mutability and defectibility extrinsically; for God can destroy and change it, by absolute power, and bring it about that it be greater or lesser in the same subject, at different times: Therefore it is not measured by essential eternity, but by participated eternity. Whence Saint Thomas, Against the Gentiles 4, chapter 61, says that the blessed vision is in participation of eternity. And in this part, above, question 10, article 5, ad 1, he says that spiritual creatures, as to the vision of glory, participate in eternity.

You will say, the divine essence, which in the beatific vision takes the place of the species, is measured by essential eternity: Therefore also the vision itself. I answer that the divine essence, as it is in itself, is measured by essential eternity, but not precisely insofar as it takes the place of a species in the beatific vision; because its concurrence to the vision begins, and can cease, and it can at one time concur to a greater, at another to a lesser vision, which altogether imports some mutability, at least extrinsically, and in order to the absolute power of God.

Treatise III

On the Knowledge of God.

In this Treatise we shall deal, first, with the formal object, both motive and terminative, of the divine intellect. Secondly, with God's knowledge with respect to possible things, which is usually called the knowledge of simple notion or intelligence. Thirdly, with the causality of God's knowledge. Fourthly, with God's knowledge with respect to future contingents. Fifthly, with middle knowledge, which is a great and celebrated subject of dispute.

Chapter I

On the formal object, both motive and terminative, of the divine intellect.

I say first, the formal and primary object of the divine intellect is not being as common analogically to created and uncreated being, but only uncreated being.

This is proved by a threefold reason taken from Saint Thomas, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 48. The first is: That alone is known per se primarily by the intellect, by whose species the intellect understands: but the species by which God understands is the divine essence alone: Therefore that alone can be understood per se primarily by the divine intellect, and consequently creatures cannot pertain to its primary object. The Minor is certain, for a species is, together with the intellect, a principle of intellection: but nothing distinct from the divine essence can be a principle of divine intellection: Therefore the species by which God understands must be necessary. The Major, however, is thus proved by Saint Thomas: An operation is proportioned to the form which is the principle of the operation: but a species is the form and principle of intellection: Therefore this must be proportioned to that, and consequently cannot exceed it: but if one thing were per se primarily known by the intellection, and another per se primarily represented by the species, the proportion of intellection with the species would not be preserved: Therefore that alone is per se primarily known by the intellect, which is per se primarily represented to it by the species.

The second reason of Saint Thomas, which is the fifth in order, is formed by him thus: What is understood first and per se is a perfection of the intelligent being, for the intellect is perfect according to this, that it understands in act, which occurs by this, that it is one with what is first and per se understood: but nothing created can be a perfection of the divine intellect: Therefore nothing created can be first understood by it, and consequently its primary object cannot be being as such, common analogically to created and uncreated being.

The third reason, which is the seventh in order, is thus: Powers are specified by their formal and primary object, as the Philosophers commonly teach: but the divine intellect cannot be specified by created being: Therefore that cannot be its formal and primary object, nor consequently being, as common analogically to created and uncreated being. The Major is clear; the Minor also seems manifest, for to give specification to a power is to exercise true and proper causality upon it; but nothing created can be a true and proper cause of any divine perfection, otherwise some divine perfection would truly and properly depend on creatures, which is repugnant: Therefore the divine intellect cannot be specified by created being.

I say secondly, the relations and attributes are not the formal motive object of the divine intellect, but this belongs to the divine essence alone, as virtually distinct from them.

It is proved, first: Divine understanding, since it is constitutive of the divine nature, as was shown in the preceding treatise, chapter 3, presupposes nothing in God virtually prior to itself: but if the relations and attributes were the formal motive object of the divine intellect, God's understanding would presuppose in God something virtually prior to itself: Therefore the relations and attributes are not the formal motive object of the divine intellect. The Major is clear, for it belongs to the notion of a primary constitutive to be the first thing understood in the constituted thing. The Minor also seems manifest, for a motive object, virtually distinct from the intellection, is prior to it virtually: Therefore if the relations and attributes, which are virtually distinguished from God's intellect and intellection, were the formal motive object of the divine intellect, God's understanding would presuppose in God something virtually prior to itself.

It is proved, secondly: Volition is one of the divine attributes: but it is repugnant to divine volition to be the formal motive object of the divine intellect: Therefore also to the attributes. The Major is clear; the Minor is proved. The motive object of divine intellection is prior to it virtually: but God's volition cannot be prior virtually to divine intellection, since intellection is prior to volition: Therefore it is repugnant to divine volition to be a motive object with respect to divine intellection.

It is proved, thirdly, and it is shown that the divine relations are not the formal motive object of the divine intellect. That is the formal motive object of the divine intellect which is a species, or performs the office of a species by which it is fecundated for intellection: but the divine relations do not have the notion of a species fecundating the divine intellect for intellection: Therefore neither the notion of a motive object with respect to it. The Major is clear; the Minor is proved. A species is a principle by which of understanding: but the divine relations are not the principle by which of divine intellection: Therefore they are not species with respect to the divine intellect. The Minor is proved, both concerning essential intellection, for absolute things are prior to notional and relative things, and consequently cannot be, with respect to them, a principle. And concerning notional intellection, for the relations of filiation and spiration are not principles by which of notional intellection, by which the Father produces the Word — indeed not even paternity itself; for the Word is similar to the Father speaking in the principle by which; but is not similar to Him in paternity: Therefore that is not the principle by which of notional intellection, by which the Father produces the Word.

It is confirmed: If the divine relations, not only by reason of the essence, but also by reason of themselves, were the species by which God understands, it would follow that the notion of species is multiplied in God not only virtually but also really: but this cannot be said: Therefore neither can that. The Minor is clear, for it does not seem less inconvenient that an intelligible species be really multiplied in God, than the intellect, or intellection. The consequence of the Major, however, is proved: Those things which belong to the divine relations by reason of that which they add above the essence and the absolute line, are really multiplied: Therefore if the notion of species belongs to them by reason of that which they add above the essence, a species is really multiplied in God.

I say thirdly, the relations and attributes do not pertain to the formal and primary, terminative object of the divine intellect, but this is the essence alone, as virtually distinct from them.

This conclusion follows from the foundations established in the preceding. For in the first place, the motive and terminative object must correspond to one another, since the same order is preserved between objects in terminating cognition, as in terminating representation; whence, because a being of reason is not represented through its own species, but through the species of a real being, to whose similitude it is feigned, it is known by our intellect not primarily, but secondarily; nor for any other reason are creatures known secondarily by God, except because they are secondarily represented through the species by which the divine intellect understands: Therefore if the relations and attributes are not the primary, motive object of the divine intellect, and this belongs to the divine essence alone, as virtually distinct from them, they will likewise not be its primary, terminative object, but this would belong to the divine essence alone, as virtually distinct from them.

Furthermore, if the relations and attributes cannot be the formal motive object of the divine intellect, because divine intellection, as constitutive of the divine nature, presupposes nothing in God virtually prior to itself, for the same reason they cannot be its formal terminative object; for the terminative object, virtually distinct from the intellection, is prior to it, since it is, as it were, its cause.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: The more perfect some power is, the more universal object it has, wherefore the internal senses have a more universal object than the external; and because among the internal senses common sense excels, a more universal object corresponds to it; likewise because the intellect exceeds the imagination in perfection, it enjoys a more universal object; whence since the divine intellect is the most perfect power, it must have the most universal object: but being, abstracting from

created and uncreated, is more universal than uncreated being: Therefore the formal object of the divine intellect is not uncreated being, but being as such, abstracting from created and uncreated.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: The more perfect some power is, the more universal object it has, with universality of containment and causality — I grant the Major; with universality of predication — I deny the Major, and under the same distinction of the Minor, I deny the consequence. From this, therefore, that the divine intellect is most perfect, it only follows that its object must be more universal in containment and causality, but not in predication; for the universality of eminential containment is more perfect than the universality of predication, since the latter is founded in potentiality, the former in actuality.

You will object, secondly, against the second conclusion: For this reason divine nature is, by reason of itself, a species, and consequently a motive object of the divine intellect, because it is pure act, excluding all potentiality: but also the attributes and relations, by reason of themselves, and as virtually distinct from the divine essence, are pure act, and exclude all potentiality, otherwise they would not be supremely perfect: Therefore they are the species by which the divine intellect understands.

I answer that the divine essence does not have the notion of species and motive object of the divine intellect, from the common notion of pure act, but because it is the primordial pure act, radically containing all God's perfections, which does not belong to the relations and attributes. Just as, therefore, although an Angel's nature and its properties agree in the degree of immateriality, only the nature is united to its intellect as a species, because it is the root of the other perfections; so although the attributes and relations agree with the divine nature in the notion of pure act, only the nature is the species by which the divine intellect knows all God's formalities, because it is the root of all of them, and consequently sufficient for representing all things.

You will object, thirdly, against the third conclusion: Divine being as such is common to the relations and attributes, and to every divine being, but not so the divine essence, as virtually distinct from the attributes and relations, since it is not predicated of them insofar as it is distinguished from them: Therefore divine being as such must be assigned as the formal primary terminative object of the divine intellect, not the divine essence itself, as virtually distinct from the attributes and relations.

I answer that divine being as such is common to the relations and attributes, and to every divine being, by community of notion, just as created being as such is common to all creatures; but the divine essence is common to the relations and attributes by real

community, as actually virtually and radically containing them. Whence since this containment is more perfect than the other (for the common by notion stands potentially to its inferiors, and is conceived as divisible and multipliable in them), the divine essence is assigned by us as the formal primary terminative object of the divine intellect, not the notion of divine being as such.

Chapter II

On God's knowledge with respect to possible things, which is called the knowledge of simple intelligence.

All Theologians suppose it certain, against Aureolus, that God knows creatures according to that proper and particular being which they have, or can have, in themselves, and not only according to that eminent and increate being which they have in God. For since God's knowledge is infinitely perfect, it must extend to whatever is knowable, distinctly and in particular; and since it is the cause of things, as we shall show in the following chapter, just as He produces them according to the proper and particular being which they have in themselves, so also He knows them. But there is a celebrated controversy among them, concerning the manner in which God knows them, namely whether He knows them immediately, and independently of the divine essence previously known, or only mediately, and in the divine essence as in a cause, and a medium previously known? The former several of the Recent authors assert; the latter, the Thomists: some, however, to more easily extricate themselves from this difficulty, admit both ways of knowing creatures in God.

I say first, God knows possible creatures in His essence as in a cause and medium previously known.

This conclusion Dionysius expressly teaches, chapter 7, On the Divine Names, where he says that God has, from Himself and in Himself through cause, an anticipated knowledge of all things; that He knows all things by a single causal grasp; that the divine wisdom, knowing itself, knows all things. Saint Thomas also plainly teaches it in various places, especially Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 49. And in this part, above, question 1, article 8, and here, question 14, article 6, where he proves it by this reason: No cause can be comprehended, unless the effects contained in it are known: but God is a cause containing eminently the creatures, and comprehending Himself: Therefore He knows all creatures in Himself as in a cause. The Minor is clear. The Major is proved. A cause is then comprehended, when it is known adequately, and in every mode in which it is knowable: but it cannot be known adequately, and in every mode in which it is

knowable, unless the effects which it virtually contains are known in it: Therefore it cannot be known comprehensively, unless the effects which it eminently or virtually contains are known in it. The Major is established, the Minor is proved. A cause eminently or virtually containing some effects can be attained as the ground of knowing them: Therefore unless it is known thus, it is not known adequately, and in every mode in which it is knowable.

It is confirmed: The knowledge which God has of creatures is wisdom: but it would not be such, if He did not know them in His essence as in a cause; for wisdom is the knowledge of an effect through its highest cause; but the highest cause of a creature is God's essence: Therefore etc.

I say secondly, God does not know possible creatures in themselves immediately, that is, independently of the divine essence previously seen and known, and consequently does not know them in two ways, namely in Himself mediately, and in themselves immediately. Thus Saint Thomas here, article 5, toward the end of the body, where he thus concludes: Therefore it must be said that God sees Himself in Himself: but other things than Himself He sees not in themselves, but in Himself.

Reason also persuades this, first because if God knew creatures immediately in themselves, and independently of the divine essence previously known, the formal and specificative object of the divine intellect would be created being, or being as such, abstracting from created and uncreated: but this cannot be said: Therefore neither can that. The consequence of the Major is evident, for that is the formal and specificative object of an intellect, which, by reason of itself, and thus immediately, is attained by it. The Minor, however, was proved in the preceding chapter by a threefold reason taken from Saint Thomas, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 48.

Secondly, God cannot know creatures, unless using for this His essence as an intelligible species: but using His essence as an intelligible species, He does not know creatures immediately in themselves, but mediately in Himself as the primary object and previously known: Therefore etc. The Major is clear, for God cannot know creatures through a created species, both because He would be in potency to it, and would be perfected by it; and also because since He knows all things from eternity, it would follow that something created, namely that species, would be from eternity. The Minor, however, is proved: The divine essence, as species, does not represent per se primarily and immediately the creatures: Therefore God, using His essence as an intelligible species, does not know creatures immediately in themselves. The consequence is clear, because an object is known through a species in the manner in which it is represented by it. The

Antecedent, however, which some of the Adversaries deny, is proved, first, because an object immediately represented through a species must agree with it in the degree of immateriality, as Saint Thomas teaches above, question 12, article 2, inferring from this principle that no created species can represent God quidditatively: but nothing created can have such agreement with the divine essence, otherwise it would be pure act, as God is: Therefore nothing created can be represented immediately through the divine essence, as species. Secondly, the representation of a species is either by reason of similitude, or by reason of identity with the object: but the divine essence can be perfectly similar to no created thing, and much less identified with it: Therefore the divine essence, as a species, can primarily represent no created thing. Thirdly, since a species is specified by its primary or immediate object, if the divine essence, as a species, primarily or immediately represented creatures, it would receive its specific perfection from them, which is repugnant: Therefore the divine essence, as species, does not represent per se primarily and immediately the creatures.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: The divine essence cannot have the notion of a medium leading to knowledge of creatures: Therefore God does not know them mediately in His essence as a cause. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent, however, Vasquez proves in two ways: First, because a medium which leads to knowledge of another must denote a real relation to it, and be perfectly assimilated to it, which two things, however, cannot belong to the divine essence, with respect to creatures. Secondly, because a medium leading to knowledge of another must have a necessary connection with it, otherwise it could not lead to certain and infallible knowledge of it; just as a probable medium does not lead to certain and scientific knowledge of a conclusion, because it is not necessarily connected with it: but the divine essence does not have a necessary connection with possible creatures, otherwise, they being destroyed, it would likewise be destroyed, which seems absurd: Therefore it cannot be a medium leading to knowledge of them.

I answer by denying the Antecedent, and to its first proof I say that although the medium of knowledge, and the thing which is known in it, must denote a real relation to one another, and be perfectly assimilated, when both are of the same order, and agree univocally; not, however, when the medium is of a higher and uncreated order, and they agree only analogically; as the divine essence and creatures — for then that medium is independent of that which it manifests, and it suffices that the manifested thing, which on the contrary depends on it, denote a real relation to it. And certainly, since a species is the formal similitude of its primary object, it denotes a greater relation to it, and must be more assimilated to it, than that which has the notion of a previously known medium,

and yet Vasquez teaches that the divine essence, without denoting a real relation to creatures, and being perfectly assimilated to them, has the notion of a species immediately, and thus primarily, representing them. There is, therefore, no reason to deny that it can have, without a real relation to creatures, and total similitude with them, the notion of a medium in which they were previously known, and as in a cause, virtually containing them, are represented by God.

To the second proof of the Antecedent, I deny the Minor, and to its proof I say that, the possible creatures being destroyed, the divine omnipotence would be destroyed, not indeed a priori, and through an intrinsic ground, but a posteriori, and through an extrinsic ground. The reason is, because the possibility of creatures is not something in itself actually outside the potency of the cause, nor consequently can it be destroyed except in the cause: but this possibility cannot be destroyed in the cause, unless the power of producing creatures is destroyed, which is the very cause itself, and consequently unless the cause itself is destroyed. From which you will understand that, without any imperfection of God, it can and must be admitted, against Vasquez, that God would be impossible, if even a single fly were impossible; likewise that God does not exist any more necessarily, than a fly is necessarily possible.

You will object, secondly, against the second conclusion. Creatures are known by God in every mode in which they are knowable, otherwise He would be infinite in knowing nothing: but they are knowable not only in the divine essence as cause, but also immediately in themselves; and in fact they are known in both ways by the soul of Christ, and by the blessed Angels, in whom is admitted, following Augustine, a twofold knowledge of creatures, namely morning and evening; or in the Word, and outside the Word: Therefore God knows creatures not only in His essence as in a cause, but also immediately in themselves.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: in every mode not denoting imperfection on the part of the knowledge — I grant the Major. If the mode of knowing involves imperfection — I deny the Major, and under the same distinction of the Minor, I deny the consequence. For, as is established from what has been said above, immediate knowledge of creatures in themselves reflects back into the knowledge the imperfection of dependence and specification from them. From which the disparity to the examples adduced is clear, for such imperfection is not repugnant to the created acts of Christ's soul, and to the knowledge of the Angels, as it is to divine knowledge; because the specificative object of the human or angelic intellect is not uncreated being, but being as such, insofar as it abstracts from created and uncreated: but the specificative object of the divine intellect is uncreated being alone, or the divine essence alone, as was shown in the

preceding chapter.

Chapter III

On the causality of God's knowledge with respect to creatures.

No one denies that God's knowledge, at least directively, concurs to the production of creatures; for since God is an intellectual agent, and does not proceed in a blind manner in the production of things, but with infinite wisdom effects all things in number, weight, and measure, it follows that God's knowledge shines forth before all His works, and directs Him in the production of creatures. Whence it is said, Psalm 103: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom," and Proverbs 3: "The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth, hath established the heavens by prudence." There remains, therefore, the difficulty, whether divine knowledge concurs to the production of things not only directively, but also effectively, and to which knowledge such effective causality belongs, whether to that which is called of simple intelligence, or to that which is called of vision?

For resolution, I say first, that God's knowledge is the cause of things, not only directive, but also effective.

It is proved, first, from Augustine, On the Trinity 15, chapter 15, where he thus says: God knows all spiritual and corporeal creatures not because they are, but they are, because He knows: but this causal clause could not be true, if God's knowledge were not a productive cause of things: Therefore according to Augustine, God's knowledge concurs effectively to the production of things.

Reason also persuades this, both because (as we shall show below) God produces things ad extra, through an act of command, which proceeds from the intellect, although it presupposes a motion of the will, as Saint Thomas teaches, I-II, question 17, article 1. Also because if God's knowledge were not an effective cause of things, it would depend on them, and be measured by them, as to truth and certitude; for that knowledge depends on the object, and is measured by it, as to truth and certitude, which does not make the object, but presupposes it.

Nor is the response of some Recent authors valid, who say that God's knowledge depends on created things, as on objects, but not as on causes physically influencing. For in the first place this response openly contradicts the doctrine of Saint Thomas, for here, article 8, ad 3, he thus says: Just as natural knowable things are prior to our knowledge, and its measure, so God's knowledge is prior to natural things, and their measure. And below, question 16, article 1, he places this distinction between the divine and our

intellect, that ours depends on things, but not the divine, on which rather things depend, and are said to be true, because they are adequated to it.

Secondly, if God's knowledge depended on created things, as on objects, and presupposed in them, rather than making, certitude and truth, it would not, as to this, be more perfect than the knowledge of the Angels; for since they do not receive species from things, but have them infused by God, their knowledge does not depend on created things, in the genus of an efficient cause and physically influencing their intellect, as our knowledge does, which receives species from things, but only in the genus of a material and objective cause: Therefore if in this second way divine knowledge depended on and were caused by things, it would not be more perfect, nor more independent of them, than the knowledge of the Angels.

Thirdly, God's knowledge is no less perfect, nor less independent of created things, than His love: but divine love does not depend on nor is measured by the goodness and perfection which is in things, nor does it presuppose it, but posits and effects it, as Saint Thomas teaches below, question 20, article 2, in these words: God's love infuses and creates goodness in things: Therefore likewise God's knowledge does not depend on the certitude and truth which is in things, nor does it presuppose it, but rather effects it.

I say secondly, the knowledge of simple intelligence is the effective cause of things in first act, but the knowledge of vision, as it is free and of approbation, causes them in second act.

The first part is clear, for the knowledge of simple intelligence contains in itself the ideas of possible things, and stands like art in the mind of the craftsman, antecedent to the will of producing the work, which is productive in first act of artificial works.

The second, however, which is denied by the Recent authors, is proved, first, from the Holy Fathers: for Saint Augustine, Confessions 13, last chapter, writes this: We, therefore, see the things which Thou hast made, because they are; but Thou, because Thou seest them, they are. Saint Gregory, Moralia 20, chapter 23, says: The things which are, are not seen by His eternity because they are, but they are, because they are seen. And book 32, chapter 6: He does not create by seeing existing things, but contains existing things by seeing. Where, since they use the word "see," they plainly indicate a knowledge not of simple intelligence, but of vision.

It is proved, secondly, from Saint Thomas, Book 1, dist. 39, question 1, article 1, ad 5, where he thus says: God's being is not subject to the liberty of the will, as is His knowledge of the operative work of the creature: but the knowledge which is subject to

the liberty of the divine will, or to God's free decree, is not of the purely possible, but of the future, nor of simple intelligence, but of vision: Therefore according to Saint Thomas's mind, this is the cause of creatures, not that.

It is proved, thirdly: The knowledge which is the cause, in second act, of the futurition and existence of things, must know them as future and existing: but the knowledge of simple intelligence is not knowledge of things as future and existing, but only as merely possible: Therefore it is not the cause, in second act, of the futurition and existence of things, but this causality belongs to the knowledge of vision, by which God knows future and existing things. The Minor is expressly taught by Saint Thomas here, question 14, article 9, in these words: Some things, although they are not in act, nevertheless either have been, or will be, and all these things God is said to know by the knowledge of vision: but some things are which are in the potency of God or of the creature, but which nevertheless neither are, nor will be; with respect to these He is not said to have the knowledge of vision, but of simple intelligence. The Major, however, seems manifest, both because just as that which medicine does not know, it does not cure, so that which art or science does not know, it does not cause. Also because, according to Augustine, City of God, book 11, chapter 10, God made nothing not knowing it; but He would have made it so, if the act and knowledge by which He causes the futurition and existence of things were not terminated at them as at known and knowable objects, but only as at effects produced by causality: Therefore etc.

Finally, the same part can be proved by this fundamental reason: God produces creatures through an act of command, according to Psalm 148: "He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created": but command is knowledge of vision: Therefore the knowledge of vision is the cause of things. The Minor is proved: Command follows the efficacious election of things in God: but the act presupposing an efficacious election is the knowledge of vision, and not of simple intelligence: Therefore command is the knowledge of vision. The Minor is established, for the knowledge of simple intelligence, since it is not free, but necessary, does not presuppose, but precedes the election and decree of the divine will: Therefore the act presupposing such election and decree is the knowledge of vision. The Major, however, in which lies the difficulty, is shown, first, from Saint Thomas, I-II, question 17, article 1, toward the end of the body, where he thus says: Whence it remains that to command is an act of reason, presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason moves by impulse to the exercise of the act: Therefore divine command presupposes the efficacious election of things. Secondly, it is proved by reason: Command is a practical and free act of the intellect: but all liberty of the intellect originates from an act of the will, and presupposes it, since the will is the first free thing,

and the first root of liberty: Therefore command is an act of the intellect, presupposing the efficacious election of the will.

For fuller understanding of this conclusion, and the resolution of several arguments, it must be diligently observed, that I said, in the second part of the conclusion, that the knowledge of vision is the cause of things in second act, as it is free and of approbation; because just as, although intellection and utterance are a single action of the intellect, which is simultaneously the production of the word, and the contemplation of it; that action, however, insofar as it is the pure contemplation of the object, and, as the Philosophers say, insofar as it is in quiet being, is not productive of the word, but presupposes it as previously made by itself in nature and reason, insofar as it is utterance. So also, although the knowledge of approbation and of vision is a single, altogether undistinguished knowledge in God, which, according to the diverse relations it denotes, either to the decree which it presupposes, or to the object which it beholds, receives those diverse names; it itself, however, insofar as it is formally of vision, and as considered as purely intuitive and contemplative of its object, is not the cause of things, but presupposes them as made by itself in some prior of nature and reason, insofar as it is practical and of approbation. Whence Saint Thomas here, article 8, toward the end of the body, says that God's knowledge is the cause of things, according as it has the will conjoined, and as it is customarily called the knowledge of approbation. From which you will easily understand how God does not cause sins, although He knows them through the knowledge of vision; because indeed He does not know them through the knowledge of vision, insofar as it is of approbation, since they presuppose no positive decree in God, by which He wills and approves their existence or futurition, but only a permissive one, by which He wills to permit their malice and deformity.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: It does not belong more to an intellective power to effect its object, than to an effective power to understand its work: but an effective power does not understand its work: Therefore neither does an intellective power effect its object.

I answer by distinguishing the Major, and granting it of an intellective power which is merely speculative, but denying it of an intellective power which is eminently speculative and practical: for it belongs to the latter to understand and to effect simultaneously, as is clear in our intellection, which (as we said above) simultaneously has the notion of utterance and of intellection, with respect to the word which it produces, for by understanding it, it produces it, and by producing it, it understands it. The same must be said, proportionally, of God's free knowledge, which is eminently speculative and practical.

You will object, secondly, against the second part of the second conclusion: Saint Thomas here, article 9, says that that knowledge is the cause of things which, being indifferent to opposites, from the determination of the will produces a determinate effect: but the knowledge of vision is not indifferent to opposites, though the knowledge of simple intelligence is, namely to the production or non-production of creatures, and to the production of these rather than others: Therefore in Saint Thomas's doctrine, the knowledge of vision is not the cause of things, but the knowledge of simple intelligence.

It is confirmed: The Holy Doctor there says that knowledge is in God the cause of things, as the craftsman's knowledge is the cause of artifacts: but the craftsman's knowledge, which is the cause of artifacts, is not intuitive, since he does not behold the artifact except after it is made, and exists: Therefore likewise the knowledge in God which is the cause of things is not that which is called of vision, or intuitive, but that which is called of simple intelligence, which is abstractive.

To the objection I answer by distinguishing the Minor: The knowledge of vision is not indifferent to opposites, after it has passed from the notion of the knowledge of simple intelligence to the notion of the knowledge of vision — I grant the Minor. Before it passed to that state, and while it was only the knowledge of simple intelligence — I deny the Minor and its consequence. For the knowledge which, in the doctrine of Saint Thomas cited, being indifferent to opposites, from the determination of the will produces a determinate effect, is knowledge passing from the state of simple intelligence, under which it is indifferent to opposites, to the state of the knowledge of vision, under which, by the determination of the will, it produces a determinate effect. Whence the argument does not exclude that, as it is the knowledge of vision, it is not the cause of things, but only that before it became such from the determination of the will, it had to be indifferent to opposites, and thus knowledge of simple intelligence — which we gladly admit; for we confess that it is entitatively the same knowledge, which antecedently to the free decree of the divine will is indifferent to the production of things, and consequently of simple intelligence, and which nevertheless, upon that decree arriving, is determined to their production, and is called the knowledge of vision.

To the confirmation it must be said that God's practical knowledge agrees in some respects with the knowledge of a created craftsman, and differs from it in many respects; for they agree in this, that both concur to the work, not only directively, but also effectively; they differ, however, first, in this, that a created craftsman does not operate by bare and sole command, nor instantly, but with delay of time, and with the application of active and passive things, from which it happens that his knowledge cannot be carried intuitively into the work, while it is being made, but only after it has

been made. God, however, produces things instantly, and by the sole act of command, nor does He need to apply active things to passive, but educes things from nothing; whence His practical knowledge can, at the same instant at which He operates, be carried intuitively into the creatures He produces. Secondly, God's knowledge differs from the craftsman's knowledge, in that the craftsman's knowledge, after the work is made, is purely speculative, because the artifact depends on it only in becoming, not in being preserved: but all created things depend on God's practical knowledge, not only in becoming, but also in being preserved, according to that which we related above from Gregory the Great: He does not create by seeing existing things, but contains existing things by seeing. Whence God's knowledge, with respect to creatures, always remains eminently formally speculative and practical, but not so the craftsman's knowledge with respect to artifacts. From this you will easily understand that saying of Genesis 1, which the Adversaries object to us: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." For this must be understood of the knowledge of vision, not insofar as it is productive, but as it is preservative of things; for under this aspect it presupposes them as made and existing, just as preservation presupposes creation.

You will object, thirdly: The knowledge of vision presupposes things existing and future: Therefore it does not cause their existence and futurition. The consequence is clear, for no cause presupposes its effect. The Antecedent, however, is proved as to both parts. And in the first place, that the knowledge of vision presupposes existing things seems manifest, from the fact that intuitive knowledge presupposes its object already made and existing, since it is impossible to intuit things which are not. That it also presupposes their futurition, is established from the fact that it follows the decree of the divine will, by which things are drawn from the state of mere possibility, to the state of futurition.

I answer by denying the Antecedent as to both parts, and to the proof of the first, I say that although intuitive knowledge, when it is merely speculative, presupposes its object already made and existing, it is otherwise when it is eminently speculative and practical. Or I grant this of intuitive knowledge which is measured by things; but I deny it of intuitive knowledge which is the measure of things: but the knowledge of God's vision is not purely speculative, but also practical, nor is it measured by things, but is their measure, as was shown above. And this doctrine and response can be illustrated by several examples. For in the mystery of the Trinity, the eternal Father, by seeing the Son, produces Him, and by producing Him, sees Him; and if the vision of my eye poured forth light, as the sun its light, by seeing it would illuminate, and by illuminating it would see. Likewise a being of reason is an object of human knowledge, as existing in exercised act, and yet is its effect; for it is not caused through the cognition by which it is

attained as possible, but through the notion by which it is apprehended as existing in exercised act. Finally, our intellection, as we said above, simultaneously has the notion of utterance and of intellection with respect to the word which it produces, and by understanding it, produces it; and by producing it, understands it.

To the proof of the second part of the Antecedent, it must be said that although by reason of the divine decree things are future inchoatively and incompletely, they are not so totally and completely; because the principle immediately productive of things, and God's executive power, is not His will, but His practical intellect, which produces things ad extra, through an act of command, as will be clear below. Whence until such an act of command exists and is understood in God, the total and complete cause of the production and futurition of things is not yet understood, but only the inchoative and incomplete cause.

Corollaries worthy of note.

From what has been said it is gathered, first, that this proposition, "Things are therefore future, because they are known by God," is true, not only in an inferential sense, but also in a causal sense. For since rationality, e.g., is the cause of the ability to laugh, this proposition, "Man is capable of laughter, because rational," is true not only in an inferential sense, but also in a causal sense: Therefore likewise, if the knowledge of vision in God is the cause of things, as we showed in the second conclusion, this proposition, "Things are therefore future, because they are known by God," will be true in a causal sense, and not only in an inferential sense. Whence the Master of the Sentences, Book 1, dist. 38: "Nor are future things the cause of God's foreknowledge; for although, if they were not future, they would not be foreknown by God, they are nevertheless not therefore foreknown by God, because they are future. For if this were so, then something belonging to that which is eternal would exist as a cause foreign to Him, diverse from Him, and the creator's knowledge would depend on creatures, and the created would be the cause of the uncreated." Which reason we discussed at length above, in proving the second part of the second conclusion.

But if you object with the Adversaries that Justin Martyr, question 18, To the Gentiles, taught the opposite in these words: "Foreknowledge is not the cause of that which was going to be, but that which was going to be is the cause of the foreknowledge." Likewise that Origen, on chapter 8 of the Epistle to the Romans, said that things are not future because they are foreknown by God, but rather that God foreknows them because they are future.

I answer, first, that these and other similar testimonies of the Fathers can equally be objected against the doctrine of the Adversaries, as against ours, since they teach that the knowledge of simple intelligence, as connoting God's will, or His decree, is the cause of things: and yet the Fathers cited, and others whom they object to us, say absolutely that God's foreknowledge is not the cause of the futurition of things.

I answer, secondly, that the Fathers in the places cited speak of sins, of which it is most true to say that they are not future because they are known and recognized by God through the knowledge of vision, as we declared at the end of the second conclusion. But if sometimes the Fathers do not speak of sins, but of free acts, whatever they may be, they only intend that divine foreknowledge is not the total and adequate cause of them, such that its causality impedes or excludes the free determination and cooperation of our will, and inflicts upon it some violence and coercion, as Saint Thomas expounds, question 2 of On Truth, article 14, ad 1. He offers another response to Origen's words here, article 8, ad 1, saying that when Origen said that things are not future because they are known by God, this must be understood of knowledge, not as it has the will conjoined, and as it connotes its decree, but according to the general notion of knowledge as such, to which as such the notion of causality does not belong. And that what he added, that God therefore foreknows certain things, because they are future, must be understood according to the cause of consequence, not according to the cause of being, that is, in a non-causal, but inferential sense; just as this proposition, "because Peter is capable of laughter, he is rational."

It is gathered, secondly, that God's executive, or productive, power of creatures, is not distinguished virtually from His intellect and will, but is the very practical intellect of God, as moved and applied by the will. For that attribute in God is immediately productive of creatures, which elicits the act by which God in fact produces creatures: but such an act is elicited by God's practical intellect, as moved and applied by the will: Therefore that is the immediately productive principle of creatures, or God's executive power. The Major is clear; the Minor is proved. God produces creatures ad extra through an act of command: but command is an act elicited by the practical intellect, as moved by the will: Therefore the act by which God produces creatures ad extra is elicited by His intellect. The Major is established from various passages of Scripture, in which the production of creatures is attributed to God's command: for it is said, Genesis 1: "Let there be light, and light was made." And Psalm 148: "He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created." And Matthew 8: "I will, be thou made clean," which two words must be read separately, as Jerome observes. Likewise, John 11, Christ says to Lazarus dead: "Lazarus, come forth." And Matthew 8: "He commanded the winds

and the sea." Where Jerome elegantly says: From this passage we understand that all creatures perceive the creator commanding — not by the error of the heretics, who think all things are animate, but by the majesty of the founder, by which what is insensible to us is sensible to Him. The Minor, however, is expressly taught by Saint Thomas, I-II, question 17, article 1, where he says that to command is an act of reason, presupposing an act of the will, by whose power reason moves.

Reason also persuades this: For command (as the Holy Doctor teaches in the same place) imports three things, namely intimation, ordination, and motion: the first two the intellect has from itself, for intimation is a spiritual utterance, according to that saying: "The mouth of the just shall meditate wisdom, and his tongue shall speak judgment." Ordination also belongs to the intellect, because it is an effect of executive prudence, and prudence is in the intellect. The third, however, it has from the will, which is first as regards exercise: Therefore command is an act elicited by the practical intellect, as moved by the will.

From this you will understand that the actual production of creatures is from art or from God's practical knowledge; for it is, as we have already shown, an act elicited by the divine intellect: but it is not an act of the light of first principles, which concerns necessary things; nor of prudence, which concerns things to be done: Therefore it is an act of art or of God's practical knowledge, which do not differ at all, as is seen in a created craftsman.

You will say, command is not an act of art, or of practical knowledge, but of prudence: Therefore if God produces creatures ad extra through an act of command, their production will not be an act of God's art, or practical knowledge, but of divine prudence or providence.

I answer that command regarding things to be done is an act of prudence, but command regarding things to be made is an act of art; and because the actual production of creatures concerns things to be made, it is not an act of prudence, but of divine art. From which you will infer that those who distinguish art virtually and attributally from God's practical knowledge can hardly maintain that the production of creatures is an act of God's practical knowledge, and that it holds in God the notion of executive power.

Against this corollary it can be objected that Saint Thomas below, question 25, article 1, ad 4, expressly teaches that executive power in God is distinguished virtually from His intellect and will, for he says: Power is not posited in God as something really distinct from knowledge and will, but according to notion, insofar, namely, as power imports the notion of a principle executing what the will commands, and what knowledge

directs.

I answer that, besides this response, the Holy Doctor added another, for he adds: Or it must be said that the divine knowledge or will itself, insofar as it is an effective principle, has the notion of power. Which second solution expresses his final judgment, whence it is more to be adhered to than the preceding. Especially since in Opusculum 11, chapter 3, and Quodlibet 6, article 1, he expressly teaches that the Angels move the heavens by the efficacious conception of the intellect, or by an act of command, and consequently does not acknowledge in them a locomotive power distinct from the practical intellect. Which a fortiori must be thought of God, as more simple, and more perfect.

It is gathered, thirdly, that the knowledge of vision differs from the knowledge of simple intelligence in this, that the latter concurs to the production of things directively only, by remote direction; the former, however, directively, by proximate and immediate direction, and effectively. For the latter concurs to the production of things by way of counsel, the former by way of command: but counsel only remotely and mediately directs the craftsman to make the work, whereas command directs him proximately and immediately, and moreover concurs effectively to its production, as is established from what has been said above: Therefore the knowledge of simple intelligence concurs to the production of things in only one way, namely directively, by remote and mediate direction; but the knowledge of vision, in two ways, namely directively, by proximate and immediate direction, and effectively.

Chapter IV

On the knowledge of future contingents.

It is certain that God has, from eternity, certain and infallible knowledge of future contingents, for since He is their cause, He knows them, when He produces them in time; otherwise He would act in a blind and ignorant manner, and without providence and wisdom; wherefore since divine knowledge is invariable, and cannot know anything in time which it did not know from eternity, it is manifest that God has had from eternity foreknowledge of all future things. Whence Augustine, City of God 5, chapter 9: To confess that God is, and to deny that He foreknows the future, is the most open madness. There is, therefore, only a difficulty, and controversy among the Theologians, concerning the mode, or the medium, in which God knows them from eternity. For Molina and Becanus think that God knows them antecedently to His decree, in free and contingent causes, or in the penetration and most perfect knowledge of the human will, which they call supercomprehension, in distinction from angelic knowledge, which, although it comprehends man's will, does not in it know his future free acts, as God does. To this opinion the view of Theophilus Raynaud is added, asserting that God knows through middle knowledge what the created will would do in these or those circumstances, if left to itself, and if it could operate alone without His concurrence. Suárez and Fonseca, however, whom Fasoli followed, teach that God knows future contingents, and our free acts, in His decree (not indeed actual and in exercised act, as the Thomists hold), but future, and to be posited in the following sign. Others hold that God knows future contingents in contradictorily opposed propositions, or in the force and law of contradiction, which requires that one proposition be determinately true and the other false. Others, finally, defenders of middle knowledge, in order to more easily extricate themselves from this difficulty, assert that God does not know future contingents in some objective mode, but immediately in themselves, and in the objective truth which they say those things have independently of God's decree, from the supposition of the future event. Before we declare and establish our own opinion, those various views of the Recent authors must be briefly compared.

§ I

All the opinions are refuted.

I say first, future contingents, whether absolute or conditioned, cannot be certainly and infallibly known by the divine intellect in free or contingent causes, as they precede the divine decree or predetermination.

Thus Saint Thomas here, article 13, where he thus says: A contingent cause stands to opposites, and thus a contingent, as future, is not subject with certainty to any knowledge; whence whoever knows a contingent effect only in its cause has only conjectural knowledge of it. By these words the Holy Doctor both taught and proved our conclusion: For just as from a principle only probable and opinionated, conclusions cannot be known certainly and scientifically, but only opinionatively; so neither in an indifferent and undetermined cause can future contingent effects be known certainly and determinately, but only conjecturally: but free and contingent causes, of themselves and antecedently to the divine decree or determination, are indifferent and undetermined to producing or not producing future and free contingents, and can either be impeded from without, lest they go into act, or determine themselves to the opposite act: Therefore, considered thus, future contingents cannot be known certainly and infallibly in them, but only conjecturally. Whence Saint Thomas, Book 1, dist. 38, question 1, article 1: Some causes stand toward either of two, and in these causes future effects have no certitude or determination.

Molina responds that although through simple comprehension future or free effects cannot be known certainly in an indifferent and undetermined cause, they can be through supercomprehension. Whence although future contingents cannot be known by an Angel in second causes, certainly and infallibly, but only conjecturally, they can indeed be known thus by God.

But on the contrary: since it belongs to the notion of comprehension that nothing of the comprehended thing be hidden from the one knowing, although supercomprehension exceeds comprehension, that excess does not stand on the part of the object, such that supercomprehension attains in the object something which comprehension does not know, but on the part of the mode of knowing, insofar as what is known more obscurely through comprehension is seen more clearly through it. Whence from the fact that God supercomprehends the human will, it can only be inferred that in it, antecedently to His decree, He has more perfect and clearer conjectural knowledge of its free acts, than an Angel, who only comprehends it, not, however, that He knows them in it certainly and infallibly. Just as from the fact that God not only comprehends, but also supercomprehends, a probable and opinionated principle, it does not follow that in it He knows certainly and scientifically the conclusions which it virtually contains, but only that He has of them a more perfect opinionated knowledge than an Angel.

You will say with Molina: God, in the opinion of the Thomists, knows certainly and infallibly, in free predetermined causes, the future free effects or acts: but such causes, even as they underlie divine predetermination, are indifferent; otherwise God's

predetermination would remove their indifference, and consequently their liberty: Therefore in indifferent causes free and contingent future things can be known certainly and infallibly. Whence Saint Thomas, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 67, teaches that just as from a necessary cause a necessary effect is known with certainty, so from a contingent, unimpeded cause, a contingent effect is known with certainty.

I answer, granting the Major, by distinguishing the Minor: free causes, as they underlie divine predetermination, are indifferent, with potential and privative indifference — I deny the Minor. With actual and positive indifference — I grant the Minor. Similarly I distinguish the consequent: Therefore in causes indifferent with potential and privative indifference, free effects can be known certainly — I deny. Indifferent with actual and positive indifference — I grant.

The solution is explained: There is a twofold indifference of created free will, one potential and privative, which consists in the lack and suspension of act, whence it is called by some the indifference of suspension, and this the created will has, before it operates; not from liberty, which is a perfection, but from imperfection, namely from the fact that it is not pure act. The other, positive and actual, which consists in this, that the will, while it actually operates, retains the power for the opposite. But although divine predetermination does not remove this indifference, which belongs to the notion of liberty, it does indeed remove the other, which is its imperfection. Whence it is not surprising that God can know certainly and infallibly the free acts of free will in predetermined free causes, since divine predetermination has a certain and infallible connection with the acts to which it is given; not, however, in free causes taken nakedly, and not predetermined by God, because these, considered thus, are undetermined for operating, and indifferent with the indifference of suspension, or potential and privative.

To the passage of Saint Thomas, I answer, following Ferrariensis in the same place, that the Holy Doctor is speaking there of natural causes, which, if not impeded from without, are as determined to their proper effects as necessary causes; whence in them, if the negation of impediments is certainly known, as happens in God's case, their future effects can be known certainly: it is otherwise, however, in created free will, which, even with every extrinsic impediment excluded, can from within indifferently act or not act; and consequently, even if the negation of all impediments is evidently known by God, He cannot infallibly know free acts in it, as determinately future.

From what has been said, the singular opinion of Theophilus Raynaud remains confuted, asserting that God explores through middle knowledge what our will would

do in these or those circumstances, if it could act by itself alone and without divine concurrence. For if the created will, as it has God's simultaneous concurrence adjoined, and as it is subject to a motion and grace merely morally exciting, cannot be a medium in which God knows certainly and infallibly its future free acts, as we showed against Molina; a fortiori the same will, taken nakedly and solitarily, and considered without God's concurrence, could not have the notion of a medium leading to certain and infallible knowledge of its future acts. I add that to inquire what man would do, if he acted by himself alone, is the same as to investigate what man would do, if he were God, since it belongs to God alone to act independently of any other, and without the aid and concurrence of another: but it is ridiculous to imagine that God explores, through middle knowledge, what man would do, if he were God: Therefore Theophilus's opinion appears plainly absurd. Whence not without reason does a certain Recent author exclaim, with Augustine, Epistle 56: I am ashamed to refute these things, since they are not ashamed to hold them. But since they have dared even to defend them, I am ashamed not for them now, but for the human race itself, whose ears could bear these things.

I say secondly, God does not know future contingent and free things, for the prior to His decree, exercitedly existing, in that very decree known as future and to be posited in the following sign.

The fundamental reason is, because the divine decree, as measured by eternity, cannot be or be conceived, with foundation in the thing, as future; for futurition is repugnant to eternity, which, since it is indivisible and total simultaneously, knows neither past nor future, but whatever is in it, only is, as Augustine says on Psalm 101.

Nor is it valid if you say with Suárez that this argument proves indeed that God cannot know His decree as really future, but does not demonstrate that it cannot be known by Him as virtually future; for just as in God there is given virtual priority between essence and attributes, so in the divine decrees virtual futurition can be admitted. It is not valid, I say, for priority only "from which" does not suffice for futurition even virtual; but priority of existence and of the instant "in which" is necessarily required: but this cannot be found in God: Therefore neither can virtual futurition. The Minor is established, both because all things which are in God exist by a single indivisible existence, and also because they mutually transcend one another and one is intrinsically imbibed in another; but those things which exist by a single existence, and which mutually transcend one another, cannot be or be conceived as prior and posterior, by priority of existence, and of the instant "in which." The Major, however, is proved, both from the fact that if priority "from which" alone sufficed for virtual futurition, the Divine Word, for the prior "from

which" of origin, by which the Father is understood as its principle, would obtain the notion of future with respect to the Father, which no Theologian admits. Also because that same thing which is virtually required for virtual futurition, is really required for real futurition: but for that, whatever real priority or posteriority does not suffice, but it is required that one thing really exist prior to another; as is established by the example of essence and properties, which, although really distinguished from one another, and the essence being really prior to the properties, as their principle, nevertheless between the essence and properties there is no true succession, nor are the properties truly and really future with respect to the essence; because they exist simultaneously with it, and the essence is not prior to them in priority of existence and of the instant "in which," but only in priority of nature, and of the instant "from which": Therefore likewise for virtual futurition it does not suffice that there be any priority and posteriority, but it is required that one thing be prior to another, in priority of existence and of the instant "in which."

Furthermore, the conclusion can be proved, and Suárez's opinion impugned, from the absurdity and inconvenience which follows from it, namely that the knowledge of absolute things in God would be no less a middle knowledge between free and natural, than the knowledge of conditioned things, in the opinion of Molina and other defenders of middle knowledge: for if this knowledge is not perfectly free, but only imperfectly, or middle between free and natural (as they say), because although it objectively involves God's free decree, it does not do so subjectively, as exercitedly existing in God; since Suárez says the same of the knowledge of absolute things, it will necessarily have to be concluded that this knowledge equally mediates between natural and free, as that which is of conditioned future contingents. There will be given, therefore, in God a twofold middle knowledge, one of conditioned things, another of absolute things: one conceived by Molina, the other by Suárez, which is absurd.

You will object with Suárez: God, for that sign of reason, in which He is not yet understood to have a free decree, comprehends His essence and will: but He cannot comprehend it, unless He knows in it His future decrees in the following sign; for since comprehensive knowledge is most perfect in every way, it must extend to all that which is contained in the comprehended object: Therefore God knows His decrees as future, and consequently in them thus known, He contemplates future contingents. It is confirmed: God, through the knowledge of simple intelligence, knows His decrees as possible: Therefore also as future.

To the objection I answer that although God, in that prior in which only His natural and necessary acts are conceived, comprehends through the knowledge of simple intelligence His essence and will, He does not, however, in it know His decrees as future;

because since in such a sign the divine will is altogether indifferent and undetermined to the production of things, there is no medium in which the divine decrees can be known as determinately future; for as we said above against Molina, in an indifferent and undetermined cause a determinate effect cannot be known with certainty.

To the confirmation it must be said that God, through the knowledge of simple intelligence, knows His decrees as possible, taking "possible" in a broad manner, insofar, namely, as it signifies that which absolutely is not repugnant (in which sense God's essence, attributes, the divine Persons, and all that is in God, can be called possible), not, however, as "possible" is used properly and in a strict signification, insofar, namely, as it denotes that which is contained only in the potency of a cause altogether indifferent and undetermined to its production; for this it would be necessary that God, in some sign of reason "in which," and not only "from which," should know His will as altogether indifferent and undetermined to the futurition or non-futurition of things, which, however, is repugnant, as is established from what has been said above.

From this you will understand that if God had from eternity created an Angel operating, e.g., loving, its love could not be known by Him as future; because it would only be posterior to the Angel's essence itself, in posteriority "from which," which (as we showed above) does not suffice for futurition even virtual; otherwise properties could be said to be future with respect to the essence, and the eternal Father could know His Word as future.

I say thirdly, future contingents, whether absolute or conditioned, are not known by God in contradictorily opposed propositions, from the force and law of contradiction.

It is proved, first: The force of contradiction requires no more the truth of one proposition, e.g., the affirmative, than of the other, namely the negative: but it stands indifferently to this, as Aristotle teaches, On Interpretation 1, and Saint Thomas there, lecture 13, and as will be established from what is said below: but in an indifferent medium nothing determinate can be known with certainty, as we showed in the first conclusion: Therefore in contradictory propositions, contingent things cannot, from the force of contradiction, as determinately future, or not future, be known by God. This reason the Holy Doctor insinuates, question 16 of On Evil, article 7, in these words: And those things which stand toward either of two cannot be known determinately in their causes, but under disjunction, namely that they will be or will not be, for thus they have truth.

It is proved, secondly: The force of contradiction does not require that one proposition be determinately true, and the other false, for the prior to the divine decree, but at most

for every real instant: Therefore in contradictorily opposed propositions, contingent things cannot, from the force and law of contradiction, be known as future, for the prior to the decree. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. If the force of contradiction required that one proposition be determinately true, and the other false, for the prior to the decree, it would also require that it have this for every prior and imaginable sign: but this cannot be said: Therefore neither can that. The consequence of the Major seems manifest, for the force of contradictory opposition is founded in that first principle, "Whatever is, either is or is not," which is true for every instant and imaginable sign of reason. The Minor is also no less certain, for if the force of contradictory opposition required that one proposition be determinately true, and the other false, for every prior and imaginable sign of reason, it would follow that contradictory propositions about a future contingent would be determinately true, for the prior to the possibility of things, and consequently that something would be known by God as future, before it was known as possible. Indeed, what is more, it would follow that they should be verified for the prior of reason to the existence of God and to His necessary predicates. From which it would further happen that, in priority of reason, something would be future, before God was conceived as existing, than which nothing more absurd can be said or conceived.

It is proved, thirdly: If the determinate truth of future contingents, and consequently their determinate futurition, arose from the force and nature of contradictory opposition, it would not be contingent nor free, but absolutely necessary, and thus all liberty and contingency of things would be destroyed: but this cannot be said: Therefore neither can that. The consequence of the Major is proved: An effect consequent upon a cause necessary with absolute necessity, obtains the same necessity as that cause: but the force and nature of contradictory opposition is a necessary cause with absolute necessity, since it is founded (as we said above) in that first principle, "Whatever is, either is or is not," than which nothing can be given or conceived more necessary: Therefore if the determinate truth of future contingents, and consequently their determinate futurition, arose from the force and nature of contradictory opposition, it would not be free and contingent, but necessary, with absolute necessity, and thus all things would happen necessarily with absolute necessity, and there would be no liberty and contingency in things.

From what has been said the response to the chief foundation of the Adversaries is clear, which is taken from the force and law of contradiction, which requires that one of the contradictories be determinately true, and the other determinately false. For we showed in the second proof of the conclusion that the force and nature of contradiction indeed

requires that one of the contradictories be determinately true, and the other false, for every real instant, but not for every instant and sign of reason and nature, nor consequently for a sign of reason antecedent to the decree.

You will say, a disjunctive proposition consisting of two contradictories, e.g., this one, "Peter will dispute or will not dispute," is true for the prior to the decree, with determinate truth: but the truth of this disjunctive is taken from the truth of some part, and consequently its determinate truth depends on the determinate truth of some part: Therefore some part of the aforesaid disjunctive must be determinately true, for that prior to the divine decree, and consequently can be known by the divine intellect, for that prior, as determinately true.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor; for the truth of that disjunctive is taken from the incompossibility of the parts with one another, as to truth or falsity, not, however, from the truth of the parts themselves of which it is composed; for that proposition is not only true, but also altogether necessary, and yet no part of which it is composed is of necessary truth. Likewise that proposition is not only true for the prior to the decree, but also for the sign of the possibility of things, since it is of altogether necessary and eternal truth, no less than this one, "Man is a rational animal"; and yet for such a sign no part of it is determinately true, as is established from what has been said above: Therefore the truth of such a proposition does not depend on the truth of its parts, and consequently from the fact that it is true for the prior to the decree, it is not correctly inferred that any of those of which it is composed must, for the same prior, enjoy determinate truth.

I say fourthly, future contingents are not known by God, for the prior to the decree, in their determinate objective truth.

It is proved by a fundamental reason: For the prior to the decree there is no determinate objective truth in future contingents: Therefore they cannot, for the prior to it, be known in their determinate objective truth. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved: Determinate objective truth of a future object presupposes that object as future: but for the prior to the decree, no contingent is determinately future: Therefore for that prior there is no determinate objective truth in future contingents. The Major is established from that common axiom, "From the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is called true or false." The Minor, however, in which lies the difficulty, is proved in many ways. First, from Saint Thomas here, question 16, article 3, ad 3, where he writes this: That which now is, was future from this, before it was, because it was in its cause that it should come to be, whence the cause being removed, it would not have

been future that it should come to be: but only the first cause is eternal, whence it does not follow that it was always true that the things which are, would be future, except insofar as it was in the everlasting cause that they should be future, which cause indeed is God alone. From which I argue thus: Only insofar as something was in the first cause that it should be future, is it future from eternity: but it was not, that it should be future, in the first cause, by reason of omnipotence, as considered in first act, for as such it only gives the denomination of possible: Therefore it was, that it should be future, in the first cause, as determined by decree, and consequently, for the prior to it, nothing can be or be conceived as determinately future. Whence Augustine, Against Faustus, book 26, chapter 4, giving the reason why he confesses that he does not know whether something is future: I do not know (he says), because what God's will holds concerning this matter is hidden from me; this, however, is not hidden from me, that it will without doubt be future, if God's will holds this.

Secondly, the same Minor is proved by this reason: God's decree is the first root and first principle of determinate futurition in things: Therefore for the prior to it, contingent things cannot be or be conceived as determinately future. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. That is the first root and first principle of determinate futurition in things, which first determines the first principle of their possibility: but the first thing determining the first principle of the possibility of things, namely divine omnipotence, is the divine decree; for since God is not a natural agent, but free, His omnipotence cannot be determined to acting, except by the free decree of His will: Therefore that is the first root and first principle of determinate futurition in things.

It is proved, thirdly, the main Minor, from the nature and definition of the future: for future is that which is determined in its causes, to have existence for a subsequent duration: but for the prior to the decree, contingent things are not determined in their causes to have existence for a subsequent duration: Therefore for that prior they are not determinately future. The Minor is established, for the decree is the very determination of the first cause, on which depends and which is presupposed by the determination of the other causes. The Major, however, is proved from the difference which intervenes between the possible, the future, and the existent. For a merely possible thing is contained within the potency of a cause altogether different [indifferent] and undetermined to its production. An existing thing has totally emerged from its causes, and is placed outside their dependencies. A future thing, however, since it is a mean between the merely possible and the existent, also stands in a middle way, nor is it totally placed outside its causes, as the existent, nor contained only in the potency of a cause altogether indifferent to its production, as the merely possible, but is contained in the

determination of the very cause inclined and determined to giving it existence in some difference of time. Whence Saint Thomas, question 16 of On Evil, article 3: To know future things in their cause is nothing other than to know the present inclination of the cause to the effect. And question 2 of On Truth, article 12: When it is said, "This is future," the order which is in the causes of that thing toward its production is designated.

Finally, the main Minor is proved: It implies that a thing be understood as possible, without omnipotence being previously understood, by which it is constituted as capable in order to the production of things: Therefore it implies that a thing be understood as future, without the divine decree being previously understood. The consequence is clear, for just as the possibility of a thing denotes an order to divine omnipotence, so futurition denotes an order to the free decree, from which it is derived.

The conclusion is proved, secondly, by overturning the chief foundation of the opposing opinion: If propositions about a future contingent had determinate objective truth, for the prior to the decree, chiefly because in future time they will have their proposition of "being-in" true: e.g., this proposition, "If God calls Peter, he will consent," is, according to the Adversaries, therefore determinately true, before the decree, because, the time arriving, for which the consent is said to be future, and the condition being posited, Peter will determinately consent. But from the truth of a proposition of "being-in," it is not permitted to infer determinate truth in a proposition of future contingent, for the prior to the decree, but at most for every real instant: Therefore the chief foundation of the opposing opinion collapses. The Minor is proved: if from the truth of a proposition of "being-in," determinate truth could be inferred in a proposition of future contingent, for the prior to the decree, for the same reason it would be permitted to infer that such a proposition is true, and Peter's consent future, the condition being posited, not only for the prior to the decree, but also for the sign of the possibility of things, and for the sign antecedent to divine omnipotence, and to God's very existence, as we argued in the preceding conclusion against those who teach that future contingents have, for the prior to the decree, determinate objective truth, from the force and law of contradictory opposition: but this is most absurd, as is established: Therefore from the truth of a proposition of "being-in," it is not permitted to infer determinate truth in a proposition of future contingent, for the prior to the decree.

Against this conclusion the Adversaries object, and it is their chief foundation: That proposition is determinately true, which is conformable to its object: but this proposition, "The Antichrist will be," even for the prior to the decree, is conformable to its object: Therefore for such a sign it is determinately true. The Minor is proved: a proposition is then conformable to the object, when it is so, as is enunciated through it:

but the object of this proposition, "The Antichrist will be," is so, as is enunciated through it, since indeed the Antichrist will have existence in some difference of time, as is certain of faith, and revealed in Scripture: Therefore etc.

It is confirmed: That proposition about the future is determinately true, which will at some time have its true proposition of "being-in," or of the present; for the truth of a proposition about the future must be regulated and known through its proposition of "being-in" or of the present: but this proposition, "The Antichrist will be," will at some time have its true proposition of "being-in"; for at some time it will be true to say, "The Antichrist now is," as is certain of faith: Therefore it is determinately true.

To the objection I answer, the Major being granted, by denying the Minor, and to its proof, I distinguish the Major. A proposition is then conformable to the object, when it is so, as is enunciated through it: if this belongs to it from the force of that sign, in which it is enunciated; or from the force of a disposition made in that sign — I grant the Major. If this belongs to it from the force of another sign, or from the force of a disposition made in another, subsequent sign — I deny the Major. That the Antichrist will have existence, for some difference of time, this does not come from the force of a disposition made in the sign antecedent to the decree, but from the force of the decree itself, by which the divine will from eternity determined itself to producing at some time the Antichrist; and because such a decree, or determination of the first cause, is revealed in Scripture, it is not surprising that this proposition, "The Antichrist will be," is not only determinately true, but also certain of faith.

To the confirmation I similarly answer, the Major being granted, by distinguishing the Minor: this proposition, "The Antichrist will be," formed for the prior to the divine decree, will at some time have its true proposition of "being-in," from the force of such a prior, and of the disposition made in it — I deny the Minor. From the force of the posterior sign, and by reason of the divine decree determining that the Antichrist be produced at some time — I grant the Minor. And in the same way I distinguish the consequent.

You will say, the object of this proposition, "The Antichrist will be," is not the determination of the first cause (otherwise it would not be about the future, but about the present), but the existence of the Antichrist himself, to be had for future time: Therefore although the first cause, in the sign antecedent to the decree, is not determined to producing the Antichrist, this nevertheless does not prevent such a proposition, for that prior, from being determinately true.

I answer that the object of this proposition, and of other propositions about a future contingent, is neither the mere determination of the cause, nor mere existence, as to be had for future time, but existence as to be had, from the force of the present determination of the cause. Whence although the decree, or determination of the first or second cause, is not the object of these propositions, it is nevertheless its foundation, and first rule, and first root of the conformity which they have with it, in a proportional way, as the indifferent judgment of reason is the first rule of the free determination of the will. Wherefore in order that some thing be and be conceived, in some sign, as future, it does not suffice that it be going to have at some time existence (for this can be verified of a possible thing, considered in the state of mere possibility), but it is furthermore required that it be going to have existence, from the force of the present determination of the cause; which cannot be verified of the Antichrist, for the prior to the divine decree, since for such a sign the divine will is altogether indifferent and undetermined to his production.

§ II

The true opinion is established.

I say fifthly, God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents in the decree predetermining their futurition.

It is proved, first, from the Holy Fathers: For Hilary, On the Trinity 9, thus says: What God decreed to do, He knew in His will. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, derives certain knowledge of future promises from God's predestination, in these words: By His predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to do. And a little below: When God promised Abraham the faith of the nations, He promised not from the power of our will, but from His predestination; for He promised what He Himself was going to do, not what men [would do], etc. From which I derive a twofold argument. The first is: What God is going to do, He foreknows in His predestination: but God is going to do all our actions, however free, according to that saying of Isaiah: "All our works Thou hast wrought in us, O Lord": Therefore He knows them in His predestination, that is, in the decree and predefinition of His will. For often in Augustine, and other Holy Fathers, this word "predestination" is used for the decree preordaining and predefining the futurition of things, as is established from Tract 68 on John, where he says that God made future things, by predestining them.

The other argument is: What God promises, He promises from His predestination, not from the power of our will: but God many times promises our free actions, according to that saying of Ezekiel: "I will cause you to walk in my commandments": Therefore He

promises them from His predestination, and knows the same in His predestination. Whence, On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 17, speaking of our good works, he says: If God foreknew that He would give them, He assuredly predestined them: which inference or illation would not be good, if the foreknowledge of our works were not founded in the predestination or predefinition of the divine will. It is established, therefore, that God, according to Augustine's doctrine, does not know our future works in themselves immediately, or in their objective truth, as the Adversaries teach, but in His decree, which accordingly must be from within efficacious, and predetermining, because that alone (as we shall show below) can have the notion of a medium leading to certain and infallible knowledge of future contingents.

The conclusion is proved, secondly, from Saint Thomas, who in several places openly favors our opinion, for in Book 1, dist. 39, question 1, article 1, ad 5, he teaches that God's knowledge with respect to future contingents is subject to the liberty of His will: but the knowledge which is subject to the liberty of the divine will is subject to its decree, and rests upon it as a medium. And Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 68, thus says: Just as God, by knowing His own being, knows the being of any thing, so by knowing His own understanding and willing, He knows every thought and will [volition]. Than which nothing can be said more openly and expressly. And after many things he thus concludes: The dominion which the will has over its own acts, by which it is in its power to will and not to will, excludes determination of power to one thing, and violence of an externally acting cause, but does not exclude the influence of a higher cause, from which it has to be and to operate; and thus causality remains in the first cause, which is God, with respect to the movements of the will, so that God, by knowing Himself, can know things of this kind. Finally, book 3, chapter 56, he says: God knows all our wills (that is, volitions) through this, that He is to us the cause of willing. In these places the Holy Doctor insinuates the fundamental reason of our conclusion: for God (as we showed above, chapter 2) does not know things immediately in themselves, but only in Himself, and in His essence as in a cause, according to that saying of Dionysius, chapter 7, On the Divine Names: He does not send Himself into individual things according to vision, but knows all things according to the containment of the cause: but God, since He is not a natural agent, but a free one, with respect to creatures, is not the cause of the futurition of things, except as determined through the free decree of His will: Therefore He does not know future contingents, except in this decree, or in His essence, as determined through it; just as He does not know merely possible things, except in His essence, as modified through the attribute of His omnipotence.

It is confirmed and further illustrated by this reason: The divine essence represents creatures, as their cause: Therefore it can be determined in the notion of representing future contingents only through that by which it is determined in the notion of their cause: but only the decree determines it to causing: Therefore only through it can it be determined to represent them. Whence Saint Thomas, Book 1, dist. 39, question 1, article 2, ad 1, teaches that God does not have determinate ideas of the things to be created, except from the purpose of His will.

You will say that although foreknowledge of future things is founded in the decree, it is not, however, predetermining.

But on the contrary: In order that something have the notion of a medium leading infallibly to knowledge of another, two things are required; the first, that it precede it, at least in priority of nature and causality; otherwise, if it were purely concomitant, it would not more be a ground of knowing the other, than the latter would be a ground of knowing it; the second, that it have a necessary or infallible connection with it, otherwise it could not lead with certainty to knowledge of it: but neither condition can belong to it, except to a predetermining decree; for if it were indifferent, it would not have an infallible connection with the acts of the human will, because it could indifferently be compatible with consent or dissent; but if it supposes the foreknowledge of the future consent and determination of the human will, it does not cause it, nor consequently precede it in priority of nature and causality. Therefore only a predetermining decree can have the notion of a medium, in which God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents.

You will object, first: Whenever Saint Thomas treats of the knowledge of future contingents, and of the medium in which He knows them, He always has recourse to their presence in eternity, in order that He know them with certainty, and never makes mention of the divine decree, as can be seen in Book 1, dist. 38, question 1, article 5, and other places to be referred to below: Therefore he thinks that God does not know them in a predetermining decree. Whence certain Recent authors, with Campanella, contend that the Holy Doctor admits neither middle knowledge, nor predetermining decrees, but reduces the whole knowledge of future contingents to their presence in eternity.

But it is answered, first, by denying the Antecedent, for in the place cited in the objection, Saint Thomas, explaining the manner in which God knows future contingents, clearly expressed both mediums, saying: God not only sees the order of Himself to the thing, from whose power the thing is future (behold, knowledge of future things in the decree, for he does not say a necessary order to future things, but a

free one, through the decree), but He also intuits the very being of the thing (behold, presence in eternity, following upon the decree).

I answer, secondly, that although the Holy Doctor did not formally and in terms express such a medium, it is nevertheless deduced by manifest inference from that principle, which he often repeats and inculcates, as the chief foundation of his doctrine, namely that God knows all things in Himself and in His essence as in a cause; for the divine essence, or omnipotence, cannot be the cause of the futurition of things, nor represent them as future, except as modified and determined through the decree, as is established from what has been said above. The reason, however, why Saint Thomas, in treating of God's knowledge with respect to future contingents, and of the medium in which He knows them, very often has recourse to their presence in eternity, is because such presence conduces, indeed is necessary, in order that God have invariable and intuitive knowledge of them, as will be established from what is to be said in the following section.

You will object, secondly: In a remote and universal cause, an effect cannot be known certainly and infallibly, e.g., in the motion of the sun the generation of a plant, or the flowering of a tree, cannot be known with certainty: but the divine decree is only the remote and universal cause of future contingents: Therefore they cannot be known certainly in the decree.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: in a remote and universal cause, an effect cannot be known with certainty, when it is impedible by a proximate and particular cause — I grant. When it is not impedible — I deny. The divine decree, however, since it is of infinite power and efficacy, cannot be impeded by second contingent causes, from attaining its effect, not only as to substance, but also as to the manner of liberty and contingency. Whence there is a twofold notable distinction between the concurrence of the sun, and of other universal causes, and God's concurrence, who is the first and most universal cause. The first is, that since the concurrence of the sun, and of other celestial bodies, is of finite power and efficacy, it can be impeded, lest it produce and attain its effect; but it is otherwise with God's concurrence, since His power and efficacy is infinite. The second distinction is, that universal second causes attain per se primarily in their effects common or generic notions, e.g., of a living thing, or of a corruptible body, which, since they are potential and determinable, even their concurrence is indifferent, potential, and determinable by inferior and particular causes. The first and most universal cause, however, since it attains per se primarily in all created things the notion of being, and the actuality of existence, which is not potential or determinable, but actual and determinative, does not influence second causes through an indifferent and

determinable concurrence, but rather determines and applies them to acting, conformably to their nature and condition.

You will object, thirdly: If God knew all future contingents in the decree, He would also foreknow in it future sins: but this cannot be said, otherwise He would be the cause and author of sin: Therefore neither can that.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor. For God knows future sins in a positive decree, by which He determines to concur positively to the entity and physical goodness of evil acts; and in a permissive decree, by which He wills to permit their malice and deformity, or to deny the efficacious aid for avoiding sin: from this twofold decree, indeed, sin follows infallibly; from the first indeed follows its entity and physical goodness, by physical and causal consequence, just as any effect follows its cause; from the second, however, follows its malice and deformity, not by physical and causal consequence, but only by logical and inferential consequence, just as the destruction or annihilation of a creature infallibly follows the suspension or denial of divine concurrence by which it is preserved in being; or as from the removal of a column follows the falling of the stone, which is sustained by it, and from the removal of salt follows the corruption of meats which is thereby prevented. For just as, although the cause per se of the descent of a stone is not the removal of the column, but the gravity of the stone; nor is the withdrawal of salt the cause per se of the corruption of the meats, but the mixture or conflict of the four primary qualities; yet it infallibly follows upon it, as upon a removed impediment. So likewise, although the denial of efficacious aid is not the cause of sin, but the malice and defectibility of the human will; if, however, God, for hidden reasons of His infinite wisdom and providence, deserts man, through the denial of efficacious aid, man will infallibly sin; according to that saying of Innocent I, Epistle 25, to the Council of Carthage: It is necessary that we be conquered by the withdrawal of Him, by whose aid we conquer.

You will say, he who removes a column, by which a stone is sustained, is considered to be the cause, at least moral and indirect, of the falling of the stone; and he who withdraws salt from meats, from whose withdrawal follows their corruption, is reputed the cause, at least moral and indirect, of their corruption: Therefore likewise God, withdrawing from man the efficacious aid, from whose denial infallibly follows sin, will be the cause, at least moral and indirect, of it.

I answer, first, that this argument can be retorted against the Adversaries, since sin follows no less infallibly upon the denial of congruous grace, in their opinion, than upon the denial of grace efficacious of itself, and physically predetermining, in the doctrine of

the Thomists.

I answer, secondly, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence, and the parity. For he who removes the column sustaining the stone, or withdraws salt from meats, is sometimes bound not to withdraw it, nor to remove the column; but God is never bound to give efficacious aid for eliciting an act of virtue opposed to sin: but in order that what follows upon a defect of action be imputed to another, three things are required, namely that he can, and ought, and does not act, as Saint Thomas teaches, I-II, question 6, article 3. From which he infers there, question 79, article 1, that God cannot be said to be the cause of sin, even indirectly. God (he says) cannot and ought not be said to be the cause of sin, even indirect; because although He does not furnish the aid, which if He furnished, men would not sin, He does this all according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is wisdom and justice: whence it is not imputed to Him that another sins, as if He were the cause of the sin; just as a helmsman is not said to be the cause of the sinking of a ship, except when he withdraws the steering, being able and bound to steer. But more on this at length in the following treatise, when we shall expound the concord of God's sanctity, with the efficacy and causality of the divine decrees.

§ III

Another medium in which God knows future contingents, namely their presence in eternity.

This medium cannot be perfectly understood, unless first the manner in which future contingents are present to God in eternity is declared, whether only objectively, by reason of foreknowledge; or also physically and really, by reason of eternity? The first is held by Scotus, Durandus, Suárez, Vasquez, and several of the Recent authors. The second is taught by the Thomists, whom, among the Fathers of the Society, Molina, Fonseca, Granadus, and Ruiz follow, along with whom...

I say first, future contingents are present to God from eternity, not only objectively and intentionally, by reason of foreknowledge, but also physically and really, by reason of eternity.

It is proved, first, from the Holy Fathers denying God foreknowledge in the strict sense, on the ground that nothing is future to God, but all things are present to Him. Thus Augustine, To Simplicianus, book 2, question 2, where he thus discourses: What is foreknowledge, except knowledge of future things? But what is future to God, who transcends all times? For if He has the things themselves in His knowledge, they are not

future, but present, and on this account it can no longer be called foreknowledge, but only knowledge: But if, as in the order of temporal things, so also with God, the things which are future are not yet, but He anticipates them by knowing: then He perceives them in two ways, in one way indeed according to the foreknowledge of future things, in another way according to the knowledge of present things: something, therefore, temporally accedes to God's knowledge, which is most absurd and most false. The same Gregory the Great teaches, Moralia, book 20, chapter 23, in these words: How is He foreknowing, while nothing but future things are foreknown, we know that to God nothing is future? Likewise Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, chapter 21, thus says: God's foreknowledge is not properly called foreknowledge: for He to whom all things are present, does not have foreknowledge of future things, but knowledge of present things.

From these testimonies of the Holy Fathers I derive a threefold argument: The first is: the Holy Fathers in the places related deny God foreknowledge in the strict sense, on the ground that all things are present to Him: but from the fact that all things are objectively only present to God, it is not rightly proved that foreknowledge in the strict sense does not belong to Him; since many things are objectively present to the minds of the Prophets, of which nevertheless they have, in the strict sense, foreknowledge: The aforesaid Fathers, therefore, hold that future things are present to God from eternity, not only objectively, by reason of knowledge, but also really and physically, by reason of eternity.

The second argument thus proceeds: The Fathers cited not only affirm that all things are present to God, but also absolutely deny that anything is future to God: but from objective presence the notion of absolute futurition is not removed, though it is from physical presence: Therefore the Holy Fathers speak of this, and not only of the first.

The third argument is: if all the creatures future to us were not physically present to God in eternity, it would follow that He knows something new in time, which Augustine reputes most absurd and most false. The consequence is clear, for it would be one thing to see it as physically present to Himself, and another, before it was, to know it as future to Himself. Therefore He would know something new in time, and would know the same thing twice, or in two ways; "In one way indeed according to the foreknowledge of future things, in the other way according to the knowledge of present things," as the same Holy Doctor says in the place cited to Simplicianus.

Saint Thomas uses the same discourse, Book 1, dist. 38, question 1, article 5. Likewise question 2 of On Truth, article 12, where he thus reasons: Since the vision of divine knowledge is measured by eternity, which is total simultaneously, and includes all time,

and lacks no part of time, it follows that whatever is done in time, He sees not as future, but as present. Where he proves that future contingents are seen by God, or are intuitively known by Him, because they are present to the divine eternity. Wherefore it cannot be understood of objective and intentional presence, but only of real and physical presence. Both because otherwise, since objective presence consists in being seen, proving that they are therefore seen, because they are present, would prove the same by the same, and would produce this sense: they are seen, because they are seen, which is ridiculous. And also because for intuitive knowledge of some object, the mere objective presence of it in the mind of the one knowing does not suffice, but its real presence and existence is required, as we shall show below. And finally because, since eternity is not an attribute pertaining to knowledge, but to duration, it does not cause objective presence, but real and physical. Whence the same Holy Doctor, in the place cited above from the first book of the Sentences, thus has it: Since God, by one eternal, non-successive intuition, sees all times, He sees all contingents in diverse times, from eternity presentially, not only as having being in His knowledge, etc. Therefore, besides the objective presence which future contingents have in the divine mind, by reason of knowledge, He knows another, real and physical one, which belongs to them, by reason of eternity, encompassing all time, and all its differences.

The conclusion can furthermore be proved by a fundamental, a priori reason, taken from the nature and perfection of eternity: for that is an infinite, indivisible, and total-simultaneous duration, as is established from its definition delivered by Boethius, and explained by us in Treatise 1, last chapter: Therefore eternity, by reason of its infinity, contains every measure of duration, namely past, present, and future: by reason of its indivisibility, it contains all that totally in itself; and by reason of its simultaneity, it coexists from eternity, without succession, with all durations succeeding one another; and consequently all times, and all things measured by time, although succeeding one another mutually, coexist with God from eternity in eternity. Whence Bernard excellently, Sermon 80 on the Canticle: Times pass under it, not it under them: it does not await future things, does not recall past things, does not experience present things, namely, as experience passes. And Peter Damian, Opusculum 36, chapter 8: All the things which, among us, slip by in flowing, or vary through the vicissitudes of times, stand still with Him in that "today" (of eternity), and immutably persevere. In that "today," namely, the day is still unmoved, from which this world took its origin; in that "today" also that day already is, in which the world is to be judged, by the equity of eternal judgment.

The Adversaries respond that from the indivisibility of eternity, it can only be inferred that it lacks succession intrinsic to itself, but not extrinsic, taken from created things, succeeding one another, and successively coexisting with divine eternity.

But on the contrary: In the first place, this response contradicts the words of Cardinal Damian, already related, and the definition of eternity delivered by Boethius; for if eternity does not lack that succession, extrinsic to it, taken from created things succeeding one another, it will be false that all the things which slip by among us in flowing, or vary through the vicissitudes of times, stand in the "now" of eternity and immutably persevere. Likewise it will be false what Boethius says, namely that eternity is the total-simultaneous and perfect possession, for from whatever head a defect of actual possession arises, whether from within, or from an extrinsic defect of that which is to be possessed, the notion of perfect possession is not preserved, as is clear in one who does not possess riches, from their lack.

Secondly, this solution can be impugned, from this, that if there were given an infinite body in the notion of extension, it would be simultaneously present to all other bodies, however distant they be from one another: Therefore since eternity is infinite in the notion of duration, it must likewise coexist simultaneously with all durations, however distant in the notion of duration, and consequently with past, present, and future, simultaneously, and without succession even extrinsic.

It is confirmed: From the local distance of two bodies from one another, their distance is not inferred, with respect to divine immensity: Therefore likewise from the succession of future things to one another, their succession cannot be inferred, with respect to eternity.

I say secondly, the real and physical presence of future contingents in eternity is necessary, in order that the knowledge which God has of them be intuitive and invariable, but not in order that it be certain and infallible.

The first part is proved: Intuitive knowledge and abstractive knowledge differ in this, that the former is terminated at a thing existing and really present, the latter, however, abstracts from the real presence and existence of the object, and requires only its objective or intentional presence; wherefore prophetic knowledge, although it is terminated at future things, as objectively present in the Prophet's mind, is not intuitive, but abstractive. Whence Saint Thomas, question 3 of On Truth, article 3, ad 8: Vision adds, above simple knowledge, something outside the genus of knowledge, which is the existence of the thing: Therefore since future contingents are not from eternity in their proper duration, so as to terminate from eternity God's intuitive knowledge, and are

known by Him through the knowledge of vision, it is necessary that from eternity they be present to Him in the measure of His eternity.

The second part is also proved: For just as, according to Saint Thomas's testimony below, question 19, article 7, God's will would be changed, if He began to will something which He did not will before, so God's knowledge would be changed, if He began to see something as present to Himself which He did not before see: but with the presence of things in eternity excluded, God would begin in time to see things as present to Himself, which He saw from eternity only as future to Himself: Therefore, with that excluded, God's knowledge with respect to future things would be variable, and would pass from abstractive to intuitive, when the object passed from future to present, and would again return from intuitive to abstractive, when the object passed from present to past. Whence Ecclesiasticus 39 says: "The works of all flesh are before Him, He looks from age to age, and nothing is wonderful in His sight." By which words Scripture, giving the reason why nothing is new nor wonderful in God's eyes, assigns no other, than that He looks from age to age: that is, because He sees all things, as present to Himself in His eternity. Saint Thomas uses the same discourse here, article 15, ad 2, in these words: If there were something which God had not known before, and afterward would know, His knowledge would be variable: but this cannot be, because whatever is, or can be, according to some time, God knows in His eternal now.

The third part, finally, which asserts that the real and physical presence of future contingents in eternity is not necessary, in order that the knowledge which God has of them be certain and infallible, is established from what was said in the preceding section; for there we showed that the divine decree is a medium in which future contingents can be known certainly and infallibly. Whence if, per impossibile, they did not coexist with God in eternity, they could nevertheless still be known certainly and infallibly by Him in His efficacious decree. This is clear in conditioned future things, whose condition will never be fulfilled, for God knows them certainly and infallibly in the conditioned decree, although they are not present to Him in eternity, because they will never exist in time, from the defect of a condition which will never be posited.

You will say, Saint Thomas, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 67, teaches that in order that a contingent be subject to certain knowledge, it is required that it have determinate being, and cannot not-be; for if it could not-be, the knowledge could also be deceived; whence since a contingent as future, and as contained in its causes, can not-be, hence the Holy Doctor infers that it cannot be known with certainty as future, and consequently, in order that it terminate certain and infallible knowledge, it must be known in itself, as it is present in the measure of eternity.

I answer that Saint Thomas there does not consider future contingents in relation to the first cause, in which, by reason of the efficacious and invariable decree, they are certainly and infallibly contained; but only with respect to second, contingent and mutable causes, and as abstracting from the divine decree, determining and applying them to acting, under which aspect they cannot be the medium in which God knows future contingents with certainty; and consequently, with respect to them, there can be no ground of certitude of divine knowledge, with respect to future things, except the presence of them in eternity.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: If the Antichrist, e.g., now existed in eternity, it would be true to say of him, that he existed from eternity: but this is repugnant to faith: Therefore also that. The consequence of the Major seems manifest, for to exist in eternity is the same as to exist from eternity.

It is confirmed: If the Antichrist existed in eternity, he would have to be produced in it, since existence cannot be communicated to him, except by the mediation of creation, or of production: but this cannot be said, otherwise he would be produced twice, namely in eternity, as in a superior measure, and in time, as in his proper measure, in which he must at some time exist: Therefore neither can that.

In order that these and similar arguments may be easily dissolved, and the root of the Adversaries' deception and hallucination in this matter uncovered, it must be diligently observed that the real and physical presence of future contingents in eternity can be conceived, or imagined, in three ways. First, through a certain anticipated production of them in eternity, distinct from that by which they are produced in time, such that the Antichrist, e.g., is conceived as present in eternity, because he is already produced in it, and placed outside his causes. Secondly, through the co-extension of the temporal thing itself to the whole of eternity, in almost the way in which infinite time would coextend with it, if it were given. Thirdly, through the co-extension of eternity itself to that difference of time, in which future contingents will at some time exist, and be present. The first two ways are neither admitted by the Thomists, nor can be admitted by any Catholic, since Scripture testifies that nothing has been produced from eternity, but all things began in time. Whence when we say that future contingents are really present to God in His eternity, this must be understood in the third sense, and by the third mode of presence, namely through the co-extension of eternity itself to that difference of future time, in which they will exist, in their proper measure and duration.

To the objection, therefore, I answer by denying the consequence of the Major, for it is one thing for the Antichrist to be from eternity, and another for him to exist in eternity:

for in order that he be from eternity, his existence would have to co-extend with the whole of eternity, in almost the way that infinite time would co-extend with it: but in order that he be said to be present and existing in eternity, this is not required, but it suffices that that difference of time, in which he will at some time exist, now be contained in eternity; and that this, by reason of its infinity, virtually extend to it.

To the confirmation I likewise deny the consequence of the Major; for in order that the Antichrist be said to be present and existing in eternity, it is not required that he be produced in it, as the Adversaries imagine, but it suffices that his production, which is future in time, be present in eternity; for by reason of this temporal and future production, the Antichrist is said to be present and existing in eternity; because since that is an infinite measure, indivisible, and total simultaneously, it contains every measure and difference of duration, without any succession, and in a single indivisible "now," as we declared before.

You will say, an Angel's aeon is a measure infinite as to what comes after, and formally indivisible, and total simultaneously, and yet future contingents, before they exist, are not really present to the Angel in the aeon; otherwise the Angel would know them intuitively, before they were in their proper duration. Likewise God's immensity is equally infinite, as His eternity, and yet it does not contain past or future places, but only present and actually existing ones: Therefore from the fact that eternity is an infinite measure, it does not follow that it contains temporal and successive things, when they are past or future, but only when they are actually present and existing.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence and the parity. There is a disparity, as to the first, in this, that just as the being of an Angel, although superior to the being of corporeal nature, does not, however, contain it in itself; rather it stands disparately toward it. So likewise, although the aeon is a more excellent measure than time, it does not, however, encompass it, but stands disparately toward it. It is otherwise, however, with the matter in eternity, for just as divine being contains in itself the being of any creature, so eternity, which is the proper measure of divine being, is not only more perfect than any other inferior measure, but also contains all of them. This can be explained by the example of a common place, in comparison with particular places, to which eternity is compared; and of a larger particular place, in order to other smaller particular places, to which the aeon is similar. For just as a larger particular place need not necessarily contain other smaller places (Africa, e.g., although larger than Gaul, does not, however, contain it), so although the aeon is a duration larger than time, because, however, it is a particular measure, to which time is not essentially subordinated, it does not contain past or future things in time. On the contrary, however, just as a common

place encompasses all particular places, e.g., the supreme heaven all other bodies inferior to it: so eternity, since it is not a particular measure, like the aeon, but universal, must contain all inferior durations, and their parts, really, and this in an indivisible manner, and without succession, because it is formally indivisible, and total simultaneously.

The reason of disparity as to the second consists in this, that immensity is infinite only in the notion of locative power, not, however, in the line of duration, as eternity is. Whence since the infinite ought only to contain every possible perfection, belonging to its own line, immensity, which is the repletive power of every place, must indeed contain and fill every present place, and all its differences, namely up, down, near, far, etc., but not past or future places. On the contrary, however, eternity must embrace in its vast and infinite bosom all differences pertaining to the line of duration, that is, past, present, and future, nor await that the temporal things themselves exist, in order to contain and measure them. Whence Isidore, On the Supreme Good, chapter 6: Divine eternity precedes all times, nor is anything believed to be past, present, and future in God, but all things are enclosed as present in Him, because by His eternity He embraces all things.

You will object, secondly: It implies that something exist in a measure superior and foreign, unless it exists in its own and intrinsic one; for it is repugnant, e.g., for some body to be under the heaven, as under the first locating thing, unless it exists in some inferior place, proper and adequate to itself: but the Antichrist, e.g., does not now exist in his proper duration and measure: Therefore neither in the superior measure of eternity.

I answer that the Major is true, when the extrinsic and superior measure is finite and limited, as happens in the example adduced; but it is otherwise, if it is infinite and unlimited, as happens in the case at hand; for eternity is infinite in the notion of duration, and by reason of its infinity, can extend not only to present time, but also to past and future; whence in order that something be contained by it, it is not required that it actually exist in its proper measure, but it suffices that it has existed, or is going to exist.

You will object, thirdly, that it follows from our opinion that the Antichrist simultaneously is and is not in eternity, which implies a contradiction. The sequel is proved: The Antichrist, according to our principles, exists really in eternity, insofar as it, by reason of its infinity, contains that difference of future time, in which the Antichrist will at some time exist: but from this it also follows that the same Antichrist is not in eternity, since eternity, by reason of the same infinity, likewise contains the difference of present time, in which the Antichrist does not yet exist: Therefore according to our

principles, the Antichrist simultaneously is and is not in eternity. It also follows from our opinion that Adam and the Antichrist, the creation of the world, and the last judgment, mutually coexist with one another. For just as those things which are the same with a third thing are the same with one another, so those things which are present and coexistent with a third thing must be present and coexistent with one another: but in our opinion, Adam and the Antichrist, the creation of the world, and the last judgment, are present and coexistent with a third thing, namely eternity: Therefore also with one another.

For the solution of this and similar arguments, it must be diligently observed that just as divine being, although most simple, is equivalent to many perfections which are dispersed in created things, and can be participated in by them in diverse ways: so although its eternity is indivisible and total simultaneously, it nevertheless has a certain virtual breadth, or parts virtually distinct, by correspondence and analogy to our time; such that we conceive it to have one virtual part, corresponding to past time, another corresponding to present time, and another corresponding to future time; and these diverse virtual parts, some call diverse "bosoms" of eternity. This being premised.

To the first I answer, first, that just as, by reason of virtual distinction, contradictory predicates can be verified of the divine attributes and relations: e.g., that God, insofar as just, punishes, insofar as merciful, does not punish; that the Father communicates His essence to the Son, and does not communicate to Him paternity, as we declared in Treatise 1, chapter 3. So the distinction of virtual parts in eternity suffices for contradictory predicates to be verified of the Antichrist. Secondly, it can be said that these propositions, "The Antichrist is and is not in eternity," are not properly contradictory, because they are not verified of eternity according to the same thing formally, but only by reason of the diverse virtual parts which it contains, and by relation and correspondence to the diverse parts of our time. Just as these, "God, insofar as just, punishes, insofar as merciful, does not punish. The Father communicates to the Son the essence, and does not communicate to Him paternity," are not properly contradictory, because they are verified of the same uncreated entity of God, insofar as it is equivalent to the absolute and the respective, and to diverse perfections, which are dispersed in inferior things.

To the second it must be said, that just as those things which are the same with a third thing adequately, are the same with one another, it is otherwise with those which are the same with a third thing inadequately, as is established in the Divine Persons, which, although they are inadequately the same in essence, are nevertheless not the same with one another. So also those things which coexist and are present with a third thing

adequately and totally, also coexist with one another; not, however, those which coexist with a third thing only inadequately, and not totally. Adam and the Antichrist, however, do not coexist with eternity totally and adequately, and according to the whole virtual extension which it includes, but only inadequately, and according to only some of its virtuality, because they do not coexist with it, insofar as it is equivalent to all differences of time, and insofar as it contains in itself all those "bosoms" and virtual parts, of which we spoke before; but only insofar as it contains one virtual part, corresponding to the difference of past time, in which Adam existed, and another corresponding to future time, in which the Antichrist will exist.

From what has been said throughout this whole chapter, you will understand that there are three mediums, in which God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents. The first is the predetermining decree, which, by reason of its infinite power and efficacy, has a certain and infallible connection with them. The second, the second causes themselves, predetermined by God; for although second causes, taken nakedly, and considered according to themselves, cannot have the notion of a medium, in which God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents, as we showed in § 1 against Molina, they can indeed have it, as they underlie the predetermining decree, and the physical predetermination, which is the execution and causality of this decree. Whence when Saint Thomas here, article 13, and elsewhere teaches that future contingents cannot be known with certainty in second causes, this must be understood of second causes, taken nakedly, and undetermined for acting, but not of them, as subject to the predetermining decree and to divine motion and predetermination: for that He knows future things with certainty in such causes, He expressly teaches, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 67, and question 12 of On Truth, article 10. The third medium, finally, in which God not only certainly, but also intuitively, and invariably knows future contingents, is His eternity, which, by reason of its infinity, indivisibility, and simultaneity, contains and measures, simultaneously, and in a single indivisible "now," all differences of time, and all things which in them successively flow and pass. Just as the center, although indivisible, is nevertheless present to each opposite point on the circumference, and to all lines drawn from that same circumference to the center. Whence God (as Saint Thomas says here, article 13, ad 3, and question 2 of On Truth, article 12) stands in order to past and future things, just as one existing on a high watchtower, from which he beholds the whole road, and all those passing on it; for although one proceeds after another, and the later one does not see the earlier, yet he who is on the watchtower sees all of them simultaneously, and has them present to himself. So likewise God has present to Himself, in the watchtower of His eternity, all temporal and successive things, even past and future ones, although they succeed one another, and cannot exist simultaneously in

their proper measure and duration.

Chapter V

On middle knowledge.

That there is in God certain and infallible knowledge of future conditioned things, the Thomists commonly teach, and it is quite openly gathered from various testimonies of Scripture, by which those future things are revealed. For in 1 Kings 23, 3 Kings 11, and Matthew 11, three conditioned future things are foretold, namely the handing over of David into Saul's hands, if he remained in Keilah; the perversion of the children of Israel, if they went in to the daughters of the Gentiles; and the conversion of the Tyrians and Sidonians, if Christ had preached among them, and had done the signs and miracles which He did among the Jews.

Nor is it valid what Curiel, Cornejo, Typhanius, and others respond, that these things are said only through human exaggeration, or according to only probable knowledge, which God had of future things of this kind, attending to the inclination of second causes, which, those conditions being posited, were of themselves more inclined to those effects, than to the opposite ones. Whence Scripture, after those words of Matthew 11, "If in Tyre and Sidon," etc., adds: "If in Sodom had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in thee, perhaps they had remained unto this day." Where the particle "perhaps" seems to denote only probability and conjecture, not, however, infallibility and certitude. It is not valid, I say, this response: First, because the seduction and aversion of the heart of the children of Israel, if they went in to foreigners, is foretold as most certain, 3 Kings 11; for Scripture says, "You shall not go in unto them; for they will most certainly turn away your hearts." Which clause "most certainly" signifies altogether certitude and infallibility, and not merely probability and conjecture.

Secondly, because Saint Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 9, treating of the Tyrians and Sidonians, says: But can we say that even the Tyrians and Sidonians, such miracles being wrought among them, would have been unwilling to believe, or would not have believed, if they had happened; when the Lord Himself attests to them, that they would have done great penance of humility, if those signs of divine power had been wrought among them? Manifestly, therefore, Augustine admits the certitude of that future conditioned thing, namely that the Tyrians would have believed, if they had seen such signs.

Thirdly, Saint Thomas, question 12 of On Truth, article 10, and II-II, question 171, article 6, ad 2, teaches that although it is sometimes only revealed to the Prophet the future, as

regards the ordination of causes toward it; God's knowledge, however, is not terminated only at the disposition of causes, but also infallibly at the future event or non-event: Therefore although the conditioned future things revealed in Scripture are sometimes made known to the Prophet only as to the order of causes toward them; nevertheless God's knowledge and foreknowledge must be terminated not only at the order of causes, but also at the future event, or its negation, under such a condition, and consequently conditioned future things are certainly and infallibly known by God, either as determinately true, or as determinately false.

Fourthly, although, the conditioned decrees being removed, there cannot be given in God certain and infallible knowledge of conditioned future things; nevertheless, with them admitted, their certain knowledge cannot be denied to God; for since such decrees are efficacious from within, as we shall show in the following treatise, they have an infallible connection with such future things, and are the most fitting medium in which their certain and infallible knowledge is founded, as we said in the preceding chapter concerning absolute decrees: but that God can, without inconvenience, indeed must, admit absolute decrees on the part of the subject, and conditioned ones on the part of the object, will be established from what is said below: Therefore there is given in God certain and infallible knowledge of conditioned future things.

Nor is it an obstacle that Scripture, attributing to God knowledge of future things of this kind, sometimes uses the particle "perhaps," or "peradventure"; for it does not always denote doubt, or uncertainty, but the mutability of free will, or the difficulty of the thing itself. Whence Jerome, on chapter 26 of Jeremiah: The ambiguous word "perhaps" cannot befit the majesty of God, but He speaks according to our feeling, that the free will of man may be preserved.

I add that, even if such a particle denoted some doubt, or conjectural knowledge in God, with respect to conditioned future things; it would nevertheless not be with respect to them, in relation to the divine decree, but in relation to second causes, respectively to which contingent things are so called. Whence from that it could only be inferred that future things of this kind are known by God conjecturally, in respect to created causes, in which they are fallibly contained, but not in relation to His decree, in which they are contained as in a certain and infallible cause. In the same sense must be understood and explained Augustine, when, On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 14, explaining that saying of Wisdom 4, "He was taken away, lest wickedness should alter his understanding," says: This is said according to the perils of this life, not according to God's foreknowledge, who foreknew that this was going to be future, which was not going to be future. By these words he only intends to teach that in Scripture God had

revealed that future thing, according to the order which He said to second and inferior causes, in relation to which He did not have altogether certitude and infallibility, but only probable and conjectural knowledge. And this too is the true and genuine sense of certain Thomists, who seem to attribute to God only conjectural knowledge of future things of this kind; for they manifestly speak of them as contained in second causes, and in relation to them; not, however, as they are contained in the divine decree, and in relation to it.

This being premised, concerning which, as I said, there is scarcely any doubt among the Thomists, the whole point of the difficulty, and controversy, which is carried on between them and the Fathers of the Society, is placed in this: whether God knows conditioned future things independently of the aforesaid conditioned decree, and consequently in a sign of reason antecedent to it, or only dependently on it, and in a sign subsequent to it? The former the defenders of middle knowledge teach; the latter, its impugners, who (as Typhanius confesses, an eminent Theologian of the same Society, and Chancellor of the University of Mullipont, in his book On Order, and On Prior and Posterior, chapter 25) are by far superior, both in antiquity, and in number, and in authority. Indeed in the preceding chapter he says that no other Theologian, before Molina, not even in a dream, thought of middle knowledge, nor supposed it anywhere, or applied it, to resolve any difficulty of Scripture, or of Scholastic Theology.

§ I

Middle knowledge is impugned from the doctrine of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas.

I could adduce several testimonies of Saint Augustine, by which middle knowledge, or the knowledge of conditioned future things, independent of the decree, and anterior to it, seems to be expunged; but in this Manual, studying brevity, I shall adduce only those which the Holy Doctor delivers in the books On the Predestination of the Saints, and On the Gift of Perseverance, which he wrote after receiving the letters of Prosper and Hilary, against the remnants of the Pelagians, and in order to respond to those letters.

In the first book, therefore, chapter 10, he thus has it: By predestination indeed God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to do. And below: When He promised Abraham the faith of the Gentiles, He promised not from the power of our will, but from His predestination: for He promised what He Himself was going to do, not what men [would do], etc. Where the Holy Father excluded and altogether eliminated middle knowledge. For its asserters say that God can predict or promise who will be converted or not, for this reason, because He foreknows who will obey the grace

offered to all. But Augustine teaches that God can predict or promise our acts, for this reason, because He is able to make them, not from our power, but from His predestination. And again, chapter 17 of the same book, he teaches that God cannot foreknow future things, except in the decree, from which it is plainly clear that all use of middle knowledge is forbidden. His words are: This is the immovable truth of predestination and grace. For what is it that the Apostle says, "As He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world"? If this was indeed said, because God foreknew that we would believe, not because He Himself was going to make believers, the Son speaks against this foreknowledge, saying: "You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you": They were chosen, therefore, before the foundation of the world, by that predestination by which God foreknew His own future works.

The Adversaries respond that when Augustine teaches that God foreknows our future works in His predestination, he speaks of absolute future things, not of conditioned ones; and consequently he does not exclude middle knowledge, which is knowledge of conditioned future things before the decree, or conditional predefinition, of the divine will.

But on the contrary, first: Saint Augustine there speaks of those future things, about which he had been asked by Prosper and Hilary, and of which he had made mention in the book On Six Questions of the Pagans: but those are conditioned future things, for there was there a question about this future thing: "If Christ had preached at such a time and place among the Gentiles, would they have believed or not?" as is established from the aforesaid Epistles of Prosper and Hilary: Therefore he speaks there of conditioned future things.

Secondly, Augustine not only teaches that predestination or the decree is required for foreknowledge of future things, but also that in the very predestination or decree, God knows future things, as is established from those words: By His predestination indeed God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to do; and from these: They were chosen before the foundation of the world, by that predestination by which God foreknew His own future works. But this cannot be verified of future things even absolute, in the opinion of the Adversaries; for although some of them wish foreknowledge of absolute things to presuppose in God an absolute decree, they nevertheless deny that it is founded in it, or rests upon it as a medium, and teach that God knows all future contingents, whether absolute or conditioned, in second causes comprehended by Him, as Molina and Beccanus think; or, as others more commonly hold, immediately in themselves, and in their objective truth: Therefore they manifestly contradict Augustine, and are very far distant from him.

Thirdly, granted that Augustine speaks of absolute future things, if God knows absolute future things in His predestination, this is because of the dependence which they have on it: but future conditioned things depend, in the conditioned state, on those same causes, on which absolute future things depend, in the absolute state: Therefore just as God knows these in His predestination, or absolute and efficacious decree, so He contemplates those in His predestination, or conditioned decree.

Finally, if God knows absolute future things in an absolute decree, such a decree must be infallibly and intrinsically connected with them, and consequently efficacious of itself, and causing the determination of the human will; for if it were purely indifferent, and awaiting determination by free will, it could not be a medium conducing to certain and infallible knowledge of our free acts, since in an indifferent cause, as indifferent, a future effect cannot be known with certainty and infallibility, as we showed above against Molina and Beccanus. Given, however, that the decree is efficacious from within, previous to our free actions, and causing the free determination of our will, middle knowledge entirely vanishes, which (as its defenders confess) cannot stand except with an indifferent decree, determinable by the created will: Therefore, granted that Augustine in the place cited speaks of the knowledge of absolute things, he nevertheless manifestly excludes middle knowledge.

Such knowledge can also be impugned from another book of Augustine's, which is entitled On the Gift of Perseverance; for in it the Holy Doctor, responding to Saint Prosper, and expounding his mind and doctrine, concerning the question about which he had asked him in his letter, namely, Are those things which are foreknown by God also predestined by Him; such that foreknowledge is supported by the decree, or on the contrary the decree by foreknowledge? — delivers two general rules, from which the destruction of middle knowledge quite openly follows. The first is had in chapter 17, where speaking of good works, he thus says: Or are they perhaps not even said to be predestined? Then are they not given by God, or did He not know that He would give them? But if they are given, and He foreknew that He would give them, He assuredly predestined them. By these words the Holy Doctor openly teaches that these two, foreknowledge and predestination, with respect to good things, stand in God in the same way, and, so to speak, proceed with the same step; and consequently, just as there is given in God foreknowledge of conditioned future things, so their predestination, or conditional predefinition, must be admitted in it; and thus middle knowledge is vacated, which is foreknowledge of conditional future things, independent of the decree, or conditional predefinition of the divine will.

The second general rule, which Augustine delivers in chapter 18 of the same book, is: When in Scripture or the Holy Fathers the name of "foreknowledge" is found, and it deals with the calling of the elect, by the name of "foreknowledge" must be understood predestination. His words are: For God to have predestined is to have foreknown what He Himself was going to do. What then prevents us, when we read in some treaters of God's word "God's foreknowledge," and it deals with the calling of the elect, from understanding the same as predestination? Which rule would be altogether false, if there were given some foreknowledge exploring the futurition of things, independent of the decree, and anticipating it, as is established: Therefore Saint Augustine does not acknowledge in God such foreknowledge, nor consequently middle knowledge.

What of Saint Thomas?

In all things, Saint Thomas, his most faithful disciple, always adhered to Augustine, wherefore middle knowledge could not have pleased him, if it displeased Augustine, nor could it have been approved by him, if it was rejected by the latter. And certainly there exist several principles of this Angelic Doctor's doctrine which openly contradict middle knowledge, and by which it is thoroughly cut down and extinguished.

For in the first place, one of the principles which the Holy Doctor often repeats and inculcates, as the chief foundation of his doctrine, is that God does not know things immediately in themselves, but only in Himself, and in His essence as in a cause, and a medium previously known. Thus he expressly teaches here, question 14, article 5, in the body, which he concludes with these words: So, therefore, it must be said, that God sees Himself in Himself: but other things than Himself, He sees not in themselves, but in Himself. He repeats the same in the response to the first. And Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 49, he proves, from Dionysius, that God knows all things in His essence as in a cause. And chapter 65, fifth reason, he thus says: Knowledge of God is of all things through the cause: for by knowing Himself, who is the cause of all, He knows other things as, so to speak, His effects. Which in chapter 67 he extends to future contingents, and in chapter 68 to free acts of our will, for he says: God knows all our wills (that is, volitions) through this, that He is to us the cause of willing. From this principle follows the manifest destruction of middle knowledge; for since the divine essence is not the cause of things, except as it has the will conjoined, and as determined through the decree (because God is not an agent ad extra by way of nature, but by way of the free), if God contemplates future and free contingents in it as in a cause, and a medium previously known, it is manifest that He does not know them antecedently to His decree through middle knowledge.

Secondly, the same Holy Doctor, Book 1, dist. 39, question 1, article 1, ad 5, teaches that God's knowledge, with respect to future contingents, is subject to the liberty of the divine will, which he repeats, article 2, ad 1, in these words: God's very knowledge is subject to the liberty of the will: but the knowledge which is subject to the liberty of the divine will is subject to the divine decree, and rests upon it as a medium: since the decree is the very exercise of the divine will and liberty: Therefore, according to Saint Thomas, God's knowledge with respect to future contingents is founded in the decree, and rests upon it as a medium, and consequently is not middle knowledge, which is independent of the decree, and anterior to it.

Nor is it valid, if you say that Saint Thomas there speaks only of the knowledge of absolute things, not of the knowledge of conditioned things. For this being granted, and not conceded, the access to middle knowledge is nevertheless still precluded; because, as we said above, if the presence of absolute things rests on the decree, it must be efficacious of itself, and connected intrinsically with them, and consequently excluding middle knowledge, which presupposes an indifferent decree, determinable as to the species of act by the human will.

Thirdly, Saint Thomas here, question 14, article 8, ad 1, and question 2 of On Truth, article 14, ad 1, teaches that things are not therefore known by God, because they are future, but they are therefore future, because they are known by God. Whence he explains Origen's saying, that says, because something is future, therefore it is known by God, and says that this must not be understood according to the cause of being, but only according to the cause of inferring. This the asserters of middle knowledge unanimously deny, and rightly, because they see that middle knowledge is destroyed by it; for since the knowledge of vision is not the cause of things except upon the supposition of the decree, if nothing is future except because God sees it to be future, indeed He beholds nothing future before, but after, the decree.

Fourthly, the same Holy Doctor, in the same question 14, and the same article 7, ad 3, teaches that God's knowledge is prior to things, and is not measured by them, as to truth and certitude, but is rather their rule and measure, for he says: Just as natural knowable things are prior to our knowledge, and its measure: so God's knowledge is prior to natural things, and their measure. And I-II, question 93, article 1, ad 3: The notion of the divine intellect (he says) stands otherwise to things, than does the notion of the human intellect. For the human intellect is measured by things, namely that a man's concept is not true on its own account, but is said to be true from this, that it agrees with things. But the divine intellect is the measure of things, because each thing has as much truth, as it imitates the divine intellect. But with that principle of the Angelic Doctor, it is evident

that middle knowledge cannot stand, because such knowledge is not the rule and measure of the certitude and truth of conditional future things, but rather presupposes their futurition and objective truth, and only speculates and explores it: Therefore middle knowledge contradicts the principles of Saint Thomas's doctrine.

Fifthly, Saint Thomas, question 6 of On Truth, article 3, when he had objected to himself against the certitude of predestination, that predestination does not have absolute certitude, but only conditioned, from the hypothesis that the human will consent, responds: To the fourth it must be said that the second cause, which must be supposed for inducing the effect of predestination, also underlies the order of predestination; and therefore the order of predestination, although it is with the supposition of the human will, nevertheless has absolute certitude. Where he openly teaches that predestination does not presuppose a knowledge exploring consent; because indeed the very consent underlies predestination and the decree, and follows it. But if consent underlies the decree and predestination, it is plain that, before God has, from such consent, predestination or the decree, it is not future, nor consequently can it be foreseen as future through middle knowledge.

Finally, it is evident that middle knowledge, its object being destroyed, cannot stand: but Saint Thomas openly excludes the object of middle knowledge, namely the determinate objective truth of contradictory propositions about a future contingent; for lecture 13, on chapter 8 of the book On Interpretation, he denies determinate truth to propositions of this kind: because a future contingent does not have determinate being in free causes. And in Book 1 of the Sentences, dist. 38, question 1, article 5, ad 2, he thus says: A future contingent is not determinately true before it happens, because it does not have determinate causes. Likewise, question 16 of On Evil, article 7, he says: Those things which stand toward either of two cannot be precognized in their causes determinately, but under disjunction, namely because they will be or will not be, for thus they have truth: Therefore middle knowledge cannot stand with the principles of Saint Thomas's doctrine.

§ II

Middle knowledge is refuted by a fundamental, a priori reason, drawn from the definition of the future.

This reason can be briefly proposed thus: Before the decree and predefinition of the divine will, nothing is absolutely, or conditionally, future, nor consequently knowable as such by the divine intellect: Therefore for the prior to it, there is not given in God certain and infallible knowledge of conditioned future things, which is called by the Recent authors middle knowledge. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. The future is that which is determined in a cause, to have existence for a subsequent time: but before the decree and predefinition of the divine will, nothing is determined absolutely or under condition in a cause, to have existence for a subsequent time, since the decree is the very determination of the first cause: Therefore for that prior nothing is absolutely or conditionally future. The Minor is evident, the Major is proved, first, from Saint Thomas here, question 16, article 7, ad 3, where he thus has it: Everything that is, was future from this, before it was, because it was in its cause that it should come to be, whence the cause being removed, it would not have been future that it should come to be. And question 14, article 3: In another way a contingent can be considered, as it is in its cause, and thus it is considered as future. Likewise, question 2 of On Truth, article 12, ad 7: When it is said, "This is future," the order which is in the causes of that thing toward its production is assigned: but that order is nothing other than the determination and preparation of causes, for the production of the thing, as the same Holy Doctor asserts throughout that whole article, and especially in the response to the seventh: Therefore according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas, the future is that which is determined in a cause, to have existence for a subsequent time.

Reason also persuades this, for a thing being future is some real, but not intrinsic, extrinsic denomination; for an intrinsic denomination cannot belong to a non-existing thing: Therefore it must come from some real and extrinsic form: but such a form cannot be other than the determination of the cause to its production: Therefore for a thing to be future is nothing other than for it to be determined in a cause, to have existence for a subsequent time. The Minor is proved: such a form cannot be the cause itself precisely as able to produce the effect, since as such it only gives the denomination of possible; nor can it also be the same cause, as actually influencing being into the effect, for thus it gives the denomination of existing: Therefore it can only be the same cause, as determined to giving it existence in a subsequent duration.

From which you will understand that it is false what certain defenders of middle knowledge say, in order to evade the force of this argument; namely, that futurition does

not necessarily require determination in the cause, but that it suffices that the thing be going to have existence at some time, even though no determination in the cause has preceded as to this. For if this response and doctrine were true, it would follow that possible things conceived in the state of mere possibility, could be said to be future; for of the Antichrist, e.g., conceived in the state of mere possibility, it would be true to say that he will at some time be; because indeed the first cause, in the following sign, by the free decree of His will, has determined Himself to giving him existence at some time.

By this, moreover, the evasion and new doctrine of other Recent authors remains impugned, who, in order likewise to extricate themselves from this argument, say that the future imports nothing real and positive, existing at the time of futurition, but only the lack of existence for then, from which, and from existence to be had afterward, futurition or the future is constituted. That this doctrine is false is established from this, that for no other reason, for the sign of pure possibility, can it be truly affirmed of something, that it is future, except because for such a sign there does not belong to it some predicate, distinguishing it from a purely possible thing, and repugnant with the state of pure possibility: Therefore, in order that at the time of futurition it be truly affirmed of something that it is future, there must belong to it that predicate distinguishing it from a purely possible thing, and repugnant with the state of pure possibility: but the lack of existence, which, in the opinion of those Recent authors, only belongs to a future thing, at the time of futurition, is not a predicate repugnant with the state of pure possibility, nor distinguishing from the purely possible, as is established: Therefore besides the lack of existence, something else must be assigned at the time of futurition, from which the thing is denominated future, and is distinguished from the merely possible, which can be nothing other than the determination of the cause to giving it existence for a subsequent time.

You will say that although the lack of existence is not a predicate distinguishing from the purely possible, the lack of existence, nevertheless, with the order to existence to be had, can furnish this distinction, since it does not belong to a thing in the state of pure possibility.

But on the contrary: The order to existence to be had does not belong to a future thing from itself, but from its cause, as is established: but not from the cause, as indifferent and undetermined to its production, since as such it only gives the denomination of possible: Therefore it belongs to it only from the cause as determined to its production, and consequently from the very determination of the cause. Whence Saint Thomas in the place cited above teaches that the order which is in the cause to the production of a future thing is nothing other than the determination and preparation of the causes. And

Saint Augustine, chapter 9, On Rebuke and Grace, and book 6, On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 17, says that for God to make future things is nothing other than to prepare their causes. And Tract 68 on John, he asserts that God made future things, by predestining them.

You will say again: if the future were that which is determined in a cause, something could be future which will never be present and existing; for it can happen that a second cause be determined and inclined to some effect, which nevertheless will not be posited in reality, but its opposite, because it will be impeded by another, superior and more powerful cause: but this seems absurd: Therefore also that.

I answer that nothing can be said or be future, in relation to the first, omnipotent and immutable cause, which is not posited at some time in time, but this can be so in relation to second, mutable and contingent causes, as is gathered from Aristotle, On Generation 2, text 64, where he thus says: One who is going to walk, does not walk. Because, indeed, that determination, by which one, willing to walk, was making the future walking, is either changed by the will, or is impeded by another, lest it obtain its effect. Saint Thomas teaches the same, On Interpretation 1, chapter 8, lecture 13, and I, question 16, article 3, and question 19, article 7, ad 2, where he writes this: God sometimes pronounces something future, according as it is contained in the order of inferior causes, e.g., according to the disposition of nature or of merits, which nevertheless does not happen, because it is otherwise in the higher, divine cause. As when Isaiah predicted to Hezekiah, "Set thy house in order, for thou shalt die, and not live." Nor then did it so happen, because from eternity it was otherwise in God's knowledge and will, which is immutable.

§ III

Another fundamental reason.

Conditioned futurition transfers a thing to which it belongs, from the state of pure possibility, to the state of some sort of futurition: but it implies that a thing pass from the state of pure possibility, to the state of some sort of futurition, except by means of the divine decree: Therefore that must precede the conditioned futurition of things, and consequently for the prior to it, contingent things can neither be, nor be known by God as conditionally future through middle knowledge. The Major is established, for a conditioned future thing mediates between the merely possible and the absolutely future, and consequently conditioned futurition does not leave a thing in the state of pure possibility, but transfers it to the state of some sort of futurition. The Minor, however, is proved in many ways: First, because that passage does not belong to the thing by reason of itself, but dependently on the influx of the first cause: but this does not act except by means of the decree: Therefore this passage cannot be understood, except through the mediation of the decree.

Secondly, conditioned futurition is something real and not a mere being of reason: but every reality belonging to things belongs to them dependently on God, as an agent through intellect and will, and consequently through a free decree: Therefore conditioned futurition cannot belong to things, except dependently on the decree, and consequently it implies that a thing pass from the state of mere possibility to the state of conditioned futurition, without its mediation.

Thirdly, conditioned futurition denotes some actuality, which mere possibility does not denote, for it denotes an order to existence as to be had, if some condition be posited, from which what is purely possible abstracts: but that greater actuality, and that order to existence to be had under a condition, cannot escape divine causality; otherwise there would be given some degree of actuality and existence, which would not proceed from God as the first being and first act: Therefore it must proceed from God as the first cause, through the mediation of the free decree of His will.

Fourthly, what is conditionally future must regard the divine will otherwise disposed, than if it were merely possible: but what is merely possible regards the divine will, as altogether indifferent and undetermined: Therefore what is conditionally future must regard it as determined through some free decree of God, not absolute, but conditioned.

Fifthly, conditioned futurition does not belong to the created thing from itself, but in relation to the first cause: but not in relation to it, as precisely capable, since from it thus considered, only the notion of possible is taken: Therefore in relation to it, as

determined through the decree.

Finally, conditioned future things depend no less on the conditioned decree, than absolute ones on the absolute: but nothing can pass from the state of pure possibility, to the state of absolute futurition, except by means of the absolute decree; as we demonstrated in the preceding chapter, fourth conclusion, by four reasons: Therefore neither can conditioned future things be transferred from the state of mere possibility, to the state of conditioned futurition, except by means of the conditioned decree.

The Adversaries respond, first, that there is this distinction between absolute and conditioned future things, that absolute things depend on an actual and exercised decree, or one actually existing in God; but conditioned things do not require a decree actually existing in the divine will, but only a decree which would be, if the condition were posited. For the existence of the cause (they say) must have a proportion with the existence of the effect; whence just as it is necessary that for an effect which is, a cause be assigned which likewise is; so it suffices if for an effect which will be, a cause be assigned which will be, and for an effect which would be, a cause which would be. Since, therefore, conditioned future things neither are, nor will be, but only would be, if the condition were posited, it is enough that for them there be assigned in God some decree which would be, if the condition were posited, and consequently existing in God not really, but only objectively, for that prior at which He knows things as conditionally future through middle knowledge.

But this solution and doctrine, which is the chief refuge and hiding-place of middle knowledge, can be confuted in many ways. For in the first place, that decree, which the Adversaries say exists objectively in the divine mind, for that prior at which He knows conditioned future things, is not presented to the divine intellect, as merely possible, since from a purely possible decree the denomination of future is not taken, but only of possible, among the effects of the divine will; it is also not presented for then as future, since it is repugnant that God know His decrees as future, as we showed in the preceding chapter, § 1, conclusion 2, against Suárez, and other defenders of middle knowledge confess: Therefore for that prior it is presented to the divine intellect, as present and exercitedly existing, since between the possible, the future, and the present, no medium is given; and consequently, since the divine intellect is altogether infallible, the divine decree truly is, for then, present and exercitedly existing in God.

Secondly, for a thing to be future under condition, for that then of futurition, is free to God: Therefore for that then it must be willed by Him, and consequently there must be in Him an actual and exercised decree. Both consequences are clear; the Antecedent,

however, is established from this, that nothing is necessary with respect to God, except the essences of things, and their essential connections.

Thirdly, although a possible thing is not an effect existing in fact, but only possibly, it nevertheless requires essentially all power, as actually existing. Likewise absolute future things are not in act, but will be in some difference of time, and nevertheless require in God some actual and exercised decree, as the Adversaries confess: Therefore although an effect future under condition is not existing in fact, but future under condition, it nevertheless demands essentially a divine decree exercitedly existing in God.

It is confirmed and further illustrated by this reason: If, notwithstanding that an absolutely future thing does not exist, but is going to exist, it nevertheless requires a decree existing in fact in God, then there is not the same reason concerning the divine decrees and other causes, since those are only, as future, required for the absolute futurition of their effects, but the divine decree, as exercitedly existing, is required for it; and consequently, from the fact that other causes, only as future, are required for the conditioned futurition of their effects, the Adversaries do not rightly gather that this same thing suffices in the divine decrees. Whence when they say that the existence of the cause must have a proportion with the existence of the effect, and consequently for an effect which will be, it suffices to assign a cause which will be, and for an effect which would be, a cause which would be: it must be distinguished: when futurition is repugnant to the cause — I deny; when it is not repugnant to it — let it pass. Thus, because futurition is not repugnant to divine concurrence, a future effect does not require it as present and existing in fact: on the contrary, however, because futurition, even virtual, is repugnant to the divine decree, as we showed above against Suárez, and other defenders of middle knowledge confess along with us, future things, whether absolute or conditioned, require a decree present, actual, and exercised in God.

You will say, that although absolute futurition is repugnant to the divine decree, conditioned futurition, however, is not.

But on the contrary: absolute futurition is therefore repugnant to it, because absolute mutation is repugnant to God: but mutation is also repugnant to Him, some condition being supposed: Therefore conditioned futurition also is repugnant to the divine decree. The Minor is established, for since God is altogether immutable, it is repugnant to the divine will, under whatever condition, to be changed. The Major, however, is commonly held by the Theologians in the Treatise on the Will of God, where they teach that if the divine decree were absolutely future, the divine will would be changed, because it would pass from not-willing, for some instant "in which," to willing in another.

It is confirmed and further illustrated by this reason: A conditioned future thing cannot be repugnant to a passage into an absolute future, if the condition be fulfilled: but although the condition be fulfilled, it is repugnant to the divine decrees that they be absolutely future, otherwise the divine will would be changed: Therefore it is also repugnant to them to be future under condition.

Some other Recent authors respond, secondly, denying the Major of the first argument, namely, that conditioned futurition transfers the thing to which it belongs, from the state of pure possibility, to the state of some sort of futurition: because (they say) for a true passage it is required that the thing spend some time under the prior state, before it is brought to the other; which cannot belong to future things, since futurition belongs to them from eternity. But if this solution or reasoning were valid, one could deny that the sun, and an Angel, and any permanent thing created from eternity (as it is not repugnant that it be created), passes from non-being and nothing to being, which is absurd, since for such a passage it suffices that from its own merits the state of nothing be owed to the created thing, and that it could, throughout the whole of eternity, or for a time, be held in it. What indeed of these things is lacking to any future things whatsoever, foreknown by God from eternity, so that the passage from possible to future does not belong to them any less, than to things created from eternity the passage from nothing to being? — since indeed the same thing which is now said to be future, could have been under the state of merely possible, and such a state was owed to it.

§ IV

Another impugnation of middle knowledge sought from the principles of the Adversaries.

This argument can be briefly proposed thus: There cannot be given in God middle knowledge, if no instant, or sign of reason, can be given, in which contingent and free things are prior knowable as conditionally future, than as absolutely future: but this is how the matter stands, according to the principles of the Adversaries: Therefore according to them there cannot be given in God middle knowledge. The Major is established, for middle knowledge, which is concerned with conditioned things, is prior to the knowledge of absolute things, since, as its defenders teach, it directs God in His absolute decrees. The Minor, however, in which lies the difficulty, is shown thus.

The Adversaries teach that contingent and free things are conditionally future, in the sign antecedent to the divine decree, and are known as such by God through middle knowledge; because contradictory propositions can be formed about them, of which one must be determinately true, and the other false, and consequently their object

determinately future, or not future. Or as others hold, because in such a sign a supposition of the future event can be made, or it can be supposed that that thing will at some time be, if such or such a condition is posited: but these two causes or proofs, for the truth and futurition of conditioned things in the sign antecedent to the divine decree, also militate for absolute future things; because from them equally contradictory propositions can be formed, and it can be supposed that they will at some time be: what, then, prevents them from also enjoying the right of conditioned things, and having belonging to them equally determinate objective truth and futurition, in that same sign antecedent to the divine decree, in which the Adversaries constitute in God middle knowledge. Indeed since contradictory propositions about conditioned things are composed of simple absolutes, and any part is in some way prior to the whole, contradictory propositions about absolute future things must be true and knowable by God, before contradictory ones about conditioned future things, and consequently their objects, namely absolute future things, must have the notion of future, before conditioned ones, and consequently the knowledge of absolute things in God must precede the knowledge of conditioned things, if the Adversaries' principles are to be adhered to. Whence Father Martinon, the most recent writer of the Society, here, disp. 9, sect. 6, num. 83, thus discourses: Conditioned future things are not less true, than those things which are contingently absolutely future, which are determinately true: Therefore conditioned future things are similarly determinately true. The Minor is clear from what has already been said. The Major is proved. Because there is no less a precise and immediate contradiction between these two propositions, "If Peter be placed in these circumstances, he will deny Christ," and "if he be placed in these circumstances, he will not deny Christ," than there is between these two: "Peter placed in these circumstances will deny Christ," and "Peter placed in these circumstances will not deny Christ": but wherever there is a precise and immediate contradiction, one extreme is determinately or distinctly false, and the other is determinately, though indistinctly, true; wherefore no less in conditionally than in absolutely future things, one is determinately true, the other false. By these words he expressly teaches that future contingents, both absolute and conditioned, are determinately true, and knowable by the divine intellect, in the sign antecedent to the decree; indeed from the objective truth, which he supposes to be in absolute future things before the decree, he proves determinate truth in conditioned things: Therefore the very principles of the Adversaries thoroughly overturn middle knowledge.

From these things you will understand that such knowledge is not necessary to direct God in His absolute decrees, as its defenders teach; indeed it is rather altogether useless for this, since, according to their principles, the knowledge of conditioned things cannot

be or be conceived prior in God to the foreknowledge of absolute things, as we have already shown. Nor can it be necessary or useful for preserving human liberty, since it rather thoroughly destroys and overturns it, if the Adversaries' principles are to be adhered to, which I prove by a twofold argument. The first is: That knowledge destroys liberty, which supposes things to be future, from the force and nature of contradictory opposition: but middle knowledge supposes this: Therefore it destroys liberty. The Major is established: for since contradictory opposition is a necessary cause with absolute necessity, as founded in that first principle, "Whatever is, either is or is not," than which nothing can be or be conceived more necessary, the futurition consequent upon it, and proceeding from it, cannot be free or contingent, but only natural and necessary. The Minor, however, is shown thus: The asserters of middle knowledge teach that contradictory propositions about future contingents, not only conditioned, but also absolute, have determinate truth or falsity, by reason of contradictory opposition, as we have already shown from Father Martinon, who openly professes this, along with the other Doctors of the Society: Therefore since the objective truth of future contingents supposes their futurition, indeed is nothing other than the very futurition of the contingent thing, as presented to the divine intellect, and known or knowable by Him, it is manifest, according to their principles, that the determinate futurition of contingent things proceeds from the force and nature of contradictory opposition.

The other argument can be briefly proposed thus: That knowledge removes liberty and contingency of things, which supposes them to be future before the first principle, and, as it were, the first root of created contingency and liberty: but middle knowledge supposes this: Therefore it removes liberty. The Major is established. The Minor is proved. Middle knowledge supposes things to be future, at least conditionally, before the divine decree: but that is the first principle and, as it were, first root of the liberty and contingency of things, since it is the exercise of the first free thing, and first in the genus of free things, and the first in any genus is the cause and measure of the rest: Therefore middle knowledge supposes things to be future, at least conditionally, before the first principle, and first root of the liberty and contingency of things.

Several other absurdities and inconveniences follow from middle knowledge, such as that it removes from God the dignity of first cause, and of first free and determining thing, and the supreme dominion which He has over our wills; that it attributes to Him a mode of concurring with free causes that is blind and ignorant, vague and indeterminate; that it paves the way for a twofold Semi-Pelagian error; but on these matters at length in the Shield of Thomistic Theology, disp. 6, art. 6.

§ V

The chief objections are resolved.

Omitting several testimonies of Scripture, which only prove that there is given in God certain and infallible knowledge of conditioned future things — which we do not deny, but contend is founded in conditioned decrees — one remains, which Molina calls the touchstone, and in which he thinks the chief strength of middle knowledge consists, and it is had in Matthew 11, where Christ rebukes and reproves the unbelief of the Jews, by comparison with the Tyrians, who, the same miracles having been seen, would have given great signs of penance: but such a rebuke would have been unjust, if the penance of the Gentiles, in the conditioned state, had been known by God in an efficacious and predetermining decree, predetermining them to penance, from the hypothesis of Christ's preaching; for the Jews could have made a just response, namely that they had not done penance, having seen Christ's miracles, because they did not have such a decree preparing for them efficacious grace, and predetermining them to penance, but only sufficient aids, which only give the ability, and do not apply the will to the act, as efficacious and predetermining ones do.

But because this difficulty pertains to the Treatise on the Helps [de auxiliis], and discussion of it will return in the following treatise, when we shall treat of the efficacy of the divine will, now I briefly answer that the Jews were justly reproved by Christ, by the example of the Tyrians and Sidonians, not only because they were equal to them in sufficient aids, which are given for the ability, but also because they presented more impediments to efficacious grace, which is given for the act, by reason of greater blindness, hardness, and ingratitude. Whence Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14: The Tyrians and Sidonians were not so blinded, nor was their heart so hardened, since they would have believed, if they had seen such signs as these (the Jews, that is) saw. This is the solution of Saint Thomas, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 159, where he teaches that although man cannot dispose himself to first grace, he can nevertheless present an impediment to its reception, and render himself more or less unworthy of it, through lesser or graver sins. Just as, although a man cannot draw the light of the sun to himself, he can nevertheless impede its illumination, by closing the door or window. Although (he says) someone by the movement of free will can neither merit nor summon divine grace, he can nevertheless impede himself, lest he receive it; and since this is in the power of free will, it is not undeservedly imputed to him who presents an impediment to the reception of grace. But more on this at length in the place cited.

The Adversaries object, secondly, some testimonies of the Holy Fathers, which seem to favor middle knowledge: for Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, teaches that predestination cannot be without foreknowledge, but foreknowledge can indeed be without predestination; Therefore he thinks that foreknowledge independent of predestination, or predefinition of the divine will, can be given, and consequently middle knowledge. Whence, To Simplicianus 2, he says, God calls him whom He pities in such a way as He knows will agree with the calling and not reject it. And Saint Thomas, Part 3, question 1, article 3, ad 4, says that predestination presupposes foreknowledge of future things: and not of things future in an absolute state, otherwise predestination would have a meritorious cause in us: Therefore in a conditioned state.

To Augustine I answer, that in the first testimony he clearly speaks of sins, which God foreknows in a permissive decree, but does not predestine, nor decree, for he says: By predestination indeed God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to do; but He can foreknow whatever He does not do, just as whatever sins. In the second, however, when he says, God calls him whom He pities in such a way as He knows will agree with the calling, etc., this must not be understood of merely speculative knowledge, and independent of the decree, but of practical knowledge, and founded in the decree, which, by means of efficacious grace, brings about such congruity and adaptation, according to that saying of the Apostle to the Hebrews 13: "May God fit you in every good thing, doing in you what is pleasing before Him," that is, may He make you will every good, as Saint Thomas expounds, lecture 3. In the same sense Cardinal Toledo, annotation 54, on chapter 5 of Luke, interprets the words of Chrysostom, Homilies 31 and 65 on Matthew, where, treating of the calling of Paul and Matthew, he says that God called them then when He knew they would consent; for he says the sense of those words is this, that God called us then, when He foreknew that He would work in them, so that they would obey. Unless you understand Chrysostom's doctrine in this way (he says), I do not agree with it, but consider the contrary to be altogether true.

To the passage of Saint Thomas taken from Part 3, I answer that there the discourse is about absolutely future things, as is established from the intent of the argument, and its solution, by which he intends that Christ's predestination was after the foreseeing of the sin of the first man, and presupposed it: but the foreseeing of sin, which Christ's predestination presupposes, is not conditioned, but absolute, as is clear in Saint Thomas's way, otherwise it would not be true that, Adam not sinning, Christ would not have come. Nor does it follow from this that there is given a meritorious cause of predestination in us; because, as Cajetan acutely noted there, the future things which are presupposed with respect to predestination are those which are not constituted through

predestination, that is, which in their being are not elicited or commanded by predestination; but all our merit is an effect constituted through predestination, and therefore is not presupposed as foreseen with respect to it, nor is there given a cause of predestination in us, even though some absolute future things are presupposed as foreseen with respect to predestination.

They object, thirdly: Conditioned future things, whose condition will never be posited, are not known by God through the knowledge of simple intelligence, since that is terminated only at possible and necessary things; nor through the knowledge of vision, because that is concerned only with those things which are present to God in His eternity; but such future things, since they will never have existence in time, from the defect of the condition which will never be purified, are not really, but only objectively, present to God in eternity: Therefore they cannot be known by God, except through middle knowledge.

I answer that those future things are known by God through the knowledge of vision, not insofar as it is formally of vision, because under this aspect it is terminated only at future things, as present in eternity, but insofar as it is free and of approbation, or as it has the decree of the divine will adjoined, in which it is founded, and on which it rests as a medium; for thus it is not terminated only at future things, as present in eternity, but extends also to all free and contingent objects, whatever they may be. It can also be said that those future things are known through the knowledge of simple intelligence: for just as there is given in God a knowledge of vision natural and necessary, namely the vision of the divine essence, and another, free, namely the intuitive vision of creatures in the mirror of eternity. So there is given a knowledge of simple intelligence, natural, which is concerned with merely possible things, and free, which is carried to conditionally future things. But when Saint Thomas and the Theologians say that the knowledge of simple intelligence is merely natural, they assert this because it is chiefly occupied with merely possible things, which God knows naturally and necessarily.

They object, fourthly: The Holy Fathers teach that God's knowledge with respect to future contingents is very wonderful, and transcends the grasp of human genius: but this would not be true, if it were founded in a predetermining decree, as the Thomists teach; since there is nothing wonderful in this, that God see His own decrees, and in them the future effects, infallibly connected with them: Therefore that knowledge is independent of such a decree, and consequently middle knowledge.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor. For nothing is more wonderful in God, than that He contemplate nothing outside Himself, but all things as in a cause, and

as in a most pure mirror, in His essence, either taken nakedly, or determined through the decree. From this indeed it comes about, that His knowledge is the cause of things, and eminently speculative and practical; that it is not measured by things, but is rather their rule and measure; that it is altogether certain and infallible, as resting on the most certain and infallible medium; and finally that it is infinite, and extending to all things, since nothing can escape God's causality. On the contrary, however, in the opinion of the Adversaries, God's knowledge with respect to future contingents is merely speculative, and exploratory, and measured by things, not, however, their rule and measure, since it does not make, but presupposes their futurition; nor are things therefore future, because they are known by God, but rather are therefore known by Him, because they are future. Whence it is similar to the knowledge of Astrologers, which does not make, but only speculates and explores conjunctions of the stars, and the courses of the planets.

You will object, fifthly: No one prudently determines anything concerning the end, unless he foreknows means fit and proportioned to attaining it: whence there is that saying of Luke 14: "Which of you having a mind to build a tower, doth not first sit down, and reckon the charges that are necessary?" Therefore before God efficaciously decrees our conversion, He foreknows whether by these or those means He is going to infallibly attain it: but this He cannot know, except through middle knowledge: Therefore it must be admitted in God.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, and the consequent, by denying the subsumed Minor; for God knows the means fit and proportioned to our conversion through the knowledge of simple intelligence, by which He comprehends His own omnipotence, and sees hidden in its treasures infinite means or aids, by which He can efficaciously and gently draw our wills to Himself, when, and where He wills. For who (says Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 98) is so impiously foolish, as to say that God cannot turn to good the evil wills of men, whichever He wills, when He wills, where He wills?

§ VI

The arguments which are usually raised against the conditioned decrees, which are admitted by the Thomists, are resolved.

Before we propose and dissolve those arguments, it must be diligently observed that some volition, or some decree, can be called conditioned in two ways. First, on the part of the subject, when, namely, the subject does not actually have the will to do something, but would have it, if some condition were posited, as if someone should say: I would wish to hunt, if this were permitted to a Cleric. For by this manner of speaking, I do not signify that I actually have a volition concerning hunting, but that I would have it, if it were permitted to a Cleric. Secondly, on the part of the object, when, namely, there is had an actual, efficacious volition on the part of the one willing, but its effect is suspended, until the condition be posited, upon whose arrival it will be reduced to act, as if I should say, I will and vow to go to Rome, if I recover from my sickness: for then there is had a present and efficacious will of such a pilgrimage, but the restoration of health is awaited, on which it depends as on a condition. Conditioned decrees of the first kind cannot be given in God, because they involve the imperfection of potentiality and suspension repugnant to God; the Thomists, however, teach that in Him conditioned decrees are to be admitted in the second way, or on the part of the object, at least concerning those conditioned future things, which God testifies in the Scriptures that He knows, and which pertain to the order of divine providence, and to the governance of the universe. For thus they say no imperfection is denoted in the one willing, as in the other, as Saint Thomas teaches, Book 1, dist. 46, question 1, article 1, ad 2, in these words: The antecedent will can be called conditioned, and yet there is no imperfection on the part of the divine will, but on the part of the thing willed, which is not taken with all the circumstances which are required for the right order to salvation.

That these are to be admitted in God can be proved, both because, since conditioned future things are more actual, than those which are merely possible (for they connote existence, as to be had under a condition, from which connotation, however, merely possible things abstract), some cause of this greater actuality must be assigned: nor is there any other assignable, besides an objectively conditioned decree. Also because if God were not determined by His decree to their conditioned futurition, that futurition would be indeterminate, and consequently God would have falsely revealed them in the Scriptures rather as future, if the condition were posited, than as not future. Especially since some of them are altogether disparate, and their futurition accordingly has no connection with their conditions, from the nature of the thing, but only from God's good pleasure.

Furthermore, the defenders of middle knowledge rise up against those decrees in many ways, whom they try to expunge and dismiss under many titles, namely from their novelty, uselessness, absurdity, and impossibility. In the first place, they say that they are new, and thought up by the Thomists, since neither in Scripture, nor in the Holy Fathers, nor in Saint Thomas, does there exist any trace of them. Secondly, that they are idle, since they in no way serve divine providence and the governance of things. Thirdly, that they are ridiculous and nugatory; for it seems ridiculous to posit in God a conditioned decree of the conversion of the Tyrians, under the condition of Christ's preaching, rendered impossible by another decree, by which God absolutely determined that Christ would never preach among the Tyrians. Just as a promise made under a condition by a guarantor which he is unwilling to fulfill is vain and illusory, as if someone should say: I will give you ten gold pieces, if I come on that day, and should determine that he will not come. Fourthly, that they are impossible, both because, if God had a conditioned decree of converting, e.g., the Tyrians, on the supposition that Christ would preach to them, since He had decreed elsewhere that Christ would never preach among them, He would by that very fact have contrary affections, in no way cohering with one another, which is impossible. Also because every decree of the divine will infers and causes some real and physical mutation in the creature: but conditioned decrees, whose condition will never be posited, cannot infer and cause mutation in the creature, from the defect of a condition which will never be purified: Therefore they are impossible in God.

But these are trivial matters, nor do they require much sweat to resolve. To the first, therefore, I answer, denying that those decrees have no foundation in Scripture, or the Holy Fathers: for nothing is more frequent in Scripture than that will of God, which they call antecedent, concerning the salvation of all men, which Saint Thomas, related above, says is conditioned on the part of the object. Several pacts or promises of God are also found in Scripture, concerning things future under condition, never to be fulfilled; such as God's will to confer upon posterity original justice, if their parent and head had obeyed the divine precept; such as the covenant made with David to preserve perpetually the hereditary kingdom for his sons, if they had imitated their father's piety; such as the will of the eternal Father to send to the Son more legions of Angels, if He were asked. Scripture also attributes to God knowledge of certain conditioned future things, whose outcome has no connection with the condition, such as that saying of Elisha to King Joash, 4 Kings 13: "If thou hadst smitten five, or six, or seven times the ground, thou hadst smitten Syria even to utter destruction." For it is clear that the devastation of Syria had no connection with that striking of the ground: God could not, therefore, assert that that devastation would be future, from the force of a connection, but only from the

efficacy of His decree.

Those decrees also have foundation in the Holy Fathers, since Saint Dionysius, and Saint Thomas, everywhere teach that God knows all things, whether possible or future, in His essence as in a cause: for from that principle, which is most common in both Holy Doctors, conditioned decrees are manifestly gathered; since (as we have often said) the divine essence cannot be the cause of conditioned future things, except as modified and determined through a conditioned decree, because God is not a necessary agent, but a free one, and operates all things according to the counsel of His will, as the Apostle says. Likewise Saint Thomas below, question 19, article 7, ad 2, expressly asserts that God wills that something happen at some time future, according to an inferior cause, which nevertheless will not be future according to the superior cause: it is established, however, that that future thing is conditioned, since it would be, unless God had otherwise ordered it, for reasons of His providence hidden from us.

To the second, I deny that those decrees are idle and superfluous in God; for just as, although God has decreed to deny glory to some, and the means efficaciously conducing to it; nevertheless the antecedent will which He has for the salvation of all is not idle and superfluous, because through it means sufficient for salvation are prepared for all. So likewise, since the decrees of which we speak conduce both to God's governance and providence (for it belongs to a prudent governor to show himself prepared to do many things, which nevertheless will never be), and to transferring things from the state of mere possibility, to the state of conditioned futurition, and to founding certain knowledge of their truth, they must not be considered idle and superfluous; and much less absurd and ridiculous, but honorable, most prudent, and worthy of the highest veneration: for although in particular agents volitions and promises about doing something under some condition, which they are unwilling to fulfill, seem absurd, they are not so, however, in a general provider; as is established concerning the antecedent and conditioned will of saving all men, which God does not will to be fulfilled in all, for hidden reasons of His providence. Whence the force of the Adversaries' instances comes only from our narrow and lowly thought, by which we conceive God as a particular agent, in the manner of other things which are familiar to us, and can hardly rise to the providence of the most universal and ecumenical governor, unrestrained by any single end, to which it pertains to permit many defects, both physical and moral, in this universe, and to order not only diverse, but also contrary things, according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 33: "Look upon all the works of the most High: two and two, and one against another." From which the response to the third instance of the Adversaries is clear, by which they try to show the absurdity of those decrees.

To the last, which concerns their impossibility, I deny the first proof: for the conditioned decree which God had concerning the faith of the Tyrians, posited that Christ preached among them; and the absolute decree, by which He determined that Christ would not preach to them, are no more opposed to one another, than the antecedent will concerning the salvation of all, and the consequent will of saving only the elect, which nevertheless we shall show, in the following treatise, have no opposition between them, because they are not concerning the object in the same manner, but considered in diverse ways.

To the second proof I answer with Alvarez, that when the decree is absolute, then it must induce a real and physical, absolute mutation in the creature; when, however, it is conditioned, it must not induce real mutation absolutely, but only under condition; that is, it suffices that from the force of that decree, the creature would really be changed, if the condition were fulfilled.

You will ask, whether conditioned decrees are to be admitted in God concerning all possible combinations of things, some of which sometimes seem ridiculous and absurd, such as, if a goat should dance, a rooster will crow; if the Turk should sleep in Constantinople, the Pope will pray in Rome?

I answer negatively, for it suffices to posit in God conditioned decrees, concerning those future things under condition, which are revealed in Scripture, or which serve the order of divine providence; but concerning others, especially if they are altogether disparate, it seems unbecoming and superfluous to admit them in God; for it suffices that God have a general decree, by which He wills not to determine Himself to their futurition, or non-futurition, and consequently to leave them in the state of mere possibility.

The arguments of the Adversaries, which proceed from an injury to human liberty or divine sanctity, will be more conveniently proposed and resolved in the following Treatise, when we shall treat of the divine predefinitions.

Treatise IV

On the Will of God.

In this Treatise we shall deal, first, with the object of the divine will. Secondly, with its liberty, and its concord with divine immutability. Thirdly, with the antecedent will of God, by which He wills all men to be saved. Fourthly, with the efficacy of the divine will. Fifthly, with certain attributes and affections pertaining to the divine will, namely the love, joy, justice, and mercy of God.

Chapter I

On the formal object, motive and terminative, of the divine will.

That there is will in God cannot be denied, once the intellect has been admitted; for just as upon every natural form follows an inclination toward a fitting good — as upon the form of fire, an inclination toward the upward place, upon the form of a stone, a propensity toward the downward place — so upon an intelligible form follows an inclination toward a good fitting to the intellectual nature, which in intellectual agents is called the will. Since, therefore, there is in God a most perfect intellect, there must also be found in Him a most perfect will. It is established, however, from what has been said in Treatise 1, chapter 3, that this does not belong to the most formal concept, or to the metaphysical constitution, of the divine nature, since God's nature is formally constituted through understanding, which is conceived prior in God than willing, because nothing is willed which is not first known; indeed, since the appetitive power is an inclination toward that which is fitting to the appetitive nature, it must necessarily presuppose that nature adequately constituted, so that it may be the rule and measure of appetition. It only remains here to be declared, then, what is the formal object, both motive and terminative, of the divine will.

I say, therefore, that the motive and terminative object of the divine will is the divine and uncreated goodness alone, and not good in common, as it abstracts from created and uncreated.

The first part is proved, first, from Saint Thomas here, question 19, article 2, ad 2, where he thus discourses: In those things which we will for the sake of an end, the whole reason of moving is the end, and this is what moves the will; whence, since God does not will other things than Himself except for the sake of an end, which is His goodness, it does not follow that anything other than His goodness moves His will. By these words the Holy Doctor both taught and proved our conclusion: for the motive object of the will is

the end, because a means, as a means, is willed only insofar as it leads to the end: but the divine and uncreated goodness alone is the end of the divine will: Therefore it alone is its motive object.

The same part is proved, secondly: The divine will is not moved, even partially, by created goodness: Therefore uncreated goodness is the formal, adequately motive object of it, not, however, goodness as such, abstracting from created and uncreated. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. If the divine will were moved by created goodness, even only partially, the love by which He would love the creature would be not only effective, but also affective; for since an effective-only love of the object's goodness does not presuppose it, but posits it, it cannot be allured or moved by it: but the love by which God loves the creature is not affective, but only effective, as Saint Bernard teaches, On the Love of God, chapter 4, in these words: You are not affected by us, or toward us, when You love us: we are affected by You, and in You, and toward You, when we love You: And Saint Thomas here, question 20, article 2, where he says that God's love infuses and creates goodness in things. Reason also supports this, for the love of affection inclines and transforms the lover into the beloved; God, on the contrary, inclines and draws all things to Himself, and it is repugnant that He Himself be transformed into a creature: Therefore the divine will is not moved, even partially, by created goodness.

The second part, however, which is about the terminative object, is persuaded by this reason. That is the formal terminative object of some power, which is attained by it per se primarily, and other things by reason of it: but only the divine goodness is attained per se primarily by God's will, whereas created goods only by reason of it, since it is the end of all other things, according to that saying of Proverbs 16: "The Lord hath made all things for Himself"; Therefore only the divine goodness is the formal terminative object of the divine will.

The same part is proved, secondly: The formal object, whether motive or terminative, of some power, must have perfect proportion and commensuration with it, in the notion of object: but good as such, abstracting from created and uncreated, does not have perfect proportion and commensuration with the divine will; since this is the purest act, and devoid of all potentiality, whereas that is potential, and contains only in potency and confusedly every notion of entity and goodness: Therefore good as such, abstracting from created and uncreated, is not the formal object, whether motive or terminative, of the divine will, but only the divine and uncreated goodness, which, since it is the purest act, and contains in the most perfect and most actual manner every created and participated goodness, has perfect proportion and commensuration with the divine will.

It is confirmed: The divine will stands to its object as the intellect to its own: but only the increate truth is the formal, motive and terminative object of the divine intellect, as was shown in the preceding treatise, chapter 1: Therefore also only the increate goodness is the formal, motive and terminative object of the divine will.

You will object, first, against the first part of the conclusion: Our merits move God's will to reward: Therefore the motive object of it is not only increate goodness, but also moral and created goodness, which is found in our meritorious acts.

I answer by distinguishing the Antecedent: Our merits move God's will, as considered in themselves — I deny. As virtually contained in the divine goodness — I grant. But if you press, and say, that our merits, as virtually contained in the divine goodness, do not have the notion of merit — I answer that as such they do not formally have the notion of merit, but they do virtually, and this suffices for the divine goodness, thus containing them, to move God's will to exercise the act of justice concerning those things contained in it.

You will object, secondly, against the second part of the conclusion: The formal terminative object of some power must contain all the particular objects, which can be attained by it, and be predicated of them, as is clear by induction made in all powers and habits: but divine goodness does not contain created goodness, to which the divine will extends, nor is it predicated of it; but the notion of good as such, as abstracting from created and uncreated, does: Therefore this, and not that, is the formal terminative object of the divine will.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: it must contain all particular objects, by formal or eminential containment — I grant the Major. By determinately formal containment — I deny the Major. Similarly I distinguish the Minor: divine goodness does not contain created goodness by formal containment — I grant the Minor. By eminential containment — I deny the Minor, and the consequence. As to what is added, namely that the formal object must be predicated of all material objects, it must be said that it must be predicated of them, either in the direct case, or in the oblique; it is not, however, always required that it be predicated of them in the direct case, as is established in Theology, whose formal object is God, who is not predicated in the direct case, but only in the oblique, of creatures; for although they are something of God, namely His effects, it cannot nevertheless be said that they are God.

There can also be objected, against both parts of the conclusion, a difficult argument, namely that if God, in loving rational creatures, only regarded His own goodness as end, and motive, and formal terminus, He would love them for His own sake, and

consequently would not love them with the love of friendship, but of concupiscence. But because discussion of this will return in the treatise on charity, lest the same things be uselessly repeated, we refer the resolution of this difficulty to that treatise.

Chapter II

On the liberty of the will of God, and its concord with divine immutability.

Nothing is more certain by faith, and more known by natural light, than that in God there is most perfect liberty; but nothing in Theology is more difficult, than to reconcile it with divine immutability. For since liberty requires indifference, by reason of which a thing is such that it can not-be, and on the contrary immutability imports necessity, by reason of which a thing is such that it cannot not-be, it can be difficultly conceived, how God's supreme immutability can consist with His supreme liberty and indifference.

Some try to resolve this difficulty by asserting that God's free act does not consist in some formality intrinsic to God, but in a purely extrinsic denomination, proceeding from the effects produced by God, or from the action by which they are produced, which they wish to be formally transient. This opinion is attributed to Aureolus, to whom certain Recent authors adhere, who teach that God's free act, at least partially and inadequately, is constituted by those things.

Others, placed at the other extreme, think that God's free act adds to God's necessary perfections some intrinsic perfection, which, because it is free, could without any imperfection have been lacking to God, or have not been in Him. This opinion is commonly attributed to Cajetan by the Recent authors, but undeservedly, as Nazarius, John of Saint Thomas, and other of our Thomists demonstrate, interpreting him as speaking of defectibility not of perfection, but of pure termination, in the manner to be explained below. But whoever be its Author, the opinion of certain Recent authors, who think that God's free act adds to the necessary something modal or a modal reality, which could have been lacking to God, or not have been in His will, is reduced to it, or approaches it.

Others, in order to more easily extricate themselves from this difficulty, take refuge in a relation of reason, asserting that God's free act is constituted by a relation of reason to existing or future creatures. Thus Vasquez, and Marcus a Serra.

Finally, our Thomists commonly teach that God's free act adds to the necessary perfections a termination distinct in notion, which could have been lacking, or not have been, in God. But there is difficulty and controversy among them, whether it could have

not been in God, according to some intrinsic notion, and according to what it says in the direct case, or only according to something extrinsic, and on the part of that which it imports in the oblique case. For Nazarius, Gonzalez, and others, hold that it could have been lacking to God only by reason of the extrinsic connotated thing, namely the existing or future creature. But Master Godoy here, disp. 48, § 5, and following, teaches that it could have been lacking, according to some intrinsic notion indeed under the concept of perfection, or entity, but under the concept of pure termination, and for this opinion he cites Suárez and Aravius. This manner of speaking too, and of explaining God's liberty, as probable, and consonant with the mind and doctrine of Saint Thomas, the Salmanticenses defend here, disp. 7, doubt 8.

I say first: God's free decree is not constituted by something extrinsic, namely by the effects which God has produced ad extra, or by the action and causality by which He produced them.

It is proved in many ways: First, because it implies that a cause be constituted by its effect, since, prior in nature than it produces it, it must already be constituted: but created things produced, and the productive action of them (supposing that it is formally transient) are effects of the decree of the divine will, for God (as the Apostle says) works all things according to the counsel of His will: Therefore it is repugnant that God's free decree be constituted by the effects produced by it, or by the productive action of them.

Secondly, the decree of creating, e.g., the world, belongs to God from eternity, and consequently its constitutive is from eternity: but neither the effects caused by God, nor the action by which they are caused (supposing that it is formally transient) are from eternity: Therefore God's free decree cannot be constituted by them.

Thirdly, the denomination of freely willing is intrinsic to God, and consequently proceeding from some intrinsic form, existing in God: but neither the effects produced by God, nor the transient action productive of them, are within God, but outside: Therefore the denomination of freely willing cannot proceed from them.

Finally, the divine will is not only indifferent to causing or not causing creatures, but also to willing or not willing to cause them: Therefore in relation to indifferent volition or nolition, one is constituted freely willing, or nilling: but the effects caused, and the action by which they are caused, are not volition: Therefore they do not constitute God's free decree.

From these things the opinion of those Recent authors who think that God's free decree, at least partially and inadequately, is constituted by the effects which God produced ad

extra, or by the action and causality by which He produced them, remains confuted. For the reasons adduced prove that God's free decree cannot, even partially and inadequately, be constituted by them. Both because it implies that a cause, even partially and inadequately, be constituted by its effect, because, prior in nature than it produces it, it must be completely and adequately constituted. Also because the decree of creating the world belongs to God from eternity, and consequently from eternity is in God its adequate constitutive. Also, finally, because the denomination of freely willing must adequately proceed from some form intrinsic to God, and existing in Him.

I say secondly, divine liberty does not consist in an intrinsic and defectible perfection of God, or one which could have not been in God.

It is proved: Both because if some perfection could be lacking to God, He would be neither immutable, nor infinitely perfect. Also because in God a perfection mixed with imperfection is not to be admitted: but a defectible perfection, entitatively, in the notion of perfection, imports imperfection; for to be able to not-be is the greatest imperfection: Therefore it is not to be conceded to God.

I say thirdly, God's free act does not add to the necessary some mode or modal entity, which could have been lacking to God, or not have been in Him. It is proved: Both because such a defectible modal entity would be imperfect, just as a defectible perfection, since to be able to not-be, or to be able to be nothing, is the supreme degree of imperfection. Also because it would say in the divine essence the imperfection of potentiality: for the divine essence would stand to it, as potency to act, and as perfectible to perfective, and would make with it a real composition; for by this very fact that it would be really defectible, it could not be identified with the divine essence, which is altogether indefectible.

I say fourthly, God's free act is not constituted by a relation of reason to creatures.

It is proved: Either such a relation is taken fundamentally, or formally? If the former be said, it remains to explain what its foundation is, whether it be something created, or increate, intrinsic to God, or extrinsic, and whether it denotes perfection or not; and thus this opinion will coincide with the preceding ones already impugned, or with that which we shall expound in the following conclusion. The latter cannot be affirmed: Both because a real being, such as God's free decree is, cannot be constituted by some form of reason fashioned by the intellect. Also because either that relation of reason is formed by God, or by the creature: Not by the creature, since God is free from eternity, and the created intellect is in time. Nor also by God, for either God would form it through a free act, or a necessary one? Not the second, otherwise that relation would be necessary to

God, and consequently could not constitute His free decree. Nor the first, because every free act of the divine intellect presupposes a constituted free decree of the will, since the liberty of the intellect arises from the liberty of the will.

I add that it seems most absurd that God's free decrees, which are the true and real cause of creatures, and on which the whole force of divine providence, and the series of things of the universe, depends, and in which, as in a medium, God's free or vision knowledge is founded, should be resolved into mere beings of reason.

I say lastly, God's free act adds to the necessary act a termination toward creatures, defectible, or possibly lacking, under the aspect of termination, but not under the aspect of perfection, or entity. This conclusion follows from what has been said in the preceding, for since God's free act is not constituted by a purely extrinsic denomination sought from creatures, as we showed in the first conclusion, but by something intrinsic to God, defectible, however, according to some formality, because this is required by liberty and indifference of the will; the termination of the divine will to creatures must be defectible, or possibly lacking, according to some notion and formality: but it cannot be defectible, or possibly lacking, in the notion of perfection, or entity, as is established from what has been said in the second and third conclusions: Therefore it must be defectible, or possibly lacking, at least under the notion of pure termination, so that it can constitute God's free act.

You will say, with Gonzalez, that that termination is defectible by reason of the extrinsic connoted thing, not, however, by reason of that which it imports in the direct case.

But on the contrary, first: That termination must be defectible, according to that which constitutes God freely willing, since defectibility belongs to the notion of liberty and indifference: but it does not constitute God freely willing through that which it says of the connoted thing, but through that which it says in the direct case, otherwise God would be constituted freely willing through mere extrinsic denomination sought from creatures, not, however, through something intrinsic to Himself, which is to fall into the opinion of Aureolus, confuted in the first conclusion: Therefore that termination must be defectible, not only by reason of the extrinsic connoted thing, but also by reason of that which it imports in the direct case.

On the contrary, secondly: The free decree is to God the ground of knowing existing or future creatures, as was shown in the preceding treatise, chapter 4, § 2. From which one may thus argue: the ground of knowing existing or future creatures must be free, and consequently defectible, under that aspect and concept under which it is the ground of knowing them: but the ground of knowing existing or future creatures is not an intrinsic

formality according to what it imports in the oblique case and terminatively, but according to what it imports intrinsically and in the direct case: Therefore as such it must be defectible, or possibly lacking. The Major is established: for if the ground of knowing creatures were not free, but necessary, it would not be a medium for free, but necessary, knowledge. The Minor is also evident; for that which God's decree imports in the oblique case is the existing or future creature: but this is not the ground or medium of knowing, but only the thing known: Therefore God's decree is to Him the ground of knowing creatures, not according to what it imports in the oblique case and extrinsically, but according to what it imports intrinsically and in the direct case.

On the contrary, thirdly: Defectibility under the concept of intrinsic termination, without defect of entity and perfection, argues no imperfection in God, and besides, this being admitted, the liberty of the divine volition is better and more easily explained: Therefore it must be admitted. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent, besides that it will be established from the solution of the objections, is briefly persuaded. Only a defect of perfection or entity is imperfection: but defectibility under the concept of pure termination imports neither a defect of perfection, nor of entity, as will be established from what is to be said below: Therefore it argues no imperfection in God.

It is confirmed: From the defectibility of that intrinsic termination under the concept of pure termination, no mutability can be inferred in the divine will: Therefore it is to be admitted. The consequence is clear, for for this reason a defectible perfection or entity is rejected by God, because from it follows a real mutation, or mutability, in Him, as we argued above. The Antecedent, however, is proved: Mutation is a passage from non-being to being, or from being to non-being, and consequently requires the arrival or lack of a form, under the concept of being, and consequently under the notion of entity and perfection: Therefore a termination defectible only under the concept of termination, and indefectible under the concept of entity, infers no mutation or mutability in God. Which can be explained from the mystery of the Incarnation: for because the divine subsistence has the exercise of intrinsically terminating human nature, without the addition of new entity or perfection, although it should cease to terminate it, it would not on that account be changed, because it would lose nothing of entity or perfection, but would only cease to have the exercise which it had before.

From these things you have the solution of this most difficult knot, which we proposed at the beginning of this chapter, and the perfect concord of God's liberty with His immutability. For from the fact that God's free act adds a termination toward creatures, defectible under the notion of termination, God's liberty and indifference is perfectly preserved, which requires that a thing be such, that it can not-be. From the fact,

however, that that termination is indefectible under the notion of entity and perfection, His supreme immutability subsists; because mutation requires a passage from non-being to being, or from being to non-being.

You will object, first: The termination of God's free act toward creatures, under the concept of termination, is a divine entity intrinsic to God: Therefore if it could be lacking, or not be in God, under the concept of termination, it could also be lacking under the concept of entity; or if it could not be lacking under the concept of entity, it could not likewise be lacking under the concept of termination. A similar argument can be made about perfection, for the termination of the divine will toward creatures denotes perfection: Therefore if it could be lacking to God under the concept of termination, it could also be lacking under the concept of perfection.

To the first argument I answer that although the termination of God's free act toward creatures, under the concept of termination, is implicitly a divine entity, it does not, however, explicate the concept of divine entity, from which it is distinguished by a virtual distinction, which distinction is sufficient, that although it be lacking, or could be lacking, under the concept of termination, it does not fail, nor could it fail, under the concept of entity. Just as, although the deformity of sin implicitly imports the concept of positive entity, because, however, it does not explicate it, and is distinguished from it as implicit and explicit, it stands very well that the deformity of sin be caused by God, under the concept of entity, without its being caused by Him under the concept of deformity. From which the response to the second argument is clear, for although that termination implies perfection, by reason of the increate entity, which it transcendentally includes, it does not, however, formally express it under the concept of termination. Whence, although it could have been lacking to God under the concept of termination, it could not, however, under the concept of perfection.

You will say, the exercise of God's will as free, reducing it from first act to second, expresses perfection: but that termination is the exercise of God's will as free, reducing it from first act to second: Therefore it expresses perfection.

It is confirmed: Every actuality expresses perfection: but that exercise is actuality: Therefore it expresses perfection.

To the instance I answer by distinguishing the Major: the exercise of God's will as free, reducing it from first act to second, entitative — expresses perfection — I grant the Major. Terminative — I deny the Major. Similarly I distinguish the Minor: that termination is an exercise reducing from first act to second, terminative — I grant the Minor. Entitative — I deny the Minor, and the consequence. To the confirmation in the

same way I distinguish the Major: every entitative actuality says or expresses perfection — I grant the Major. Purely terminative — I deny the Major. For this, although it implies perfection, by reason of the divine and increate entity which it transcendentally includes, does not, however, formally express it. Just as a relation, under the concept of relation, and as to the notion of "toward," does not express perfection, although it implicitly includes it, and cannot be perfectly abstracted from it.

You will object, secondly: If the termination of an act of the divine will toward creatures does not exist necessarily in God, but can or could be lacking to Him, or not be in Him, not only according to what it imports extrinsically and in the oblique case, but also as to what it imports intrinsically and in the direct case, it follows that it is really distinguished from the necessary termination; for by this very fact that it can be lacking, it can be really separated from it: real separability, however, is the greatest sign of real distinction. It also follows that God can or could be changed; for to be changed is nothing other than to stand otherwise intrinsically than before: but if such termination does not exist necessarily in God, but can or could be lacking to Him, God can, or could, stand otherwise intrinsically than before: Therefore He can, or could, be changed.

I answer by denying both sequels, and to the proof of the first I say that for real distinction, separability as to entity is required; but since the necessary termination and the free termination of the act of the divine will have the same entity, they cannot be separated from one another according to the concept of entity, but only according to the concept of termination. Which can be explained and persuaded by the example of the relation of a father to two sons, which, one ceasing, ceases to be terminated to him, remaining terminated to the other survivor, without the termination as to the one, which ceases, being on that account really distinguished from the termination to the other, which remains; namely because the reality and entity of both is the same.

To the proof of the second I distinguish the Major: to be changed is nothing other than to stand otherwise intrinsically than before, through the acquisition of a new form, entity, or perfection — I grant. Through only a new termination — I deny. The solution is clear from what has been said above, and can be further illustrated by the example adduced above; for although the Divine Word in the Incarnation stands otherwise intrinsically than before, and becomes intrinsically man, since before He was not intrinsically man; because, however, this does not happen through the acquisition of a new form, entity, or perfection, but only through a new termination of the human nature, which before He did not terminate, He is not changed through the Incarnation, as we shall more fully expound in the treatise on the Incarnation.

Chapter III

On the antecedent will of God, by which He wills all men to be saved.

Concerning the antecedent will of God, five celebrated controversies are to be briefly resolved here.

The first is, whether after the fall of Adam there is in God a general and antecedent will of saving all men? The second, whether such a will be in God formally and properly, or only eminently, or metaphorically? The third, for what reason that general will of saving all men is called antecedent? The fourth, in what sense it is said to be conditioned? The fifth, whether by force of such a will Christ suffered and died for all, that is, offered and ordered His death and passion to the salvation, not of a few only, but of all and each of men? The sixth, whether through the antecedent will sufficient aids for salvation are prepared?

§ I

The first four difficulties are briefly resolved.

I say first, God, by a general and antecedent will, wills to save all men, even after Adam's fall. This is against Jansenius, books 9 and 10, On the Grace of Christ the Savior, where he teaches that God had indeed such a will for all and each of men, considered in the state of innocence, but not after Adam's fall, and the foreseeing of original sin.

The conclusion is proved from that celebrated testimony of the Apostle, 1 Timothy 2: "God will have all men to be saved," etc., where it is clear that the discourse is about men constituted in the state of fallen nature, both because he speaks of men as they now are, for he wills that prayers and supplications be made for them before God. Also because in the same place he says that, to fulfill this will of God, Christ offered Himself as a redemption for all: but redemption presupposes the fall into original sin.

Nor does the Apostle only openly teach our assertion, but also prove it by a threefold reason, which he insinuates in these words, which he adds in the same place: "Because there is one God of all, one mediator of God and men, who gave Himself for all." God, therefore, wills the salvation of all men, first because He is God and Lord of all, who founded all equally, and bears the care and providence of all. Whence Ignatius, Epistle 6 to the Philadelphians, says that our God is the lover of all, and wills all men to be saved, on which account He also makes His sun to rise upon the good and the bad, and rains upon the just and the unjust. Secondly, because He is mediator not only of certain men, but of absolutely all. This reason Cajetan rightly weighs in his commentary on this

passage of the Apostle, in these words: If there were several mediators between God and men, it would be thought that one was mediator for some, and another for others, but from the fact that one is mediator of God and men, for reconciling men to God, it falls to him alone to mediate between God and all men. Thirdly, because He is redeemer of all men, and died for all. Whence according to the Apostle, God's antecedent will of saving men, and Christ's will of dying for them, are as it were parallel, and correspond mutually to one another.

I say secondly, the antecedent will, by which God wills all men to be saved, properly and formally, and not only metaphorically, or eminently, is in God.

It is proved, first: The antecedent will by which God wills all men to be saved is the will of good pleasure, and not only of sign, as Saint Thomas teaches, question 23 of On Truth, article 2, in these words: Will is properly said of God, and this is the will of good pleasure, which is distinguished into antecedent and consequent. The same he asserts, on chapter 2 of the first Epistle to Timothy, lecture 1, where, expounding those words of the Apostle, "He will have all men to be saved," he reduces this will to the will of good pleasure: but the will of good pleasure is repeated formally and properly in God, as the same Holy Doctor teaches here, question 19, article 11, where he thus says: The will properly so called is called the will of good pleasure, but the will metaphorically so called is the will of sign: Therefore the antecedent will by which God wills all men to be saved is found formally and properly in God, and not only metaphorically, or eminently.

It is confirmed: The same Angelic Doctor in the same place, article 6, ad 1, compares the antecedent will which God has for the salvation of all men, to the antecedent will by which a judge is said to will a murderer, insofar as he is a man, to live. And lecture 1, on chapter 2 of 1 Timothy, to the antecedent will of preserving merchandise absolutely considered, which a merchant has, a tempest impending: but it is most certain that a pious and just judge properly and formally wills, though inefficaciously, that he who is a murderer, as a man, live; similarly a merchant, a danger of tempest impending, wills, properly and formally, though inefficaciously, to preserve his merchandise, by reason indeed of the advantage which their preservation, as far as it is concerned in itself, brings: Therefore likewise the antecedent will which God has for the salvation of all men, although it is not efficacious with respect to all, is in God properly and formally.

It is proved, secondly: The object of the antecedent will, namely the salvation of all men, considered according to itself, is properly and formally willable, since under this aspect it is a good, nor is it considered as impeding a greater good, namely the manifestation of divine justice toward some, and of His mercy toward others: Therefore it is willed by

God, properly and formally, and not only metaphorically, or eminently.

I say thirdly, God's will is not denominated antecedent from the fact that it precedes the consent, merits, or demerits of our will, and their foreseeing; nor consequent from the fact that it presupposes both. But it is called antecedent because it is concerned with the good of the creature, absolutely and precisely considered according to itself; consequent, however, because it is terminated at it, as clothed with all its individual circumstances.

The first part is proved: God's consequent will, since it is of itself efficacious, and causes our consent, as we shall show in the following chapter, precedes it in priority at least of nature and causality: Therefore God's will is not denominated antecedent, from the fact that it precedes our consent. The consequence is clear, otherwise the members of the division of God's will into antecedent and consequent would be confused. Likewise predestination includes the will of salvation, not only antecedent, but also consequent, as Saint Thomas asserts, Book 1 to Annibaldus, dist. 46, sole question, article 2, ad 1, and is established from the fact that otherwise it would not be efficacious, since it would include only inefficacious will, such as the antecedent is: but predestination does not presuppose foreknowledge of merits, as we shall show in the treatise on predestination: Therefore the consequent will is not that which presupposes foreknowledge of merits.

The second part of the conclusion is expressly Saint Thomas's, here question 19, article 6, ad 1; likewise Book 1, dist. 46, question 1, article 1, ad 2; also lecture 1, on chapter 2 of the first Epistle to Timothy, and is briefly explained thus. Since these two wills, or volitions, are not distinguished in God, except by relation to their objects, or material connotations, nor consequently have that diverse denomination of antecedent and consequent, except from them; that which is carried to the created good, absolutely and according to itself considered, is rightly called antecedent; and that which is terminated at the same good, as clothed with all its particular circumstances, is rightly called consequent; if that good, precisely according to itself considered, precedes itself, as clothed with particular circumstances: but so it is, for this superinduction of particular circumstances is a certain accident with respect to such a good according to itself considered, and consequently presupposes it in some way: Therefore God's will is rightly called antecedent, from the fact that it is concerned with the good of the creature according to itself considered; consequent, however, from the fact that it is terminated at it, as clothed with all its circumstances.

I say fourthly, the antecedent will of saving all men is not said to be conditioned, because it depends as on a condition, on the consent which it awaits from free will, but from the fact that it imports a conditioned act, by which God would will the salvation of all men,

unless this were repugnant to the order of His providence, to the manifestation of His justice, and to the general good of the whole universe. Thus Saint Thomas, Book 1, dist. 46, question 1, article 1, ad 2, where he says: The antecedent will can be called conditioned, and yet there is no imperfection on the part of the divine will, but on the part of the thing willed, which is not taken with all the circumstances which are required for the right order to salvation. The same he teaches on 1 Timothy, chapter 2, lecture 1.

Reason also supports this: for since men cannot will salvation, unless God wills them to will, and unless He operates in them the very willing, as the Apostle teaches, to the Philippians 2, and Augustine, in the Soliloquies, chapter 24, in these words: I cannot will what is good, unless You will it — it implies that in God there be a decree or volition of saving men, dependent, as on a condition, on the consent and volition of men, and awaiting it from the human will. Whence the Church of Lyons, in the book On the Defense of the Truth of Sacred Scripture: Certainly this is manifest in this question, that even if generally and indifferently God wills all men to be saved; nevertheless in the hearts of some, by the kindness of His mercy, He Himself operates this same will of His, that they too will to be saved, and are saved: to whom also the Apostle says, "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling," for it is God who works in us to will and to accomplish, according to His good will. In the hearts of others, by the severity of His just and hidden judgment, He does not operate this salutary will, but leaves them to their own judgment, so that, because they have not willed to believe, they are damned by a just non-willing.

You will object, first, against the first conclusion: Saint Augustine did not understand universally that passage of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," but applied a threefold limitation to it. The first, which he delivers, Against Julian 4, chapter 8; On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 14; and On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8, is that the particle "all" is not taken universally, but by an accommodated distribution, for those who are saved, so that this proposition makes this sense: God wills all who are saved to be saved, or that no one is saved except whom God wills. In the way that a schoolmaster is said to teach all the youths of some city, not because he teaches all, but because none is instructed except by him. The second, which is had in the Enchiridion, chapter 105, and elsewhere, is that "all" is taken indeed universally, but with incomplete universality, namely for the kinds of individuals, not, however, for the individuals of kinds, that is, not for all men absolutely singularly, but for every kind of men, for Jews and Gentiles, slaves and free, princes and private persons, learned and unlearned, adults and little ones, men and women, etc., because from all these conditions, some are predestined, and are saved. Just as when it is said, "every animal was in the ark of Noah," the sense is not that

all individuals of animals were there, but some from every species. The third limitation, in Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 15, and City of God 22, chapter 1, is that God wills, not formally, but causally, all men to be saved, by causing holy men to will the salvation of all. Just as when it is said, Romans 8, "The Spirit Himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings," it is the same as saying He makes us ask; and when it is said, Genesis 21, "Now I know that thou fearest the Lord," the sense is, "I have caused to know": Therefore according to Augustine, God does not have a general and antecedent will of saving all men existing in fallen nature, but only some, and consequently such a will is not to be admitted in God. Especially since the Semi-Pelagians formerly had recourse to that will, and alleged that testimony of the Apostle adduced by us, as the chief foundation of their heresy, as is to be seen in the Epistles of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine.

I answer that Saint Augustine in the places cited must be understood of the consequent will, not, however, of the antecedent; so that the sense of his doctrine is that the proposition of the Apostle, understood of the consequent will of saving men which God has, is not to be taken universally, but with some one of the three limitations adduced; with which it stands that if it be understood of the antecedent will (as Damascene understood it, On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 24), it can and must be taken universally. Whence Saint Thomas, Book 1, dist. 46, question 1, article 1, ad 1: According to Damascene (he says) the word of the Apostle is understood of the antecedent will, and not of the consequent; but according to Augustine it is understood of the consequent.

To what is added about the Semi-Pelagians, it must be said that they understood and explained the antecedent will, in a mode altogether different from that in which the Disciples of Saint Thomas use it. For they said that there was a certain general and conditioned will of God, awaiting the foreseen and explored consent of free will, which accordingly became consequent and efficacious from that same consent; whence they did not admit that God pursues the elect with a more special love than the reprobate, but wills salvation equally to them, as far as it lies on His part. We, however, abhor these things, as is clear from what has been said in conclusions 3 and 4, and will be more fully established from what is to be said in the Treatise on predestination.

You will object, secondly, against the second conclusion: Saint Thomas, in the Opusculum On Foreknowledge and Predestination, chapter 6, says that the will which God has for the salvation of all men is the will of sign. And here, question 19, article 6, ad 1, and also Part 3, question 21, article 4, in the body, he says that it is rather to be called a velleity, than an absolute will. Likewise Saint Chrysostom, Homily 1 on the Epistle to the Ephesians, calls that will by the name of desire, saying that God wondrously desires and

vehemently longs for our salvation: but neither the will of sign, nor a velleity, nor desire, are found in God properly and formally, but only metaphorically, or eminently: Therefore neither is the antecedent will concerning the salvation of all men. Reason also persuades this; for no inefficacious will can be in God properly and formally; both because according to Scripture, every will of God is efficacious, and always fulfilled, as is established from Isaiah 46: "All my will shall be done," and from Psalm 134: "Whatsoever the Lord pleased he hath done." Also because every inefficacious will, lacking effect, denotes imperfection: but the antecedent will of saving all men is inefficacious, since not all attain salvation: Therefore it is not in God properly and formally.

To Saint Thomas I answer that that Opusculum is not the Holy Doctor's, which is gathered, both from the fact that it is not had in the Roman printing of Saint Thomas's works, which is to be preferred to others. Also because otherwise he would openly contradict himself, since he expressly taught the opposite, question 23 of On Truth, cited above. It can also be said that although that will, according as it exists formally in God, is the will of good pleasure, insofar as it is manifested by some exterior sign, it can be called the will of sign; and Saint Thomas considered it in this second way in the cited Opusculum, if it be edited by him, but from this nothing against us. When, however, he calls that will a velleity, by this he does not intend to teach that it is not a will in fact, or that it is not formally in God, but only that it is not will simply, but in a qualified sense, insofar as it attains the object according to itself, and precise from circumstances. For thus he clearly explains himself here, article 6, ad 1. Or he calls such a will a velleity, because it is not absolute, but conditioned; for a conditioned will, comparatively to an absolute one, is usually called a velleity, as the same Holy Doctor declares, Book 4, dist. 17, question 2, article 1, ad 3, in these words: Although a complete will cannot be of the impossible, a conditioned will can, which is also called a velleity.

To Chrysostom it is answered that he uses the name "desire" broadly, and in a certain ample signification, insofar as the most fervent love of some thing, even present and possessed, is sometimes called desire of it, as is established from 1 Peter 1: "Into which the Angels desire to look."

To the reason adduced, I deny the Major, and to its first proof I say that Scripture in the places cited only wishes to declare that every will of God simply so called, such as the consequent will is, is efficacious, and always fulfilled; with which it stands that there be given in Him formally a will in a qualified sense, such as the antecedent is, which is not fulfilled, as is gathered from Matthew 23: "Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets... how often would I have gathered thy children together, and thou wouldest not!"

To the second proof it must be said that some will can be called inefficacious in two ways: first, from some extrinsic impediment, overcoming or retarding its efficacy; secondly, from the very ordination and providence of the one willing. A will inefficacious in the first way is imperfect, and cannot be found in God; it is otherwise, however, with a will inefficacious only in the second way, such as is the antecedent will concerning the salvation of all men; for God, from His own ordination and providence, wills that it lack effect, and be inefficacious in many, so that indeed there be room for the mutability and liberty of the human will, and for the manifestation of His attributes.

You will say, granted that such a will is formally in God, it can nevertheless not be true and sincere; for if it were in the power of a merchant to flee or to calm the tempest, lest the merchandise perish, who would believe that he had a true and sincere will concerning their preservation, if he did not avoid or overcome the impending tempest? Since, therefore, God has hidden in the treasures of His omnipotence infinite means, by which He can save all men, He does not seem to have a true and sincere will of saving those to whom He denies such means and aids, and confers or offers only sufficient ones.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence, and the parity. The reason of distinction is because a merchant is a particular person, whose business it is to intend his own particular good, and gain, whence if, a tempest impending, he does not do whatever he can for the preservation of the merchandise, he is convicted of not sincerely willing to save it: but on the contrary, God is a universal provider, whose business it is to intend and provide for the common good of the universe, and to permit that some creatures fail, and be frustrated of their end; whence with a sincere will of the salvation of someone, absolutely considered, He can permit that he fall into sin, and deny him efficacious aids for avoiding it, lest a greater good be impeded, namely the order of divine providence, the beauty of the universe, the manifestation of His attributes, the beauty of justice, the splendor of mercy, etc.

You will object, thirdly, against the third conclusion: Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, book 1, chapter 9, says that the consequent will in God takes its origin from our vice; and Saint Thomas, Book 1, dist. 46, question 1, article 1, expressly says that the consequent will presupposes foreknowledge of works: Therefore for this reason it is rightly denominated such, and consequently is also rightly called consequent, because it precedes that foreknowledge.

I answer that when Damascene and Saint Thomas say that the consequent will has its origin from our vice, and supposes foreknowledge of works, they do not speak of the antecedent will, universally taken, and according as it extends both to good works,

predefined by God, and to evil ones, permitted by Him; but of the consequent will, specially taken, or of the punitive consequent will, which presupposes fault, and takes its origin from our vice, according to that saying of Tertullian, God from His own is merciful, from ours just. For in order that they explain God's consequent will, they place an example in some particular object, which God wills, the foreseeing of sin being supposed, namely the damnation and eternal punishment of the reprobate; although it is not necessary that all that God wills by consequent will presuppose sin, or foreknowledge of merits or demerits, as is established in predestination, which is a consequent will of God, and yet, in Saint Thomas's opinion, does not presuppose foreknowledge of merits.

You will object, fourthly, against the fourth conclusion: God does not save men, unless they will: Therefore the antecedent will of saving all men depends on the volition of man, which God awaits from free will.

But I deny the consequence, for although God does not save men, unless willing, and freely consenting to His calling, He does not, however, await this volition and consent from free will, but Himself effects and works it in the heart of man through His grace; according to that saying of Augustine, Epistle 107: That we believe in God, and live piously, is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy, not because we ought not to will and run, but because He Himself works in us both to will and to run.

§ II

The fifth difficulty is resolved, namely whether Christ suffered and died for all?

I say fifthly, Christ suffered and died for all, or offered and ordered His death and passion to the salvation, not of a few only, but of all and each of men.

The conclusion is proved, first, from these words of the Apostle, 2 Corinthians 5: "If one died for all, then all were dead, and Christ died for all." In which passage the Apostle proves that all and each of men were dead, that is, contracted the debt of dying in Adam, from this, that Christ died for all: but all altogether distributively died in Adam, and in him contracted the debt of dying: Therefore Christ also died for all and each of men distributively, and not only for the kinds of individuals, as Jansenius interprets. Nor only as to the sufficiency of the price, as others say, since in this sense He could also be said to have died for the demons and for the damned. Whence the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 3, defines that Christ died for all, in that sense in which it was denied by Calvin; but Calvin did not deny that Christ died for all as to the sufficiency of the price, nor even

for some of every kind and condition, for on chapter 17 of John he uses both of these evasions, to explain the passages of Scripture in which it is said that Christ died for all: Therefore etc.

There are added testimonies of the Holy Fathers, especially of Augustine, on whom Jansenius chiefly relies. For in the commentaries on Psalm 95, toward the end, he thus says: He will judge the world in equity, not a part, because He did not purchase a part. He is to judge the whole, because He gave a price for the whole. And book 2 On the Symbol, to the Catechumens, chapter 8, he thus introduces Christ speaking, and reproaching the reprobate: You see the wounds which you inflicted; do you recognize the side which you pierced? For through you and because of you it was opened, and yet you would not enter. Likewise book 6 Against Julian, chapter 1, he proves from the testimony of the Apostle adduced above that all men are dead by the death of sin, because Christ died for all. His words are: "One (says the Apostle) died for all, therefore all died," showing that it could not have happened that He should die, except for the dead: for from this he proves that all are dead, because for all the dead, one died: I press, I insist, I thrust upon the one refusing... "One died for all, therefore all died." See that he wished it to be a consequence, that all be understood dead, if He died for all. Since, therefore, they are not dead in body, it remains that all are dead in sin, if Christ died for all; let no one deny, let no one doubt, who does not deny or doubt that he himself is a Christian.

Reason also supports this: for if Christ did not die for the salvation of all and each, one of the chief foundations of our faith wavers; for according to the doctrine and institution of the Church, each of the faithful is bound to believe that Christ is his redeemer, no less than that God is his creator, and to invoke Him as such: but this cannot be believed, if Christ is the redeemer of only some; especially indeed if He be said to be the redeemer only of the elect, of whose number no one can believe himself to be, without special revelation, as the Council of Trent defines, session 6, chapter 13: Therefore Christ is the redeemer of all men, and suffered and died for the salvation of all. Whence the Church, in solemn prayers, frequently repeats these words: "God, founder and redeemer of all the faithful"; and in Ecclesiastical hymns it is said: "Jesus, redeemer of all." With which these words of Ambrose, on Psalm 118, are consonant: That mystical sun of justice rose for all, came for all, suffered for all, and rose again for all.

I add that this doctrine of the general redemption of Christ not only strengthens our faith, but also fortifies hope, and kindles charity, as the Holy Fathers plainly teach: for Augustine, in the book of Meditations, chapter 14, thus says: All my hope and the certainty of my whole confidence is in the precious blood of Christ, which was shed for

us, and for our salvation. And Sermon 5 to the Brethren: The Son of God died for us; be secure that you will receive His very life, you who have as a pledge His death. What life does He preserve for you, made just, who gave His own death also to the impious? With what certain and firm promise does He preserve for the just His own life, who gave to the unjust His own death? Did I seek you impious, that having redeemed you, I should abandon the redeemed to be lost? Have I borne your evils, and shall I not restore my hour? Has the fountain of life died for us, and will He deny His own life, who for us expended His own death? Similarly, that Christ's death and general redemption is a great incentive of charity, the Apostle teaches, 2 Corinthians 5, in these words: "The charity of Christ presseth us: because if one died for all, then all died: and Christ died for all; that they also who live, may not now live to themselves, but unto him who died for them." Whence Bernard, Sermon 20 on the Canticle: The work of our redemption altogether easily claims all our love for itself; this alone more sweetly allures our devotion, and more justly exacts it, and binds it more tightly, and affects it more vehemently.

Against this conclusion can be objected in the first place some testimonies of Scripture, in which, treating of Christ's death and redemption, this word "many" is used, as Matthew 20: "The Son of man is come... to give his life a redemption for many." And 26: "For this is my blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many," etc. But to this it is answered that in these passages it is signified that Christ's blood was shed for many, as to efficacy, and for all, as to sufficiency, as Saint Thomas interprets that passage of Matthew. Or it can be said that "many" (as Augustine testifies, book 6 of the earlier work Against Julian, chapter 12, and book 2 of the later work, chapter 134; likewise book 20 of the City of God, chapter 32) is frequently used in Scripture for "all," as Daniel 12: "And many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth, shall awake," that is, all shall rise again in the day of judgment. And to the Romans 5: "For if by one man's offense many died."

Secondly, other testimonies are objected, in which Christ is said not to have prayed for the reprobate: John 17: "I pray not for the world, but for them whom thou hast given me." That is (as Augustine interprets, Homily 100 and 107 on John), not for the reprobate, but for the predestined. Whence Saint Thomas, Part 3, question 21, article 4, ad 2, says that Christ did not pray for all His crucifiers, nor even for all who were going to believe in Him. But to this it is answered that these words do not signify that Christ in no way prayed for the reprobate, but only that He did not pray for them with that special prayer, which He then, after the Last Supper, poured forth for the Apostles alone. Or that He did not pray for them, with an absolute prayer, and proceeding from the consequent will, that He should obtain from the Father for them eternal life, and the

means efficaciously conducing to it. Whence the Holy Doctor adds, after the words adduced: But only for those who were predestined, that through Him they might obtain eternal life. By which words he openly declares that he only denied that kind of prayer in Christ for all His crucifiers, which He had for the elect.

Thirdly, it is objected that in Hebrews 9, verse 12, Christ's redemption is called eternal. But to this it is easily answered that it is called eternal, not because it belongs only to the predestined, in whom alone is the perennial fruit of Christ's death, but because it need not be repeated; as the old sacrifices, to which the sacrifice of Christ's death is there compared.

Fourthly, these words of the Third Council of Valence in Gaul, chapter 4, are objected: "Christ did not die for those who died in impiety." But the sense of those words is that Christ did not die, that the impious, consigned to eternal punishments, should be exempted from them by the benefit of the Savior; the Council does not, however, deny that, while they lived, Christ's redemption and sufficient aids for salvation were offered to them.

Finally, Jansenius objects several testimonies of Augustine, by which he asserts that only those are redeemed by Christ who are actually saved, and that no one perishes of those whom Christ redeemed, and for whom He died. But it is briefly answered that this word "to redeem" has two senses; for in the first place it signifies to offer a sufficient price for the liberty of a captive, with sincere will, that such a price be applied to him; secondly it signifies the same as actually to liberate the captive from slavery. When, therefore, Augustine says that only those are redeemed by Christ who are actually saved, or that no one perishes of those whom Christ redeemed, he speaks of redemption not in the first, but in the second sense; just as Prosper too, when in his response to the first objection of Vincentius he says: Those who pass through this world without the faith of Christ, and without the regeneration of the sacrament, are strangers to redemption. For he only means that they are not redeemed in second act, and as to application. Whence in the same place he says: Since, on account of the one nature of all, and the one cause of all, truly assumed by our Lord, all are rightly said to be redeemed, and yet not all are liberated from captivity, the property of redemption belongs to those who are no longer vessels of the devil, but vessels of Christ. That is, only these are properly said to be redeemed, who are justified, and liberated from the power of the devil.

§ III

The last difficulty is resolved.

I say lastly, God, through the antecedent will, prepares for men, even in the state of fallen nature, means or aids sufficient for salvation. This is expressly Saint Thomas's, on chapter 12 of the Epistle to the Hebrews, lecture 3, where he thus says: God wills all men to be saved, and therefore grace is lacking to no one, but He communicates Himself to all as far as it is in Himself. And Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 150: God (he says), as far as it is in Himself, is ready to give grace to all, for He wills all men to be saved. That He is speaking of men in the state of fallen nature is openly gathered from this, that otherwise he should not have said that God is ready, but had been ready, to give grace to all. Finally the same Holy Doctor, Book 1, dist. 46, question 1, article 1, speaking of God's antecedent will, thus has it: The effect of this will is the very order to the end of salvation, and the things promoting to that end, commonly proposed to all, both natural and gratuitous. By these words he insinuates the fundamental reason of our conclusion: for God, through the antecedent will, orders all men to the end of salvation; for "the effect of this will is the very order to the end of salvation," says the Holy Doctor: Therefore through it He prepares for men means or aids sufficient for salvation. The consequence is clear, for since the end is not attainable except through means, it implies that men be sufficiently ordered by the antecedent will to the end of salvation, unless through it means and aids sufficient for salvation are prepared for them.

It is confirmed: By this very fact that God, through the antecedent will, orders men to salvation and the supernatural end, He obligates them to observe the supernatural precepts, which are necessary means for its attainment: but man cannot be obligated, without sufficient aids, to the observance of supernatural precepts, otherwise he would be obligated to the impossible, since he cannot, without the aid of grace, fulfill the supernatural precepts: Therefore through the antecedent will God prepares for men sufficient supernatural aids for salvation.

Against this conclusion a certain Recent author objects, first: God's antecedent will concerning the salvation of all men is nothing other than a certain velleity, which regards only human nature, according to the general notion of nature, and as founded by God for salvation: but the will by which God prepares for men in the state of corrupted nature the means necessary for salvation is a true and properly so-called will, and not only a certain velleity, and regards men in particular, as they are in themselves, not, however, only human nature, according to the general notion of nature, and as founded by God for salvation: Therefore God does not, through the antecedent will, prepare for men in the state of fallen nature means or aids necessary for salvation.

I answer by denying the Major, as to both parts; for in the first place it is false that the antecedent will is not a true and properly so-called will, although it is not will simply, but in a qualified sense, nor absolute, but conditioned, for which reason it is sometimes called a velleity, as Saint Thomas cited above teaches. It is also false that such a will does not regard men in particular as they are in themselves; for when Saint Thomas teaches that the antecedent will is that which regards human nature according to the general notion of nature, he does not intend that it regards it as such and as precise from all singulars, but that it regards all men in the individual and in particular, as they agree and share in the same nature founded for salvation, and ordered to the supernatural end.

He objects, secondly: Through that will alone does God operate in men those things which conduce to their salvation, by which He wills them simply: but through the antecedent will He wills nothing simply of those things which conduce to men's salvation: Therefore through it He operates none of them. Whence Saint Thomas, Book 1, dist. 47, question 1, article 2, teaches that operation does not correspond to the antecedent will, but to the consequent.

I answer, granting the Major, by distinguishing the Minor: through the antecedent will God wills nothing simply of those things which efficaciously conduce to human salvation — I grant. Inefficaciously — I deny. Similarly I distinguish the consequent: Therefore through it He operates none of those things which conduce to men's salvation, efficaciously — I grant. Inefficaciously — I deny. For as Saint Thomas cited above says: "The effect of this will is the very order to the end of salvation, and the things naturally proposed to all promoting to that end, both natural and gratuitous." Whence when he teaches that operation does not correspond to the antecedent will, but to the consequent, he speaks of the operation and principal effect, such as is the preparation of efficacious aids, and the attainment of glory; not, however, of the operation and less principal effect, such as is the simple ordination to the end of salvation, and the preparation of sufficient aids.

You will say, the same Holy Doctor compares the antecedent will of saving all men to the will of a judge, who simply wills a murderer to be hanged, but in a qualified sense would will him to live, namely insofar as he is a man: Therefore just as a judge, from this will by which he would will the murderer to live, prepares for him no means by which he might escape capital punishment, so neither does God, etc. But I deny the consequence and the parity, the reason of distinction being that a judge is not a general provider, as God is.

Chapter IV

On the efficacy of the divine will.

In order that the efficacy of the divine will be perfectly understood, two celebrated controversies are to be resolved here. The first is carried on between the Thomists and the defenders of middle knowledge, namely whether the divine decrees concerning our free acts are efficacious from within, and predetermining the will, or purely indifferent, and awaiting the determination and consent of the will? The second is against Jansenius, and his followers, namely whether the efficacy and predetermination of the divine decrees does not only hold place for the state of fallen nature, but is also extended to the state of the innocence of Angels and men.

§ I

The decrees of the divine will concerning our free acts are of themselves efficacious and predetermining of the will.

It is proved, first, from Scripture, for the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 4: "That no one of you be puffed up for one against another above that which is written: for who distinguisheth thee? or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?" From which words this argument can be drawn: If the divine decree concerning our free acts is not efficacious from within, and predetermining of the human will, but purely indifferent, and determinable by it as to the species of act, there will be no ground for distinguishing the one consenting from the one not consenting, but such distinction will be reduced to the created will, and consequently one man will be able to be puffed up and glory against another: but this is repugnant to the words of the Apostle: Therefore also that. The consequence of the Major is proved: the distinction of an effect must be reduced not to that in which the causes agree, but to that in which they differ; for because two individuals of the same species agree in the specific notion, and two species in the generic degree, they cannot be discerned or distinguished from one another through that common, specific, or generic notion: but the one going to consent and the one not going to consent agree in the decree, if that, as it is from God, is purely indifferent, and differ only according to the consent and dissent of free will, the indifference and potentiality of such a decree to determining acts of diverse species: Therefore not into the divine decree, but into free will, is the discretion or distinction of the consenting from the non-consenting reduced.

It is proved, secondly, from the Holy Fathers, who everywhere teach that this question, why to one is given grace and efficacious calling, and not to another, is altogether inscrutable and impenetrable, nor can be resolved by the willing or not-willing of free will. Thus Saint Prosper, On the Calling of the Gentiles, book 1, last chapter, where he thus has it: Therefore the depth of that question, which, following the Apostle's admiration, we confess to be impenetrable, is not resolved by the willing or not-willing of free will, because although not to will evil belongs to man, yet unless it is given, he does not have to will good. Similarly Augustine resolves the depth of this question no otherwise than by having recourse to the inscrutable judgments of God, as is established from Tract 26 on John, where he thus says: Why He draws this one, and does not draw that one, do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err. And On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 34: If someone (he says) should ask me, why it is thus persuaded to that one, that he is persuaded, but not to another (that is, why is calling efficacious given to one, and not to another), only two things occur which it pleases me to answer: "O the depth of the riches!" and "Is there unrighteousness with God?" Let him who does not like this response seek Theologians more learned than Augustine, but let him beware lest he find presumptuous ones instead. But if God, concerning our free acts, had a purely indifferent decree, and awaiting the determination and consent of free will determining it to the species of act, the solution of that question would be easy; for it could easily be answered (as the Adversaries themselves respond) that calling is therefore efficacious in one, and not in another, because the one wills to obey Him, and by middle knowledge is foreseen going to consent, but not the other; or because the one, through free will, determines the indifference of the divine decree to the act of such a species, but not the other. Just as to one inquiring why the sun, with a fig tree, produces figs, with an olive tree, olives, with a vine, grapes, it is easily answered, because the concurrence of the sun, of itself indifferent and undetermined, is modified in the inferior causes in which it is received, and is determined by them to producing these effects rather than those: Therefore God's decrees concerning our free acts are not purely indifferent, but determining, and efficacious from within.

It is proved, thirdly, from Saint Augustine, because in various places he openly favors our opinion: Tract 105 on John he says that God predestined all future things, that is, predefined them. And Tract 68: God made future things, by predestining them. And On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10: By His predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to do: but God cannot foreknow, in His predestination, or decree, our future acts, unless such a decree is efficacious of itself, and causing the free determination of our will, and consequently predetermining it, as was shown in the Treatise on the knowledge of God, chapter 4, § 2: Therefore Saint

Augustine acknowledges in God decrees concerning our free acts that are of themselves efficacious and predetermining our will. Which can be confirmed from the fact that the Holy Doctor in several places acknowledges an intrinsically efficacious grace, by which God converts the hearts of men, when He wills, how He wills, and where He wills, as is established especially from the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8, where he thus says: This grace (namely efficacious), therefore, which is secretly given to human hearts by divine liberality, is rejected by no hard heart, for indeed it is given for this purpose, that the hardness of the heart be first removed. But once a grace efficacious and infallible from within, as it comes from God, is admitted, a decree of itself and from within efficacious, and predetermining the will, must necessarily be granted, as the Adversaries confess, and of itself is manifest: Therefore decrees efficacious from within and by their own nature are according to the mind of Augustine.

It is proved, fourthly, from Saint Thomas, who also in several places manifestly teaches our opinion. For, Quodlibet 12, article 4, he subscribes to the opinion of those who say that all things are predetermined by God's providence, and in this sense he teaches there, with Augustine, that it can be conceded that all things are subject to fate, provided that by the name "fate" we understand divine providence, preordaining and predetermining all things which happen in the world. He adds, however, that this name "fate" ought not to be used by Catholics, because it is not fitting for Catholics to have names in common with the Gentiles. But who could say that purely indifferent decrees, or ones supposing the foreseeing of our consent through middle knowledge, could be called by the name of "fate," and who would dare to assert that through such decrees all things are predetermined by divine providence, as the Holy Doctor speaks? No one, therefore, can deny that he acknowledges in God decrees efficacious from within, by which He predetermines our will, that it may operate freely and infallibly at once, namely as to the substance of the act, and the mode of liberty, as will be declared below. Whence in this part, question 23, article 1, ad 1, solving the argument from the authority of Damascene saying, "God indeed foreknows all things, but does not predetermine all things," he responds that Damascene names "predetermination," the imposition of necessity, as in natural things, which are predetermined to one thing. In the same way he responds to that authority, and to another of Gregory of Nyssa, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 90. He holds, therefore, a decree predetermining the will, not to one thing by way of nature, but by way of liberty, with total infallibility, to be necessarily admitted; otherwise he would have vainly explained those authorities of the Fathers in this way, indeed he ought not to have interpreted them, but to have admitted them simply and absolutely.

From these things it is clear how skilled and versed in the doctrine of Saint Thomas are certain Recent authors, who say that the name "predetermination" is new, and thought up by Bañez, since the Holy Doctor uses it not only in the places cited, but also, Book 1 to Annibaldus, dist. 47, sole question, article 4, ad 4, where he thus has it: By the will of God things are not only produced into being, but He also predetermined the mode by which they are to be produced. Whence since God's will is efficaciously fulfilled, it is necessary that things happen in the same way, just as the divine will disposed. Indeed Dionysius, Paul's disciple, and the most ancient of the Theologians, at the very beginning of the nascent Church, used the same word, chapter 5, On the Divine Names, where he writes this: We call substantific reasons in God exemplars, which the Theologians call predefinitions, and predeterminative divine and good wills of existing things.

It is proved, fifthly: If the decrees of the divine will concerning our free acts are not of themselves efficacious, but purely indifferent, it follows that the free determination of our will to consenting to the calling of divine grace is not caused by the divine will, and consequently that God is not the first cause of all things, nor consequently God. The sequel is proved: God's will cannot cause such a determination, unless by means of His decree, since, as the Apostle testifies, He works all things according to the counsel of His will: but by means of a decree of itself indifferent to consent or dissent, determination to consent rather than to dissent cannot be caused; for since the determinate and the indifferent are equally opposed to one another, as the hot and the cold, the white and the black, just as it is repugnant that the hot be produced from the cold, or the white from the black, so too the determinate from the indifferent: Therefore if the decree of the divine will, concerning our free acts, is not of itself efficacious, and predetermining, the determination of the human will will not be caused by the divine will.

It is confirmed and further illustrated by this reason: I ask the Adversaries, by whom is a decree indifferent to consent or dissent determined to one part rather than the other, by God, or by the creature? If by the creature? Then the concurrence of the creature precedes in nature the concurrence of God, since the determining thing, as such, must precede that which is determined, because as such it is compared to it as form; and consequently the concurrence of the creature necessarily escapes the causality of the divine decree under some formality. If by God? Then His decree prior in nature determines the second cause, and consequently is not purely indifferent, but predetermining, as the Thomists teach. Certainly one must either admit a process to infinity in the determination of the divine concurrence and decree, of themselves indifferent; or concede that there is given some actual determination of the created will,

which is not caused by God; or finally say that the decree of the divine will by which it is caused, is of itself determined, and consequently efficacious for the consent rather than the dissent of our will. Whence John of Saint Thomas excellently says that this difficulty is to the defenders of middle knowledge a deep abyss, and full of most rapid whirlpools, which no one crosses through, whom it does not swallow up, unless efficacious grace throws him out onto the shore.

It is proved, sixthly: If God has, concerning our free acts, decrees purely indifferent, and awaiting the determination and consent of our will, it follows that He does not have as perfect and absolute a dominion over our free acts, as the created will has: but this cannot be said, since, according to Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 14, God has the wills of men more in His power than they have their own: Therefore neither can that. The sequel of the Major is proved: The created will, by reason of the perfect dominion which it has over its free acts, can, its liberty remaining unimpaired and unharmed, freely determine itself, and begin such determination, nor should it suppose or await it from another created cause: Therefore if God cannot furnish and do the same thing without violation of liberty, so that such determination begins and issues from the created will, but must await it from free will, and, as it were, beg it, He will not have as perfect and absolute a dominion over our free acts, as the created will itself, and man will have his own will more in his own hand, than God Himself; which is contradictory to the proposition of Saint Augustine, asserting that God has the wills of men more in His power, than they have their own.

It is proved, seventhly: Decrees and aids of themselves efficacious being removed, the necessity of prayer, which the Christian and spiritual life sets forth as its basis and foundation, entirely collapses, and all our prayer becomes altogether vain and illusory. For what, I pray, do the asserters of indifferent decrees and of middle knowledge petition from God, when they ask for God's grace for living well and holily? For either they ask for grace and aid; and this cannot be said, since grace, according to them, is ready at every instant, and is conferred on the most hardened whatsoever. Or they ask for the use and application, or determination, of grace? And this not, since they will that it not spring forth from God's grace and decree, but be awaited from the human will: "It is an illusory petition (says Augustine) when that is asked of him which it is known he does not give, but which, him not giving it, is in man's power": Therefore if the efficacy of God's aid becoming efficacious is in our power, and its efficacy depends only on the determination and application of our will, as the Adversaries teach, it is vainly asked of God; for to the one asking God will respond: "Make grace efficacious, and you will have whatever you desire."

I add that the indifferent decree of concurring with free causes, which the Adversaries admit in God, has several difficulties which sharply bite and prick them, and from which they can hardly extricate themselves. For either that decree is general and absolute, of concurring with whatever man wills, as some of the defenders of middle knowledge teach; or special and conditioned, namely "I will to concur with love, or hatred, if the creature wills, and if it determine itself to love or hatred," as others assert? If the first be said, that mode of God's concurring, through an indifferent concurrence, and without intention and volition of any particular act and effect, with only the general intention of doing what the creature will want, He will be blind, ignorant, imprudent, vague, and confused, and will make God similar to fishermen, who cast their net into the sea, ignorant of what fish they will catch, and enclose in their nets. If the second be asserted, such a decree will make a ridiculous and nugatory sense, for since, according to the Adversaries, God's concurrence is nothing other than the action of the second cause, insofar as it is from God, for God to say, "I will to concur with love, if the creature determines itself to loving," is the same as to say, "I will to concur with love, if I concur with love": or, "If I see love produced, I will produce it."

It is confirmed: It implies a contradiction that that be conditionally promised or decreed, without which such a condition cannot be fulfilled; for if someone should say to a man placed in darkness, "If you see this object, I will furnish you light," he would mock him, since without light he cannot see it. Similarly if someone should say to a boy, weak and unable to lift some weight, "If you lift it, I will help you to lift it," he would likewise mock him, since he is unable to lift it, unless he is helped by another: but the created will, in whatever order of things it be constituted, cannot will, nor determine itself, without God's actual concurrence, according to that saying of Augustine in the Soliloquies, chapter 24: I cannot will what is good, unless You will it: Therefore God's concurrence cannot be promised or decreed by God, under the condition that the human will should will, or determine itself.

Finally, the indifferent decrees can be confuted by an argument drawn from the new decree of Innocent XI, of the following tenor.

THURSDAY, THE 23RD DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1679.

In the General Congregation of the Holy Roman [Inquisition] held in the palace of the Universal Apostolic Inquisition of Monte Quirinale, before Our Most Holy Lord INNOCENT, Pope XI, and the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, General Inquisitors against heretical depravity in the whole Christian Republic, deputed by the Holy Apostolic See. Whereas these two propositions

were brought before the aforesaid Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords: "God grants us His omnipotence, that we may use it, just as someone grants a Villa or a book to another." And "God subjects His omnipotence to us." These, by their order, were diligently examined by Theologians specially deputed for this purpose: whose opinions having been heard, and the matter having been reported to Our Most Holy Lord, and proposed before His Holiness together with the opinions of the said Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, His Holiness decreed and ordered that both propositions be altogether prohibited, as He does by this present decree condemn and prohibit them, as at the least rash and new; and he orders that no one hereafter, of whatever rank, order, or condition, dare assert them, or either of them, under the penalties and censures contained in the Index of Prohibited Books, and others to be inflicted at His Holiness's discretion.

[Place of Seal.]

FRANCIS RICCARDI, Notary of the Holy and Universal Inquisition.

On the 2nd day of December, 1679, the aforesaid decree was affixed and published at the doors of the Basilica of the Prince of the Apostles, of the Palace of the Holy Office, and in the usual and customary places of the City, by me, Francis Perrino, Courier of the Most Holy Inquisition of Our Most Holy Lord the Pope.

By this decree the indifferent decrees of the Recent authors seem to be touched; for several of them everywhere teach and assert that men have in their power the omnipotence and concurrence of God, and use it at will, and determine it either to good or to evil as it pleases them, and in this sense they understand and explain that saying of Isaiah 43: "Thou hast made me to serve with thy sins." They add that God's concurrence, flowing from divine omnipotence, is in us by way of a habit which we use when we will, and as we will; and which is subject to the liberty and choice of our will. Whence the aforesaid decree seems to militate against such doctrine and opinion, and to condemn and reprove it as rash and new. One must stand, therefore, by the ancient, and true and solid doctrine of the Thomists, asserting that God's omnipotence, and His decrees, aids, and concurrence, are not in our power, nor subject to the choice of our will, but rather that it powerfully and gently subjects that to itself, and that they are of themselves and from within efficacious, and consequently are not determined by the created will to acting, or not acting, but determine and apply it to whatever God will have willed, on account of the supreme and absolute dominion which He has over it, as we have declared at length above from Augustine.

§ II

The objections are resolved.

You will object, first: The concurrence of universal and superior causes is indifferent, and is determined by particular and inferior causes to the species of act: e.g., the concurrence of the sun is determined by the fig tree to producing figs, by the olive tree to producing olives, by the vine to producing grapes, by man to generating man, by a horse to producing a horse: Therefore likewise the decree or concurrence of the first and most universal cause is indifferent, and is determined by free causes to the species of act. Whence Saint Thomas, question 1 of On Power, article 4, ad 3, teaches that the influence of the first cause is modified, determined, and specified by second causes.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence, and the parity. The reason of distinction is because the concurrence of universal second causes need not cause the determination of inferior causes, as to the species of their acts or effects: e.g., the sun does not cause the determination of the plant, or tree, to producing fruits of such a species, but presupposes it as instilled by nature. The concurrence of the first cause, however, since it is most universal, and extends to all things, causes the determination of free will, and does not presuppose it or await it from the created will; whence it cannot be indifferent, as the concurrence of universal second causes. When, however, Saint Thomas teaches that the influence of the first cause is modified and determined by second causes, he only intends that God adapts and accommodates His concurrence, and His motion, to their natures; such that He moves necessary and natural causes to one thing by way of nature, not leaving potency to the opposite, but free causes to one thing by way of a free thing, and leaving potency to the opposite; which is for God's concurrence and motion to be determined by second causes only materially and objectively, or as others say, exigitively.

You will object, secondly: Saint Thomas, question 6 of On Truth, article 3, teaches that God prepares for the salvation of the predestined means of themselves indeed defectible, some of which, though others fail, will have their effect: just as (he says) the perpetuity of the species is preserved through the succession of several individuals, each of which is corruptible: but if a decree efficacious from within, and predetermining the will, were given, any aid of grace in the predestined would have efficacy and effect: Therefore such a decree is repugnant to the mind and doctrine of Saint Thomas.

I answer that the Holy Doctor there speaks of free will, compared with the end of predestination, to attain which it is most true that there is no efficacy in any particular aid, but in the whole collection which He prepares from an efficacious intention of

glory; he does not, however, deny that any aid of divine grace has intrinsic efficacy for the act in particular for which it is given, but rather teaches the opposite, as is gathered from the example he adduces; for if in any individual of a corruptible nature there were no efficacy for some preservation of nature, neither could the perpetuity in all individuals be preserved: Therefore likewise, unless there were efficacy of grace in some aids for particular acts, by which one arrives at beatitude, the attainment of the end could not be had through them.

The Adversaries object, thirdly: From decrees efficacious from within, and predetermining the created will, fate is introduced into human affairs, since such decrees are no less firm, inflexible, and immutable, than the constellations of the stars, and the courses of the planets, in which the pagans of old placed fate. Whence Lessius calls those decrees iron and adamantine: Therefore they are not to be admitted.

I answer, first, that the same thing was objected of old to Augustine by the Semi-Pelagians, as is established from Saint Prosper in the Epistle to Augustine, where, relating the chief complaints of the men of Marseilles against his doctrine, he says that they complained that from his doctrine a certain fatal necessity was introduced. Whence Faustus, the coryphaeus of the Semi-Pelagians, book 10 On Free Will, chapter 4, impugning Augustine's doctrine, though suppressing his name, thus says: But under the appearance of piety, the evil of paganism, and among the vocabulary of grace, a fatal decree will be hidden. And chapter 12: Let the original definition, or fatal one, withdraw from here.

I answer, secondly, that if by the name "fate" is understood divine providence, by its eternal and immutable decree predefining and predetermining all things which happen in the world, to happen according to the nature and condition of the causes from which they proceed, that is, free things freely, and necessary things necessarily, there is no inconvenience in admitting fate, although we ought not to use this name, because it is not fitting for Catholics to have names in common with the Gentiles. Thus indeed does Saint Thomas expressly teach, Quodlibet 12 cited above, and he proves it from Augustine saying: If anyone understands fate in this way, let him keep his opinion, correct his tongue, and not say fate, but the providence of God. Augustine has similar things, book 2 Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, where he writes this: Nor do we assert fate under the name of grace, because we say that God's grace is preceded by no merits of men: but if it pleases some to call God's most omnipotent will by the name of fate, we indeed avoid profane novelties of words, but we do not love to contend about words.

There is, moreover, a great and notable difference found between the predetermining decree, and fate rigorously taken, which the Gentiles formerly admitted: for that was from causes altogether extrinsic to the will, namely from the stars and the celestial bodies; but this proceeds from God, who, since He is the author and principle of the will itself, and has the wills of men more in His power, than they have their own, is not related as an extrinsic agent with respect to our will, but is reckoned among its internal causes, as will be more fully declared below. Whence although the fate of the Gentiles would infer necessity upon the will, and remove from it the power to the opposite, the predetermining decree does not, which rather fosters, preserves, and confirms such power, as will be established from what is said below. Whence undeservedly are predetermining decrees called iron and adamantine by Lessius, since they are most gentle, and proportioned and accommodated to the nature and condition of the second causes which they move. More truly indeed could the indifferent decrees which the defenders of middle knowledge feign for God be called glassy and leaden: glassy indeed, because, to use Augustine's words, "they shine with vanity, but are broken by truth"; leaden, however, because they await sealing and determination from the human will.

§ III

God physically predetermines the will to eliciting its free acts.

It is proved, first, by a fundamental reason: Simultaneous concurrence does not preserve in God the notion of first cause, with respect to our free acts: Therefore prior concurrence, which is called by the Thomists physical predetermination, must necessarily be admitted. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. An indifferent concurrence, to be determined by God, and by the will, does not suffice for the notion of first cause: but simultaneous concurrence is indifferent, to be determined by God, and by the will, as the Adversaries teach: Therefore it does not suffice for the notion of first cause. The Major is proved: A concurrence in which God is more subordinated to the creature, than the creature to God, does not suffice for the notion of first cause: but in an indifferent concurrence, as from God, and determined, as from the will, God is more subordinated to the creature than the creature to God: Therefore such a concurrence does not suffice for the notion of first cause. The Major is established, for it is against the perfection of the first cause to be subordinated to the second. The Minor, however, is thus shown. Because the created will cannot elicit a free act without divine concurrence, it is subordinated to God in the production of the free act, as the Adversaries teach: but God cannot cause a free act without the concurrence of the will, and besides, the created will determines the divine concurrence, if it is indifferent as from God, or offered to the will in an indifferent manner: Therefore in this manner of concurring, God is more subordinated to the will, than the will to God.

From this you will understand that, in order that in God the notion of first cause be preserved in relation to free acts, He must concur to them by a prior concurrence determining the concurrence of the created will. Both because every cause must be prior, at least in nature and causality, to its effect. Also because an indifferent concurrence cannot cause the determination of our will, just as the hot cannot be produced by the cold, nor the white by the black. Also, finally, because in order that God, as first cause, influence the free consent of the created will, the created will must be subordinated to God in its production: but unless it depend on Him as determining, it is not subordinated to Him: Therefore neither does it depend on Him as first cause. The Minor is proved: That the created will cannot effect a free act without divine concurrence does not suffice for it to be subordinated to God in its production: Therefore in order that this subordination be preserved, it must depend on God, as determining His concurrence. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. God cannot effect a free act of the created will without its concurrence, and yet God is not subordinated to the created will in the production of a free act, for it is against the notion

of first cause to be subordinated to the second: Therefore that the created will cannot effect a free act without divine concurrence does not suffice for it to elicit it as subordinated to God, nor consequently for God, as first cause, to concur to it.

It is proved, secondly, the necessity of physical predetermination with respect to the created will, by a reason drawn from Saint Thomas, Physics 2, lecture 8, where he thus discourses: Just as a motive power which is toward either of two does not issue into act unless it be determined to one by the appetitive power, so nothing which is toward either of two issues into act, unless it be determined to one by something, because that which is toward either of two is like a being in potency, but potency is not a principle of acting, but only act; whence from that which is toward either of two, nothing follows, except by something else that determines to one. He has similar things, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 2, where he writes this: That which stands indifferently to many, does not operate one more than another, whence from a contingent to either, no effect follows, unless by something by which it is determined to one: but the created will is of itself an indeterminate and indifferent principle toward either of two, and stands indifferently toward many: Therefore it will never issue into a determinate act, unless it be first, at least in nature, determined by some extrinsic agent, namely God.

Suárez responds, book 3 On the Helps, chapters 42 and 43, that our will, although it is indifferent and in potency to its acts, nevertheless, on account of the eminence of its power, and its liberty, and the perfect dominion which it has over its acts, is virtually in act, and consequently does not need to be determined and reduced to act by some extrinsic agent, but can determine itself and reduce itself to act.

But on the contrary: Although the will, by reason of its liberty, has dominion over its acts, that dominion is nevertheless not supreme and absolute, but dependent on God's dominion, and subordinated to it: Therefore although it can, in its own order, and as a second free thing, and as a second moving thing, determine itself, and reduce itself to act, it can nevertheless not furnish this, except with subordination to the first free thing, and first mover, and consequently unless dependently on His motion and determination. Whence excellently Saint Thomas, I-II, question 109, article 2, ad 1: Man is lord of his acts of willing and not willing, on account of the deliberation of reason, which can be bent to one part or the other: but that he deliberates or does not deliberate, if he is also lord of this, it is necessary that this be through a preceding deliberation, and since this does not proceed to infinity, it is necessary that finally one arrives at this, that man's free will be moved by some exterior principle, which is above the human mind, namely God.

You will say, this only proves that the human will must be premoved and predetermined by God, to the volition of good in common, and the first intention of the end, from which afterward it can move and determine itself to the choice of means, and the volition of particular goods. Whence the same Holy Doctor, I-II, question 9, article 6, ad 3, thus says: God moves the will of man as universal mover to the universal object of the will, which is good, but man determines himself through reason to willing this or that, which is truly good or apparently good.

But on the contrary. From an indifferent principle, as indifferent it is, a determinate act cannot issue, unless it be first determined by another, as Saint Thomas says in the places related above: but, the first intention of the end being posited, and love of good in common, the will still remains indifferent to the choice of this or that means, and to the volition of this or that particular good: Therefore it still needs to be determined by God. Whence the Holy Doctor in the place cited only intends to constitute a distinction between God's motion in order to good as such, and in order to particular goods, consisting in this, that to the first He adequately applies and determines the will, it only concurring elicitively, but not applying and determining itself; but in order to particular goods, the created will not only concurs elicitively, but also applicatively, applying and determining itself, not indeed as the first applying and determining, but as the second, and consequently under the motion, application, and predetermination of God, as first mover, applier, and determiner. From which it does not follow that it is not predetermined by God to the volition of particular goods, but rather the opposite.

It is proved, thirdly, by a reason showing the necessity of physical predetermination in order to supernatural acts: God, through prevenient grace, truly and properly effects in us the determination of the will to good: e.g., to believing the revealed mysteries, or to loving God above all things: but He cannot furnish this, except through grace physically predetermining: Therefore it is to be admitted. The Major is certain of faith, and is established from the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 7, defining that the beginning of justification in adults is to be taken from God's prevenient grace: but such a beginning starts from the determination of free will, by which the unbeliever is determined to believing the mysteries revealed to him, or the believer to consenting to his calling, and to loving God above all things. The Minor, however, in which lies the difficulty, is thus shown. Moral motion is not true and proper efficiency, but only improper and metaphorical, and belongs more to the genus of final cause, than efficient; for it only moves objectively, and by exhibiting to the will a goodness which by its fittingness allures it; as is established by the example of a boy, who by the display of an apple is morally moved and excited to running; for who would say that this moral excitement is

truly and properly the efficient cause of that running? Therefore God, through grace only morally exciting, cannot truly and properly effect in us the determination of the will to good, but only through grace physically prevenient and predetermining.

You will say, God truly and properly causes such determination in us, through grace of cooperation and coefficiency, or through simultaneous concurrence of the supernatural order, by which He influences, together with the will, its consent and determination.

But on the contrary, first: The Council of Trent cited teaches that the beginning of our justification (and consequently the determination of the will to believing or loving God above all things, from which the beginning of justification starts) proceeds from God's prevenient grace: but the grace of cooperation and coefficiency is not prevenient, but concomitant: Therefore the first beginning of our justification does not proceed from it.

On the contrary, secondly: Simultaneous concurrence, according to the principles of the Adversaries, is indifferent, or offered to the will in an indifferent manner: Therefore far from truly and properly causing the determination of our will, it rather presupposes or awaits it from the will, so that God influences determinately in our free acts, or so that the indifference, suspension, and indetermination of the divine decree is removed and resolved, as is established from what has been said in the preceding section.

§ IV

Physical predetermination is according to the mind of Saint Thomas.

It is proved, first: The predetermining decree being admitted, physical predetermination cannot be denied, since that is the execution and causality of such a decree, and flows from it, as a ray from the sun, a rivulet from the fountain, and an effect from a cause: but Saint Thomas admits a predetermining decree, since he asserts, Quodlibet 12, article 4, that all things are predetermined by divine providence, as is established from what has been said in § 1: Therefore also physical predetermination.

It is proved, secondly: Prior concurrence, and physical predetermination, mean the same thing: but Saint Thomas admits prior concurrence: Therefore also physical predetermination. The Major is established; the Minor is proved from Saint Thomas, question 3 of On Power, article 7, ad 3, where he thus says: In the operation by which God operates by moving nature, nature does not operate, but the very operation of nature is also the operation of divine power. By these words the Holy Doctor expressly distinguishes in God a twofold concurrence: one which is from God alone, nature itself not operating, which is accordingly prior, and precedes the operation of the second cause, at least in priority of nature; the other which is identified with the aforesaid

operation, and this is simultaneous concurrence, which is the very operation of the second cause, insofar as it depends on God simultaneously influencing. Whence he adds there, in the response to the fourth, that both God and nature operate immediately, although they are ordered according to prior and posterior.

It is proved, thirdly: By the name of physical predetermination the Thomists understand nothing other than a certain flowing and transient power, by which God moves and applies second causes to operating: but Saint Thomas admitted such a power: Therefore also physical predetermination. The Major is established; the Minor is proved from the place cited On Power, in the response to the seventh, where the Holy Doctor writes this: The natural power which is in natural things, conferred at their institution, is in them as a certain form having established being, but that which is given by God in a natural thing, whereby it actually acts, is only as an intention, having a certain incomplete being, in the manner in which colors are in the air (namely in intentional being, by reason of the species which represent them), and the power of art in the instrument of the craftsman. This testimony is so manifest, that the Coimbrans, Physics 2, chapter 7, question 14, article 1, candidly confess that Saint Thomas there admitted a prior concurrence, moving and applying second causes to operating, which is the very physical premotion, or predetermination, which the Thomists admit. Their words are: Concerning the manner in which God concurs with second causes to their operations and effects, there presents itself the celebrated opinion of Saint Thomas, question 7 of On Power, article 7, and of his followers, Capreolus, Ferrariensis, and others, thinking that all second causes, before they operate, receive from God a certain influx and motion, which is, as it were, an intentional being of the divine power, by which they are excited to bringing forth actions, in the way that the instruments of arts, such as the adze and the axe, receive a prior motion from the craftsman, when they are applied to accomplishing the work. Azorius has similar things, Institutions of Moral Theology, book 1, chapter 21, question 8, where he writes this: Eighthly it is asked, whether God, when He operates with nature or the will, moves and applies it itself to acting? Saint Thomas openly thus says: God not only gives forms to things, but also preserves them, and applies them, etc. But it seems to me that Saint Thomas's opinion is most true, for Augustine plainly seems to deliver it, etc. Likewise Pererius, book 8 On Causes, chapter 8: In this (he says) that Saint Thomas adjoins that second causes, and among these our will, are moved, applied, and determined to acting by God, although some Theologians dissent, I nevertheless go into that opinion with hands and feet, most gladly. Bellarmine writes similar things, book 4 On Free Will, chapter 16: Another way (he says) of reconciling human liberty with divine cooperation, and perhaps also more probable, is according to the opinion of Saint Thomas, who teaches that divine cooperation so concurs with second causes, even free

ones, that He not only gives to them and preserves their operative powers, but also moves and applies them to the work, as can be known from Part 1, question 105, article 5, and Book 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 70, question 3 of On Power, article 7. Which opinion is quite agreeable, both to Scripture, which says that we are, live, and move in God; and also to the reason and order which the first cause has with second ones. Finally the little book on the manner of studies, composed by six Fathers of the Society, and printed at Rome in the College of the Society, by order of the Father General, in the year 1586, which is delivered as a rule to all Lecturers of the Society, § On the selection of opinions in the Theological faculty, thus says: In Theology let ours follow the doctrine of Saint Thomas, as is prescribed in the 4th part of the constitutions, chapter 14, with a few exceptions: And afterward, explaining what those few exceptions are which are not held to be followed, num. 6, among others he recounts this opinion of Saint Thomas: That second causes are properly and univocally instruments of God, and that when they operate, He first influences into them, or moves them. This I have transcribed word for word from the exemplar of this book of the 1586 edition, which is kept in our Convent of Toulouse. Whence it is surprising that some Fathers of the Society have dared to deny that these things are had in such a book. These testimonies openly demonstrate that the prior concurrence by which God moves and applies second causes to acting is according to Saint Thomas's mind, since it is (as Novatian says, chapter 18 On the Trinity) a firm kind of proof, which is taken from the Adversaries, that truth be proved even by the very enemies of truth.

It is proved, fourthly: According to Saint Thomas, God physically moves all second causes: Therefore also He physically premoves and predetermines them. The Antecedent is established from Part 1, question 105, article 5; from I-II, question 109, article 1; from Book 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 70; and from question 3 of On Power, article 7, where he teaches that God moves all second causes to their operations, which cannot be understood of moral motion (since natural causes, being devoid of reason, are not capable of it), but only of physical motion. The consequence, however, is proved from the same Holy Doctor, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 149, where he thus has it: The motion of the mover precedes the movement of the mobile thing in reason and cause, that is, in priority of reason and causality. Which doctrine he took from Aristotle, Metaphysics 4, text 23, saying: The mover is by nature prior to the moved: Therefore if God physically moves all second causes to operating, He physically premoves them.

It is proved, fifthly: A motion efficacious from within, with which dissent cannot be compatible, is physically predetermining. But Saint Thomas admits such a motion: Therefore also a physically predetermining motion. The Major is established; the Minor

is proved from the same Holy Doctor, II-II, question 24, article 11, where he thus says: The power of the Holy Spirit infallibly works whatever it wills; whence it is impossible that these two be simultaneously true, that the Holy Spirit will move someone to an act of charity, and that he lose charity by sinning. And I-II, question 10, article 4, ad 3: If God moves the will to something, it is impossible that it be posited that the will not be moved to it.

§ V

The objections are resolved.

The Adversaries object, first, that Saint Thomas, Book 2, dist. 39, question 1, article 1, in the body, thus has it: The very power of the will, as far as it is concerned in itself, is indifferent to many things, but that it exits determinately into this act or that, is not from another determinately (or as some manuscript codices have, is not from another determining), but from the will itself: Therefore according to Saint Thomas, the will is not predetermined by God.

I answer, with the learned Father Nicolai, in a marginal note to this passage, that the Holy Doctor there only denies that in order that the will exit determinately into this or that act, it is from another determining, created, natural, belonging to the same genus or the same order; but he does not exclude that it be from God as first agent, determining the created will, subordinated to Himself, by a determination conformable to its connatural exigency, that is, not necessitating, but effecting that it act infallibly and freely.

From this you will easily understand another testimony of Saint Thomas, taken from question 3 of On Evil, article 3, ad 5, where he thus says: The will, since it is toward either of two, is determined to one by something, namely by the counsel of reason, nor need this be through some extrinsic agent. For the Holy Doctor by these words only intends to exclude an extrinsic created agent, not, however, an increate agent, which is the author and cause of the will itself and of its motion. For this he always excepts, as is established from Book 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 88; from Part 1, question 83, article 1, ad 3, and question 105, article 4, ad 1 and 2; and from question 22 of On Truth, article 9, where he thus says: On the part of the will, it cannot change the act of the will, except that which operates within the will, and this is the will itself, that which is the cause of the will's being, which according to faith is God alone. The same Scotus teaches, Book 4, dist. 49, question 6, § "I say therefore," where he thus says: It is against the nature of the will to be determined by an inferior cause, because by this very fact it would not be superior; but it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause, namely God.

The Adversaries object, secondly, two testimonies of Saint Thomas, taken from Book 2 of the Sentences. The first is had at dist. 25, question 1, article 1, ad 3, where he thus says: The determination of the action and end is constituted in the power of free will, whence there remains to it the dominion of its own act, though not so as to the first agent. The other, dist. 28, question 1, article 1, where he writes this: Man would not be of free will, unless the determination of his own work pertained to him, that from his own judgment he might choose this or that.

But these do not even lightly touch physical predetermination. For in the first passage the Holy Doctor only intends that the choice and determination of the action is in the power of free will as of a second free thing, and second determining thing, and accordingly does not exclude subordination and dependence on the motion and determination of the first free thing, but rather includes it. Wherefore he adds: "though not so as to the first agent." Which last words openly declare that the determination of our will is not so in its power, that it does not also descend from the supreme power of God, causing it; because the dominion which the will has over its acts is not supreme, as that which belongs to the first agent. Whence the same Holy Doctor, question 3 of On Power, article 7, ad 13: The will is said to have dominion over its own act, not by exclusion of the first cause, but because the first cause does not so act on the will that it determines it of necessity to one thing, as it determines nature; therefore the determination of the act is left in the power of reason and will. From which the response to the second testimony is clear, for Saint Thomas only intends that man would not be of free will, unless to him, as to a second free thing, and second determining thing, the determination of his own work pertained, and unless he had dominion over his acts, subject, however, and subordinate to the supreme dominion of God, who, as Augustine says, has more the wills of men in His power, than they their own.

The Adversaries object, thirdly: Saint Thomas, Quodlibet 1, article 7, ad 2, says: Thus God moves the human mind to good, which nevertheless can resist this motion: but if the divine motion physically predetermined the human will to a good work, the will could not resist it: Therefore Saint Thomas thinks that God does not physically predetermine the human will.

I answer by denying the sequel of the Minor, for the will can resist, or dissent from, any divine motion, with this distinction, however, that it can resist, or dissent, from a motion purely exciting, and offering only sufficient aid, both in the composed sense, and in the divided; or antecedent and consequent potency; indeed in fact the will resists this motion, and rejects it, and deprives it of the effect to which it is principally and ultimately ordered: but to a motion physically predetermining, and offering efficacious

aid, the will never in fact resists; for such (as Augustine says) is rejected by no hard heart, for indeed it is given for this purpose, that the hardness of the heart be first removed: it can nevertheless resist it, in the divided sense, and antecedent potency, but not in the composed sense, and consequent potency. Whence Saint Thomas, I-II, question 10, article 4, ad 3: If God moves the will to something, it is impossible to posit that the will is not moved to it, but this is not simply impossible. Nor is it valid if you say that if the will could resist the divine motion in the divided sense or antecedent potency, it could frustrate it of its effect, and render it vain and inefficacious. For in this consists the efficacy of such a motion, that it leaves in man the potency of resisting it, and confers an unconquered will of not resisting. Whence Saint Thomas here, question 19, article 8, ad 2: From this very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows not only that those things happen which God wills to happen, but that they happen contingently or necessarily, because He so wills them to happen.

Other testimonies of Saint Thomas, which Peter of Saint Joseph of Julien objects to us, in an Opusculum which he calls The Defense of Saint Thomas, are altogether free of all difficulty, and are expounded by us in the Shield of Thomistic Theology, treatise on human acts, disp. 6, article 2, § 13 and following; whence we omit them here, lest we cause tedium to the Reader.

§ VI

The concord of created liberty with the predetermining decree, and physical predetermination.

There are three most difficult and most obscure concords, which three can deservedly be called most sacred enigmas: namely the concord of God's liberty with His immutability; the concord of Christ's liberty with His impeccability; and the concord of man's liberty with the efficacy of grace and the divine will. Whence Augustine, book On the Grace of Christ, chapter 47: This question, where the free will of the will, and God's grace, are disputed, is so difficult to discern, that when free will is defended, God's grace seems to be denied; but when God's grace is asserted, free will is thought to be taken away. And book 2 Against the Letters of Petilian: If I should propose to you the question, how does God the Father draw to the Son men whom He left in free will? Perhaps you would be difficult to resolve it: for how does He draw, if He leaves it that each choose what he wills? And yet both are true, but few are able to penetrate this by understanding. But that it may be somehow explained by what bond or glue these things are connected and coupled together, He will grant it, who, as Job says, makes concord in high places.

It must be observed, therefore, with Saint Thomas, On Interpretation 1, lecture 14, that there is a twofold root of our liberty. The first is extrinsic, and existing in God, namely the infinite efficacy of the divine will, attaining the substance and mode in our operations; as the same Holy Doctor at length declares here, question 19, article 8, in these words: Since the divine will is most efficacious, it not only follows that those things happen which God wills to happen, but that they happen in the way in which God wills them to happen, etc. Likewise Book 1 to Annibaldus, dist. 47, sole question, article 4, he thus says: Since God's will is efficaciously fulfilled, it is necessary that things happen, and happen in the same way in which the divine will disposed.

In the same manner of reconciling liberty, Saint Peter had long before used against Simon Magus, who, denying free will, said that what God wills to be, is, and what He wills not to be, is not; to whom he responded, as Clement of Rome relates, Recognitions, book 3, near the beginning: You are ignorant, Simon, greatly ignorant, of how, in each individual thing, the will of God comes about. For some things He willed to be such, that they could not be other than that which by Him they were instituted, and to these He assigned neither rewards nor punishments. But those things which He willed to be such, that they have it in their own power to do what they will, to these, for their acts and wills, He assigned that they either merit rewards or punishments. By these words the Apostle traces back necessity and contingency and created liberty into the efficacy of the divine will, as into the first principle, and as its first, as it were, root.

The second root of created liberty is intrinsic to man, and residing in himself, namely the objective indifference of judgment, as Saint Thomas declares in various places, for Part 1, question 83, article 1, thus says: Because the judgment of reason stands to diverse things, and is not determined to one, it is necessary that man be of free will. And I-II, question 17, article 1, ad 2: From this the will can be carried to diverse things, because reason can have diverse knowledges of good. Likewise question 24 of On Truth, article 2, he expressly says that the root of the whole of liberty is constituted in reason. Reason also persuades this, for since the will is a rational appetite, following the knowledge of the intellect, and the direction of reason, it is impossible that it be necessarily carried into the object, which is proposed to it by the intellect as indifferent.

From these things you will understand, first, for what reason neither the predetermining decree, nor physical predetermination, remove or harm the liberty of our will; because indeed each proceeds from the first root of liberty and contingency, namely the infinite efficacy of the divine will, and each causes the proximate and intrinsic root of human liberty, namely the objective indifference of judgment; because, prior in nature than they apply the will to choosing or rejecting some object, they apply the intellect to forming an

indifferent judgment of reason, by which it may represent to the will such an object, as indifferent, and as some particular good, which it can choose or reject.

You will understand, secondly, how the predetermining decree, and physical predetermination, perfect the potential liberty of our will, and cause the actual. For every motion, which is accommodated to the nature of the subject which it moves, perfects it: but the motion of the predetermining decree, and of physical predetermination, is accommodated to the nature and condition of the created will, which, since it is a rational appetite, requires to be moved to free acts, under the objective indifference of judgment, which is the proximate root of liberty. I add that such motion reduces the potential liberty of our will, from first act to second, and consequently removes from it some imperfection and defect, namely potentiality and suspension, or lack of act: Therefore it perfects it.

That it also causes its actual liberty, is established from what has been said above; for the actual liberty of our will is nothing other than its free determination: but this is caused by the predetermining decree, and physical predetermination, not, however, by an indifferent decree or simultaneous concurrence, as was shown above: Therefore also the actual liberty of our will, which accordingly, that decree and predetermination being removed, is altogether removed, since, the cause being removed, the effect cannot stand.

You will object, first: It belongs to the notion of a free cause to determine itself to whatever it will. Therefore if the created will is predetermined by God, it will not be free.

I answer that just as it does not belong to the notion of an efficient cause that it be first, but that it effect, although it be moved by another prior one, as is clear in fire and heaven; so it does not belong to the notion of a free cause that it determine itself primarily, but that it determine itself according to its nature; so that if it be the first free thing, it determine itself primarily, and independently of any other prior mover and determiner; but if it be second, such as the created will is, it determine itself secondarily, and dependently on the motion of the first free thing, and first determiner.

You will insist, first: These two things fight with each other, and involve a contradiction, namely that the will move and determine itself, and nevertheless prior in nature be moved and determined by God; otherwise the same thing would be simultaneously from itself and from another.

I answer that this instance was foreseen and resolved by Saint Thomas, for Part 1, question 105, article 4, he objects to himself this argument: God cannot make contradictories be simultaneous: but this would follow, if He moved the will, for the will

being moved from itself, is not to be moved by another: Therefore God cannot move the will. To which he thus responds: To the second it must be said that to be moved voluntarily is to be moved from itself, that is, from an intrinsic principle, but this intrinsic principle can be from another extrinsic principle, and thus to be moved from itself is not repugnant to being moved by another. The same he teaches, question 3 of On Evil, article 2, ad 4, in these words: Since free will moves itself, it is not excluded that it be moved by another, from which it has this very thing, that it move itself. Likewise question 24 of On Truth, article 1, ad 5, he thus has it: Something can so be moved by another, that it nevertheless moves itself, and thus is it with the human mind. It is not, therefore, repugnant, according to Saint Thomas, that the created will move and determine itself to acting, and nevertheless be prior in nature moved and determined by God, and consequently be premoved and predetermined by Him. Reason also persuades this: for it is not repugnant that some action proceed from two agents of diverse order, subordinated to one another; for the same generation of a plant or of a man is from the sun, as the first generator, and from the plant or man, as the second generator: Therefore likewise the same determination of the created will can simultaneously be from God as the first free and determining thing, and from the will, as the second free and determining thing. Indeed the opposite implies a contradiction, for since the determination of the created will is something created, existing in the nature of things, and imbibes in itself some degree of existence, it cannot escape divine causality; whence since God cannot cause it through an indifferent decree, or through simultaneous concurrence, as was shown above, it must necessarily be caused through a predetermining decree, and through a prior and predetermining concurrence: Therefore it implies that the created will determine itself, unless it be predetermined by God.

You will insist, secondly: That which cannot cause the determining form, cannot cause the determination: but the will cannot cause the form determining itself: Therefore neither can it determine itself. The Major is clear; the Minor is proved. The form determining the will is God's efficacious decree: but this cannot be caused by the will: Therefore the will cannot cause the form determining itself.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor, and to its proof, I distinguish the Major: The form determining the will is God's efficacious decree only — I deny the Major. It is God's efficacious decree, and also the act which the will elicits — I grant the Major, and, the Minor being granted, I deny the consequence. For in order that the will be capable of determining itself, it is not required that it be able to cause every form determining itself; but it suffices that it be able to cause some: there is, however, in our opinion, a twofold form determining the created will, one on the part of God, namely

the efficacious and predetermining decree; the other on the part of the will itself, namely the act elicited by it, which, since it is free, and exercises the liberty of the will, is also its determination; and consequently, in order that there be in the created will potency to determine itself, it is not required that it be able to cause God's efficacious decree, but it suffices that it be able to effect its own act, determining itself.

You will object, secondly: It belongs to the notion of a free agent that, all things prerequired for acting having been posited, it be able not to act: but the physical predetermination being posited, the will cannot not act: Therefore that destroys liberty.

I answer that if the Major be understood of the things prerequired for acting, in priority of time, or of the instant "in which," those being posited, the free agent can act and not act, both in the composed sense, and the divided; but if it be understood of the things prerequired only in priority of nature, or of the instant "from which," those being posited, the free agent can indeed not act in the divided sense, but not in the composed sense; for those things which according to the order of nature only are prerequired for acting, are simultaneous with the act (for priority of nature is not priority of existence and duration, but of dependence and causality), but it implies that the negation of the act be composed, or conjoined, with it. Since, therefore, physical predetermination is among the things prerequired for acting, only in priority of nature and causality, and constitutes the actual principle of operation, it is not required, for the liberty of the will, that, the predetermination being posited, it be able not to act in the composed sense, or to compose the negation of the act with it, but it is enough that, that being posited, it be able not to act in the divided sense, that is, that under it, it retain the potency for not acting, or for not continuing the action which it elicits. On which more at length in Part 2, treatise 2, chapter 4, § 4.

You will object, thirdly: Every antecedent supposition, or one not descending from the free election of our will, destroys the liberty of free will: but the predetermining decree, and physical predetermination, are some antecedent supposition, and one not descending from the election of our will: Therefore they destroy the liberty of free will.

To this argument, which among the Adversaries is a palmary one, and, as it were, an Achilles, a threefold response can be given. For in the first place the Major can be absolutely denied, for a supposition antecedent to the free consent of our will only by priority of nature does not remove liberty, but causes it, nor does it destroy it, but builds it up. The reason is, because priority of nature is priority of causality and origin, whence it belongs only to a cause, with respect to the effect; or to a principle of action with respect to the operation. Just as, therefore, a cause does not destroy or remove the effect,

but causes and perfects it; so a supposition, only by priority of nature preceding the free consent of our will (such as is the supposition of the predetermining decree, and of physical predetermination), does not remove liberty, but causes it, nor does it harm it, but fosters, perfects, and preserves it.

I answer, secondly, that although every antecedent supposition which arises from a created agent destroys liberty, not every one which proceeds from an increate agent does; for there is found a threefold disparity between a created and an increate agent. The first is, that a created agent is not of infinite efficacy, as the increate is, and consequently cannot attain the substance and mode of liberty in our operations. The second, that God, since He is the first free thing, and such by essence, and has the wills of men more in His power than they have their own, as Augustine says, contains all created and participated liberty in the most eminent and perfect manner, but not so a created agent. Thirdly, because created agents are altogether extrinsic to the will, whereas God, since He is the author and principle of the soul, and is intimately conjoined to it, as the soul of the soul itself, and as the principle in which we live, move, and are, is not properly reputed an extrinsic agent with respect to our will, as Saint Thomas teaches, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 88.

I answer, thirdly, by distinguishing the Major: Every antecedent supposition, which does not arise from the first root of liberty, removes liberty — let it pass, the Major. That which arises from the first root of liberty — I deny the Major, and under the same distinction of the Minor, I deny the consequence. For the predetermining decree, and physical predetermination, arise from the first root of the whole of liberty and contingency, namely from the infinite efficacy of the divine will, as we declared before; whence just as the supposition arising from the indifferent judgment of reason does not remove liberty, because that is the proximate root of liberty, so neither does the supposition arising from the predetermining decree, and physical predetermination. From which you will understand that although such a supposition is formally antecedent, it is nevertheless virtually or equivalently consequent, as to the effect of preserving liberty; because although it does not descend from the will itself, it does descend from Him who has the wills of men more in His power, than they have their own, and from the infinite efficacy of the divine will, which is the first root of liberty. Whence it is reduced to the second member of the distinction delivered by Anselm, book 2, Why God-Man, chapter 18, namely to consequent necessity, which does not harm liberty, as he himself there teaches.

Nor is valid the instance of a certain Recent author, saying that it seems absurd to deny that necessity is antecedent, whose cause is antecedent, since it is established among all

that any necessity follows the condition of its cause and is denominated from it. For as the Dialecticians teach, one thing is that from which the signification of a name is imposed, and another is that for which signification it is imposed; whence just as, although a stone is named from hurting the foot, not everything which hurts the foot is on that account a stone; so although antecedent necessity takes this denomination from the preceding cause, not every cause, however, which precedes free will, need or can be called antecedent necessity, but only that which precedes, by determining the will to one thing by way of nature, and by removing from the intellect the objective indifference of judgment, as happens in beatific love, and the volition of good in common.

From these things the argument proposed, on which the Adversaries chiefly rely, can easily be retorted against them, in this manner: A necessity which consequently follows our liberty equivalently cannot remove it: but a necessity arising from the efficacy of the predetermining decree and of physical predetermination consequently follows our liberty and consent equivalently, since it follows upon it, as contained eminently in the will and omnipotence of God, which, as Augustine says, has the wills of men more in His power, than they have their own: Therefore it cannot remove liberty.

You will also understand from what has been said, that although physical premotion is not in our power as it were effectively, and originatively, since it is not derived from us, it is nevertheless in our power, as it were terminatively, and as to use; because that motion is terminated for this purpose, that the will have the use and exercise of actual liberty, and actual dominion over its acts. Whence just as it can be called virtually or equivalently consequent, so also it is equivalently in our power, by this very fact that it makes the act to which it moves and applies the will exist in its power, and be subject to its dominion.

You will object, fourthly: If grace of itself efficacious and physically predetermining be necessary for conversion, it follows that a sinner who does not receive such grace cannot be converted, and consequently is not free with respect to it, since it belongs to the notion of a free agent that it be able to act or not act.

But I answer, first, that the same difficulty exists concerning congruous grace, since it, in the opinion of Suárez, and Vasquez, and other Theologians of the Society, is so necessary for conversion, that it is repugnant that a sinner, unless prevented by such grace, be in fact converted, as Father Martinon demonstrates in the Antijansenius, whose words we shall relate in the following section.

I answer, secondly, by distinguishing the sequel: it follows that a sinner who does not receive such grace cannot be converted, in consequent potency, and conjoined with act — I grant the sequel. In antecedent potency, and separated from act — I deny the sequel.

For although the first potency is from efficacious and physically predetermining grace, which infallibly conjoins potency with act, and cause with effect, according to that saying of Augustine, On Nature and Grace, chapter 42: The will being healed and helped, possibility comes together with effect in the saints, not, however, the second. Whence just as Saint Thomas, question 3 of On Power, article 5, ad 1, teaches that when it is said that God cannot act, except what He has foreknown and decreed, it is usually distinguished by antecedent and consequent potency: or if "cannot" refer to the act, it is granted; if it refer to the potency, it is denied. So likewise when it is said that he who lacks efficacious aid cannot operate, cannot be converted, cannot fulfill the precepts, it must be distinguished: in antecedent potency, it must be denied. In consequent potency, it must be granted. Or if "cannot" refer to the act, it is true. If it refer to the potency, it is false. Which things are usually explained more fully in the Treatise on the Helps.

§ VII

Another difficult argument is resolved.

The Adversaries object, furthermore, another difficult argument, which Molina calls the touchstone, and which is one of the chief foundations of the opinion of middle knowledge, whence we briefly touched it in the Treatise on the knowledge of God, last chapter, § 4, but reserved its full and complete solution to this place. It can be briefly proposed thus: If the predetermining decree, and physical predetermination flowing from it, like a rivulet from a fountain, are altogether necessary for operating, and some application of free will, prerequired for acting, Christ, Matthew 11, would unjustly reprove the Jews above the Tyrians, that they were not converted, and did not do penance; for the Jews would have a legitimate excuse, and could respond to the Lord Christ's expostulation and reproach, why do You reprove us by the example of the Tyrians, if You had regarding us a predetermining decree, and gave us efficacious and predetermining grace, which You had decreed to confer on them, we would surely, like them, be converted, and do penance? Whence the Adversaries say that from our opinion the necessity of correction is removed, and the reproaches vain, by which God in the sacred letters reproaches His vineyard (that is, the Israelite people, or the faithful soul) that it does not bear grapes, but thorns or wild grapes, that is, that it does not make the fruits of good works, but evil and perverse works, as is had in Isaiah 5.

I answer, first, that the Apostle, to the Romans 9, objected to himself the same difficulty; for when he had established this truth, "God hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth," he immediately objects to himself: "Thou wilt say then to me: Why doth he then find fault? for who resisteth his will?" As if he should say, why does

God complain, or rebuke sinners? For if He willed to have mercy, and not to harden (which He does, not by imparting malice, but by not bestowing grace), we would not resist. This is the whole reason of the unjust complaint of sinners: as though a sinner obstinate in evil, to whom grace efficacious by its own nature has been denied, could not be reproved, and only then would reproof be just, when to all is conferred common sufficient grace, which each one, from innate liberty, renders efficacious or inefficacious? As if this most acute sense the Apostle had not seen, nor Augustine, nor Prosper, who (as we saw above) profess that the depth of this question cannot be resolved by the willing or not-willing of human free will.

I answer, secondly, that the same argument was formerly proposed to Saint Augustine by the Pelagians, for the Monks of Adrumetum, under Abbot Valentine, contended that if efficacious grace were necessary for acting, the necessity of correction would be removed; whence they said that no one should be corrected, if he does not do God's precepts, but only that prayer should be made for him that he do so, as Augustine relates, book 1 of Retractations, chapter 67. But let us hear them, in the same Holy Doctor, On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 4, murmuring, and saying: I would rightly be corrected, if I did not have it (namely grace) by my own fault: that is, if I could give it to myself, or take it myself, and did not do so, or if, it being given, I refused to accept it. And chapter 5: Since, therefore, even the will itself is prepared by the Lord, why do you rebuke me, because you see me unwilling to do His precepts, and do you not rather ask Him, that He operate in me both to will? From which it is established that this argument of the Adversaries is not new, but very old, and taken from the ancient workshop of the Pelagians. Whence not undeservedly does a certain Recent author exclaim: What a great consolation to the school of the Thomists, that they are struck by no arguments, by which Augustine's opinion has not been assailed! What a deplorable desolation, how little safe the lot of those, who hurl no other darts against the Thomistic opinion, than those which their adversaries formerly cast against Augustine! Is it not the same thesis of Augustine and of the Thomists, if the same arguments militate against both?

I answer, thirdly, that the difficulty proposed is common to us and to the Adversaries, since Suárez, Vasquez, and other more celebrated Theologians of the Society admit congruous grace; indeed all Professors of Theology of the same Society are bound to teach it, by the prescript, or decree, of Claudius Aquaviva, given at Rome in the year 1613, on the 14th of December, as Tanner and Paul Leonard attest, who also relate such a decree; but this congruous grace being admitted, the two inconveniences objected to us follow, namely that God unjustly complains of sinners who are not converted, and that sufficient grace for conversion is denied to them, as Father Martinon, the most recent

writer of the Society, shows, in the Antijansenius, disp. 27, sect. 3, num. 25, where, speaking of congruous grace, he writes this: If such great motion and excitation is morally necessary for conversion, therefore those who receive less do not have aid morally sufficient, and thus as many as are not converted lack aid morally sufficient for conversion, and it is morally impossible for them to be converted. Whence such complaint and reproach would be metaphysical, not moral, or reasonable: "What is it that I ought to have done more to my vineyard, and have not done?" Isaiah 5. For the Jews could rightly respond: You ought to have given us aid morally sufficient, not, however, such that with it, it was morally impossible to be converted, without which no one would be converted. How did you expect grapes from those from whom it was morally impossible that wild grapes not be brought forth? He has similar things at num. 28.

I answer, fourthly, directly to the difficulty proposed, by denying the sequel of the Major; for in order that Christ justly reprove the Jews, by the example of the Tyrians, it sufficed that they be equal to them in sufficient aids, and that they place more impediments than the Tyrians to efficacious aids, by reason of greater ingratitude, and hardening in sin, for as Augustine says, On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14: The eyes of the Tyrians and Sidonians were not so blinded, nor their heart so hardened, since they would have believed, if they had seen such signs as these (namely the Jews) saw. The reason of the first is, that in order that someone be able to be justly corrected and reproved by the example of another, it suffices that he be able equally as that one, and yet does not furnish equal things: but he who is equal to another in sufficient aids, although he be unequal in efficacious ones, can equally, because efficacious aids do not give the power to act, nor furnish the power or complement of the potency, but only actuality and application, as I suppose from the Treatise on the Helps. The reason of the second is taken from this, that he is culpable, and worthy of reprehension, who by his own malice, or negligence, places an obstacle and impediment to divine grace, and consequently he who places greater impediments to it than another, can justly, by comparison to him, be reproached and reproved. Whence Saint Thomas, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 159: Although someone, by the movement of free will, can neither merit nor summon divine grace, he can nevertheless impede himself lest he receive it: for it is said, Job 21: "Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of thy ways." And Job 24: "They have been rebellious to the light." And since this is in the power of free will, to impede the reception of divine grace, it is not undeservedly imputed to him who presents an impediment to the reception of grace: for God, as far as it is from Himself, is ready to give grace to all, for He wills all men to be saved, but those alone are deprived of grace, who in themselves present an impediment to grace. Just as, the sun illuminating the

world, it would be imputed as a fault to him who closes his eyes, although he cannot see, unless prevented by the light of the sun.

From these things it is clear that God rightly reproaches His vineyard that it does not bear grapes, but thorns or wild grapes, or the faithful soul, that it does not make the fruits of good works; because although the vineyard lacks some cultivation necessary that it in fact produce fruit, and the soul some aid, by which it be applied to acting, that defect and lack nevertheless proceeds from the fault of the man himself, who by his own malice, or negligence, furnished an impediment to divine grace. Just as a man placed in darkness would rightly be reproached, that he did not see, if someone offered him light, and wished to open the window, but he impeded it. Or (that we may stay with the same example) just as if a farmer had given the vineyard all the first cultivations, and were ready to give it the last, and the vineyard should refuse, or place an impediment to it, he could deservedly reproach it, if it afterward did not produce grapes, but thorns, or wild grapes.

From these things you will understand that, since no one, however just, is immune from original sin, and actual, at least venial, as the Council of Trent defines, session 6, canon 23, there is no one who ought not humbly acknowledge that, for the merit of his own sins, he can justly be forsaken by God, and deprived of efficacious grace, and consequently who ought not, as the Apostle warns, work out his salvation with fear and trembling. Whence Pope Leo, Sermon 8 on the Epiphany: This is a cause for the holy to tremble and fear, lest they, elated in works of piety, be forsaken by the help of grace, and remain in the infirmity of nature. Also for all truly humble persons, that excellent opinion of Richard of Saint Victor on this matter must always be had before the eyes, On the Interior State of Man, part 1, chapter 22: Grace (he says), which once man received before sin, could not justly be withdrawn, which, although he had received it beyond merit, he nevertheless ought not to lose without fault: but now it can at every hour be justly withdrawn, because man can never be found without fault.

You will say, first, if man, through his own fault, or negligence, can place an impediment to efficacious and predetermining grace, he will also be able to resist it, since to resist grace, and to place an impediment to it, are synonymous, and signify altogether the same thing. Man will also be able, from the powers of free will, to prepare himself for its reception, or at least not to place an impediment to its reception, and thus some flesh will be able to glory before God, namely the Tyrian above the Jew, that he rendered himself, by innate liberty, more apt to receiving the aids of grace.

But I deny both sequels; the first indeed, because just as, although someone can impede the entrance of a sunbeam into a hall, by closing a window, and place an impediment to its reception, he cannot, however, deprive it, once received, of its effect, nor impede it from illuminating the air. So likewise, although man, through his own fault or negligence, can impede the reception of efficacious and predetermining grace, and by his own unworthiness move God to deny it; he cannot, however, resist it, once received, and existing in the soul (in consequent potency, and in the composed sense, as we expounded in the preceding section), or frustrate it of the effect which God efficaciously intends to produce through it. For it is impossible (says the Holy Doctor cited above) that these two be simultaneously true, that the Holy Spirit will move someone to an act of charity, and that he lose charity by sinning.

The other sequel is also denied, namely that man will be able, from the powers of free will, to prepare himself for grace, or at least not to place an impediment to it. For as Saint Thomas says, on chapter 12 of the Epistle to the Hebrews, lecture 3: This very fact, that someone does not place an obstacle to grace, proceeds from grace itself; whence if someone should place one, and yet his heart be moved to remove it, this is from the gift of God's grace. And afterward he adds: That therefore this obstacle is removed by some, this is from the mercy of God; but that it is not removed from others, this is from justice. Just as, therefore, although man, by closing a window, can impede the illumination of the sun, he cannot, however, draw and summon it to himself. So likewise, although someone can impede himself, lest he receive grace, he can nevertheless neither merit it nor summon it, nor dispose himself to receiving it, from the powers of free will alone, but only from the power of grace itself, moving his heart.

You will say, secondly, although the solution and doctrine delivered, about the impediment which is placed to efficacious and predetermining grace, through an antecedent fault, can have place with respect to the denial of such grace, in the state of fallen nature, it does not, however, with respect to its denial, in the Angels, and in Adam, for perseverance; since the denial of such aid supposes in them no antecedent fault, actual, or original.

Some of our Thomists respond that the Angels and Adam lacked efficacious aid for persevering, from their own fault, not indeed antecedent, but concomitant, which was prior to the privation of efficacious aid, in the genus of material and dispositive cause. For it is not repugnant that some things be simultaneous in time and duration, and yet mutually precede one another in nature, and causality; as is clear by the example of the wind opening a window, and through it entering into a hall; for the entrance of the wind precedes the opening of the window, in the genus of efficient cause, since it actively

concurs to it; and the very opening of the window is prior to the entrance of the wind, in the genus of material dispositive cause, because it disposes for the aforesaid entrance of the air and wind. Whence the Philosophers commonly teach that causes are causes to one another mutually, and that although they exercise their causalities in the same instant of time, nevertheless one is prior to the other in one genus, and posterior in another, by priority and posteriority of causality and nature. But because this solution seems more subtle than solid, and to have more foundation in the doctrine of the Philosophers, than of the Holy Fathers,

I answer, secondly, conceding that the doctrine delivered above about the impediment of efficacious grace, through an antecedent fault, does not have place in the Angels, nor in Adam, but that in them the denial of efficacious grace for persevering must be reduced to the simple will of God, and His inscrutable judgments. For thus the Holy Fathers teach, especially Augustine, book 11 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 10, where, speaking of the evil Angels, he thus says: But God could have converted their will to good, because He is omnipotent: He could plainly have done so, why then did He not do it? because He did not will it; why He willed it not, is with Him. And Tract on the New Canticle, chapter 8, he teaches that God permitted Adam's fall, so that it might appear what free will could do without God's aid. What (he says) unaided free will is worth, is demonstrated in Adam himself: for evil it suffices for itself, for good it does not, unless it be helped by God. From this you will understand that the reason for the fall of Adam and of the Angels cannot be rendered from this, that the first actual grace conferred on them was purely sufficient, and subject to their free will, as to efficacy and use, but that they needed efficacious grace for persevering, which nevertheless He denied to Adam and to the non-persevering Angels, because He willed it, and because it is in His power to confer or deny it to whomever He wills. Nor can Suárez, Vasquez, and other defenders of congruous grace, assign another reason why God gave congruous grace for persevering to the persevering Angels, and denied it to the non-persevering.

§ VIII

The concord of divine sanctity with the predetermining decree and physical predetermination with respect to the material element of sin.

It follows from the principles established above, in dealing with the efficacy of the divine decrees, and physical predetermination, that God predefines from eternity the material element of sin, and in time physically predetermines the will to it; for since such a material element is some created being, and includes in itself some actuality, and some degree of existence, it cannot escape divine causality, and consequently must be subordinated to God as first cause: but such subordination cannot be preserved through an indifferent decree, nor through simultaneous concurrence furnished by Him, as we showed there: Therefore according to the principles established by us, a predetermining decree, and physical predetermination toward the material element of sin, must necessarily be admitted. It only remains for us to explain here, how divine sanctity can cohere and be associated with such a decree, and such predetermination. That this concord may be explained:

I say first: God, without any prejudice to His infinite sanctity, can predefine, and in fact predefines, the material element of sin, taken materially, that is, insofar as it is a being, and a physical and vital act.

The conclusion is proved by a fundamental reason: God, without prejudice to His infinite sanctity, predefines all good acts, as such, whether they be good with moral goodness together with natural, or only with natural or physical goodness: but the material element of sin, materially taken, is a good act, with goodness not indeed moral, but natural, or physical; since under this aspect, and according to its physical being, it does not pertain to the moral line, nor consequently to the line of moral evil, but to the line of natural and physical being, which is good with physical and natural goodness: Therefore the material element of sin, materially taken, can be predefined by God, without any injury or prejudice to His infinite sanctity.

The Adversaries respond that although the material element of sin, materially and specificatively taken, is, from its genus, or from its line, good; nevertheless, on account of the indispensable connection which it has with moral malice, in hatred of God, e.g., God cannot, by His decree, efficaciously will and predefine it, unless He also, indirectly and secondarily, will and predefine the formal element itself; whence since that is repugnant to divine sanctity, this too must be judged adverse to it equally.

But on the contrary, first: Although some things are inseparably connected with one another, it does not follow, nor is it necessary, that a cause or power which attains one

must necessarily attain the other, as is clear in the good, which although it is identified with the true, indeed is transcendentally included in it, is nevertheless attained by the will in such a way that the true is in no way attained by it; because indeed the true is not the object of the will, but the good: Therefore likewise, although in intrinsically evil acts, e.g., in hatred of God, the material element of sin cannot really be separated from the formal, or from moral malice; by this very fact, however, that that malice is not contained within the adequate object of the divine will, God can, by His efficacious and predefinitive decree, attain the material element of that sin, or its foundation specificatively regarded, without attaining in any way, even indirectly, its formal element. Which reason will be more urged in the following conclusion.

It is confirmed: The material element of sin, although connected with the formal, terminates divine complacency, without the formal malice terminating it: Therefore likewise it will be able to terminate God's efficacious volition, and predetermining decree, without the formal malice terminating it. The consequence is clear, for if divine complacency, terminated at the material element of sin, does not necessarily pass to the formal, this is so because the material is contained within the object of the divine will, but not the formal: but this reason being admitted, no reason can be assigned, why the same should not be said of God's efficacious volition: Therefore this can be terminated at the material element of sin, without extending to the formal. The Antecedent, however, is proved: The material element of sin does not terminate an act of displeasure of the divine will: Therefore it terminates divine complacency; since the divine will cannot take complacency in formal malice, it is true to say that the material element of sin terminates divine complacency, without the formal malice terminating it. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. God's omnipotence truly and properly causes the material element of sin, which, since it is a created and participated being, cannot escape divine causality: Therefore it does not terminate divine hatred and displeasure. The consequence is manifest, both from Wisdom 11: "Thou hatest none of the things which thou hast made"; also because if the material element of sin, as caused by God's omnipotence, displeased God, and terminated His displeasure, it would follow that omnipotence itself too, as influencing into it, would displease God, and terminate His displeasure; for whoever a work displeases, He who influences into it also displeases; whence because sin displeases God, also the sinning man displeases Him, according to that saying of Wisdom 14: "The impious and his impiety are hateful to God": but it is most absurd to say that God's omnipotence, as influencing into the material element of sin, displeases Him: Therefore also to assert that the material element of sin terminates the act of displeasure of the divine will.

It is confirmed further: Because the material element of sin is contained within the object of divine omnipotence, but not the formal, God, by His omnipotence, causes through prior concurrence the material element of sin, without causing the formal, as we shall show in the following conclusion: but this reason militates with equal efficacy in God's will, since that is no less holy, nor less selective, than His omnipotence: Therefore the divine will will be able to predefine the material element of sin, without predefining the formal element annexed to it, and inseparably conjoined with it, and consequently without any injury and prejudice to divine sanctity.

I say secondly, God physically predetermines the will to the material element of sin, or influences into it through prior concurrence, without any prejudice to divine sanctity.

It is proved, first: When the soul moves and applies a bent leg to walking, it thus causes that motion, insofar as it is physical and vital, so that it nevertheless does not effect it, insofar as it is oblique and defective; but the defect of limping in the bent leg is totally reduced elsewhere, because indeed that defect is not contained within the adequate object of the locomotive power: but similarly the formal element of sin, or its moral malice, is not contained within the adequate object of God's omnipotence: Therefore God can so apply and predetermine the will of man to the material element of sin, that He nevertheless does not apply nor predetermine it to the formal element annexed to it, and inseparable from it, and consequently without prejudice to divine sanctity. The Major is clear; the Minor is thus shown. The adequate object of divine omnipotence is that which is reducible and orderable to God as last end, since the notion of first principle and last end are converted with one another; whence it is said, Proverbs 16: "The Lord hath made all things for Himself": but the formal element of sin, or its moral malice, is not orderable to God as last end, since it is rather a recession and deviation from Him as last end: Therefore it is not contained within the adequate object of God's omnipotence.

It is proved, secondly, by an argument ad hominem: God in fact concurs by simultaneous concurrence with the created will to the material element of sin, and yet does not concur with it to the formal malice; otherwise such malice would be attributed to God, just as the material entity of sin is attributed to Him: Therefore He can also premove and predetermine to the material entity of sin, without premoving and predetermining to the formal malice, and consequently without injury to divine sanctity. The consequence is proved, first, because the malice and deformity of sin is much more connected with simultaneous concurrence, than with prior concurrence; for with the first it is conjoined proximately and immediately, but with the second only mediately and remotely; because simultaneous concurrence is the very act of the will, insofar as it is

from God simultaneously operating, with which act the very malice of sin is immediately conjoined; but prior concurrence is not identified with the action of the will, but is something prior to it; whence it is not conjoined with the malice and deformity of sin, except through the mediation of the act of the will: Therefore if God can, by simultaneous concurrence, concur with the created will to the material element of sin, without concurring to the formal, a fortiori He will be able to do this through prior concurrence. Secondly, divine omnipotence is no less selective, as predetermining, than as concurring simultaneously with the will: Therefore if, as concurring simultaneously, it attains the entity and actuality of the sinful act, and abstracts from the formal malice, it will also be able, by predetermining, to abstract from it. Thirdly, God, concurring simultaneously to the material element of sin, prescinds it from the formal, for this reason, because the latter is not contained within the sphere or adequate object of divine omnipotence: but this reason militates with equal efficacy for prior and predetermining concurrence: Therefore the same as before.

The Adversaries respond that there is this distinction between prior and simultaneous concurrence, that the latter is indifferent, and God is determined by the created will, rather than determining it; but the prior and predetermining concurrence is not determined by the created will, but determines it, whence the latter cannot be selective, though the former can.

But on the contrary, first: According to this solution and doctrine, the created will determines the divine concurrence to the entity of the sinful act, and yet does not determine it to the formal malice: Therefore likewise God, through His concurrence, will be able to determine the created will to the entity of the same act, without determining it to the malice. The consequence seems manifest, for no reason can be assigned, why the created will should be more selective in determining the divine concurrence, than divine omnipotence and will in determining the concurrence of the created will: Therefore if this can determine the divine concurrence to the entity of the sinful act, prescinding from the malice, that is, not determining God's concurrence to it, God too will be able to determine the concurrence of the created will to the entity of the act, without determining it to the malice, but prescinding from it.

On the contrary, secondly: Granted that God's concurrence, considered in first act, that is, the decree of concurring with free causes, be indifferent, or that God offer His concurrence to the will in an indifferent manner; the actual and exercised concurrence, however, by which He in fact simultaneously influences with the created will to the act of hatred of God, e.g., cannot be indifferent, since it is intimately imbibed in that act, and identified with it. I ask, therefore, whether such actual and exercised concurrence

attains only the entity and substance of that intrinsically evil act, or also extends to its malice and deformity: If the first be said, it follows that prior concurrence a fortiori will be able to prescind from the malice and deformity of the same act, and attain only its substance and entity; because, as we said above, prior concurrence is more distant from the malice and deformity annexed to such an act, than simultaneous concurrence. If the other be asserted, it follows that God, through simultaneous concurrence, causes the malice and deformity of sin, which is repugnant to divine sanctity.

In order to extricate themselves from these arguments, the Adversaries fall into various absurdities, and are compelled to swallow and devour several inconveniences. For some Recent authors, unable, or unwilling, to conceive how God can cause the material element of sin, and prescind from the formal malice, have dared to call back from the ashes and the tomb the opinion of Durandus and Aureolus, long since extinguished and buried, and to assert that God does not immediately cause the entity of sin, and its material element, but only mediately and remotely, insofar as He gave to the will the power of operating, and consequently of producing the entity and actuality of the evil acts which it elicits.

But this opinion is called by Saint Anselm, in the book On Foreknowledge and Free Will, audacity, or rashness: Audacity (he says) is to say that some being is not from Him, from whom every good thing is; and Saint Thomas, Book 2, dist. 37, question 2, article 2, says that it is closest to a double error. And Book 2 to Annibaldus, dist. 37, sole question, article 1, that it is heretical, and contrary to reason: It is heretical (he says) to say that some being, insofar as it is a being, is not from God, nor is it only contrary to faith, but also to reason. Similarly Albert the Great, Sentences 2, dist. 35, article 7, says that this opinion, which had prevailed among many of the ancients, has almost withdrawn from the court, and is reputed by many moderns to be heretical. Finally Dominic Soto, book 1 On Nature and Grace, chapter 18, says that it is the unanimous consent of the Theologians that God causes the entity of sin, which underlies its malice and deformity. Theologians (he says) do not indeed deny that God is the cause of the entity (so they call it) which is sin, by that genus of efficiency, by which He moves all living and non-living things to their natural actions.

Reason also persuades this, for as Saint Thomas discourses in the places cited: That which does not have being from itself cannot have operation from itself: but the entity of a sinning man does not belong to him from himself: Therefore neither can the actual entity of sin belong to him from himself.

Furthermore, as the same Holy Doctor argues, Book 2, dist. 37, question 2, article 2, in the argument "But on the contrary": Whatever is not the cause of the operation by which some substance is produced into being, is not the cause of that substance: but through some action of sin, certain substances are produced into being, just as through adulteries and fornications men are generated: If, therefore, God is not the cause of these actions, insofar as they are actions, He is not the cause of the men who are generated through these actions, which is absurd.

Other Recent authors, placed at the other extreme, seeing that if it be admitted that God's simultaneous concurrence is selective, and attains the entity of sin, prescinding from its malice and deformity, the same could be said of the prior and predetermining concurrence, say that God, through simultaneous concurrence, not only causes the entity and substance of the evil acts, but also their malice and deformity. They add, however, that God furnishes this, as it were, unwillingly and coerced, and, as it were, dragged and determined by the human will, lest indeed He fail in the office of first cause, or violate the rights of created liberty.

But this response and doctrine can be confuted in many ways. For in the first place it seems impious to assert that God, as determined by the human will, follows its fall, and causes the malice and deformity of its sin, and is, as it were, drawn thereby into the fellowship of its crime; for this seems manifestly repugnant to divine sanctity. Whence just as the Authors of the earlier solution already impugned take away from God the notion of first cause, in order to defend the rights of divine sanctity; so these, on the contrary, in order to preserve in God the notion of first cause, tarnish the reputation of divine sanctity.

Secondly, it is repugnant that God, even as drawn and determined by the human will, cause that which is not contained under the adequate object of His omnipotence: but the malice and deformity of sin, since it is a recession from God as last end, is not contained under the adequate object of divine omnipotence; since that is only that which is orderable to God as last end, as was shown above: Therefore it cannot be caused by God, even as drawn and determined by the human will.

Thirdly, that which is from someone only permissively is not properly said to be caused by him, as Anselm teaches, book On the Fall of the Devil, chapter 1, and is established from the fact that permission is only the negation of an impediment, and mere negation cannot truly cause, and confer real being: but the formal malice of sin is from God only permissively, as is established from the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 6: Therefore it is not caused by God, even as drawn and determined by the created will.

Fourthly, God does not cause that which He holds in hatred, according to that saying of Wisdom 11: "Thou hatest none of the things which thou hast made": but He holds in hatred the malice and deformity of sin, as is established from that saying of Wisdom 14: "The impious and his impiety are hateful to God": Therefore He does not cause it.

It is confirmed: If God's omnipotence caused sin as to the formal element of malice, itself as effecting and influencing into it would displease God, and terminate His hatred: but this cannot be said, otherwise God would hold Himself in hatred, and displease Himself: Therefore neither can that. The sequel of the Major is evident, for whoever a work displeases, he also who influences into it displeases: Therefore if God's omnipotence caused sin formally as such, and influenced into its malice and deformity, which displeases God, it would equally displease Him, and terminate His hatred.

Fifthly, if the malice of sin proceeded efficiently from God as first cause, it would be reduced more into God than into the sinning man; for an effect proceeding from a first cause and a second, depends more on the first cause than the second, and consequently is reduced more into that than into this: The consequent is absurd, and altogether injurious to divine sanctity: Therefore also the Antecedent.

Finally, if God influenced not only into the material entity of sin, but also into its formal malice, He could be called the cause and author of sin, which is to fall into the error of Calvin, condemned by the Council of Trent. The sequel is proved: God is the first cause and first author of the entity and actuality of the sinful act, although, according to the doctrine of the Adversaries, He does not influence into it, except as drawn and determined by the human will, determining the indifference of the divine decree: Therefore likewise, although He does not influence into its malice and deformity, except as drawn and determined by the created will, He can nevertheless be called the cause and author of sin.

From these things you will understand that the Thomists better and more easily reconcile God's infinite sanctity, with the notion and dignity of first cause and first principle, than the Adversaries. For those, admitting in God indifferent decrees, take away from Him the notion of first cause, with respect to the determination of the created will, as we showed above, and nevertheless do not preserve the rights of divine sanctity, since, in order to extricate themselves from the arguments of the Thomists, they are finally compelled to assert that God, as drawn and determined by the created will, influences, through simultaneous concurrence, not only into the entity of sin, but also into its malice and deformity. The Thomists, however, abhorring both, in order to reconcile the dignity of first cause with God's sanctity, have recourse, with Saint

Thomas, to the infinite efficacy of the divine will and omnipotence, by reason of which God so causes the material entity of sin, that He prescinds from its formal malice, as the Holy Doctor expressly teaches, question 3 of On Power, article 7, ad 15, in these words: Because the first cause influences more into the effect, than the second, therefore whatever there is of perfection in the effect is principally reduced into the first; but that which is of defect must be reduced into the second cause, which does not operate as efficaciously as the first: Therefore according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas, far from it following, from the efficacy of the divine decree regarding the material element of sin, that the formal malice found in the act of our will be reduced into the divine will, and its causality; rather, such efficacy causes the malice and deformity of sin to be traced back, not into the first cause, but into the second.

§ IX

The objections are resolved.

You will object, first: If God, by absolute and efficacious will, predefines the material element of sin, and predetermines the will to it, it will be licit and praiseworthy for man to will it: but this is absurd: Therefore also that. The sequel of the Major seems manifest, for it is licit and praiseworthy to will all that God wills, since it is praiseworthy in all things to conform oneself to the divine will.

I answer by denying the sequel of the Major, and to its proof I say that although it is licit and praiseworthy to will all that God wills, as special mover and provider, it is not to will all that He wills, by the general will of the first mover, and universal provider; for by this general will He wills to permit sins, and to concur together with us to their material element, as the Adversaries confess, and yet it is neither praiseworthy nor licit to will those things, nor is it always an act of virtue to conform oneself to such a will.

You will object, secondly: Man cannot posit the material element of sin, unless he consequently posit the malice and deformity annexed to it: Therefore if God, by absolute and efficacious will, wills that man posit and produce such a material element, He consequently also wills that he posit the malice adjoined to it, and accordingly that he sin.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence. For that discourse labors under the same defect as these. The soul absolutely and efficaciously wills the bent leg to be moved by progressive motion: but the bent leg cannot be moved by progressive motion, except by limping: Therefore the soul absolutely and efficaciously wills that the bent leg limp. Likewise: God efficaciously wills that Peter be generated by Paul; but

Peter cannot be generated by Paul, unless he contract original sin: Therefore God efficaciously wills Peter to contract such sin. A similar argument can also be formed from the principles of the Adversaries: For God, according to their principles, by absolute and efficacious decree wills to place man in those occasions and circumstances, in which He foresaw, through middle knowledge, that he would sin: but it is impossible that a man placed in those occasions and circumstances not sin, otherwise divine foreknowledge would be deceived, and what God foreknew would not come to pass: Therefore God, by absolute and efficacious decree, wills that man fall into sin. Just as, therefore, those consequences are not valid, so neither is that which is made in the argument proposed. The reason is, because (as we showed above) things identified, or connected with one another, can be prescinded: not only intentionally and through knowledge, but also really, through volition, and causality; and this always happens, when, of two notions or formalities connected with one another, one is contained within the formal object of some power, or within the sphere of activity of some cause, but not the other; whence since moral malice is not contained within the formal object of God's will, nor within the sphere of divine causality and omnipotence, though its entity and actuality is, God can, by absolute and efficacious will, will and predefine the material element of sin, under the notion of a being and act, and predetermine the will to it, without such predefinition or predetermination extending to the malice and deformity adjoined to it from the defectibility of the created will. Whence Saint Thomas, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 162: Every sin proceeds from some defect of the proximate agent, not, however, from the influence of the first agent; just as the sin of limping proceeds from the disposition of the leg, not, however, from the motive power, although from it is whatever of perfection of motion appears in the limping: but the proximate agent of human sin is the will; the defect of sin, therefore, is from the will of man, not from God, who is the first agent, from whom nevertheless is whatever pertains to the perfection of action in the act of sin.

You will say, to posit the material element of sin with the defect and moral malice is the same as to posit it with liberty and advertence of reason: but God, through His predefinition, wills, and effects through physical predetermination, that man posit the material element of sin, with liberty and advertence of reason: Therefore He wills and makes, through such predefinition and predetermination, that man posit the material element of sin with the defect and moral malice.

I answer by denying the Major, for although liberty and advertence of reason are conditions necessarily required, in order that human acts be morally evil, moral malice does not consist in them, but either in the privation of rectitude and conformity with the law, as some wish, or, as others more probably think, in a transcendental order to the

object as deformed from the rules of morals. Whence since God, by His predefinition, does not will, nor by His predetermination effect, that man posit the material element of sin, as founding, or connoting, such privation, or as denoting that transcendental order, it comes about that He neither wills through His predefinition, nor effects through His predetermination, that man posit the material element of sin, with the defect and moral malice, but only that He produce in it entity, actuality, vitality, and other notions pertaining to the physical order, and reducible into God as first principle and last end.

You will insist: Every positive thing must be predefined and predetermined by God: Therefore if the formal element of sin consists in something positive, as the more common and probable opinion of the Theologians asserts, it must be predefined and predetermined, and consequently caused, by God.

I answer, first, that the same argument could be made of simultaneous concurrence, since every positive and real thing must be produced by God through simultaneous concurrence.

I answer, secondly, by distinguishing the Antecedent: Every positive thing must be predefined and predetermined by God, under the notion of positive entity — I grant. Under the notion of defect and deformity — I deny. On which more in the Treatise on sins, chapter 8, § 2.

You will object, thirdly: God cannot morally move and predetermine man to the material element of sin, otherwise He would tempt, seduce, and deceive him: Therefore neither can He physically. The consequence seems manifest, since physical motion, being efficacious from within, and standing on the part of the power, is much greater and more vehement, than moral motion, which is not efficacious of itself, and only allures and invites the agent to operating, extrinsically and objectively.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence, and the parity. For a manifold distinction intervenes between physical and moral motion. The first is selective, and stops within the physical order, not so the second, which extends to the moral order, and attends chiefly to those things which belong to that order. The first only regards the entity and actuality of the act to which it moves, the second attends, or ought to attend, to conformity or deformity from the law. The first belongs to God, as He has the notion of first cause, and universal provider; the second belongs to Him as special provider and mover.

Whence although if God morally moved man to the material element of sin, He would tempt and deceive him, from this, however, that He physically moves and predetermines

him to such a material element, it does not follow that He tempts or seduces him, but only that He applies him to producing the entity and actuality which is found in it, and which per se primarily is reduced into divine causality and omnipotence. To the proof to the contrary it must be said that although physical motion is greater than moral intensively, that is, more powerful and efficacious, it is nevertheless less extensively, because it stops within the physical order, nor does it extend to the line of morals, as moral motion does.

I add that, if this argument were valid, it could easily be retorted against the Adversaries. For they teach that, since God, through middle knowledge, sees infinite occasions and circumstances in which men would not sin but would act well, and be converted, He nevertheless sometimes places them in others, in which, through the same knowledge, He foreknew infallibly that they would sin. Whence I thus argue: He who places a man in occasions of sinning, morally premoves and predetermines him to sinning; for just as occasions of sinning move morally and objectively to sin, so also he who places a man in them is reckoned to premove and morally predetermine him to sinning, whence commonly it is said, "opportunity makes the thief": Therefore if God sometimes places men in those circumstances and occasions, in which, through middle knowledge, He foresaw them infallibly going to fall into sin, He tempts them, seduces them, and deceives them, and morally premoves and predetermines them to sin, which, since it is an effect, or rather a moral defect, must be reduced into a cause morally moving, not into one physically predetermining.

You will say, with a certain Recent author: God, in the opinion of the Thomists, predetermines the persuasions by which the Demon morally moves us to sinning: Therefore not only physically, but also morally, is one predetermined to evil acts.

I answer by distinguishing the Antecedent: He predetermines the persuasions, etc., insofar as they are physical and vital acts — I grant the Antecedent. Insofar as they are morally evil, and inducing to sin — I deny the Antecedent, and the consequence. For just as, in the opinion of the Adversaries, God causes such persuasions, as they are certain physical and vital acts, in the Demons through simultaneous concurrence, and yet is not reckoned to cooperate in their malice; so neither in our opinion is He reckoned to move to sinning, although through prior concurrence He produces the same persuasions, as they are vital and physical operations, on the way to being persuasions.

You will object, fourthly: The Council of Trent, session 6, canon 6, condemns those who say that God does not stand only permissively toward sins and evil works: but this seems to follow from our opinion: Therefore it does not seem consonant with the

Council of Trent. The Minor is proved: he who causes something to which another infallibly follows, is not reckoned, nor can be said, to stand only permissively in order to it: e.g., because death infallibly follows the infliction of a lethal wound, and blindness the piercing of the eyes, he who inflicts a lethal wound on another, or pierces his eyes, is inaptly and abusively said to permit his death or blindness: but from the predefinition and predetermination of the material element of sin, sin infallibly follows, since it is impossible that man freely and advertently elicit an evil and prohibited act, and not sin: Therefore that being supposed, God cannot be said (except abusively, and by way of denial) to stand only permissively in order to sins.

It is confirmed: For God to stand permissively toward something is not to impede it, when He can, as Saint Thomas teaches, Book 1, dist. 47, question 1, article 2, in the body, and ad 3; but supposing that God predetermines the will to the material element of sin, e.g., of hatred of God, He neither impedes its malice, since its entity, freely produced, cannot be separated from the malice: Therefore neither can He be said to permit it.

To the objection I answer by denying the Minor, and to its proof, I distinguish the Major: He who causes something to which another infallibly follows, is not reckoned, nor can be said, to stand only permissively to it. If it follows by physical consequence and causality — I grant the Major. If it follows only by logical consequence and inference — I deny the Major. For upon the vital motion of the bent leg, limping infallibly follows, and yet the soul causing that motion is not reckoned to be a positive, but only a permissive, cause of such a defect: because since that is not contained within the sphere of activity of the locomotive power, it does not follow upon its progressive motion, by physical consequence and causality, but only by logical consequence and inference. Whence the examples adduced in the objection are not to the point, because death and blindness, since they are within the sphere of activity of the second causes, follow per se, and from the nature of the thing, and by physical consequence, upon the infliction of a lethal wound, and the piercing of the eyes; on the contrary, however, since the malice and deformity of sin is not within the adequate object of the divine will, nor within the sphere of its causality, it does not result nor follow from the predetermination of the will to the material element of sin, by physical consequence and causality, but only by logical consequence and inference, as we declared in the preceding treatise, chapter 4, toward the end of § 2.

To the confirmation it must be said that although God, the predetermining decree of the will to the material element of sin being posited, cannot in the composed sense impede its malice, namely by conjoining the impediment, that is, the negation of the malice of the act of hatred of God, with the predefinition, and consequently with the positing of

such a material element; yet just as the will, even in eliciting that act, can in the divided sense not elicit it, so also God can impede it in the divided sense, lest it elicit it. In order, however, that some cause be reckoned to stand only permissively toward some defect, it is not always required that it be able to impede it in the composed sense, or with consequent potency, as is established by the often-adduced example of the soul moving the bent leg to walking, which is reckoned to permit the defect of limping, although, the motion of the bent leg being supposed, it cannot compose the negation of this kind of defect of limping with such a motion.

§ X

The refutation of Calvinism.

From what has been said throughout this whole chapter, it remains manifest that the opinion of the Thomists differs far from Calvin's doctrine, and has no affinity with his errors. In the first place, indeed, as far as pertains to the causality and efficacy of the divine decrees, and the aids flowing from them, there are two chief distinctions between Thomistic and Calvinistic doctrine. The first and chief is that Calvin, and the rigid ones called Calvinists, teach that divine decrees and aids are so efficacious, that they absorb all indifference of the human will, and, only spontaneity, or immunity from coercion, being left, they remove from it the proximate power of dissenting. For in the Antidote and canon 5, session 6, he writes this: What then does Augustine mean, when he speaks of the liberty of the will? Namely what he so often repeats, that men are not compelled by God's unconquerable grace, but are ruled as voluntary, that they willingly obey and follow. The Thomists, however, so compose divine decrees and aids, however efficacious of themselves, and predetermining, with the actual indifference of the will, and power of dissenting, that these two are always conjoined with one another, grace in the will, and, the same will being constituted under grace, a sufficient power of not consenting, according to that saying of Saint Prosper, book 2 On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 27: God so grants to Himself the willingness of the man to obey Him, that He does not even take away from those who are going to persevere that mutability by which they can be unwilling.

A second distinction, akin to this, and, as it were, its corollary, is sought from the diverse understanding of the composed and divided sense. For since Calvin, and the rigid Calvinists, affirm that divine decrees and aids consume and absorb all indifference of the will, and all power of dissenting, they necessarily deduce, from the consequence of this error, that the distinction of the composed and divided sense must be so understood, that the proposition that the will cannot dissent from God moving in the composed

sense, but can in the divided, signifies that the will lacks the power of dissenting, while the divine motion in the soul, excluding this power of dissenting, is present and perseveres, but only when it has gone away or departed. The Thomists, however, since they will that divine decrees and aids so govern the will, that they do not take away the power of resisting or dissenting, consequently assert that the will's inability to dissent from God moving in the composed sense, but only in the divided, denotes that although actual dissent cannot be conjoined and composed with the divine motion (as being efficacious from within, and consequently infallibly inferring consent), the will, nevertheless, even as it underlies grace, and is moved and applied by it to acting, retains absolute power of dissenting. Whence Alvarez, book 2, response, chapter 1, num. 34: The composed sense (he says) is not that which is insinuated in the argument, namely that when efficacious grace is in the will, the will cannot not do that act to which it is determined, but with the motion removed, it can not do it, for this sense was fabricated by Calvin.

These two distinctions of Thomistic doctrine from Calvinistic are so manifest, that Father Annat could not conceal or dissimulate them: for in the book which he published On Uncoerced Liberty, page 226, he expressed both differences in these words: What Jansenist will find among the Thomists one who said that the will, predetermined by divine grace, lacks proximate power to dissenting? What will they give who interpret the distinction of the composed and divided sense thus, that the sense should be, that the will moved by God can dissent, when that motion has gone away, and another has arrived?

From these things you will understand how great are the discords in this Author of words and thoughts fighting with one another. For in the first place, in the book for the defense of middle knowledge, published at Toulouse, disp. 4, last chapter, he writes that there is found no distinction between the Thomists and Calvin, except verbally and as to a certain manner of speaking. Whence in the same place, num. 120, he thus exclaims: Is it not a just petition of the defender of middle knowledge, who, after so long an altercation of so many years, still ask what is really the difference between the doctrine of the Adversaries and Calvin, in that precise doubt in which it is asked, whether or not there is in man any use of free will? And yet in the place cited from the book On Uncoerced Liberty, and in other places to be referred to below, he assigns the two differences already expounded.

Secondly, the same Author, in the same place, num. 95, says that the manner of defending liberty, which Amesius received from Alvarez (by which, namely, the power of dissenting is said to be simultaneous with the aid by which man is moved to assenting)

pertains to Calvinism, and is not according to the mind of Trent. And yet, book 4 Against the Bajans, chapter 8, § 7, num. 4, he writes this: Luther and Calvin, and their followers, are therefore heretics, because they do not admit free will, such as Trent demands, namely that, excited by God through efficacious grace, it can nevertheless dissent. And below: It follows, therefore, that we say that the proximate power of dissenting is both sanctioned by Trent, and denied heretically by heretics. Likewise, in his response to the seventeenth letter of Louis Montalte: Catholic (he says) Doctors agree among themselves, that grace of itself efficacious so governs the will, that it does not remove the force and power of resisting, so that these two things are composed with one another, grace in the will, and, the same will being constituted under grace, a sufficient power of not consenting; nor do they doubt that this is the true sense of the Council of Trent in these words, "he can dissent, if he wills."

Thirdly, in the aforesaid book for the defense of middle knowledge, painting a picture of Thomistic liberty, he asserts that the Thomists require only two things for true and perfect liberty, namely in the intellect, objective indifference of judgment, and in the will, spontaneity, or immunity from coercion: from which picture, in the same place, he says, Calvin deleted nothing at all: After (he says, num. 112) we have shaken out everything from the Adversaries' opinion, we find nothing else, than that there is God's predefinition, absolute, efficacious, infallible, unfrustratable, from which the action of the will follows, coercion and all violence being excluded, and a mediocrity of cognitions being supposed. Nevertheless, in the places already related, he manifestly declares that the Thomists require, besides these two, a third, namely the power of dissenting, or of not acting, which separates the Thomists from the Calvinists. Likewise in the book which he published under the name of Eugenius Philadelphus, page 654 of the Paris edition, he says that the Thomists, by this one line (namely, the power of dissenting), have kept the confused borders with the heretics undivided.

Fourthly, the same Author in the aforesaid book on middle knowledge implicates the Thomists with the Calvinists, and in the books published against the Bajans and Jansenists separates them from the Jansenists, and yet says that the error of Jansenius and of Calvin is the same, which certainly cannot otherwise be reconciled, than by denying that common principle of the syllogistic art and of natural light: Those things which are the same with a third thing are the same with one another. I omit many other antilogies, or fights of words and thoughts differing with one another, which are found in the aforesaid books of this Author (writing diverse and opposite things, according to the diverse reason of the times, and as he saw it expedient for his own cause, and his own utility). For we have dealt with this at length in the Apology of the Thomists, which is

had in the Shield of Thomistic Theology, at the end of the Treatise on the knowledge of God.

As pertains to the other error of Calvin, by which he makes God the cause and Author of sin, there are likewise two chief distinctions of Thomistic doctrine from Calvinistic. For Calvin made God the author of sin under a twofold title. The first and chief is taken from this, that he taught that God moves the will of man to acts, whether good or evil, only spontaneously and not freely, and just as a horse is moved by its rider, as is established from what has been said above; for supposing that God moves the will to evil and sinful acts, by that notion which removes the indifference of the will, and which necessitates the will, it evidently follows that the malice and deformity of sin cannot be reduced into the created will, but only into God's motion, because the will, moved and excited only by a spontaneous motion, and lacking actual indifference, and potency to the opposite, cannot influence into its acts moral malice, which, without the liberty of indifference, and potency to the opposite, cannot subsist, as is manifest in first-first motions, and undeliberated acts. Whence if there be found any moral malice in its acts, it must necessarily be poured back into God as into its Author. The other reason is that by which Calvin cannot fail to make God the author of sin, namely that he taught that He moves the will of man to evil acts, by moral motion, by commanding the devil to tempt men, seduce them, and induce them into sin, as will be established by one reading chapter four of the second book of the Institutes: for moral motion, since it is not selective, as physical motion is, as we declared in the preceding section, extends not only to the entity and substance of the act, but also to its malice and deformity, secondarily at least and indirectly. Since, therefore, the Thomists neither acknowledge only spontaneity in the will moved and predetermined by God, nor say that God moves it to evil acts, even as they are physical and vital, by moral motion, but only physical, it is manifest that they differ altogether from Calvin, and have no affinity or commerce with him, as concerns the aforesaid error, by which he makes God the author of sin.

Nor is it an obstacle that Calvin sometimes seems to distinguish between the entity of sin, and its malice, and attribute the first to God, but not the other, and deny that He is the author of sin; for this he only denies as to the sound of words, and to avoid the odium of words, and inconsequently to his own principles; since the opposite manifestly follows from that twofold principle which he admits, namely that God moves the will to evil acts only spontaneously and not freely, and that He commands the Devil to tempt men, and induce them into sin, which is to move them to the act of sin by moral motion. I add, from André Duval, Doctor of the Sorbonne, volume 1, on the Secunda Secundae, page 53, that there existed innumerable passages in Calvin's Institutes, in which he

expressly and in terms said that God is the author of sins, even as to the malice and deformity which they import formally, but that these were erased in later editions by the Calvinists. Becanus also shows, volume 1 of the Summa of Theology, chapter 16, by the testimony of David Pareus, a famous Calvinist, indeed even the chief of the Calvinist faction in Germany, that Calvin had really made God the author of crimes, and that in an error, which even the very ears shudder at, very many of the Calvinists had defected from Calvin. Why, then, does Father Annat, in his book on middle knowledge, try to absolve from that crime Calvin, from which not even the more rigid Calvinists themselves absolve him? Why does he try to wash that Ethiopian, and say that he distinguishes between the material and formal element of sin, or between its entity and malice, and attributes only the first to God, not the other; and that he, if we respect the use of his words, is religious enough, to beware lest he say that God is the author of sin? Certainly more sincere and more cautious in this part are other Theologians of the Society, who candidly confess that Calvin attributes both to God as author, and makes God the author of sins.

From what has been said, it is clear that Master Lorca, of the Cistercian Order, truly and prudently said, disp. 21 on grace, conclusion 2: Those exceed too much, who with unconquerable contention defend that physical predetermination, which the Thomists teach, removes liberty. The opinion which asserts this differs nothing pure from Calvin. Since it is evident that it is the doctrine of Saint Thomas, and of several of the ancient Scholastics, one need not fear that there is any danger in it, but rather it must be believed that it is consonant with the Catholic faith. And to use these censures is neither pious, nor prudent. Wherefore I do not think that the most pious and most wise Cardinal Bellarmine wrote what is read in his Controversies, namely that the opinion which teaches that efficacious grace is a physical quality of God, which determines the will to willing and choosing the good, seems either altogether the same as the error of Calvin and Luther, or to differ little from them. It is more credible and more likely that those words were intruded by certain German Jesuits, who were overseeing the printing of the book of Controversies, as we showed in the Apology of the Thomists. But whatever be the case with this, to Bellarmine I oppose Baronius, who declares Molina's doctrine to be dangerous in its novelty, contrary to Augustine, and akin to the errors of the Pelagians, or Semi-Pelagians, in a letter sent to Lord de Villars, Archbishop of Vienne, which I shall here transcribe entire, and word for word.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND MOST REVEREND LORD.

Forgive me if I write back somewhat later than is fitting to Your Lordship's letters, which, as holy, pure, and orthodox in all things, I embrace, and from which may I dissent

in not even the smallest point or particle. Only concerning Molina's books does the controversy remain. I have read them, but not without indignation, since in them he prides himself on doing nothing more strongly than opposing Saint Augustine (although he never names him as a saint), and reproving him of drowsiness, and boasting himself to be more watchful and more acute in those disputations. Who could bear such a man saying such things without nausea? He escapes like a snake, and easily slips from one's hands: so that if someone finds him rash, he can hardly convict and expose the heresy. The Church of God does not need such commentators as these, whose purity, candor, and brightness she is accustomed to delight in only, having herself neither spot nor wrinkle. I have read him, I say, and I have noted up to fifty and more positions, words, and phrases, which, if not at least akin to the errors of the Pelagians, or Semi-Pelagians (although he himself, more cautiously, at least contains himself, or protests himself to be, within the limits of the Catholic faith), I do not think that whoever reads them without private affection will altogether deny it. Who needs the Church of God to have Molina's books, that it might learn what it has already learned and taught for so many centuries from so many Holy Fathers, Councils, and decrees? As for what pertains to Our Lord Pope Clement himself, this is his proposal, this his wish, this finally his decree, that he should not recede a nail's breadth from the footsteps of his predecessors, but stand most firmly on them. He knows plainly that so many holy Pontiffs, Innocent, Sixtus, Celestine, Hormisdas, and finally Felix (whose are the Canons of the Council of Orange) have professed in their writings, and have testified, that the Roman Church, in those things which regard grace and free will, has always been accustomed to follow Saint Augustine. Indeed Hormisdas testifies this in so many words in his letters, so that there is no need of another judgment, since it has already been prejudged. Meanwhile there is labor in discussing Molina's volume, of which, whether it should be rejected, or purged, or retained, the case is still before the judge. In my opinion, indeed, the Catholic Church does not need it, in which there would be at least certain horrid things to the hearing that would need correction. I have warned my Reverend Fathers of the Society of Jesus, lest they let their reputation be endangered in the defense of his books, brought into hazard. I love them all, God knows, as Fathers, so that of them I may use that saying: "The reproaches of them that reproached thee have fallen upon me." But I do not wish to be more prolix. Farewell, most loving Father, a lamp to my feet, since it has fallen to me to walk through obscure places. Concerning the placing of Blessed men in the number of the Saints, God has reserved this for another time. Rome, the Ides of March, in the year of the Lord 1603.

Of Your Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lordship, Brother and Servant, Caesar Cardinal Baronius.

Peter Matthieu makes mention of this Epistle, in the History of Seven Years of Peace, volume two, book seven, narration four, which he says he saw, and relates a fragment of it, namely these words: "I have warned my Reverend Fathers of the Society of Jesus," etc.

§ XI

An efficacious decree, and God's prior and predetermining concurrence, must be admitted for both the state of fallen and of innocent nature.

It is proved, first, from the principles established above, for for both states there must be preserved in God the notion and dignity of first and most universal cause: but this, the predetermining decree, and God's prior concurrence being removed, cannot stand: Therefore for both states, of fallen and of innocent nature, the predetermining decree, and the prior concurrence, or physical predetermination, must be admitted. The Major is certain of faith; the Minor is established from what has been said above, for since an indifferent decree awaits determination from free will, it cannot cause it, whence if God, for the state of innocence, had a purely indifferent decree, and only simultaneous concurrence, He was not the cause of the free determination of the will of Adam and of the Angels, nor consequently of the discretion of the good Angels from the evil; and such discretion must be reduced, not into God, but into free will, and not into grace, but into nature.

It is confirmed: Second causes, in whatever state they be posited, must be subordinated to God as first cause, in operating: but the subordination of second causes to the first in operating cannot be preserved without God's prior concurrence, and physical predetermination, as was shown in § 3: Therefore such concurrence and predetermination must be admitted for either state of human nature. Whence Saint Thomas everywhere and constantly requires the necessity of divine premotion, not only on account of the debility of our wounded nature, but also on account of the indispensable dependence and subordination of any second cause on the first in acting, as is established from I-II, question 109, article 1, where he thus says: It is manifest that just as all corporeal motions are reduced into the motion of the celestial body, as into the first corporeal mover: so all motions, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced into the first mover simply, which is God. And therefore, however perfect some corporeal or spiritual nature be posited, it cannot proceed into its own act, unless it be moved by God. Whence in the following article, ad 1, he asserts that the mind of man, even of the healthy man, does not so have dominion over its own act, that it does not need to be moved by God.

It is proved, secondly, from the principles established in the Treatise on the knowledge of God: for there we showed that God's knowledge is the cause of things, and that God contemplates all things in Himself as in a cause and a medium previously known, and consequently that He knows absolute and conditioned future things in His essence, determined through an absolute or conditioned decree, and thus there is not given in God middle knowledge, which is knowledge of conditioned future things, independent of the conditioned decree, and anterior to it: but these things cannot stand, if for the state of innocence a purely indifferent decree be admitted; for that cannot be a medium for certainly and infallibly knowing future things, whether absolute or conditioned, since in an indifferent cause, as indifferent, a determinate effect cannot be certainly and infallibly known: whence, the predetermining decree for the state of innocence being removed, God will have to know all future things, whether absolute or conditioned, pertaining to that state, immediately in themselves, and in their objective truth, and consequently for such a state there will have to be admitted in God middle knowledge, which directs God in His indifferent decrees, and explores the future consent of the created will of Adam and of the Angels. Likewise God's knowledge for such a state will not be the cause of the futurition of things, nor their rule and measure, but rather will be ruled and measured by them, as to truth and certitude, which is altogether alien from the doctrine of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas, as was shown in the same treatise. Whence a certain Recent author rightly says that those who narrow the efficacy of the divine decrees to the state of fallen nature scatter with the left hand the stones of the Augustinian wall, which they compose with the right.

Furthermore, because Jansenius calls this cause to the tribunal of Augustine, and contends that this dispute is to be settled only by the testimonies of Augustine, several testimonies of this Holy Doctor, which openly favor our opinion, must here be briefly weighed, so that from them it may be established how false is what the aforesaid Author says, book 8 On the Grace of Christ the Savior, that efficacious grace, and physical predetermination, extended to all states of human nature, is most remote from Augustine's sense, and can be proved by no testimony of his.

Augustine, therefore, clearly expressed the necessity and efficacy of the divine motion, for every state, and for all causes both necessary and free, book 3 On the Trinity, chapter 3, in these words: God's will is the first and highest cause of all corporeal species, and motions. The same he has, Tract 1 on John, explaining those words, "All things were made by him." And in Prosper, sentence 58, saying: The divine will is the cause of all corporeal and spiritual motions. Where it is established that the Holy Doctor speaks not only of corporeal causes, but also of spiritual motions. Whence, book 1 On Genesis to

the Letter, he universally says: Let God, therefore, move the whole creature by hidden power. And book On Grace and Free Will, chapter 20, speaking specially of the free motion of the will, he writes this: Divine Scripture, if diligently examined, shows that not only good wills of men, which He Himself makes from evil, and made good by Himself, He directs into good acts, and into eternal life, but also those which preserve the creature of the world, are so in God's power, that He makes them incline whither He wills, when He wills. And chapter 21, he continues thus: The Almighty works in the hearts of men even the motion of their will, that through them He may work whatever He wills to work, He who knows how in no way to will anything unjustly. Which, book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 14, he confirms by the example of the election of Saul, whom he says was made a prophet by the most omnipotent power of God, of inclining human hearts wherever He wills. He also confirms it by the example of those who elected David as King: Whom (he says) God brought, that they might constitute Him King. And how did He bring them? Did He perhaps bind them with corporeal chains? He acted within, He held their hearts, He moved their hearts, and drew them by their wills, which He Himself worked in them. Of all these things He derives the reason, not from the corruption of their heart, but from the supreme dominion over our wills, saying: When God wills to constitute Kings on the earth, He has more in His power the wills of men, than they have their own. All these things, for establishing the necessity and efficacy of God's general motion, are so clear and expressed, that nothing more clear and expressed can be adduced, unless perhaps that which the same Holy Doctor has, book 1 Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 20, where, speaking of the change of King Ahasuerus from indignation to gentleness (which was an act of the natural order), he says that God converted the heart of the King by most hidden and most efficacious power, and translated it from indignation to gentleness. Therefore, from Augustine, God's efficacious motion, preventing our wills, is required not only for supernatural acts, but also for the operations of the natural order, and consequently must be admitted for whatever state of human nature.

That this may become more evident, and cannot be eluded by any evasion, other testimonies must be produced, by which the same Holy Doctor, descending to the state of integrity of the Angels and of the Proto-parents, declares that efficacious grace was necessary in them. For Tract on the New Canticle, chapter 8, he thus says: What unaided free will is worth, is demonstrated in Adam himself: Therefore he thinks that efficacious aid for not sinning was denied to him. Whence, Sermon 11 on the words of the Apostle, speaking of the same Adam, he adds: Falling from the potter's hand, he was broken, for He Himself ruled him who had made him: but rule denotes a certain motion preventing, and applying free will, not, however, a purely sufficient aid, and one determinable and

applicable by free will. Likewise, book 11 of the City of God, chapter 19, he teaches that the discretion of good and evil Angels was from God, not from free will, for only God (he says) could discern them. Whence to them he refers that saying of the Apostle: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" But the discretion of good and evil Angels could not proceed from grace sufficient and common to both, and determinable by them, as to consent, or dissent: Therefore it must have been from grace efficacious and predetermining free will to consent. Which argument Jansenius himself often uses, against those who deny efficacious and predetermining grace in the state of fallen nature. I add that, book 12, chapter 9, speaking of the good will, by which the good Angels adhered to God through love, he says that it proceeded from the aid of grace, and consequently that it was efficacious of itself: If they could not (he says) make themselves better, than He had made them, surely also they could not have the good will by which they might be better, unless by the operating aid of the Creator, etc. Finally there is a celebrated passage of the same Augustine, in the same chapter 9 of the same book, by which he asserts that the good Angels, when the evil ones fell by evil will, were more amply aided, so that they arrived at that fullness of beatitude, whence they became most certain that they would never fall. Where Augustine manifestly admits a greater aid, and more ample help, in the good Angels who stood firm, than in those who lapsed into fault, which greater help cannot be other than efficacious grace, since all had received sufficient grace in abundance.

Nor is valid the response of Jansenius, asserting that that greater aid which Augustine says was conferred on the good Angels, and denied to the evil, is not the very gift of perseverance, or the efficacious aid for persevering, but only a greater aid which they received from God in beatitude itself, namely a certain knowledge, by which the now blessed knew that they would never fall. For this evasion openly contradicts the text, since Augustine says that the good Angels, more aided, arrived at beatitude, not that, where they arrived at beatitude, they were more aided. Whence Estius, on Book 1, distinction 41, § 13: If this aid, by which the blessed Angels are said to be more aided, were beatitude itself, the sense would be rendered inept: namely that beatitude was conferred on the Angels, by which they might arrive at beatitude.

Nevertheless Jansenius objects several testimonies of Augustine against our opinion. The chief and, as it were, palmary one is that which is sought from chapter 11 and 12 of the book On Rebuke and Grace, where the Holy Doctor distinguishes a twofold aid: one which he calls "aid without which," the other which he calls "aid by which" (that is, sufficient and efficacious aid), and teaches that the first was granted to Adam in the state of innocence, not, however, the second, which is conferred on the saints and predestined

in the state of fallen and by grace repaired nature.

The common response is that Augustine there does not speak of any grace of the state of innocence, but only of that which was granted to Adam to persevere in that state, and in that integrity which he had received from God in his creation, which grace was not the aid by which one perseveres, or the efficacious one, but the aid without which we cannot persevere, or the sufficient one. Thus Saint Thomas interprets Augustine, his most faithful disciple, I-II, question 109, article 10, ad 3: It must be said (he says) that as Augustine says in the book On Rebuke and Grace: man in the first state received a gift by which he could persevere, but he did not receive it that he might persevere. But now, through the grace of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace by which they can persevere, and moreover it is given to them that they persevere; and thus the gift of Christ is greater than the trespass of Adam. And certainly Augustine clearly explains himself in the same place, chapter 12, where, after having expounded that twofold kind of aid, he adds: To the first man, therefore, who in that good in which he had been made upright, had received the ability not to sin, the ability not to abandon that good itself, was given the aid of perseverance, not by which he would persevere, but without which by free will he could not persevere. But now to the Saints predestined into the kingdom of God through the grace of God, not only is such aid of perseverance given, but such that perseverance itself is given to them: not only that without this gift they cannot be persevering, but that through this gift they cannot be anything but persevering. From which it is clear that the Holy Doctor there speaks of the aid without which, and of the aid by which, for persevering.

But although this interpretation is legitimate, and according to Augustine's mind, it does not, however, seem to evacuate the present difficulty; because other testimonies of the same Holy Doctor can be produced, taken from that same twofold chapter of the same book On Rebuke and Grace, by which he manifestly seems to exclude from the state of innocence every efficacious grace, and to admit only sufficient grace, subject to the free will of Adam and of the Angels, as to efficacy and use. For there he teaches that Adam stood in truth by will and free will. That he could remain in justice, if he had willed. That, in order that he might will to persevere, God left it to his own arbitrium. Likewise he says there that the evil Angels fell through free will, while the good stood through the same free will, which then was so free, that it could will well and evil. Finally he asserts that God so ordered the life of Angels and men, that in it He first showed what free will could do, then what the benefit of grace, and the judgment of justice, could do.

To these and similar testimonies a twofold response can be given. The first is that Saint Augustine in these places did not wish absolutely, and under whatever notion, to

exclude efficacious grace from the state of innocence, but only efficacious grace insofar as it is healing and medicinal, under which notion and formality it is required in fallen man, namely for healing the wounds, inflicted on him through original sin. Whence Augustine only teaches, in this respect, that Adam stood in truth by will and free will; that he could have remained in justice, if he had willed; that, in order that he might will to persevere, God left it to his own arbitrium, and similar things, insofar as he felt no infirmity of will or repugnance of the lower appetite, and suffered no difficulty in acting, which had to be overcome by Christ's medicinal grace: and the same, proportionally, must be said of the Angels. Thus Saint Thomas interprets Augustine, II-II, question 137, article 4, ad 2, where he thus has it: Augustine says in the book On Rebuke and Grace that to the first man it was given, not that he should persevere, but that he could persevere, through free will, because no corruption existed then which would furnish a difficulty of persevering. In the same manner Estius expounds him, on Book 1, distinction 41, § 14, who also adds that unless we receive this understanding of Augustine's words insinuated by Saint Thomas, it will be most difficult, indeed not even possible, to reconcile Augustine with himself: that is, to show how the things which are objected are not contrary to those things which were previously adduced from the same Augustine. Namely, that the good will, by which the Angels adhered to the Creator, was the work of God, and that they could not have it, except by the operating help of the Creator. That the good Angels, in order that they might arrive at beatitude, were more aided, than the evil, who fell from it. That the discretion of the good and evil Angels was from God, not from free will, and consequently not from nature, but from grace, and other things of this kind, which openly declare the efficacy and operation of divine grace in the Angels and the first parents.

The second response, of a certain Recent Thomist, which almost coincides with the preceding, is that Augustine compares the grace necessary per se for either state, of health, or corruption, from the proper, so to speak, merits of each state, and the attended condition of a healthy or infirm man. For in this sense it is true that although fallen and infirm man, on account of the perpetual battle of rebellious concupiscence, needs unconquerable aid, lest, amid so many and such great temptations, his will itself succumb through his infirmity; nevertheless in the state of innocence, healthy and integral, he did not per se need such aid, but from the force of that state, only required sufficient grace, although from elsewhere (namely from the general subordination of the second cause to the first) he needed efficacious motion, and prior concurrence, as Augustine teaches in the places related above by us, in which he admits the necessity of divine motion not only for supernatural acts, but also for natural ones, and consequently from the force of the subordination of second causes to the first.

Chapter V

On the love of God, and other affections, and attributes of the divine will.

Having considered the liberty and efficacy of the divine will, we must treat briefly of some of its affections, and specially of love, which is the first movement of the will, from which all the others arise.

§ I

In God there is formally love, both of His own goodness and of existing and future creatures, but not of the merely possible.

The first part is against Valentine Herice, who thinks that in God there is not found love properly so called, with respect to His own goodness, but only joy, or complacency; because (he says) love properly so called, or specially taken, insofar as it is distinguished from desire or joy, requires that its object abstract from presence and absence, or from possession and non-possession: whence since the divine goodness is present to God in the most perfect manner, and possessed by Him, the act of the divine will terminated at it cannot have properly and formally the notion of love, but only the notion of joy, and complacency. But this foundation is frivolous, for although love abstracts from presence and absence, by negative abstraction, that is, does not per se essentially require presence or absence, but is indifferent to either, and in this differs from joy, which essentially regards the good as present and possessed, and from desire, which essentially demands its lack and absence; it does not, however, abstract from them by positive abstraction, such that it be against the notion of love to be terminated at a good as present and possessed. For far from it being repugnant to love that there be union and presence of the object; rather it perfects and increases it, whence the love of the blessed, although it is terminated at the divine goodness as possessed, is more perfect than the love of wayfarers who are carried to God, as not yet possessed. I add that if presence of the object were repugnant to love, it would follow that joy and love could never be simultaneous, and that no one would ever rejoice over a good obtained, because he loves it, but because he loved it, while it was not yet had: which, however, is false and absurd, is established from this, that the good over which we rejoice begins to displease, when it begins not to be loved, and joy over it ceases, when love of it ceases, as experience establishes.

The second part, which asserts that God loves existing creatures, and future ones, is evident, because to love is to will good: but God wills to existing and future creatures some good, namely existence had, or to be had in some difference of time: Therefore He loves them. From which the third part remains proved, which denies that God loves the

merely possible, for God wills no good to merely possible things, since He wills not to give them existence, which is the basis and foundation of all goods. I add that, if God loved merely possible creatures, He would love them not freely, but necessarily, because the goodness which would belong to them would precede every free decree of the divine will: but in the divine will a necessary love of creatures is not to be posited, since Saint Thomas, and other Theologians, acknowledge no necessary love in God, except that by which He loves Himself; and since the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from God's natural and necessary love, is not produced from love of creatures, as we shall show in the treatise on the Trinity: Therefore in God there is not given a love of possible creatures.

You will say, first: God loves His omnipotence: Therefore also possible creatures. The consequence seems manifest, for whoever loves some object, also loves all that which is connected with it, and without which it cannot exist: but God's omnipotence is connected with the possibility of creatures, and cannot exist without it: Therefore if God loves His omnipotence, He also loves possible creatures.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence, and to its proof, I distinguish the Minor: If that which is conjoined with it is capable of love — I grant the Major. If not — I deny the Major. For although God loves the penitence of the sinner, He does not, however, love the sin, without which penitence cannot stand, because that is not capable of love. Or secondly I distinguish the same Major: whoever loves some object, also loves all that which is connected with it a priori, and by way of cause or condition conducing that the object be such — I grant the Major. If it has with it only a connection of consequence, and a posteriori, and by way of effect or terminus, I deny the Major. But the possibility of creatures is not the a priori reason of divine omnipotence, but rather, on the contrary, this is the cause and a priori reason of the possibility of creatures: Whence only a posteriori, and by an extrinsic denomination, as they say, would it follow that omnipotence be removed, the possible creatures being removed, just as it would follow a posteriori that the sun be removed, from the removal of its illumination.

You will say, secondly: God wills all men to be saved, and consequently, by simple affection and antecedent will, loves the salvation of the reprobate: but that salvation is not future, but only possible: Therefore God loves merely possible things.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor. For although the salvation of the reprobate is not future, by consummated and absolute futurition, it is future, however, by conditioned and inchoative futurition, through the graces and sufficient aids offered to all, which are the seeds of salvation, by which, if the impious would respond, and not

place impediments to the efficacious aids, they would obtain it.

§ II

In God there is formally joy or delight, but not desire, nor hatred, nor anger.

The first part is clear, because joy or delight is the rest of the will in the object willed: but the divine will rests supremely in its own goodness, as finding all sufficiency in it: Therefore in itself it supremely rejoices, and most sweetly delights.

The second is shown thus: Desire is carried around a good not had, or which is not in our power; for of goods had we only rejoice and delight, nor are we reckoned to desire that which, since it is in our power, we do not have, for if we desired it, we would surely also have it: but God, by reason of His increate and infinite goodness, contains all extrinsic and created goods, at least eminently, and by reason of His omnipotence, and the perfect dominion which He has over our wills, has in His power the goods which depend on our liberty; since according to Augustine, by reason of that, He has more in His power the wills of men, than they have their own: Therefore in Him there cannot be desire, even in order to goods extrinsic to Himself, and which depend on our liberty.

The third is Saint Thomas's, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 96, where he thus discourses: Just as love stands to the good, so hatred stands to evil; for to those whom we love, we will good, but to those whom we hate, evil. If, therefore, God's will cannot be inclined to evil, as was shown, it is impossible that He hold anything in hatred. By these words he insinuates the fundamental reason of this part: for hatred is carried toward evil in a certain way under the aspect of evil, for although evil cannot be the motive of the will, which always tends toward good, either true, or apparent, it can nevertheless be its terminative object, insofar as the will, under the aspect of good fitting to itself, wills that which is known and disfitting to the enemy: but the divine will is carried only to God's goodness as its adequate object, both motive, and terminative; whence when it wills to inflict punishment on the sinner, it does not intend it, as an evil of his, as we, when we hold someone in hatred, but insofar as in it shines the beauty of His justice, and the order or beauty of the universe, which is indeed a good: Therefore in God there is not hatred properly so called.

You will say: Punishment, as manifestative of God's justice, and conducing to the beauty of the universe, is indeed good to God, as just, and as author of the universe, but not to the reprobate himself to whom it is inflicted, since it is not useful, or delectable, to him: Therefore although God wills it, as it is showing of His justice, and conducing to the beauty of the universe, it does not follow that He does not will it, as it is an evil of the

sinner himself.

But on the contrary: since God is the universal good of all, that which is good with respect to God is reckoned to be also good for any creature: Therefore eternal punishment, as manifestative of divine justice, is good not only with respect to God intending it, but also with respect to the subject to whom it is inflicted, not indeed according to the particular inclination which he has to his own good, but according to the universal inclination, by which, as a part of the universe, he is inclined to the good of its Author.

The fourth part, finally, which asserts that anger is not properly in God, but only metaphorically, is Saint Thomas's, here question 20, article 1, ad 2, and Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 89, and is proved by the reason which he insinuates in the same place: Anger is an appetite for vengeance, with hope of avenging, proceeding from sadness: but sadness is repugnant to God: Therefore also anger. Whence the same Holy Doctor, in the place cited Against the Gentiles: Anger, therefore, is far from God according to the notion of its species, not only because it is an effect of sadness, but also because it is an appetite for vengeance, on account of the sadness conceived from injury inflicted.

Nor is valid what Suárez says, holding the opposite, namely that it is not of the essential concept of anger that it arise from sadness, but only that it be an appetite for harming another, under the notion of just vengeance. For it would follow from this, that every act of avenging justice would pertain to anger, and thus a judge who with tranquil and settled mind punishes a murderer, from the motive of avenging justice, would punish him from anger, which is absurd.

§ III

In God there is supreme and perfect justice, not commutative, but distributive.

The first part is clear, both from Scripture, which everywhere concedes to God the attribute of justice, and also by reason: for justice is a virtue rendering to each what is his own: but God renders to each creature what is its own, according to that saying of Dionysius, chapter 8, On the Divine Names: He distributes to all their own things, according to the dignity of each of existing things: Therefore in God there is perfect justice.

I add that legal justice is in the Prince architectonically, as it were in the one commanding and directing; in the subjects, however, secondarily and administratively, as in those subject and obedient to the law, as Saint Thomas teaches, II-II, question 57, article 6. But God is King of Kings and Lord of Lords, and the supreme moderator of the whole

universe, through whom Kings reign, and the founders of laws discern just things, as is said, Proverbs 8: Therefore in Him there is legal justice, in a superior manner than in any Prince.

But that commutative justice is not in Him, Saint Thomas expressly teaches, Book 4, dist. 46, question 1, article 1, where he thus says: Commutative justice, by which equality is constituted between God giving, and the creature receiving, cannot belong to God, according to proper acceptation. And here, question 21, article 1: Commutative justice (he says), or directive of commutation, does not belong to God. Reason also persuades this: For commutative justice is concerned with given and received, as with its proper matter; whence in Him who cannot receive from another there cannot be commutative justice: but God cannot receive anything from a creature, nor can the creature give anything to God: Therefore in God there cannot be commutative justice. The Major is established, for to exchange is to receive not one's own, or another's, for one's own; the Minor, however, is thus shown. To give something to another is to transfer into him its dominion: but the creature cannot transfer into God the dominion which it has in the things which it possesses, both because God is incapable of an imperfect and inferior dominion, such as is that found in the creature; also because all things are under God's dominion, before they are offered to Him, much better than under the dominion of the creature; indeed the very giving and offering is in us from the aid and influx of God: Therefore a creature can never properly give anything to God. Whence it is said, to the Romans 11: "Or who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him?" And 1 Chronicles 29: "All things are thine: and what we have received of thy hand, we have given thee." And Augustine, Confessions, book 1, chapter 4: Who has anything not thine? Thou payest debts, owing nothing, remittest debts, losing nothing.

It is confirmed: Since the formal object of commutative justice, by which it differs from all other virtues, is equality of given and received, it can only be formally and properly found in that between whom and another there can be equality of given and received: but between God and a creature there cannot be equality of given and received, since whatever is offered to God by the creature is owed to Him under many titles, namely the title of creator, preserver, helper, supreme lord, and last end: Therefore commutative justice cannot be found formally and properly in God. This reason Saint Bernard insinuates, book On Loving God, chapter 3, in these words: If I owe my whole self for having been made, what shall I now render also for having been remade, nor was I remade as easily as I was made? In the first work He gave me to myself, in the second He gave Himself: where He gave Himself, He restored me to myself. Given, therefore, and restored, I owe myself for myself, and I owe twice, what shall I render to God for myself?

For if I could repay a thousand times over, what am I in comparison to God, who first loved us, so great, and by so much loved such little ones, and such?

It is confirmed further: In him who from commutative justice renders something, there must be a strict debt of rendering it, for he who renders something without debt and obligation, does not give it from commutative justice, but from liberality, or fidelity: but in God there is not, nor can there be, a strict debt and obligation with respect to the creature, since strict debt imports some inferiority and dependence of the debtor on him to whom it is owed, whence Saint Thomas, here question 21, article 1, ad 3: God is not a debtor, because He is not ordered to other things, but rather other things to Him: Therefore in God neither is, nor can be, commutative justice in order to the creature.

That in Him, however, is distributive justice, the same Holy Doctor openly delivers, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 46, where, speaking of God, and His justice, he thus concludes: Commutative justice, therefore, does not belong to Him, but only distributive. And on chapter 9 of the book On the Divine Names, lecture 4: Commutative justice has no place in God, because as it is said, to the Romans 11: "Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him?" But distributive justice is attributed to Him, which does not observe equality of quantity, so that it gives equal things to all, but equality of proportion, so that it gives to each according to what is worthy. Reason also supports this: For distributive justice denotes the greatest perfection and excellence, since it is not equal to equal, as commutative justice is, but of a superior to inferiors; for it belongs to a superior to distribute to inferiors from the common goods, to each according to his proportion, as if a father of a family gives clothes to his whole family, not, however, the same ones, but small ones to the little ones, larger ones to the grown, prudently he bestows; whence such justice befits the supreme governor and prince of the world, who, as Dionysius cited above says, distributes to all their own things, according to the dignity of each of existing things.

This accommodated and proportioned distribution Tertullian excellently explains, book two Against Marcion, chapter 12, in these words: His goodness made the world, His justice modulated it. Where the word "modulate" seems to signify that just as music orders diverse tones and songs, and reduces them to due number and proportion. So also God's distributive justice, in the creation of the world, reduced all creatures to due order and consonance, giving to each what is its own, and making all things in weight, number, and measure. Whence in the same place he adds: All things, as goodness conceived, so justice distinguished.

I add that distributive justice does not have annexed the imperfections and defects, which are found in commutative. For in the first place, distributive justice does not induce, as commutative does, a debt arising from this, that from those to whom it distributes the goods of the republic, it has first received something, or on account of the distribution made, expects that something be conferred to it. Secondly it is not required that the distributor deprive himself of dominion over the thing which he distributes, for it suffices, His supreme dominion being retained, that He confer inferior dominion on those to whom He distributes those things, as is established in a Prince, who can preserve distributive justice, by bestowing common goods in fief, or emphyteusis, or even only by donating usufruct. Thirdly, the debt of distributive justice is not born from the right of another toward the distributor, but from natural rectitude, and the very law of equity, by which the distributor is bound to commensurate the reward to the perfection of merits. Which debt in a human Prince obligates from the ordination of natural law which is from God; but in God Himself, who does not have a law imposed on Him by another, arises from this, that He Himself is the law and first rule of the whole of rectitude. Whence Anselm, in the Proslogion, chapter 10: Just art Thou, Lord, not because Thou renderest to us what is due, but because Thou doest what befits Thee, the supreme good. Distributive justice is not equal to equal like commutative, but of a superior to inferiors, to whom He distributes the common goods of the republic.

You will object, first, against the first part. To be a debtor to oneself removes the proper notion of justice, which must necessarily be toward another: but God is only a debtor to Himself, not, however, to the creature, as is established from what has already been said: Therefore in Him there is not true and perfect justice.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: To be a debtor to oneself, as the terminus or person to whom something is to be rendered, removes the proper notion of justice — I grant the Major. To be a debtor to oneself, as the principle and foundation of debt and obligation, to be rendered and exercised, however, in order to another — I deny the Major, and under the same distinction of the Minor, I deny the consequence. And so the debt which God has toward the creature is indeed a debt toward it, but does not arise from its right and action, but from God's ordination, and from the supreme rectitude and equity of the divine will, which is the supreme law, and primordial rule of the whole of equity; whence the creature is not the creditor of such a debt, although it is rendered to it as the terminus.

You will object, secondly, against the second part: That which is given from convention and pact, is given from true and strict commutative justice: but God gives to the just the kingdom of heaven, from a burdensome convention and pact of laboring in His

vineyard, as is established from the parable which is had, Matthew 11: Therefore He gives them the kingdom of heaven from true and strict commutative justice. Whence Scripture and the Fathers often say that God would be unjust, unless He gave the reward to those living holily: To the Hebrews 6: "For God is not unjust, that he should forget your work." And Augustine, book 4 Against Julian, chapter 3: God Himself, which be far from Him, will be unjust, if the true just man is not admitted to His kingdom.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: That which is given from convention and pact, obligating and burdening one to another, is given from true and strict commutative justice — I grant the Major. That which is given from convention and pact obligating and burdening one, not to another, but to himself — I deny the Major. When, however, God gives something to men from convention and pact, the pact and convention of God with man is not such that from the man's action God be burdened, and obligated to him from true and strict justice; because since such an action is under God's dominion, and proceeding from His influx, and owed to Him under infinite titles, God cannot be burdened by it, nor can there arise in Him a strict and rigorous obligation of rewarding it, however much a pact and promise be adjoined to it. Whence if God deprived the just man of his reward, He would be unjust, not by violation of right, but by violation of His own truth, and of just distribution, and by injustice opposed not to commutative justice, which cannot be in Him, but to distributive, or legal-architectonic, which are found in God as in the supreme prince and judge.

You will object, thirdly: There is given commutative justice in Christ in order to God: Therefore also in God in order to Christ. The Antecedent is established from the doctrine which our Thomists commonly deliver in the Treatise on the Incarnation, where they teach that Christ's satisfaction was an act of commutative justice. The consequence, however, is proved from this, that commutative justice must be mutual, or on the part of both extremes.

I answer by denying the consequence, and to its proof I say that commutative justice must be mutual, or on the part of both extremes, when each extreme is capable of it, but otherwise when one of the two extremes is incapable of such justice, as happens in the case at hand; for God, for reasons already expounded, is incapable of commutative justice. Just as, although the relation between mother and son from its nature is mutual, and stands on the part of both extremes, there is nevertheless not given in Christ a real relation to the mother; because since the suppositum of the Divine Word is of a superior and increate order, it cannot really be carried to a creature, nor receive in time any new real relation.

You will object, fourthly, against the third part: Distributive justice regards geometric and comparative proportion of one to another, not, however, the debt which belongs to each properly, as is established from what has been said above. But God, in the bestowal of natural goods, and in the distribution of rewards, or punishments, does not attend to geometric and comparative proportion, but to the connatural exigency of each, and to the due commensuration of merit with reward, and of demerit with punishment: Therefore He does not exercise an act of distributive justice, and consequently such justice is not given in God.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor. For although God, in distributing His natural goods to creatures, and rewards to the just, and punishments to sinners, attends to the connatural exigency of each, and to the due commensuration of merit with reward, and of demerit with punishment (in which shines a certain mode and certain similitude of commutative justice, as Saint Thomas notes, Book 4, dist. 46, question 1, article 1, little question 1), He nevertheless simultaneously attends more principally to geometric equality, or to comparative proportion; because what He chiefly intends, in bestowing natural perfections on individual things, in distributing rewards to the just, and demanding punishments from sinners, is the beauty of the universe, and its perfection, which consists not so much in the absolute perfection of things, as in the order and proportion of them to one another, just as the perfection of music consists in the diversity and proportion of tones.

§ IV

In God there is mercy, as regards the effect of relieving another's misery, but not as regards compassion and sorrow over another's evil.

The first part is clear, for it belongs supremely to God to repel misery from others, and to diffuse to all a goodness by which their defect and misery is excluded: Therefore effective mercy is found in God. Whence Saint Thomas here, question 21, article 3, excellently observes that to bestow perfections on things belongs to the divine goodness, and to justice, and to liberality, and to mercy, however, according to a different reason. For the communication of perfections absolutely considered belongs to goodness. But insofar as perfections are given to things by God according to their proportion, it belongs to justice. Insofar, however, as He does not give perfections to things for His own utility, but only for His own goodness, it belongs to liberality. Insofar, however, as the perfections given to things by God expel every defect, they belong to mercy.

From this Cajetan, II-II, question 30, article 4, infers that mercy in God imports every perfection simply simple, and the notion of the purest and most perfect act: From its act

(he says) it appears that mercy in itself requires immunity from all misery. For if we distinguish mercy, into mercy simply, and into mercy with respect to such a misery, we find that in the same way as mercy with respect to such a misery, e.g., poverty, is thus immune from poverty, in the same way mercy simply is free from all misery. And since all potentiality is a certain misery, on account of which it is fitting that every creature be somehow subject to some misery; it follows that mercy according to itself requires in itself such and so great a superiority, that it be pure act, that it be the highest nature, that it be God; and therefore it is set forth as proper to God to have mercy, and to manifest omnipotence, which is founded upon His actuality.

The second part too is evident, for sadness and compassion are acts or affections of the sensitive appetite, which cannot be found in God, because that which is sensible is altogether alien from Him. Whence Augustine, book 2 To Simplicianus, question 2: If from mercy you remove compassion, so that there remains tranquil goodness of relieving, and of freeing from misery, some kind of knowledge of divine mercy whatsoever is insinuated.

From this you will understand that the mystery of the Incarnation was necessary for some completion of divine mercy. For since there is a twofold act of mercy, namely to repel another's misery, and to be affected by another's misery, or to compassionate the sufferings of another; the first indeed belongs to God by reason of His goodness and omnipotence, but the other is contrary to Him, by reason of His perfect felicity and tranquility. Whence, in order that from each act of God mercy might be completed, and that He might become perfectly merciful, it was fitting that He Himself become incarnate, that He might be able to compassionate our infirmities, and, as the Apostle says, to the Hebrews 2, He ought to be assimilated to His brethren in all things, that He might become merciful, that is, lest anything be lacking to Him for the completion of perfect mercy.

Treatise V

On Providence, Predestination, and Reprobation.

We shall conclude this treatise in only three chapters. First we shall treat of God's providence in general; secondly of predestination, which is a part of divine providence, and a certain special providence which God has concerning the predestined, and by which He prepares for them the means by which they infallibly attain eternal life. Thirdly, of reprobation, which is opposed to predestination, since it is the same science of opposites.

Chapter I

On the providence of God.

Before we treat of predestination, or special providence, which God has concerning the elect, we must briefly discuss His providence in general, and as it extends to all creatures, and to all things that happen in the universe.

§ I

There is in God a most perfect providence which extends to all things.

The first part can be denied by no one except an Epicurean, or one Epicureanizing, as Salvian excellently says, book 1 On Providence. For in the first place, all the reasons which demonstrate the existence of the supreme deity, also prove His providence; for to assert that God exists, and that there is in Him no providence of the things He has founded, is the most open madness. Whence Lactantius, book On the Wrath of God, derides Epicurus, because he said that God exists, and yet denied all providence: Epicurus (he says) indeed said that God exists, because it is necessary that there be something in the world excellent, and outstanding, and blessed; he nevertheless denied all providence by which the world would be governed, than which I do not see what could be said more contradictory. For if God exists, He is surely provident as God, nor can divinity otherwise be attributed to Him, unless He also hold the past, know the present, and foresee the future. Since, therefore, he took away providence, he also denied God. But when he professed that God exists, he conceded providence to be simultaneously; for one without the other can neither exist nor be understood at all. Which truth so prevailed among men, that it imposed the name of God from understanding or foreseeing, for this Greek name theós, which signifies God, is said from theáomai, which signifies "I consider," or "I foresee," as Damascene says, book 1 On the Faith, chapter 11.

Secondly, as Saint Thomas discourses, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 75, all second causes, in this that they exist as causes, follow a divine similitude: This is found commonly in causes producing something, that they have care of those things which they produce; just as animals naturally nourish their offspring: God, therefore, has care of those things of which He exists as cause. Whence Ambrose, book 1 On Duties, chapter 13: What craftsman neglects the care of his work? Who abandons and forsakes what he himself thought worth founding? If it is an injury not to govern, is it not a greater injury to have made it? Since not to have made something is no injustice, not to care for what you have made is the height of unmercifulness. And Theodoret, Sermon 1 On Providence: From this very affection by which He made us love our children, He wished us to understand how much He Himself loves His children, that is, the effects produced by Himself.

Thirdly, divine providence can be demonstrated from the wonderful beauty, order, disposition, ornament, and governance of this universe. This reason Philo the Jew elegantly explains, book 4 On the Monarchy, in these words: If someone should come into a city constituted with the best laws, what else will he suspect, than that it is governed by the best magistrates? Wherefore he who enters into the great city, namely the world, and there contemplates the temperament of the air, the conversions of the yearly seasons, then the sun and moon, moderators of day and night, and the movements and dances of the wandering and fixed stars, and of the whole heaven in its orb, will he not, plausibly, or rather necessarily, think of a father and founder, and also a ruler? Nazianzen uses the same argument, Oration 34, and adduces the example of a cithara, whose sweet harmony when we hear, we do not doubt that it is played by a skilled craftsman. So likewise when we contemplate the most sweet harmony of the parts of the world in their motions, we ought not to doubt that a skilled craftsman, namely God, composes all these things and brings them into concord, and that He is the supreme ruler and governor of the world.

A similar argument can be drawn from the perpetual conflict of the elements, dissenting among themselves on account of the various qualities of which they consist. For the order of the universe could not be perpetual, in such great diversity of parts, indeed continuous struggle, unless some supreme intelligence, with the highest counsel and wisdom, provided for its perpetuity. Which Athanasius explains in the book Against the Gentiles, by the example of a city, or an army, in which peace and tranquility could not long be preserved, unless there were some Prince, or Magistrate, who kept all in office, and provided for such peace and tranquility.

The second part, which is about the extension of divine providence to all creatures in particular, and to all things that happen in the world, is no less certain than the preceding. For as Saint Thomas discourses here, question 22, article 2: Since every agent acts for the sake of an end, the ordination of effects to the end extends only as far as the causality of the agent extends: but the causality of the first agent extends to all things, and reaches even to the ultimate individual differences: Therefore also His providence. Which reason proves that not only natural and necessary things, but also human and free ones, are subject to divine providence, since divine causality extends no less to these than to those.

I add that, since the governance of divine providence proceeds from the love by which God loves the things made by Him; the greater love with which God pursues some things, the more they fall under His providence: but God loves men more than natural things, as is clear from the effect, because He conferred on them greater goods: Therefore He has a greater and special care and providence of them. Whence Augustine excellently: A hair does not perish, which when it is cut you do not feel, and shall the soul perish, by which you feel? So if your superfluous things are guarded, in how great security is your soul? Cast yourself upon God, you will fare best in the best.

§ II

The objections are resolved.

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: If the world is governed by divine providence, why do so many evils and so many defects happen in the world? Why do so many monsters occur which are beyond the intention of nature? Whence come so many creatures troublesome and pernicious to man, such as gnats, fleas, flies, serpents, poisons, and the like? Finally, why are just and holy men most often oppressed by miseries and hardships, while the wicked and perverse lead their days in prosperity, and abound in honors, pleasures, and riches? Or, to speak with Jeremiah the Prophet: Why does the way of the wicked prosper, is it well with all who transgress and act unjustly?

To these questions, which are, as it were, so many objections against divine providence, it must be answered individually. To the first, therefore, it must be said with Saint Thomas here, question 22, article 2, ad 2, and Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 71, that although a particular provider must, as much as he can, avoid and impede the evils and defects of the things subject to his governance and providence; the universal provider, however, must permit evils and defects in some, for the good of the whole, to whose preservation he principally tends. But the evils and defects which divine providence permits to occur in created things conduce to the perfection, decor, and beauty of the universe. Just as the

charm of a painting arises from the pleasing mixture and temperament of shadow and light, and of diverse colors. Or as the harmony of music sings more sweetly, from the consonance of diverse voices. Or (to use Augustine's example, City of God, book 1, chapter 18) just as antithetical figures, or antitheses, are ornaments of speech, and make the beauty of discourse. Or finally, just as in medicine, the most excellent pharmaceuticals are made from poisonous things, tempered together in a fitting mixture.

From this the response to the second question is clear, for monsters, in their own way, conduce to the decor and beauty of the universe, and serve to manifest the perfection and integrity of other things, which shine more from their very deformity, for opposites placed next to each other shine more brightly. The same must be said of flies, gnats, serpents, and other imperfect animals; for they share some degree of goodness and perfection, which, if it were lacking to the universe, it would not be perfect in every way. If you shave a man's eyebrow (says Isidore, book 1 On the Supreme Good, chapter 11), you take away a small thing, but you bring on the deformity of the whole body. So also in the universe of creation, if you say the smallest worm is naturally evil, you do injury to the whole of creation.

As for poisons, they likewise conduce to the good of the universe, and are useful and necessary to some creatures. For (as Ambrose says, book 3 of the Hexameron, chapter 9), often the same things which are harmful to you furnish harmless food to birds or wild beasts. Starlings feed on hemlock, and it is no harm to them, because by the quality of their own body, they escape the poison of the lethal juice. Those skilled in these matters also say that hellebore is even the food of quails, because by a certain natural temperament of their own body, they avoid the force of the harmful food.

Finally, to the last question, which is about the adversity of the good and the prosperity of the evil, I say briefly that in these too divine providence shines forth wondrously, as the Holy Fathers everywhere teach: For the desires of the elect (says Gregory), while pressed by adversity, profit; just as fire is pressed by wind so that it grows, and whence it seems, as it were, to be extinguished, thence it is more strengthened. Prosperity, on the contrary, as Chrysostom says, is the stepmother of virtue, and softens the mind of man, breaks it, and dissolves it into sluggishness and torpor. For all things which are superfluous, harm (adds Seneca); excessive fertility lays low the crops, branches are broken by their own weight, excessive fecundity does not reach maturity. The same thing also happens to minds, which immoderate prosperity breaks, by which they abuse not only to the injury of others, but also to their own. On which more in the Shield of Thomistic Theology.

You will object, secondly, against the second part of the assertion. The providence and care of such vile and imperfect animals, such as gnats, flies, little worms, and the like, seems to be unbecoming to the divine majesty: Therefore it is not to be posited in God.

I answer by denying the Antecedent, for far from it that God's infinite majesty be cheapened by the care of such vile and imperfect animals, rather in them His infinite wisdom and power shine forth more, than in other animals of great bulk and magnitude. Whence Pliny, book 11, chapter 2: Nature is nowhere more whole than in the smallest things. And Jerome, to Heliodorus, Epistle 3: We admire the Creator not only in heaven, and on earth, and in the sun, and the ocean, in elephants, camels: but also in the smallest animals too, in ants, the gnat, flies, little worms, of this kind, whose bodies we know better than their names, and we admire the same skill in all things.

§ III

Providence does not consist formally in an act of the will, but of the intellect, namely in an act of command presupposing the choice of means.

The first part is Saint Thomas's, here question 22, article 1, ad 3, where he thus says: Providence is in the intellect, but it presupposes the will of the end.

Reason also persuades this: both because providence is a part of prudence, as the same Holy Doctor teaches here, article 1, and I-II, question 49, article 6: but prudence is in the intellect, since it is an intellectual virtue: Therefore also providence. Also because Boethius defines providence as the ordination of things toward the end: but to order one thing to another belongs to the intellect, as we shall show in the following chapter, § 2: Therefore providence does not consist formally in an act of the will, but of the intellect. Which the very etymology of the name sufficiently indicates, for to provide is the same as to see from afar the things which are to be done: but to see is not an act of the will, which is a blind power, but of the intellect.

That such an act, however, is command, presupposing the intention of the end, and the choice of means, is also taught by Saint Thomas here, article 1, ad 1, in these words: To command concerning the things to be ordered to the end, of which He has the right notion, belongs to God, according to that saying of the Psalm, "He hath set a precept, and it shall not pass away"; and according to this, the notion of providence belongs to God. Reason also supports this, for, as we said above, providence is a part of prudence: but the principal act of prudence is command, as Aristotle teaches, Ethics 9, chapter 9, saying: Prudence is precept-giving; for its end is to command something, that it be done or not be done: Therefore providence essentially consists in an act of command. This

will be more established in the following chapter, where we shall show that predestination, which is a part of divine providence, formally and essentially consists in an act of command, following upon the election of the predestined to glory.

You will object, first, against the first part: Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 29, thus says: Providence is God's will by which all things which are, have a fitting management: Therefore he thinks that providence consists in an act of the will.

I answer, from Saint Thomas, question 5 of On Truth, article 1, ad 1, that providence is called by Damascene God's will, which presupposes an act of the will, or virtually includes it. For the act of command, in which providence formally consists, presupposes the election of the will, and virtually includes it, as the same Holy Doctor teaches, I-II, question 17, article 3, ad 1, in these words: After the determination of counsel, which is the judgment of reason, the will elects; after election, reason commands that be done what is elected.

You will object, secondly, against the second part: Saint Thomas, II-II, question 49, article 6, ad 3, thus says: In the right ordination to the end, which is included in the notion of providence, the rectitude of counsel, judgment, and precept is imported: Therefore providence does not consist adequately in command, but also in counsel, and in judgment regulating the election.

I answer that the rectitude of counsel and judgment is imported into the ordination in which providence consists, not constitutively and formally, but virtually and presuppositively; both because without them the rectitude of command cannot subsist; also because in ordered acts of the soul, the preceding is virtually enclosed in the following. Whence Saint Thomas, question 5 of On Truth, article 1, toward the end of the body, thus has it: In prudence is included in a certain way both the will which is of the end, and the knowledge of the end, because indeed each act is presupposed to it.

You will object, thirdly: The act of command is admitted in us to move the will, and other powers, as to the execution of their acts: but for this reason it need not be admitted in God, because in Him neither the will, nor another power, is movable, since He is pure act: Therefore such an act of command is not given in God.

I answer that the act of command is not posited in God, as in us, to move and apply the executive power to operating ad extra (because as we showed in the treatise on the knowledge of God, there is not given in God any executive power, virtually distinct from the intellect and will), but such an act is immediately directed to the creatures themselves, and commands their production, according to that saying of Genesis 1: "Let there be

light," and this saying of John 11: "Lazarus, come forth." Wherefore the mobility and subjection is held not on the part of God, but of the creatures which are made.

Nor is it valid if you say that with respect to omnipotent God nothing is difficult, and consequently, the efficacious decree of the futurition of things being posited, they are produced in time, nor is an act of command required for this. For although with respect to God nothing is difficult, on the part of the work, nevertheless on the part of the operable object, many things are to be overcome in execution; which indeed God overcomes not by blind and natural impulse, but by command and providence.

§ IV

Corollaries worthy of note.

From what has been said it is gathered, first, that God's providence is distinguished from His practical knowledge, for God's practical knowledge is of the end and of the means; but providence is only of the means, insofar as they are ordered to the end, as Saint Thomas expressly teaches, question 5 of On Truth, article 1. From which you will understand that providence is also distinguished from God's executive power, because such power is His practical knowledge, or of approbation, producing things ad extra through an act of command, as was shown in chapter 3 of the Treatise on the knowledge of God.

It is gathered, secondly, that God's providence is distinguished from His art, because, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in the place cited, in the response to the 9th, art regards produced things, according as they issue from a principle, and are placed in relation to one another; providence, however, regards them, according as they are ordered to the end. I add that art is the right reason of things to be made, that is, of those things which proceed from the agent into extraneous matter; but prudence, of which providence is an act, is the certain reason of things to be done, which are acts not proceeding into extraneous matter, but perfecting the agent itself.

It is gathered, thirdly, that the eternal law is distinguished from God's providence, for it stands as its principle, since it delivers general rules and principles of operable things; providence, however, according to those rules, disposes of the motions of creatures, and orders them to their ends. Thus Saint Thomas, question 5 of On Truth, article 1, ad 6.

It is gathered, fourthly, that God's providence is distinguished from the divine idea. For as Saint Thomas teaches in the place cited from On Truth, in the response to the 1st, an idea is the exemplary form of a thing considered absolutely and according to species; providence, however, is the form of a thing, according as it is ordered to the end.

§ V

Although it belongs to the notion of general providence that it order creatures to an end, it does not belong to it that they attain the end to which they are ordered, but only the last end, which is intended by the one providing.

The first part, which some of our Thomists deny, is proved, first, from Saint Thomas, question 6 of On Truth, article 1, where he establishes this difference between providence and predestination, that providence only regards the order to the end, whence through God's providence all men are ordered to beatitude; but predestination also regards the outcome or event of the order, whence it belongs only to those who attain glory. The same he teaches, Book 1, dist. 40, question 1, article 2, and there to Annibaldus, sole question, article 1: Therefore according to Saint Thomas's doctrine, it does not belong to the notion of general providence to attain the end to which man is ordered, but this only belongs to predestination.

It is proved, secondly, by a reason which the same Holy Doctor insinuates in the places cited: The reprobate, through the general providence of the supernatural order, are ordered to glory, and sufficient aids are conferred on them, by which they can attain it, as was shown in the Treatise on the Will of God, chapter 3: but the reprobate will never attain glory: Therefore it does not belong to the notion of general providence to infallibly attain the end to which the creature is ordered.

It is confirmed: Providence receives its efficacy from the volition of the end which it presupposes: Therefore just as, without imperfection, a twofold will is constituted in God with respect to the end to which men are ordered: one antecedent and inefficacious, by which He wills all men to be saved; the other consequent and efficacious, by which He wills only the predestined to be saved, as we demonstrated in the place cited; so also, without imperfection, a twofold providence can be admitted in God, one of which is efficacious for the attainment of the end; and consequently it does not belong to the notion of all providence that it attain the particular end to which God orders the creature.

That divine providence, however, always attains the ultimate end intended by the provider, as the second part asserts, is thus shown. The ultimate end intended by God as universal provider is the manifestation of His attributes: but although man, by sinning, fails to attain the end to which he is ordered by God's general providence, the divine attributes are manifested, especially indeed His avenging or punitive justice: Therefore God's general providence always attains the ultimate end intended by the provider Himself. Whence Saint Thomas above, question 19, article 6: Since God's will is the

universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will not attain its effect. Whence that which seems to recede from the divine will by sinning, falls into the order of the divine will, while it is punished through His justice. The same Augustine teaches, on Psalm 100, in these words: The works of the Lord are not so constituted, that the creature, constituted in free will, overcome the will of the Creator. God does not will that you sin, for He forbids it; nevertheless if you have sinned, do not think that man did what he willed, and that God had happen what He did not will: for just as He wills that man not sin, so He wills to spare the sinner, that he return and live; so finally He wills to punish him persevering in sin, that His justice not be defeated by the contumacious one. So whatever you choose, the Omnipotent will not lack whence to complete His will concerning you. Likewise Epistle 120: The soul (he says) using creatures perversely, does not effect it that it escape the ordination of the Creator, since if it uses good things badly, He uses even bad things well; and by this that soul, using good things perversely, becomes bad, He, using even bad things in order, remains good: he who unjustly orders himself into sins, is justly ordered into punishments.

You will object against the first part of the assertion: To most perfect providence belongs not only the ordination of means, but also the attainment of the end: but God's providence exists in the highest degree of perfection: Therefore it belongs to its notion not only to order means, but also to attain the end. See Saint Thomas here, article 4, ad 2, thus says: In this consists the immovable and certain order of divine providence, that the things which are provided by Him all come about, in that manner in which He provides, whether necessarily, or contingently. And in the response to the 3rd, he asserts that divine providence does not fail of its effect, nor of the mode of coming about which it provided. Likewise Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 94, he expressly delivers that the order of providence cannot at all be changed, nor be frustrated of its effect. Finally, in this part, question 23, article 6, he proves that predestination is certain, because it is a part of providence, and the order of providence is infallible: Therefore the distinction which we have established between providence and predestination is manifestly against Saint Thomas. The Holy Fathers also favor this, everywhere asserting that providence always attains its aim, even when it seems to be resisted; and the Church itself, which in a certain collect sings: God, whose providence is not deceived in its disposition.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: To most perfect providence, presupposing the consequent will of the end, belongs not only the ordination of means, but also the attainment of the end — I grant the Major. Presupposing the inefficacious and antecedent will of the end — I deny the Major. Whence since God's general providence does not presuppose a consequent will, but only an antecedent one concerning the

salvation of all men, although it be most perfect, it need not, however, have infallibly annexed the attainment of that end; just as predestination, which presupposes a consequent and efficacious will concerning the salvation of the elect.

To the testimonies of Saint Thomas, which seem to militate to the contrary, it must be said, with Ferrariensis in the place cited from the Summa Against the Gentiles, that the Holy Doctor speaks in a permissive sense; insofar as providence, in some part of itself, namely in predestination, has annexed both infallibility of order and of event, not, however, that it belongs to the concept of providence as such that there be both infallibilities.

Or secondly it can be responded with the same author, that those things which are provided by God are not the end, but the means; for although the end, in execution, is an effect of providence, it is nevertheless not immediately provided by it, but is the effect of the means which are ordered to the end: but concerning means, divine providence is immutable; and as to this it is true that it is never frustrated; for by this very fact that it provides means, they infallibly will be posited in being: but because sometimes it confers only sufficient means, sometimes efficacious, it is consequent that it does not always have annexed the attainment of the end; and thus must be understood what the Church sings of God's providence: God, whose providence is not deceived in its disposition. As for the testimony taken from question 23 of this part, it must be said that Saint Thomas proves that predestination is certain, because it is a part of providence, presupposing a consequent and efficacious will of the end, which extends to both natural and supernatural things; not, however, from this precisely, that it is a part of the general providence of the supernatural order, which presupposes a will only antecedent and inefficacious concerning the salvation of men. As for the Holy Fathers offering that divine providence always attains its aim, even when it seems to be resisted, it is easily answered that they speak of the ultimate end intended by the general provider Himself, which is the manifestation of His attributes; for that is always obtained, as we declared in the second part of the assertion.

Chapter II

On predestination.

The most exalted and most obscure mystery of predestination is recommended by an excellent metaphor of the Song of Songs, where the bride's cheeks, which not obscurely express the counsels of the supreme Judge concerning the sons of men, are said to be like the bright palms, because they surpass all force of intellects, and black as it were like a raven, because by their obscurity they envelop our minds in darkness. Of it, however, we must treat here, and its existence, essence, causes, and effects are briefly to be explained.

§ I

Beyond the general providence of God, by which He sufficiently orders all men to salvation, there is given predestination, or a certain special providence, by which He efficaciously orders and transmits some to eternal beatitude.

This truth is certain of faith, for it is gathered from various testimonies of Scripture and the Holy Fathers, which openly declare it. To the Romans 8: "Whom he predestinated, them he also called." To the Ephesians 1: "He hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children of God, through Jesus Christ." Acts 13: "As many as were pre-ordained to life everlasting, believed." And elsewhere everywhere, under the name of election, this truth is delivered. Whence Prosper, response 1 to the objections of the Gauls: No Catholic denies God's predestination. And Epistle to Rufinus: To deny predestination is as impious as to oppose His grace itself. Likewise Fulgentius, On the Faith, to Peter, chapter 35: Hold most firmly, and doubt in no way, that all whom God, out of gratuitous goodness, made vessels of mercy, He predestined to the adoption of sons of God before the foundation of the world; and that neither can any of those whom God has predestined to the kingdom of heaven perish, nor can anyone of those whom He has not predestined to life, be saved by any means.

Reason also supports this: For if only the antecedent will of saving all men, and only general providence, by which He confers on all sufficient aids for salvation, sufficed for attaining salvation, there would be no difference on the part of the divine will between the predestined and the reprobate, and their whole discretion would come from free will, and thus predestination would not be a special benefit of God: but this cannot be said: Therefore neither can that. The sequel of the Major is evident, for the antecedent will, and general providence, are equal with respect to all. The Minor, however, is established from the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 4: "For who distinguisheth thee?" And from Augustine, City of God 11, chapter 19, where he teaches that the discretion of the good and evil

Angels was from God, and says: Between the holy Angels and the unclean it was discerned, where it was said: "God divided between the light and the darkness." Only He could discern these. Which a fortiori must be thought of men, for as Bernard elegantly says, Sermon 2 on the words of Isaiah: What do you think, will He not discern between clods, He who discerned between stars?

It is confirmed: If someone attained salvation without predestination, or the efficacious and absolute decree transmitting him into eternal life, the attainment of such an end would be by chance, and beyond God's intention, which is repugnant to His infinite wisdom and providence; and God would not then act according to the counsel of His will, as the Apostle says, but according to the determination and purpose of the human will, nor would He elect men, but rather be elected by them, contrary to that saying of Christ, John 15: "You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you."

It is confirmed further by Saint Thomas's reason, here question 23, article 1: To that to which something cannot come by the power of its own nature, it must be transmitted by another; just as an arrow is sent by the archer into the target: but eternal life, which consists in the clear vision of God, is above the nature of any creature: Therefore the rational creature must be transmitted into it by God, and consequently the notion of such transmission, which is called predestination, exists from eternity in the divine mind.

You will say, first, if predestination is given, defining salvation, if I am predestined, whatever I do I shall be saved; but if I am not predestined, I shall infallibly be damned, and all the good works which I do will be useless to me for salvation. It is better for me, therefore, to await the outcome of the divine counsels, and, without any solicitude about my salvation, to lead a happy and tranquil life.

I answer, first, that this argument, which the impious often turn over, that they may sin more freely, and by which the scrupulous are vexed, that they may torment themselves superstitiously, militates equally against the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, as against the certitude of divine predestination. Whence Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14: When these things are said, they ought not to deter from confessing the predestination of the Saints; just as we are not deterred from confessing God's foreknowledge, if someone should speak of it to the people thus, that he should say: whether you now live rightly or not rightly, such will you be afterward, as God has foreknown you will be, either good, if good; or evil, if evil, etc.

I answer, secondly, that just as in the affairs of human life, no one except a fool leaves aside means useful to ends, however much God has predefined all things by His providence; and no one, unless dull and stupid, reasons thus: God knows this field, for

instance, will be fertile this year, or barren: if He knows it fertile, whether it has been cultivated by me or not, it will bear me abundant fruits. If barren, therefore it will be such, even if I have assiduously cultivated it. So also foolish is the reasoning of the argument proposed: For as the Angelic Doctor rightly says here, article 8: Just as natural effects are so provided, that natural causes too are ordered to those natural effects, without which those effects would not come about: so a person's salvation is predestined by God, in such a way that whatever promotes man to salvation also falls under the order of predestination, whether one's own prayers, or others', or other good things, or whatever of this kind, without which someone does not attain salvation. Whence the predestined must strive to operate well and to pray, because through things of this kind, the effect of predestination is certainly fulfilled. On account of which it is said, 2 Peter 1: "Labour more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election." Saint Prosper has similar things, book 2 On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 36, where he thus discourses: Although what God has determined cannot in any way not happen, nevertheless the zeal for praying is not removed, nor is the devotion of free will relaxed by the purpose of election: since, in order that the will of God be fulfilled, the effect is so predestined, that through the labor of works, through the persistence of supplications, through the exercise of virtues, there be increases of merits; and those who have done good things are crowned not only according to God's purpose, but also according to their own merits. Likewise Gregory the Great, Dialogues, book 3, chapter 13, writes this: Those things which were not predestined can in no way be obtained; but the things which holy men accomplish are so predestined, that they obtain them by prayers. For the very predestination of the reward is so disposed by the Omnipotent, that the elect arrive at this through labor, insofar as by asking they merit to receive what the omnipotent God has disposed to give them.

You will say, secondly: Man, through sufficient aids, which are furnished to him through the antecedent will, and general providence of the supernatural order, can be saved: Therefore predestination is not required, but such providence and antecedent will suffice. But I deny the consequence, for predestination is not required in order that man be able to be saved, but that he be in fact saved; just as the gift of perseverance is not necessary in order that man be able to persevere, but that he in fact persevere. Whence Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 1: This perseverance concerning which we now treat, indeed, by which one perseveres in Christ even to the end, no one is to be said to have had it in any way, who has not persevered even to the end. And chapter 6: We speak of that perseverance by which one perseveres even to the end; if it was, as it were, given, there was perseverance even to the end; but if there was not perseverance even to the end, it was not given.

§ II

Predestination does not consist formally in an act of the will, but of the intellect, namely in the practical judgment following the choice, which is called command.

The first part is proved, first, because predestination is the same as most perfect providence, by which the rational creature is ordered to the end of beatitude: but providence consists in an act of the intellect, as was shown in the preceding chapter, § 2: Therefore also predestination. Secondly, because predestination is essentially the ordination of the rational creature to glory, to be obtained through certain and determinate means, wherefore Saint Thomas, defining it, says it is the transmission of the rational creature to glory, and the predestined are called in Scripture pre-ordained: but to order belongs to the intellect, not to the will: Therefore predestination does not consist in an act of the will, but of the intellect. The Minor is proved: both because to order one thing to another is to compare one with the other: but the comparison of one with another belongs to the practical intellect, just as to the speculative belongs the inference of one from another: Therefore to order belongs to the intellect. Also because to order something to an end is the same as to direct: but direction belongs to the intellect, not to the will, which, since it is a blind power, must be directed by another, nor can it itself direct: Therefore neither can it order. Also, finally, because to order belongs to a superior, in human affairs, wherefore the general in an army orders what the soldiers ought to do, and the Prince in a republic orders what his inferiors ought to do: Therefore to order the things to be done by oneself, in man, will belong only to the supreme power, such as Saint Thomas teaches in several places the intellect to be. Whence Aristotle, Metaphysics 2, chapter 2, says that it belongs to the wise man to order.

The second part is also proved: Predestination, since it is most efficacious and altogether infallible, if it consists formally in some act of the divine intellect, must consist in that which is of all most efficacious: but the act of judgment antecedent to election is not such, but only the act of command following it, and regulating the use and execution: Therefore predestination consists formally in the act of command. The Major is established; the Minor, however, is simultaneously declared and proved. The intellect through the judgment preceding election only judges of the fittingness of means in order to the work, whence that act is explicated by way of the indicative, as if it is said, "It is good to do this," or "this is fitting to do," and belongs to that relation which the will has to the end by way of intention and affection, not, however, to that by which it tends toward the end by way of execution and causality; whence in itself it does not have efficacy for the execution of the work, except only radically: for the judgment about the fittingness of means being posited, the effect can fail to follow, on account of the

difficulty of execution. Command, however, superadds a certain intimation of the thing to be executed, moving to this, that it be done, and is explicated by way of the imperative, "do this," and belongs to the relation by which the will tends toward the end by way of execution and causality; wherefore, an efficacious command standing, it does not stand that the operation and execution of the means not follow: Therefore command is the act of the practical intellect most efficacious of all; whence in it are found all the things necessary for constituting the essence of predestination. For it is of itself the notion of the order of means to the end, since ordination belongs to the practical intellect; and it is efficacious in virtue of the preceding election; for the act of the will preceding is virtually enclosed in the following act: which cannot belong to the judgment preceding election. For although that is the ordination of means to the end, it lacks, however, the efficacy, which it cannot have from the following election; because one act does not give efficacy to another, unless either it influences it, or remains virtually in it; for which a certain antecedence, or priority, at least virtual, is required, which the election does not have with respect to the judgment by which it is regulated, but only with respect to the command following it, by which the use or execution is regulated.

§ III

The objections are resolved.

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: The predestined are called elect in Scripture: but election is an act of the will: Therefore predestination belongs to the will. Whence Saint Thomas, in the Opusculum on predestination, chapter 1, thus says: Although predestination presupposes an act of knowledge, it nevertheless names the act of the will electing, etc.

I answer, from the same Holy Doctor, question 6 of On Truth, article 1, ad 2, that although predestination is not the same as election, because, however, it presupposes it, from this it is that the predestined are called elect. As for the passage taken from the Opusculum on predestination, it must be denied that that Opusculum is Saint Thomas's, for it is not had among the other Opuscula, nor is it reckoned among Saint Thomas's works in the Roman edition, which is to be preferred to the others, but is found only at the end of the first part of the Lyons impression made in 1552, where it was inserted by some student. Or those words, "Predestination names an act of the will," we can interpret as a presuppositive naming and of the connotated, if they be understood of the act of the will in itself. Or of the act of the will not in itself and formally, but virtually, insofar as it is virtually contained in the act of command of the intellect, participating efficacy from it. In the same way must be explained some testimonies of the

Holy Fathers, by which they seem to constitute predestination in an act of the will. And that saying of the Apostle to the Romans 9: "Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated," for predestination and reprobation are called love and hatred, to signify that each presupposes an act of the will, as Saint Thomas teaches in the place above.

You will object, secondly: To the notion of predestination belongs not only ordination, but also motion as to exercise: but to move belongs to the will, since that is the first mover as to exercise: Therefore also to predestine.

I answer that to move absolutely belongs to the will, but not to move by ordinative motion, which enters into the essence of predestination; for such motion is from the intellect, in virtue of the preceding act of the will.

You will insist: Volitive being is so proper to the will, that it can in no way be communicated to the intellect: Therefore neither can motive being as to exercise.

But I deny the consequence and the parity: The reason of distinction is, because the notion of the volitive is the substance of the act of the will, but the motive efficacy is not the substance, but its mode: whence just as liberty, although attributed to the will as first principle, is communicated to the act of the intellect, by subordination to the will, because it is a certain mode of it; so for the same reason motive efficacy is communicated to the intellect, although the notion of the volitive cannot be communicated to it.

You will object, thirdly, against the second part: Predestination is the cause of its effects: but the command following election is not the cause of the effects of predestination; for they are constituted future by force of God's efficacious decree or election: Therefore predestination does not consist in the command following election, but rather in the election itself of the predestined to glory. Whence if, per impossibile, the efficacious election being posited, command did not follow, men would be predestined.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor, and to its proof, I distinguish the Antecedent: By force of the efficacious decree or election, they are constituted future, inchoatively, and in the order of intention — I grant the Antecedent. Completely, and in the order both of intention and of execution — I deny the Antecedent and the consequence. For just as in the opinion of those who admit in God an executive power, virtually distinct from the intellect and will, from this that the election of the divine will be efficacious, it does not follow that from force of it the elected thing is constituted completely future, such that the concurrence of the executive power, which is posterior to it, is not necessary, because it only constitutes it future in its own order; so neither in our opinion does it follow that the concurrence of the divine command is necessary, but

it is only gathered that it is infallibly connected with the efficacious election. Whence if, per impossibile, election being posited, command did not follow, men would be predestined only inchoatively, not, however, formally and completely, nor in such a case would they attain glory, but only glory would be inchoatively future, since for the execution and production of things, election, or intentive decree, does not suffice, but furthermore an active use is required, or an executive decree, and consequently that directing command.

Other objections touch the existence of the act of command, not as it is in God, but as it is in us, and consequently will be more conveniently proposed and resolved in the treatise on human acts, where we shall treat of the act of command.

§ IV

Predestination is not a subjective part, but an objective part, of divine providence.

The sense of this assertion is that divine providence is not compared to predestination, as a superior to its inferior, such that it be divided into four or five attributes, namely into natural providence, general supernatural providence, predestination, reprobation, and the providence of the hypostatic order; but as to a part of its adequate object, such that one and the same providence, virtually undistinguished, attain those three orders of nature, grace, and hypostatic union, and only by reason of the diverse material objects to which it extends, receive diverse names; just as divine knowledge, although it is a single virtually undistinguished attribute, is nevertheless, in relation to diverse connoted things, and material objects, divided into the knowledge of simple intelligence, of vision, and of approbation, and is marked with diverse names.

The assertion thus explained is proved by this fundamental reason: The unity or diversity of providence is taken from the ultimate end intended by the provider, and not from the particular ends of the provided things; otherwise there would be as many providences distinct in species, as there are particular ends of things distinct according to species, and there would be one providence according to species for animals, another for men, another for Angels, which no one has ever said: but there is only one end intended by God in the providence of all things, namely His own glory, and the manifestation of His attributes: Therefore also one providence extending to all things which belong to the order of nature, grace, and hypostatic union. Just as one power in God, virtually undistinguished, extends to all producible effects, one knowledge to all knowable things, one art to all makeable things, one eternal law to all things which God commands or forbids.

You will say, there are given in God several ideas distinct in species: Therefore also several providences virtually distinct among themselves.

But I deny the consequence and the parity, for as is gathered from Saint Thomas above, question 15, article 2, ad 2, there is a notable distinction between an idea and providence, consisting in this, that providence stands on the part of God providing and understanding, and is signified as that by which God practically understands and orders concerning the things to be done, whence as to unity in the mode of attaining its proper object, it must be commensurate with the divine intellect: and consequently just as that is single, without virtual distinction, so also is providence. An idea, however, stands on the part of the object understood, and is signified as that which is understood by God; whence it is proportioned not with the intellect, but with the object, as to unity or diversity; and thus since the objects understood by God are several, there are also given several ideas in the divine intellect.

From what has been said it is gathered, first, that the best definition of predestination is that delivered by Augustine in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14, in these words: The predestination of the saints is nothing other than the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits, by which those who are liberated are most certainly liberated, whoever they may be. Where by the name "foreknowledge" Augustine understood God's practical knowledge, or of approbation, resting upon the decree of the divine will, which does not presuppose, but makes, the existence and futurition of things, and to which belongs the act of command, in which predestination essentially consists: the other particles, however, declare the certitude and infallibility of the means and aids, by which the predestined are led into eternal beatitude.

It is gathered, secondly, that equally good is the definition of predestination, taken from Saint Thomas here, article 1, in these words: Predestination is the notion of the transmission of the rational creature to the end of eternal life. Where the first particle, namely "notion," holds the place of genus, and denotes that predestination, like the other objective parts of God's providence, is an act of the divine intellect. The remaining ones, however, hold the place of difference, for in the first place "of transmission" denotes the special order of the predestined, namely through special aids by which he is infallibly led into eternal life; and by this it differs from general providence, even supernatural, by which even the reprobate are ordered to glory, but not specially, or efficaciously through special aids, as the predestined; but only generally, or sufficiently, through the conferring or offering of sufficient aids. Secondly, "of the rational creature" signifies the difference of predestination, on the part of the subject, from natural providence, for the subject of predestination is only the rational creature, but the subject of providence is every

creature. Thirdly, "to eternal life" assigns another difference, by which the predestination of men and Angels, or of the pure intellectual creature, is distinguished from the predestination of Christ, or of the God-man; for this was to the natural being of the Son of God, whereas the predestination of men and Angels is only to eternal life and the clear vision of God, by which the perfect adoption into the son of God is made, according to that saying of the Apostle, to the Romans 8: "We ourselves also, having the firstfruits of the Spirit, do groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption of the sons of God."

§ V

The election of the predestined to glory has no other motive cause than the divine goodness; and not foreseen merits, which are rather an effect than a motive of predestination.

This assertion (which, as Bellarmine says, book 2 On Grace and Free Will, chapter 11, ought to be called not the opinion of any Doctors whatsoever, but the faith of the Catholic Church) is proved, first, by a twofold argument taken from Scripture and the Holy Fathers. The first is: According to Scripture and the Holy Fathers, no reason can be rendered why one be elected to glory, and not another, but this must be referred to God's simple will, and to His inscrutable judgments, and to the infinite depth of divine wisdom: but this would be false, if the election of the predestined to glory were made from foreseen merits, as from a cause: Therefore that does not have foreseen merits as motive cause, but only the divine goodness. The Major is established, first, from the Apostle to the Romans 9, where, treating expressly of the cause of our predestination, he refers it to the sole will of God having mercy, electing these, and leaving those, and to prove this he brings in the example of the two twins, Jacob and Esau, who, since they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, it was said, "not of works, but of him that calleth," "Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated." And a little after: "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy: and I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy." That is (as is said more clearly, Exodus 33), I will have mercy on whom I will, and I will be clement toward whom it pleases me. And again: "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." And immediately foreseeing and forestalling the complaint which those impatient of gratuitous predestination were going to make, when they say, "Why doth he then find fault? for who resisteth his will?" — he adds, rebuking: "O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus?" Where he recalls the whole decision of the difficulty to the simple will of God. And in the following chapter 11, after he has spoken enough of predestination according to purpose, he concludes the whole discourse with this exclamation: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! how incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways!"

The same Major is established, secondly, from Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 7, where he thus says: Of two impious men equally grown in age, why this one is taken up, and the other left, "O the judgments of God, how incomprehensible!" And Epistle 112, explaining the signification of the wood of the cross, reduces to the depth the hidden reason why one is elected, not another. Likewise, in the

book of Soliloquies of the Soul to God, chapter 28, which is on the profound predestination and foreknowledge of God, addressing God he thus says: But those of us, sons of men, whom it hath pleased Thee to dwell among, Thou hast, from the inaccessible depths of Thy hidden and incomprehensible judgments, of Thy wisdom, always just though hidden, predestined before the world, called from the world, justified in the world, and dost magnify them after the world. But Thou dost not do this for all, at which all the wise of the earth, wasting away, marvel. Finally, book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 12, he teaches that in little ones dying without baptism, it is wrongly recurred to chance, since not even a sparrow falls to the ground without the will of the heavenly Father; or to the carelessness of parents, by whose, in most cases, haste, and prepared ministers, the child dies; but this must be attributed to God's hidden will, who did not will that baptism be applied to them. Whence Prosper, on chapter 4 of the Gauls: Let there also be considered among Christians so many thousands of little ones, who have passed from this life without baptism, whom neither the planter could preach to, nor the waterer could aid.

The same Major is established, thirdly, from Saint Thomas here, question 23, article 5, ad 3, where he writes this: Why He elected these to glory, and reprobated others, has no reason except the divine will: Whence Augustine says, on John, why He draws this one and does not draw another, do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err. Just as also in natural things, that this part of matter be under this form, and that under another, depends on the simple divine will: just as it depends on the simple will of the craftsman, that this stone is in this part of the wall, that in another, although the reason of the art holds that some be here, and some there. He has similar things, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 161.

The Minor also seems manifest: for if the election of the predestined were made from foreseen merits as from a motive cause, a reason could easily be rendered, why one is elected to glory, and not another, namely because God foresaw the merits of one, and the evil works of the other, and consequently there would be no need to have recourse to God's simple will, and to His inscrutable judgments. Whence Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 98, explaining the aforesaid passage of the Apostle, "Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated," thus says: If he wished to be understood as referring to future works, either the good works of this one, or the evil works of that one, which God assuredly foreknew, he would by no means say "not of works," but he would say "from future works," and in that manner he would resolve this question, indeed he would make no question needing to be resolved. And Epistle 105, to Sixtus: Who would not marvel that this most acute sense was lacking to the Apostle! For this indeed he did not see;

when, as if a question had been raised against him, he did not respond so briefly, so openly, so — as those (namely the Pelagians) think — truly and absolutely. Here was the place to say what they think: but the Apostle does not say this.

The other argument taken from Scripture is sought from this, that predestination is frequently designated in Scripture by the name of "lot": to the Ephesians 1: "We are called by lot, according to the purpose of him who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will." To the Colossians 1: "He hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light." There can be no other reason for this appellation, except that just as something is said to happen by lot to someone, which befalls him without a preceding cause and effort of his; so of predestination no cause is found on our part, but it must be reduced to God's gratuitous election alone. This argument taken from the appellation "lot" Saint Augustine uses, discourse 2 on Psalm 30, for persuading the gratuitous predestination of the elect.

He also proves it, book On Grace and Free Will, chapter 9, from this, that to the Romans 6, eternal life is called God's grace: Although the Apostle could say (he says), and say rightly, "the wages of righteousness is eternal life," he preferred nevertheless to say, "the grace of God is eternal life," so that from this we might understand that God leads us not for our merits, but for His mercy, to eternal life. Which cannot be verified of the leading to eternal life in execution, because this is the wages of righteousness, whence to say that it is given without merits would be an error: Therefore he speaks of it in intention, and of the very election of the predestined to glory, which is purely gratuitous, although glory itself, in execution, is to be acquired through merits.

Our opinion is proved, secondly, from the same Augustine, who not only manifestly teaches God's gratuitous predestination in the places already related, but also, book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 7, where he thus says: They (the eleven Apostles) were elected to reign with Christ, not in the way that Judas was elected to the work suited to him. When, therefore, we hear, "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" — we ought to understand that those were elected by mercy, that one by judgment: those He elects, therefore, to obtain His kingdom, that one to shed his blood. This is a remarkable testimony for our opinion, for in it there is discourse of election to reigning, and thus indeed to glory; likewise of election before foreseen merits, as being that which he says was made through mercy, and not through judgment, that is, through the discussion of merits.

Furthermore, our assertion can be persuaded by a moral argument, taken from the effects which Augustine's doctrine on predestination produced among the Massilians.

For it is established from the letters of Saint Prosper and Saint Hilary written to Augustine, that the Massilians were troubled for this reason, that they thought that from Augustine's doctrine on predestination, fate is introduced, free will is removed, men are led into despair, and other similar things, which the Adversaries also object to us. Since, however, even those most acute men could have objected such things to Augustine, even under a feigned pretext, if they had thought that the predestination which he taught presupposed foreknowledge of works or of human cooperation. It is certainly delirium, to dream something of this kind about such a predestination, whose decree in every part is constituted in man's power. It is truly insane to believe that those complaints about the depth could have come from those who, of their own accord, in full voice and profession, protested in the same letters of Prosper and Hilary, that they received predestination according to foreknowledge of works, that they held those to be predestined and elected, whom God foreknew would believe; finally, who said, in plain words, according to Faustus their coryphaeus: "Unless foreknowledge has explored, predestination decrees nothing": Therefore they thought that the predestination of those to be saved, which Augustine taught, preceded all foreseeing of merits: Therefore since Augustine, in the books which he wrote back, did not deny that this was his doctrine, nor complained of the Massilians, that they were imposing on him an alien opinion, this is a manifest sign, that his opinion was that which teaches that the predestined to glory were elected to it from God's mere will, before the foreseeing of merits. Whence since Augustine's opinion in the matter of predestination is the doctrine of the whole Church, and was approved by several Supreme Pontiffs: Let them see (says Baronius, volume 6, num. 32) at how great a peril certain of the Recent authors, while rising up against the Innovators, in order to confute them, recede from Saint Augustine's opinion on predestination; since otherwise arms are not lacking by which heretics can be defeated.

§ VI

The same truth is urged by a threefold theological reason.

The first is: Our merits are effects of predestination: Therefore predestination is not from foreseen merits. The consequence is manifest, for if merits are effects of predestination and election, they could not certainly have been foreseen as future, before predestination and election, since an effect cannot be foreseen as future, before its cause; but if before predestination they are not foreseen as future, they could not have moved God to predestine; nor indeed does God predestine from the foreseeing of possible merits, otherwise all would be predestined. The Antecedent, however, in which lies the difficulty, is proved in many ways: First from the Apostle to the Ephesians 1, saying that God elected us that we should be holy: Therefore the very election influences and causes holiness and merits. Secondly from Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 18, where, weighing and pressing the aforesaid words of the Apostle, he thus says: Let us consider, therefore, the words of the Apostle: "As he chose us in him, that we should be holy and immaculate." Not, therefore, because we were going to be so, but that we should be so. It is indeed certain, it is indeed manifest: We were, indeed, going to be such, precisely because He Himself, predestining, elected, that through His grace we should be such. Likewise, book 5 Against Julian, chapter 3: He elected (he says) no one worthy, but by electing made him worthy. Similarly Epistle 105 to Sixtus, he says that He made those to be elected, He did not find them. Thirdly from Saint Prosper, book 2 On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 35, saying: God gives to those whom He elects without merits, the source whence they are adorned with merits. By these words he openly teaches that merits are effects of predestination, not, however, its motive cause. Fourthly from Saint Thomas, on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, where he thus says: It is manifest that every benefit which God confers on man for salvation is an effect of predestination: but the divine benefit extends not only to the infusion of grace, but also to the use of grace: Whence since merits, or good works, proceed from the good use of grace, it is manifest, according to Saint Thomas's doctrine, that they are effects of predestination. Fifthly by reason: For merits cannot be understood as conducing to glory, without the gift of perseverance: but the gift of perseverance is an effect of predestination, and follows upon the intention of giving glory: Therefore likewise also merits. The Minor is proved: if the gift of perseverance did not follow, but preceded predestination, it would be given through general providence, and consequently would be conferred on all, which is openly false, and against Augustine in the places related above, § 1, where he asserts that no one is to be said to have had the gift of perseverance, unless he persevered even to the end, and consequently unless he was predestined.

The second reason is: Although one intending to efficaciously give something to another, by way of reward, if he does not have that person's merits in his power, must necessarily first foresee them, it is otherwise, however, if he has them in his power: but God has men's merits in His power, because these He promises and gives not from the power of our will, but from His predestination, as Augustine teaches, On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10: Therefore He can intend to efficaciously give glory to men, by way of reward and crown, antecedently to the foreseeing of merits, by obligating Himself, from vital intention and will, to give to them the very merits and good works, and whatever is required for meriting, according to that which we have already related from Saint Prosper: God gives to those whom He elects without merits, the source whence they are adorned with merits.

From this you will understand the notable distinction which exists, as to this, between God and the Kings and Princes of the earth: for a Prince cannot intend to efficaciously give arms or a horse to a soldier as a reward, unless he has first foreseen his merits, because he does not have in his power the merits of the soldiers, nor their industry, or good use of the horse and arms: God, however, has in His power the merits of men and the good use of free will, as Augustine teaches, book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 3, in these words: Because all goods, both great, and middling, and lowest, are from God, it follows that the good use of free will too is from God, which is numbered among the great goods. Wherefore He can, before foreseen merits, intend to efficaciously give men glory, by way of reward and crown, to be conferred through merits to be given.

The third reason, which is the chief and fundamental one, is delivered by Saint Thomas, article 4 of this question 23, and can be briefly and clearly proposed thus. He who wills in order, wills the end before the means to the end: but God wills in order: Therefore He wills the end before the means to it: but glory is the end, and merits are the means conducing to it: Therefore He wills glory before merits, and consequently the election to glory is not from the foreseeing of merits.

Nor is it valid what some respond, that the Major is not true, when someone wills the end for another, or when the end is intended as a reward and as a crown, as happens in the case at hand. For whether the end be intended for oneself, or for another, whether it have the notion of reward and crown, or not, there must always be a reason for willing the means, since the whole goodness of the means is taken from the goodness of the end: Therefore that is always willed and intended before.

Nor is it an obstacle what others say, namely that it is not necessary that the efficacious intention of the end precede in God the efficacious election of means, but that an

inefficacious volition and intention of the end suffices. For just as (they say) a father, e.g., from a simple and inefficacious will, by which he wills his son to become a Doctor or Bishop, is moved to furnish him aids for studies: so also God, from an inefficacious intention and antecedent will, by which He wills to give glory to all, can be moved to the election of means efficaciously conducing to it. This response is not an obstacle, I say, for it can be efficaciously confuted. First, because the election of means must be proportioned to the intention of the end: Therefore the efficacious election of an efficacious means to the end must presuppose an efficacious intention of the end, so that due proportion be preserved. For that man would be plainly imprudent and foolish, who should not efficaciously intend some end, and yet should choose means efficaciously conducing to it. Secondly, election presupposes intention no less than execution presupposes election: but the real and efficacious execution of the end through means necessarily presupposes efficacious election: Therefore likewise efficacious election necessarily presupposes efficacious intention. Nor is the example adduced valid: for a father desiring the Episcopate for his son does not have it in his power, nor does he furnish means efficacious to its attainment, and thus it is not surprising that that disposition of means does not arise from an efficacious intention of the end: God, however, predestining men to glory, has in His power both the end to be acquired, and the means efficaciously conducing to it, namely men's merits, as was shown above: whence it is repugnant that, from an inefficacious will of saving men, He be moved to the efficacious election of means.

From these things the response of others remains confuted, who say that before foreseen merits, beatitude in common was willed by God, but not in particular, and as applied to some determinate person, e.g., Peter. For volition of glory only in common, and applied to no one in particular, cannot be efficacious, but only a simple complacency and love of it; since beatitude in common, and as it abstracts from circumstances and from persons in particular, cannot be posited in act, nor under this aspect be attainable by anyone: Therefore if efficacious election of means presupposes efficacious intention of the end, and not only simple complacency and love of it, as we have already shown, before willed and foreseen merits, there must be presupposed in God an intention of beatitude in particular, and as applied to determinate persons, and not only volition of beatitude in common, and as it abstracts from circumstances and persons in particular. Besides which, to will something in common, and afterward in particular, denotes imperfection, being a proceeding from imperfect to perfect: Therefore it is repugnant that God first will glory to men in common, and afterward in particular. Especially since consequent and efficacious will, such as the election to glory is, is not carried to things in common, but in particular, and with all circumstances.

Finally, the solution of others can easily be confuted, who say that efficacious intention of the end is presupposed to the election of means, if the means are not only efficacious, but also formally loved as such; but not otherwise, if, although the means be efficacious, they are not, however, formally loved as efficacious, in which manner they teach it happens in the present case. For in the first place, this response destroys the decree of predestination, of whose intrinsic notion it is, that it be the preparation of efficacious means, as they are formally such, and of the benefits of God by which those who are liberated are most certainly liberated, whoever they may be, as is established from Augustine's definition delivered above. Furthermore I ask, whether, when God intends to efficaciously give glory to the elect, does He, in that prior of intention, know the efficacy of the means which lead to it, or not? If He does not know, He lacks knowledge; if He does know it, and yet does not elect it as efficacious, He lacks prudence. For how does he proceed prudently, who, intending the attainment of some end, which uniquely depends on the efficacy of means, elects means which indeed he knows to be efficacious, and yet does not will them as efficacious? For thus he manifestly exposes himself to chance and fortune, and to frustration of the end which he intends. I add that the election, only efficacious as to the physical entity of the aids of grace, is common to the predestined and the reprobate, since sufficient aids are conferred on the latter, which, according to Molina, Lessius, and other Recent authors, are not distinguished entitatively from efficacious aids: but the election discerning the predestined from the reprobate cannot be common to them: Therefore it must be efficacious not only with respect to the entity of the aids, but also with respect to the efficacy, and connection which they have with glory.

§ VII

The chief objections are resolved.

The Adversaries object, in the first place, that saying of the Apostle, to the Romans 8: "For whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son." By which words, foreknowledge of the good use of free will seems to be presupposed to predestination. Whence Ambrose, book On Faith 5: He did not predestine before He foreknew, but whose merits He foreknew, their rewards He predestined. And Fulgentius, book 5 to Monimus: He predestined to the kingdom those whom He foreknew, by the aid of the mercy of Him who prevents, would return to Him.

I answer that in the aforesaid testimony of the Apostle, the word "predestined" signifies complete predestination, or the act of command, in which it formally consists; but the

word "foreknew" is taken for the foreknowledge indeed antecedent to that act of command, but nevertheless consequent, and founded in the very efficacious election to glory, which is, as it were, the radical and initiative predestination. Whence the sense of the Apostle is, that those whom God, consequently to their efficacious election to glory, foreknew were going to be initiatively and radically conformed to the image of His Son, these He completely predestined through the act of command, for this purpose, that they be completely and formally conformed to that same image of His Son. Wherefore from that passage it is only concluded that foreknowledge of the good use of free will is had initiatively from God, before the act of command, in which predestination formally consists; but not before the efficacious election to glory, which precedes that act, and is called predestination radically. In which sense too the words of Ambrose and Fulgentius can be explained, especially since Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 18, says: What prevents us, when among some treaters of God's word we read "God's foreknowledge," and it deals with the will of the elect, from understanding the same as predestination. That is, knowledge founded in the decree and predefinition of the divine will.

They object, secondly, a difficult testimony of Augustine, taken from Book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, where he thus says: Election does not precede justification, but election, justification; for no one is elected, unless already distant from him who is rejected: whence what is said, that He elected us in Him before the foundation of the world, I do not see how it is said, except by foreknowledge.

Setting aside Bellarmine's response, saying that Augustine wrote the books to Simplicianus as a young man, and, having become old, retracted the opinion on election to glory, which he had taught in the place cited: Several of our Thomists respond that Augustine speaks not of eternal election, but of the execution of temporal election, of which it is true that it presupposes the distinction of those to be elected, nor is it liberal, but from justice.

But this response can be efficaciously confuted, for Augustine, after he had asserted, concerning the election to glory, of which he was speaking there, that it presupposes the distance of those to be elected from those to be rejected; concerning the same election, explaining the words of the Apostle to the Ephesians 1, "He elected us in Him before the foundation of the world," asserted that this cannot otherwise be understood, except by foreknowledge; because, namely, although it does not presuppose merits from eternity in reality, it nevertheless presupposes them foreseen from eternity in the divine mind: but if he were speaking of temporal election, taken for execution, this explanation could not be adapted to the words of the Apostle; since the execution of temporal election is,

and presupposes the merits of the elect pre-existing in time: Therefore that interpretation of Augustine does not fit the text.

It is better, therefore, answered that, besides the intentive decree of glory, antecedent to the foreseeing of merits, another executive one is given, regarding glory, presupposing foreseen merits. For just as in us intention and use are two distinct acts of the will, of which the first precedes the election of means, but the second follows it, and is concerned with the execution of the means and the end: so it must be asserted of God, in our manner of understanding, and in the divine will, besides the election of means belonging to the order of intention, an executive decree distinct in some way from election must be admitted, which decree is the very volition by which God wills to efficaciously execute the means by which the predestined, in their own time, attain glory. And of this decree must be understood what Augustine teaches in the place cited, namely that it presupposes justification foreseen by God in His decree, and foreknowledge of merits. In which sense too other Fathers can be explained, who say that foreknowledge of merits precedes predestination; for this is true of predestination taken for the executive decree of it, not, however, of predestination taken for the intentive decree of glory, which is purely gratuitous, and antecedent to the foreseeing of merits. In the same manner must be understood and explained Saint Thomas, when, on chapter 8 of the Epistle to the Romans, lecture 6, expounding these words of the Apostle, "whom he foreknew, he also predestinated," he says that it would reasonably be said that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination, if this were understood of predestination to glory, but not of predestination to grace, because to hold this would be to posit that grace is given from our merits. There the Holy Doctor takes predestination, not for the intentive decree of glory, which in his opinion antedates the foreseeing of merits, but for the executive decree of it, which presupposes foreseen merits; and he only intends to teach this distinction between predestination to glory and predestination to grace, considered in the order of execution, that the first is not purely gratuitous, but depends on foreknowledge of merits; the second, however, is purely gratuitous, and independent of merits.

This twofold decree, intentive and executive, Augustine encompasses, Sermon 7 on the words of the Apostle, where he says: God elects, as the Apostle says, "according to his own grace" (behold the intentive decree, liberal and gratuitous), "and according to their justice." Behold the executive decree, presupposing foreseen merits.

Reason also persuades that these two decrees are to be admitted in God: For an exterior act cannot have the honesty of some special virtue, unless some interior act of the will formally enjoys the same honesty; for just as liberty does not belong formally to the

exterior act, so neither does honesty, or moral goodness, which is founded in liberty, and presupposes it: but the exterior conferral of glory formally enjoys the honesty of justice, as the Theologians teach in the treatise on merit: Therefore there is given some act of the divine will, formally enjoying honesty of this kind; and since election regarding glory, belonging to the order of intention, does not enjoy such honesty, but is purely gratuitous and liberal, an executive decree must be admitted in God, invested with such honesty.

It is confirmed: Merits, since they are moral means, do not cause the execution of the end except by moving the will of the one rewarding, that he will to confer the reward: Therefore if the merits of the just cause the temporal execution of glory, they move the divine will, and incline it to the bestowal of glory: but the divine will cannot be moved temporally, nor have some motive newly in time, just as it cannot will something newly in time: Therefore it is moved by merits from eternity; and since this cannot be verified of the intentive will of glory, there must necessarily be admitted in God some executive decree, distinct from the intentive, which presupposes foreseen merits, and depends on them as on a motive cause. Through this doctrine, and this distinction of a twofold decree, not only are several testimonies of the Holy Fathers explained, which seem to militate against our opinion, but also the chief foundations of the Adversaries are resolved, as will be established from what is said in what follows.

They object, therefore, thirdly: Glory in execution is not conferred on adults, except as a reward of merits: Therefore from eternity God did not decree to confer it otherwise, than from foreseen merits. The consequence is proved: For it was not willed and decreed from eternity in another manner, than that in which it is mandated to execution in time: Therefore if in time it is not conferred except dependently on merits, it was also not willed and decreed from eternity, except from them as foreseen.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by distinguishing the consequent: God did not decree from eternity to confer glory otherwise, than from foreseen merits, by the intentive decree — I deny. By the executive decree — I grant. To the proof it must similarly be said that the intentive decree is not adequated with execution in the manner of attaining the object, indeed rather it proceeds in the opposite manner, for whence intention begins, execution ceases and is terminated; but the executive decree indeed is: Whence of this indeed it is true, that from eternity glory was willed through it in that manner in which it is conferred in time, but not of the other.

You will say, first: To every efficacious decree of God something must correspond on the part of the effect: but in glory, as conferred in reality, nothing shines forth which

corresponds to the intentive, liberal, and gratuitous decree: Therefore such a decree is repugnant, it being supposed that in time glory is conferred from merits.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor. For in order that something correspond in reality to the efficacious, intentive, liberal, and gratuitous decree, it suffices that, although the exterior conferral of glory be formally from justice, and not liberal formally, it nevertheless be liberal in root, namely in the conferral of the first grace initiating the merits of glory, which took its origin from His gratuitous intention, from which it comes about that the very conferral of glory be virtually, and in root, gratuitous.

I say, secondly: These two acts, "I freely will to give glory," and "I will to give glory from merits, and as a crown," seem to fight with one another and be incompatible: Therefore also the two aforesaid decrees which we admit in God, since by the first God freely wills to give glory, and by the second He wills to give it from merits, and as a crown.

I answer by denying the Antecedent, for in the first act "freely" falls upon the act, and excludes merits, not from glory as to be given, but from the motive of the will intending to give glory: In the second, however, "from merits" falls upon the object, or the thing to be given, namely glory, which God does not will to give without merits, whence between the two aforesaid decrees there is no repugnance or incompatibility.

§ VIII

The chief effects of predestination.

I say first: Glorification, justification, and efficacious calling, are effects of predestination. This is established from that saying of the Apostle, to the Romans 8: "Whom he predestinated, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified." The reason is, that in order that something be an effect of predestination, three things are required: first, that it be from God willing to give glory; second, that it be given from the sole intention of giving glory; third, that it in fact conduce to the attainment of glory: but God confers in fact beatitude, justifies, and efficaciously calls the elect, from the intention of giving him glory, to which he in fact arrives: Therefore the aforesaid are effects of predestination.

You will say, first, predestination is not concerning the end, but concerning the means, whence it is defined by Augustine, the foreknowledge and preparation of the means, by which those who are liberated are most certainly liberated, whoever they may be: but glorification is the end, and not a means: Therefore it is not an effect of predestination.

I answer that predestination is immediately concerning the means, but because these in execution efficaciously infer the end, it is mediately concerning the end.

You will say, secondly: The effects of predestination cannot be common to the reprobate and the predestined: but justification and calling are common to the elect and the reprobate, since they are many times granted to the latter: Therefore they are not effects of predestination.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor; for although calling and justification can be found in the reprobate, not, however, in the same manner in which they are in the predestined; because in these they are found with efficacious ordination, and perseverance even to the attainment of glory, in the reprobate without it, whence they do not stand in the same manner.

I say, secondly, grace interrupted by sin, not only as recovered through penitence, but also as first conferred, is an effect of predestination. For it conduces with effect to the end of predestination, and influences into beatitude, since on account of it a new degree of glory is given to the predestined, beyond the degree corresponding to the grace in which he rises again, or at least the same degree of glory is given under a new title: on which the Theologians in the treatise on penitence, when they treat of the revival of merits. Nor is it an obstacle if you say that such grace does not avail for the attainment of glory, except as restored through penitence. For this is true, if the particle "as" denotes a required condition, without which such grace does not influence into glory; but it is otherwise, if it expresses and signifies the formal reason of such influence; for thus it is not from penitence, which stands only as removing an impediment, but from the right and proportion which sanctifying grace has with respect to glory.

You will say: Even if to the grace which Adam had in the state of innocence, some degree of glory corresponds, and consequently it conduces to the end of predestination, it nevertheless, as first conferred, was not an effect of his predestination, but only as repaired through penitence: Therefore the same must be said of the grace first conferred on us, interrupted by sin, and restored through penitence.

But I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason of distinction is, because since the grace of the state of innocence did not presuppose the foreknowledge and predestination of Christ, nor was it given from His merits, as we shall show in the treatise on the Incarnation, it was not commanded by the efficacious intention of glorifying Adam, which was posterior to Christ's predestination; whence by force of the first infusion it did not denote an order to final perseverance, but only by force of the reparation made through Christ. In our grace, however, insofar as first conferred, the opposite happens;

for since its first conferral is from Christ's merits, and presupposes His predestination, it is prepared from the intention of glory in the elect, and by force of the first infusion denotes an order to glory, and to final perseverance.

I say, thirdly, although inefficacious callings are not effects immediately elicited by predestination, they are nevertheless commanded by it, and ordered to its proper end, namely the salvation of the elect.

The first part is clear, both because inefficacious callings, and sufficient aids, since they are common to the elect and the reprobate, are from the general providence of the supernatural order. Also because since predestination, according to Augustine, is the preparation of benefits by which the elect are most certainly liberated, only those callings which efficaciously and most certainly conduce to its end ought to be reckoned among the effects elicited by predestination. And in this sense must be understood some testimonies of the Holy Fathers, by which they seem to assert that only efficacious and congruous callings, or those according to purpose, are effects of predestination; for they speak of the effects of predestination elicited, and immediately proceeding from it; whence they prove this part of our conclusion, but do not militate against the second, which is persuaded by this reason. Whatever in some way conduces to the end of predestination, can be commanded by it, and proceed at least mediately, and is in fact commanded by it; since it belongs to the power or virtue which regards the end, to command those things which in some way conduce to it: but although inefficacious callings in the predestined do not conduce to glory immediately, they nevertheless conduce to it mediately and dispositively, insofar as they gradually soften the heart of man, so that he finally responds to God calling; or objectively, insofar as, being called back to memory, they excite to thanksgiving, and humility, on account of past resistance: Therefore they proceed from predestination, at least mediately and imperatively.

You will say: He acts imprudently, who, from the efficacious intention of the end, commands means which he knows to be inefficacious for obtaining it: Therefore it seems incongruous that God, from an efficacious intention of beatitude, command certain inefficacious callings, which must be frustrated of their effect.

I answer that he indeed acts imprudently, who, from the efficacious intention of the end, commands altogether inefficacious means; but it is otherwise if from it he commands means efficacious in some respect, although simply inefficacious for obtaining the end. Rather, sometimes this is required by true prudence, as in our case; namely that through callings inefficacious for a perfect act, but efficacious for other less perfect acts, the heart of man be gradually softened, and disposed to perfect conversion, and his infirmity,

inconstancy, ingratitude, and other things, be shown to him, on account of which he may afterward be more humbled.

I say, fourthly, the permission of sin in the elect is an effect of their predestination.

It is proved by a fundamental reason: What is from God for the sake of salvation and spiritual fruit is an effect of predestination: but the permission of sin (that is, the denial of efficacious aid for avoiding it) in the elect happens from the intention of their salvation, and for the sake of their spiritual fruit: Therefore it is an effect of predestination. The Major is established; the Minor, however, is proved, first, from that saying of the Apostle, to the Romans 8: "To them that love God, all things work together unto good." Where the gloss adds, even the very sins, and Saint Thomas, there, lecture 8, teaches that the sins of the predestined cooperate for their good. The same is asserted everywhere by the Holy Fathers: for Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 9, writes this: To them that love God all things work together unto good, so much altogether all things, that even if any of them deviate and go astray, this very thing too causes them to profit unto good, because they return better and more cautious. Ambrose, Apology 1 for David, chapter 2: The saints, if perchance men have fallen, more through the fragility of nature than the lust of sinning, rise more keenly to running, repairing greater contests by the goad of shame, so that not only is the fall thought to have brought no impediment, but even to have accumulated incentives of swiftness. Gregory, Moralia 2, chapter 26: It happens that sometimes He usefully withdraws this grace, and shows to the one presuming, how much he is weak in himself; for then we truly know whence our goods are, when, as it were, by losing them, we perceive that they cannot be kept by us. Finally Saint Thomas, I-II, question 79, article 4, says that from divine mercy blinding for a time is ordered medicinally to the salvation of those who are blinded, but this mercy is not extended to all who are blinded, but only to the predestined, to whom all things work together unto good.

The same Minor is proved, secondly, by this reason: The permission of sin is willed by God for the sake of some good end: for God (says Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 11), since He is supremely good, would in no way permit some evil to be in His works, unless He were so omnipotent and good, that He might do good even from evil: but no end of the permission of sin can be thought, which is better, and more consonant with the order of divine wisdom and providence, than the salvation and spiritual progress of the elect themselves: Therefore from His intention and love, the permission of sins is willed by God in the elect, or commanded by predestination.

You will object, first: The permission of sin is from God's general providence, whose it is to permit defects, whether moral or physical, in the universe, so that from thence its order and beauty may shine forth more: Therefore it is not an effect of predestination.

But I deny the consequence, for just as we said in the preceding conclusion, although inefficacious callings are elicitively from God's general providence, insofar, however, as they conduce to the end of predestination, they are commanded by it. So likewise, although the permission of sin, considered according to itself, or as conducing to the beauty of the universe, and the manifestation of the divine attributes, is elicitively from God's general providence; yet insofar as it conduces to the good of the elect, in the manner already explained, it proceeds mediately and imperatively from predestination, and consequently is its effect, not indeed elicited, but commanded.

You will object, secondly: Every effect of predestination must be grace, indeed also grace through Christ: but the permission of sin is not grace, but the denial of grace; nor is it from the merits of Christ, since Christ did not merit that grace be withdrawn from the predestined, but on the contrary that it be given to them for avoiding sins: Therefore the permission of sin is not an effect of predestination.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: Every effect of predestination must be grace, either intrinsically and by reason of itself, or extrinsically and by reason of that to which it is ordered — I grant the Major. By reason of itself, and intrinsically, always — I deny the Major, and under the same distinction of the Minor, I deny the consequence. For although the permission of sin, by reason of itself, and intrinsically, is not grace, but the lack of grace, nor as such can it be an effect of Christ's merits, yet insofar as it is extrinsically ordered so that the predestined, rising more humble, persevere in grace, it is extrinsically grace, and from Christ's merits. Whence under this aspect it can be petitioned by us in prayer, just as it was petitioned by Christ, who petitioned from the Father the whole reward of His merits, and all the effects of our predestination. Although some of our Thomists not improbably say that this distinction intervenes between Christ and us, that Christ's will was not the very one that was going to commit the sin, and therefore He could petition the permission of sin, without it being able to be inferred from this that He took complacency in the permitted sin: our will, however, is going to commit the sin, whence if it should seek its permission, it would, at least virtually and indirectly, take complacency in the sin.

From what has been said, it is gathered that the permission of the sins of the reprobate is an effect of the predestination of the elect, since it conduces to their good and spiritual fruit. For as Saint Thomas discourses, on chapter 8, question, to the Romans, lecture 6:

Just as the natural evils which happen in the universe are not always ordered to the good of those to whom they happen, but rather to the good of the universe: so the evil of fault, or its permission, is not always elected for the good of him to whom the sin is permitted, but rather for the good of the noblest parts of the universe, namely of the elect, according to that saying of Proverbs 11: "The fool shall serve the wise," because indeed (says the Holy Doctor) even the evils of sinners fall out to the good of the just.

I say lastly, the substance of the predestined is an effect of his predestination.

It is proved: Whatever in some way conduces to predestination, if it comes about from the intention of glory, is an effect of predestination, at least commanded: but the substance of the predestined conduces to predestination, and moreover comes about from the intention of glory, which is the end of predestination: Therefore it is an effect of it, at least commanded. The Major is established, for although, in order that something be an elicited and immediate effect of predestination, it is required that it be ordered to it as a means to an end; nevertheless, in order that it be its commanded and remote effect, it suffices that it conduce in some way to predestination, if it comes about from the intention of glory, which is the end of predestination. The Minor too, as to the first part, is evident, for the substance of the predestined is the efficient cause of the acts by which man is justified and merits glory; it is also the efficient cause of glory itself, and of the beatific vision, which he produces by means of the intellect, elevated by the light of glory; it can also be the motive by way of object, of thanksgiving for the benefit of creation and preservation: Therefore the substance of the predestined conduces to predestination. That it comes about, however, from the intention of glory, as the second part of the Minor asserts, is thus shown. It is not repugnant, from within, that the substance of the predestined come about from the intention of glory, and besides, it is congruent that it come about thus with the extension of predestination in providing, and it shows the greatest love of God toward the elect, and the special care which He has of them: Therefore in fact the substance of the predestined comes about from the intention of glory. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent too, as to the second part, is manifest; but it is proved as to the first. First, because by force of the decree by which Christ was elected, that He be the natural Son of God, Christ was made, as man, who is the subject of predestination, as the Theologians teach in the treatise on the Incarnation, when they treat of Christ's predestination. Likewise, by force of the decree ordering man to natural beatitude, man could be made, if he were founded in pure nature: Therefore by force of the decree efficaciously ordering to glory, the substance of the subject ordered to glory can be made, at least imperatively. Secondly, if there were some repugnance in this, it would be chiefly because the substance of the predestined, since it is the subject of

glory, must be presupposed to its intention, and consequently cannot be made by force of it: but this reason is nothing: Therefore this is not repugnant. The Major contains the chief foundation of the opposing opinion; the Minor, however, is thus shown. That which is prior in the genus of material cause, can be posterior in the genus of final cause: Therefore although the substance of the predestined be the subject of glory, and consequently prior to it, in the genus of material cause, it can be caused by it in the genus of final cause, and consequently proceed imperatively from the intention to glory. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is declared and proved by various examples. A vital power, although it is the effective and receptive principle of its own act, can nevertheless come about from the intention of it, and depend on it in the genus of final cause. The health which a doctor desires for the patient, is prior to him in the genus of final cause, but the patient himself, for whom it is desired, precedes in the genus of material and subjective cause. Christ, in the genus of final cause, is prior to the human race, and the whole order of nature and grace, whence to the Colossians 1 he is called the firstborn of every creature; and yet the human race, as to be redeemed, and consequently the natural order, precedes Christ in the genus of material cause, in the notion of the end "for which," as our Thomists commonly teach in the treatise on the Incarnation: Therefore likewise, although the substance of the predestined be the subject of glory, which predestination regards as end, it will be able to proceed from its intention, or be commanded. The reason of all these things is, because mutual causality between two things, in a diverse genus of cause, is not repugnant, for, as the Philosophers commonly teach, causes are causes to one another, and exercise mutual causality and dependence among themselves. From which are resolved the chief foundations of the Adversaries, as will be established from what is said next.

They object, therefore, first: The predestination of men presupposes their substance produced, or at least foreseen: Therefore it does not cause it. The consequence is clear; the Antecedent is proved. The substance of the predestined is produced through natural providence: but natural providence precedes supernatural, just as nature precedes grace: Therefore predestination presupposes the substance of the predestined. A similar argument can be made about the antecedent will of saving all men, for this precedes predestination, or that special will, by which God discerns the predestined from the reprobate: but that general will of saving all men presupposes their substance and being, since it presupposes the will of creating them: Therefore predestination presupposes the substance of the predestined produced, or at least foreseen.

But to these, from the principles already established, it is easily answered that the antecedent will of saving all men, and natural providence, precede predestination, in the

genus of material cause, and are posterior to it, in the genus of final cause, which suffices in order that the substance of the predestined be an effect of predestination, as has already been shown, and is established in the common opinion of the Thomists, and others, who teach that sufficient aids in the predestined are effects of predestination, notwithstanding that they are effects of common supernatural providence, which is prior to predestinative providence: Therefore likewise the substance of the predestined, although it be an effect of natural providence, and this be prior to predestination, will nevertheless be able to be an effect of predestination.

The same solution must be applied to a similar argument which the Adversaries propose, namely that our predestination, since it is posterior to Christ's predestination, which depends on the foreseeing of original guilt, presupposes it, but original sin presupposes the substance of all the predestined. It is answered that our predestination presupposes original sin, in one genus of cause, namely material, but not in every genus of cause, because it precedes such sin, or its permission, in the genus of final cause.

They object, secondly: In order that something be an effect of predestination, it is required that it be a means with respect to glory, as is established in calling and justification, which for this reason are said to be effects of predestination, because they are ordered to glory, as means to an end: but the substance of the predestined is not a means to glory, but only its subject: Therefore it is not an effect of predestination.

I answer by distinguishing the Major: In order that something be an elicited effect of predestination, it is required that it be a means with respect to glory — I grant the Major. In order that it be an effect only commanded by it — I deny the Major: for this it suffices that it in some way conduce to glory, and come about from the intention of it, as is clear from what has been said above.

They object, thirdly: The effects of predestination must be from Christ's merits, for He merited all the effects of our predestination, as the Theologians teach in the treatise on the Incarnation: but the substance of the predestined is not from Christ's merits, for according to Augustine, Epistle 105, Christ did not die for the just, that men should be founded, but for the impious, that they should be justified: Therefore it is not an effect of predestination.

I answer, granting the Major, by distinguishing the Minor: The substance of the predestined, taken nakedly, and considered within the limits of pure nature, is not from Christ's merits — I grant. As it is ordered to grace and glory, and is efficaciously transmitted to it — I deny. Whence to the passage of Augustine it must be said that he only intends that the generation of man, considered within the limits of pure nature, is

not from the merits of Christ's death and passion; he does not, however, deny that it, as ordered and transmitted to grace and glory, falls under merits. I add that many things are attributed to Christ's merits, on account of which nevertheless He is not said to have died; for Christ merited for Himself the glory of His body, and the exaltation of His name; He also merited the illuminations and accidental joys of the Angels, as we shall show in the treatise on the Incarnation, and yet He is not said to have died for the glory of His body, and the exaltation of His name, nor for the illuminations and joys of the Angels; because the particle "for" denotes the chief end of Christ's death and passion; but those are not the chief ends of His death, but only the justification and glory of the elect.

From what has been said it is gathered that all natural goods are commanded effects of predestination, for although they come about from natural providence, they are nevertheless ordered through predestination to the salvation and good of the elect: according to that saying of the Apostle: "All things are yours; and you are Christ's; and Christ is God's."

Chapter III

On reprobation.

That there is in God reprobation, or some efficacious and immutable decree, by which He willed from eternity to exclude from glory some men and Angels, is certain of faith, since this is established by express testimonies of Scripture, especially from chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans. Whence at the Council of Valence, canon 3, it is said: We confidently confess the predestination of the elect to life, and the predestination of the impious to death. Saint Thomas also proves this here, question 23, article 3, by this discourse: Predestination is a part of providence: but it belongs to providence to permit some defect in things which are subject to providence; whence, since through divine providence men are ordered to eternal life, it also belongs to divine providence, that it permit some to fail from this end, and this is called reprobating.

The Holy Doctor adds, Book 1 to Annibaldus, dist. 40, article 3, that reprobation is necessary, so that the defectibility of the created will and the necessity of grace be perfectly shown. For the liberty of created will would not be perfectly shown, if man could not sin finally, and die in final impenitence. Similarly the necessity of grace is not perfectly manifested, unless the necessity of the gift of final perseverance is shown, which cannot be shown, unless it be permitted that some men sin, and die in sin, and consequently fail of the attainment of eternal life. It was also necessary that God reprobate some, so that from thence the glory of His attributes might shine and gleam

more, especially His avenging justice, in their punishment; His patience, and longsuffering, in bearing with them so long; and His goodness and mercy toward the elect, which discerned them from the reprobate and destined them to glory.

This reason the Apostle touches, to the Romans 9, in these words: "God, willing to shew his wrath" (that is, avenging justice) "and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction: that he might shew the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory." Finally the beauty of the universe demands this, which arises from the diversity of creatures, and the admixture of good and evil ones. Which reason the same Paul also insinuates, when, 2 Timothy 2, he writes: "In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some indeed unto honour, but some unto dishonour."

As for the essence and quiddity of reprobation, the Theologians commonly teach that it does not denote in God only the negation of predestination, but a positive act; both because the Apostle, with names importing a positive act, explains it, to the Romans 9: "God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth"; "Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated." Also because if reprobation consisted only in negation, merely possible Angels and men, and never future, could equally be said to be reprobated, as those who, from existing beings, are damned; since not only these, but also those, are not predestined by God. I add that a more perfect mode of acting must be attributed to God: but a more perfect mode of acting is through a positive act, than through only the lack or suspension of an act: Therefore reprobation consists in a positive act, and not only in the negation of predestination.

But if you ask, what is that positive act, in which reprobation essentially consists? I answer that it is the act of command, by which God commands the permission of sin, or the denial of efficacious grace for avoiding it, and other means efficaciously conducing to the end of reprobation, namely the manifestation of divine justice. For reprobation is an objective part of providence, just as predestination is: but providence consists essentially in an act of command, ordering means to the attainment of the end intended by the provider, as was shown in chapter 1, § 2: Therefore also reprobation. It connotes, however, and presupposes, an act of the will, which is called hatred of the reprobate, or his rejection and exclusion from glory; just as predestination likewise connotes and presupposes an act of the will, which is called the love or election of the predestined to glory. This being premised, it only remains for us here to treat of the causes and effects of reprobation, concerning which three grave difficulties and controversies are to be briefly resolved here.

§ I

Reprobation, insofar as it denotes exclusion from glory as an undeserved benefit, does not have foreseen demerits, or actual sins, as its motive; but it does, insofar as it includes the will to punish and to inflict penalty.

Thus Saint Thomas, Book 1 to Annibaldus, dist. 41, sole question, article 3, where he writes this: To the divine will concerning the salvation of man, a twofold will seems opposed: namely a will of contradiction, according to which He wills that someone not be saved, and a will of contrariety, according to which He wills to damn someone. The first will indeed does not require any reason on the part of the thing willed, since the salvation of man is not owed to human nature; for a reason is not required, why I do not give to someone to whom I am not obligated to give. But the will of damnation regards the reason of the thing willed on the part of the damned, since damnation is inflicted from a debt.

The first part of this assertion is proved, first, from those words of the Apostle to the Romans 9: "For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil... it was said, not of works but of him that calleth, Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated." Where Saint Thomas, lecture 2, says that just as the love of which he speaks here belongs to God's eternal predestination, so the hatred of which he speaks here belongs to reprobation, by which God reprobates sinners, nor should it be said that this reprobation is temporal. By which the response of certain Recent authors is excluded, who say that these words are not to be understood of the love pertaining to eternal predestination, nor of the hatred belonging to eternal reprobation; because they think that Esau was not reprobated from the kingdom of heaven, but only repelled from a temporal inheritance.

But those Authors attend only to temporal things: nor do they notice that the Apostle raised these words of the Prophet to a mystical and spiritual sense, and assumed them to prove that God, without injury to anyone, elected certain ones according to purpose to glory, and to others only willed to deny a benefit, before their merits were foreseen; which sense Augustine follows at length, Epistle 105, question 2, to Simplicianus, and often elsewhere. Whence whether Esau was reprobated from eternal life, or only repelled from temporal inheritance, matters not to the purpose; since the force of the Apostle's discourse does not consist in this, but the Apostle takes Jacob and Esau as a type and figure of all the elect and reprobate.

I add that the same Apostle, to the Hebrews 12, numbers Esau among sinners and the impenitent, which is no small argument that he himself was excluded not only from

temporal inheritance, but also from the celestial kingdom. Nor is it an obstacle that some, with Theophylact and Cajetan, interpret this of penitence toward Isaac his father, and of reprobation from his blessing: For Saint Chrysostom, Homily 31 on the Epistle to the Hebrews, and Saint Thomas, on chapter 12 of the same Epistle, and other Holy Fathers commonly, think that Esau did not have true penitence toward God.

Furthermore, the same first part can be persuaded by this reason: God is the supreme lord of glory, and glory is owed to no man: Therefore, without any injury to anyone, He can efficaciously decree to confer it on some, and deny it to others, without this presupposing merit or demerit of their own will on the part of men. The consequence is clear, because in this the notion of supreme dominion consists, namely being able to do with one's own thing whatever one wills, without any injury. Whence because the first grace is owed to no man, God can, without any injury, give it to some, and deny it to others, as the Adversaries concede: why, then, could not the same be said of glory? This reason Saint Thomas insinuates in the place related above, and here, article 5, ad 3, in these words: In those things which are given from grace, someone can give to whom he wills, more or less, at his own pleasure, provided he subtracts what is owed to no one, without prejudice to justice. And this is what the father of a family says, Matthew 20: "Take what is thine, and go thy way; is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" And question 6 of On Truth, article 2, ad 9: This very fact (he says), that there is no debt, is sufficient reason for not giving.

The Adversaries respond that although God, as supreme lord of glory, could absolutely so conduct Himself, and deny glory to the reprobate, before their demerits were foreseen, as an undeserved benefit; not, however, upon the supposition of the elevation of human nature to the supernatural order, and of the antecedent will, by which He wills all men to be saved, because, this elevation and will being supposed, glory is thus owed to man, not by the debt of justice, or of connaturality, but by the debt of congruity.

But on the contrary, first: This ordination and will being supposed, without any incongruity, God can efficaciously will to deny efficacious grace to some, none of their demerits being foreseen: Therefore likewise, still that will and ordination being supposed, He can, without any incongruity, none of men's demerits being foreseen, will that some be excluded from glory, as an undeserved benefit. The consequence is clear, for God is no less lord of glory, than of efficacious grace; nor is glory, by force of this will, and ordination, more owed, than efficacious grace: Therefore just as He can, without any incongruity, will to efficaciously deny that to some, none of their demerits being foreseen; so also this, notwithstanding the elevation of human nature to the supernatural order, and the antecedent will of saving all men.

On the contrary, secondly: Granted that, by force of that elevation, and antecedent will, glory would be owed to some men vaguely and in common, it would not, however, be owed to these or those in particular: Therefore granted that, that elevation and will being supposed, God could not efficaciously will to exclude all men from glory, as from an undeserved benefit, He could nevertheless, before all demerit, efficaciously will to deny glory to these or those in particular, as an undeserved benefit, even before foreseen demerits.

The second part of the assertion, which says that reprobation, insofar as it includes the will to punish and to inflict penalty, presupposes foreseen demerits and sins, is manifest; for it is repugnant to divine equity that He decree to punish and inflict any penalty, except on account of foreseen fault. Whence Augustine, book 3 Against Julian, chapter 8: God is good, God is just; He can liberate without good merits, because He is good; He cannot damn without evil merits, because He is just.

§ II

The objections are resolved.

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: The will of efficaciously excluding some from glory, before their demerits are foreseen, seems incompatible with the antecedent will of saving all men, which the Apostle, 1 Timothy 2, asserts to be in God; for how does God sincerely will the salvation of those whom, before foreseen demerits, He excludes from salvation?

I answer by denying the Antecedent, for just as a pious and just judge can sincerely will the life of a man, whom nevertheless he in fact delivers to be hanged; just as a merchant willing to cast merchandise into the sea, a storm having arisen, to save his life, truly and sincerely wills to preserve them, but with an inefficacious will and simple complacency. Likewise, just as in the opinion of the Adversaries, God, giving to man sufficient aid, and incongruous grace, for some act, with simple complacency and antecedent will, desires for him congruous and efficacious grace, and yet, before any fault foreseen, wills efficaciously to deny it; since the denial of the first grace, or the first permission of sin, in their opinion, is not the punishment of a preceding sin, but proceeds from God's simple will. Finally, just as God, by antecedent will, wills all little ones to be saved, and yet, no demerits being supposed or foreseen, which in them are none, wills that some be excluded from glory, namely those to whom He does not will the sacrament of baptism to be applied. So likewise, although He wills that some be efficaciously excluded from glory, as it is an undeserved benefit, so that He may show that He is the supreme lord of glory, and that glory is owed to no man or Angel; with an inefficacious desire, however,

and simple complacency, falling upon their salvation, according to itself considered, and as precise from the circumstances of the defectibility of free will, the manifestation of His attributes, the beauty of the universe, explained above, He truly and sincerely wishes salvation for all.

You will say, it at least savors of cruelty, to exclude someone from the heavenly kingdom, without any fault presupposed, since such exclusion is the greatest evil which can be inflicted on man: Therefore this must not be attributed to God, since Scripture prescribes that we think of God in goodness.

I answer, first, that this argument is easily resolved, according to what is to be said in the following section, where we shall show that negative reprobation, or the will of excluding the reprobate from glory, presupposes original guilt foreseen, and depends on it as a motive cause.

I answer, secondly, abstracting for now from this opinion, by denying the Antecedent absolutely: for it does not disgrace divine goodness, nor does it bear any mark of cruelty, to be unwilling to confer an undeserved benefit on someone, as is clear in a King denying to someone an Episcopate, or another dignity, not owed to him, and in God denying the first congruous or efficacious grace, which is owed to no one. Glory, however, is an undeserved benefit to human and angelic nature, even elevated to the supernatural order, as was shown above.

You will object, secondly: In predestining and reprobating men and Angels, we ought to concede to God a more connatural mode of operating, unless the opposite be established to us from revelation: but the more connatural mode of operating in reprobating men and Angels is that God will no one to be excluded from glory, before the foreseeing of demerits, and elsewhere the opposite has not been revealed from Scripture: Therefore it must be said that God wills no one to be excluded from glory, before the foreseeing of demerits.

I answer, granting the Major, by denying the Minor, for as I argued in the preceding chapter, treating of the gratuitous election of the predestined: Just as in attaining the end, the agent begins more connaturally from the intention of it, than from the election of means: so in failing from the end, it is begun more connaturally from the will of the defect from it, than from the will of the defect from the means.

You will object, thirdly, against the second part: The crown, as a crown, depends in execution no less on merits, than punishment, as punishment, on demerits: but notwithstanding that dependence, the crown can be intended before merits are foreseen,

as is established from what has been said in the preceding chapter: Therefore likewise the exclusion of men from glory, as it has the notion of punishment, could be intended by God, before sins or demerits are foreseen.

I answer, granting the Antecedent, by denying the consequence and the parity: The reason of distinction is, first, because that election to glory, even as a crown, be made before foreseen merits, injures no one thereby; but it would indeed, if the decree of inflicting punishment preceded the foreknowledge of sin. Secondly, because the crown, in the order of intention, does not depend on merits, but causes them; for since it is a good per se, and not occasioned, it can be intended independently of the foreseeing of another. Punishment, however, because it is an occasioned good, can neither be executed, nor intended, except on occasion of foreseen guilt. Whence Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 26: God is moved from Himself to have mercy, to punishing not except from our presupposed fault. And Tertullian, book 2 Against Marcion: God from Himself is good, from us just, namely with avenging justice.

§ III

Original sin, as it is an infection of nature, is the motive cause of the reprobation of men, but not as it is an infection of the person.

For the understanding and proof of this assertion, it must be diligently observed that original sin, as it is the infection of nature, must be distinguished from original guilt, as it is the infection of the person. Original sin, as it is the infection of nature, is the sin by which we all sinned in Adam, which nevertheless infected human nature, and rendered it hateful to God. Original sin, however, as it is the infection of the person, is the sin by which we are infected by being born, and which is contracted through seminal propagation, and is deleted through the sacrament of baptism. There is given, therefore, in original sin, both the infection of nature and the infection of the person, and the infection of nature can remain, the infection of the person being removed; as is clear in the concupiscence which remains in us after baptism, because it is an effect of original sin, as it is the infection of nature, which is not removed by baptism. And lest anyone think this distinction to be gratuitously thought up, an express testimony of Saint Thomas must be related, Part 3, question 81, article 3, ad 1, where he expressly delivers it, in these words: It must be said that original sin in Adam, which is the sin of nature, was derived from his actual sin, which was a personal sin; because in it the person corrupted nature, by the mediation of which corruption the sin of the first man is derived to posterity, according as corrupted nature corrupts the person. This being premised.

The first part of the assertion is proved, first, from Augustine, who, in various places, openly delivers this truth. For throughout the whole of Epistle 105, on the reprobation of Esau, who was the type and figure of all the reprobate, he thus speaks: For what did he love in Jacob, before he was born, or had done anything good, except the gratuitous gift of His mercy? And what did he hate in Esau, before he had done anything evil, except original sin? For neither would He love justice in the former, which he had not yet done, nor would He hate nature in the latter, which He Himself had made good. By these words he most clearly teaches that original sin was the cause of Esau's reprobation: And this cannot be understood of original sin, as it is the infection of the person, or of that original sin by which we are infected by being born, because it is beyond doubt that Esau, like Jacob, had circumcision applied as a remedy, and consequently in both original guilt was deleted and forgiven: Therefore this must necessarily be understood of original sin, as it is the infection of nature, arising from the sin by which Esau and all of us sinned in Adam. Whence the same Holy Doctor, in various places, teaches that God reprobates men because they are from a corrupted and vitiated mass, or from the mass of perdition. For in the epistle cited he thus says: If they are vessels of wrath, which are perfected for perdition, which is rendered to them as owed, let them attribute this to themselves, because they were made from that mass, which, on account of the sin of one, in which all sinned, God justly and deservedly damned. And On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 8: Let those who are liberated (from the mass of perdition) love grace; but let those who are not liberated acknowledge the debt. Likewise, book 2 to Boniface, chapter 7: Where it is said, "he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth," He who makes one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor: the good indeed is given undeservedly and freely, because it is from the same mass as that to which it is given: but the evil is rendered deservedly and as owed, because in the mass of perdition, evil is not evilly rendered to evil. And again: Evil is rendered, because all are guilty, from this, that through one man sin entered into the world. Finally, On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 7: Those who have not heard the Gospel, and those who, having heard it, and having been changed for the better, did not receive perseverance; and those who, having heard the Gospel, were unwilling to come to Christ, that is, to believe in Him; and those who, through infant age, could not even believe, but could be absolved from the original wound only by the laver of regeneration, which nevertheless not having received, they died and perished, are not discrete from that lump, which is established to be damned, all going from the one into condemnation. Where he assigns one common cause of reprobation for all the reprobate, both little ones and adults, namely the damnation of the lump, from which they were not discerned, all going from the one into condemnation, that is, on account of the fault of one, in which all sinned.

I add that the same Holy Doctor, book 4 Against Julian, chapter 8, and book 5, chapter 4, and book 6, chapter 10, and others everywhere, asserts that the will of reprobating men was God's judgment, and an act of avenging justice, and consequently he thinks that it was in punishment of some sin, which could be nothing other than original; for thus reprobation is in the same manner and at the same instant for all: but all men agree in nothing, except in original sin: Therefore the cause of the reprobation of men, according to Augustine, is original sin, by which all sinned in Adam.

The same part is proved, secondly, from Saint Thomas, Augustine's most faithful Disciple, who, everywhere adhering to his footsteps, delivers the same doctrine in various places. I shall here adduce only three of his testimonies. The first is taken from question 6 of On Truth, article 2, ad 2, where he thus says: God's election, by which He elects one and reprobates another, is rational, nor is it necessary that the reason of election be merit, but the divine goodness is in the very election: the reason of reprobation, however, is original sin in all. Which words are so clear and expressed, that they command us to marvel, that several of our Thomists are unwilling to subscribe to our opinion, and dare to deny, or call into doubt, whether it is consonant with the mind and doctrine of both Holy Doctors, Augustine and Thomas.

Nor can it be said that those Holy Doctors only meant that original sin is a sufficient cause of the reprobation of men, not, however, a motive that in fact impelled God to reprobating men. For Saint Augustine, in the places cited, expressly teaches that God held in hatred, in Esau, original sin, and that God reprobates men, because they are from a corrupted and vitiated mass, through the sin of the first parent: Therefore he thinks that such a sin was really the cause and motive, why God willed to exclude them from glory. Similarly Saint Thomas, in altogether the same manner, asserts that original sin is the cause of reprobation, in the same way that he denies that merit is the cause of predestination, for he says: In the very election, the reason is the divine goodness; but the reason of reprobation is in men original sin: but it is manifest that he denies that merit is an actual cause and influencing into the predestination of men: Therefore also that he affirms that original sin is a cause actually influencing into their reprobation.

Nor is it an obstacle that the same Holy Doctor, after the words related, adds: Or this very fact, that they do not have a claim to have grace conferred on them. By which he signifies that God wills even the exclusion of the reprobate from the kingdom, under the title of grace, or an undeserved benefit. It is not an obstacle, I say, because those two titles, namely of undeserved grace, and of debt of justice, are not at all opposed to each other, but are compatible with each other. For just as the fact that something is not owed to another does not remove the possibility that he can demerit it; so the fact that

something is denied by way of an undeserved benefit does not impede that it can also simultaneously be denied under another title, namely of owed punishment, and on account of personal or original guilt; as is established in a King, who can deny an Episcopate or another dignity to someone, both because it is an undeserved benefit to him, and also because he is unworthy of it, on account of his own fault or that of his parents from whom he took his origin. Whence according to Saint Thomas's doctrine there is given a twofold motive of reprobation, or of the efficacious intention of excluding the reprobate from glory, namely the title of undeserved grace, of which we treated in the preceding section, and the title of owed justice on account of original sin, of which we treat in the present. The first only has place in the reprobation of the evil Angels, but both are found in the reprobation of men.

The second testimony is had here, question 23, article 5, ad 3, where Saint Thomas considers the whole human race, obnoxious to the damnation of common sin, just as the whole universe of things, as to this, that just as God, willing to represent His goodness in manifold ways, constituted diverse degrees of things, of which some hold a high, and some the lowest place in the universe: so, willing to represent His goodness in manifold ways in the human race obnoxious to damnation, He elected from the damned mass some, to whom, by sparing them, He might represent His goodness by way of mercy; but others He designated, so that, by punishing them on account of the sin of the mass, He might represent His goodness by way of justice. His words are: Let us consider, therefore, the whole human race, just as the whole universe of things. God willed, therefore, in men, as to some whom He predestines, to represent His goodness by way of mercy, sparing; and as to some whom He reprobates, by way of justice, punishing. And this is the reason why God elects some, and reprobates some. Whence I thus argue: According to Saint Thomas, reprobation is an act of avenging justice, and consequently in the reprobate God punishes and avenges some sin: Not actual, because this is not the cause of reprobation, as it is in the order of intention, in Saint Thomas's manifest opinion, as is established from what has been said in § 1: Therefore original. Reprobation of men happens, therefore, according to Saint Thomas, on account of original sin, by which we all sinned in Adam.

The third testimony is had, II-II, question 2, article 5, ad 1, where Saint Thomas teaches that the aid of grace for loving God, and for believing the articles of faith, is denied to some, in punishment of original sin. This aid (he says), to whomever it is divinely given, is given mercifully; but to whom it is not given, it is not given from justice, in punishment of a preceding sin, and at least original, as Augustine says in the book On Rebuke and Grace. From which passage this argument can be sought: That is the cause

of reprobation, which is the cause of its first effect; for predestination and reprobation, on the part of the acts of the divine intellect and will, can have no cause, but only on the part of the effects which follow from them, as Saint Thomas teaches here, question 23, article 5, in these words: It is not to be assigned that there be a cause of the divine will, on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be assigned on the part of the things willed, insofar, namely, as God wills one thing to be for the sake of another. And he adds: No one, therefore, was so insane of mind as to say that merits are the cause of divine predestination, on the part of the act of predestining. But original sin, according to the same Angelic Doctor, is the cause of the first effect of reprobation, namely the denial of the first grace for believing the revealed mysteries, and for loving God: Therefore since, according to Saint Thomas, original sin, by which we are infected by being born, is dismissed through baptism, it must be understood that the Holy Doctor speaks of original sin by which we all sinned in Adam, or of original sin, as it is the infection of nature, not, however, as it is the infection of the person. Whence, Book 1 to Annibaldus, dist. 41, sole question, article 3: The end of damnation is God's justice: but the debt of damnation, on our part, is not only the evil works of this one or that one, but also the infection of nature. And a little after he adds, that reprobation has as its cause, not out of necessity the foreknowledge of operations, but for this the foreknowledge of the infection of nature suffices. Than which nothing more clear can be said, to show that the very infection of nature, not considering the infection of the person, is punishable, and a sufficient cause of the reprobation of men. Likewise, on chapter 9, question, to the Romans, lecture 4: Human nature (he says) has vileness from its matter, because as is said, Genesis 2, God made man of slime: but it has greater vileness from the corruption of sin, which through one man entered into this world, and therefore man is deservedly compared to mud... Similarly, God has free power, from that same corrupted mass of the human race, as from a certain mud, doing injury to no one, to make some men prepared into glory, and others left in misery, that is, remaining in the debt-incurred damnation from the sin of the first parent.

The first part of our assertion can also be persuaded by this discourse: It is not repugnant, indeed it is fitting, that the reprobation of men, or the will of excluding them from glory, come about on account of original sin: Therefore since this opinion is altogether consonant with the mind and doctrine of both Holy Doctors, Augustine and Thomas, as has already been shown, it is to be preferred to the other which denies this. The consequence is clear, for the doctrine of Saint Augustine, in the matter of grace and predestination and reprobation, is of such authority in the Church, that it cannot be denied without rashness. Whence Baronius, related in the preceding chapter, prudently warns certain of the Recent authors, at how great a peril they expose themselves, while

receding from Saint Augustine's opinion on predestination. I add that if once, and in something, one recedes from Augustine's opinion in the matter of predestination or reprobation, his authority totally collapses, and consequently all the arguments which are founded in it, for proving that grace is of itself and from within efficacious, and that the election of the predestined is purely gratuitous and liberal, are thoroughly weakened, and resolve into smoke and air. The Antecedent, however, is shown as to both parts. For in the first place, that it is not repugnant that the reprobation of men come about on account of original sin, as it is the infection of the whole human nature, is proved from this, that the foreknowledge and foreseeing of such sin, since it was prior in the divine mind to Christ's predestination, or the decree of the incarnation, as Saint Thomas and his Disciples teach, Part 3, question 1, article 3, also preceded the predestination of men, and consequently their reprobation, which was either posterior to predestination, or simultaneous with it: Whence since original sin places in men unworthiness, and positive enmity with God, and renders the whole human race hateful to Him, it furnished sufficient motive to God, that He should will, on account of it, that some men be excluded from glory.

That this is fitting is clear from this, that it shows God's predestination and reprobation to be more sweet, and manifests more the mercy of God toward the predestined, and His justice toward the reprobate, while these are drawn out from the mass of perdition by mercy alone, and those are justly left in the same mass. Whence Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 8: Let those who are liberated (from the mass of perdition) love grace; but let those who are not liberated acknowledge the debt. Also shining in comparative reprobation is the notion of supreme dominion, insofar as of two existing in equal damnation, or mass of sin, God wills to give glory to one, and to exclude the other from it; and in absolute reprobation is the beauty of divine justice, insofar as from the motive of punishing original guilt, He wills the exclusion of the reprobate from the kingdom.

The second part of the assertion, however, which says that original sin, as it is the infection of the person, is not the cause of reprobation, is established in the many in whom such sin is remitted through baptism; for a sin remitted through baptism cannot be the cause of reprobation, since it cannot cause its first effect, namely the denial of the first grace; otherwise in the baptized there would remain some debt of eternal damnation, which is openly contrary to Trent, session 5, canon 5.

From this the response is clear to the chief foundation, by which several of our Thomists are moved, to deny that original sin is the cause of reprobation. For if (they say) original sin were the first cause, on account of which God willed to efficaciously exclude the

reprobate from glory, it would also be the first cause on account of which He willed to efficaciously permit them to fall into actual sin, on account of which they are damned, and to deny them efficacious grace for avoiding it: but this permission and denial of grace, original sin cannot cause, at least in the reprobate baptized, to whom it was remitted, since from the Apostle to the Romans 5, and from Trent, session 5, canon 5, no debt of damnation remains in those who are renewed through baptism: Therefore original sin cannot be the cause of the reprobation of men.

But this argument indeed proves the second part of our assertion, but does not at all touch the first. Whence, granting the Major, I distinguish the Minor: This permission and denial of grace, original sin cannot cause, as it is the infection of the person, and insofar as we are infected by being born — I grant the Minor. As it is the infection of nature, and the guilt by which all sinned in Adam — I deny the Minor. Similarly I distinguish the consequent: Therefore original sin cannot be the cause of the reprobation of men, as it is the infection of the person — I grant. As it is the infection of nature — I deny. For although under the first aspect it is removed by baptism, by which we are spiritually renewed, not, however, under the other; for the infection of the person being removed through such a sacrament, there nevertheless remains in it the infection of nature, as is clear in concupiscence, which, since it is an effect of the infection of nature, remains in the baptized, as experience establishes.

§ IV

Certain testimonies of Saint Thomas, which seem to conflict with our opinion, are explained and reconciled.

Certain testimonies of Saint Thomas are usually adduced, by which he seems to insinuate that original sin is not the cause of the reprobation of men, or of the will he had of excluding some from the heavenly kingdom. For in the first place, here question 23, article 3, treating of reprobation, he teaches that it is an act of divine providence: but if it were made on account of original sin, it would be an act not of providence, but of avenging justice: Therefore according to Saint Thomas, the reprobation of men is not from original sin.

Secondly, the same Holy Doctor, in the same place, in the response to the 1st, does not explain these words of Malachi, "Esau I have hated," in the propriety of speech, of true hatred strictly taken, but explains God holding the reprobate in hatred, through this, that He does not confer an undeserved benefit on him: but if reprobation happened in punishment of original sin, it would have the notion of hatred strictly taken; since God properly holds sin and sinners in hatred, according to that saying of Wisdom 14: "The

impious and his impiety are hateful to God": Therefore according to Saint Thomas, reprobation is not made in punishment of original sin.

Thirdly, the same Angelic Doctor, in the same place, article 5, ad 3, and Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 161, and elsewhere often, attributes the reprobation of men, or the exclusion of some from glory, to God's good pleasure alone, and mere will: Therefore he thinks that it does not happen on account of original sin.

But to these it is easily answered. To the first it must be said, according to Saint Thomas, that the reprobation of men is formally an act of providence, but includes on the part of the subject, and as it were materially, an act of justice excluding them from the kingdom, on account of original sin; whence in the same place, article 5, ad 3, he says that God predestined some by way of mercy, sparing, and reprobated some by way of justice, punishing, as we declared in the preceding section. Just as, therefore, in that act which is to steal on account of adultery, the deformity of theft, and its formal malice exercised against justice, stands materially with respect to the adultery, which is the end by which that act is formally specified; so also to permit some to fail from the end, on account of original sin, is formally an act of providence, but the justice which intervenes there, excluding them from the kingdom, on account of original guilt, stands materially in respect of the specification of the act of providence.

To the second I answer that Saint Thomas, in the place cited, did not explain those words, "Esau I have hated," of God's hatred strictly, but broadly taken, insofar, namely, as it imports the will of denying an undeserved benefit: both because for solving the argument this was sufficient, also because he intended there to deliver a general doctrine, which could also be extended to the reprobation of the Angels. But when, on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, he treats specially of the reprobation of men, he explains these words of hatred properly and strictly taken, as is established from his words which we related at the beginning of § 1.

To the third it is answered, from the same Holy Doctor, in the same place, lecture 4, that reprobation can be considered in two ways, namely absolutely, and comparatively. Absolutely, when it is asked simply, or, as he himself says, in general, why some are reprobated by God, and what is the cause of the reprobation of some, no comparison being made with those who are elected. Comparatively, however, when it is asked specially, as the same Saint says, why God reprobates this one rather than that one? Why, since all men are born obnoxious to the same damnation through the sin of the first parent, He frees some from this mass and mixture, and elects them to eternal life, but leaves others in the same mass, and does not elect them to eternal life: If, therefore,

reprobation is regarded in this second way, it has no other cause than the good pleasure of the divine will: but if it be considered in the first way, it has some cause on the part of man, namely original guilt. The Holy Doctor's words are these: Concerning the election of the good, and the reprobation of the evil, a twofold question can be raised: one indeed in general, why God wills to harden some and to have mercy on some: the other in particular, why He wills to have mercy on this one, and to harden this one or that one. And indeed a reason for this first question can be assigned; but of the second question no reason can be assigned, except the simple will of God, etc.

§ V

The chief effects of reprobation.

Since there is the same science of opposites, just as for something to be an effect of predestination, three conditions are required, namely that it be caused by God, that it be from an efficacious will of giving glory, and that it efficaciously conduce to that end; so, for something to be an effect of reprobation, it must be that it be from God, that it conduce with effect to the end of reprobation, and that it be willed and prepared by God from the intention of such an end. From this principle commonly received by the Theologians.

It is gathered, first, that although sin, as to the formal, conduces to the end of reprobation, namely exclusion from glory; because nevertheless it cannot, under this aspect, be willed by God, nor caused; it cannot be an effect of reprobation, as to the formal. As to the material, however, being an effect of reprobation is proved by the opposite reason: for, thus considered, it is caused by God, and there follows upon it (not indeed by a consequence of causality, but of inference) the exclusion of the creature from glory, and consequently it can be from the efficacious will of such exclusion.

It is gathered, secondly, that the permission of original sin, as it is the infection of nature, and insofar as it was committed by Adam as head of the whole human nature, is not an effect of reprobation; but the permission of the same sin, as it is the infection of the person, and insofar as it is contracted by us through generation, is, this being supposed, that it is never remitted.

The first part is clear from what has been said in § 3; there indeed we showed that original sin, as it is the infection of the whole human nature, and as committed by Adam, is the cause of the reprobation of men: Therefore under this aspect it cannot be its effect. The second, however, is established from this, that original sin, as it is the infection of the person, and insofar as it is contracted by us through generation, if it is never remitted,

conduces to the end of the reprobation of men, namely to their exclusion from glory; and since, under this aspect, it is not the cause of the reprobation of men, its permission can be produced or commanded by it: Therefore under this aspect it can be, and in fact is, in those to whom such sin is never remitted, an effect of reprobation.

The consequence is clear: for whatever conduces to the end of reprobation is its effect, provided it be produced, or commanded, by it.

From these things is easily resolved that argument by which a certain Recent Thomist thinks he demonstrates that original sin is not the cause of the reprobation of men: Since God (he says) is orderly appetitive, He first intends the end before the means ordered to it: but the permission of original sin never to be remitted is a means ordered to the end of reprobation, namely to the exclusion of men from glory, and conduces to it, if it is never remitted: Therefore God first intends to exclude men from glory, than to permit original sin, and consequently such sin is not the cause of the reprobation of men.

But from the principles already established it is easily answered to this argument, by distinguishing the Minor: The permission of original sin, as it is the infection of the person, and insofar as it is contracted by us through generation and seminal propagation, is a means ordered to the end of reprobation, and conduces to it, this being supposed, that it is never remitted — I grant the Minor. The permission of original sin, as it is the infection of the whole nature, and as committed by Adam — I deny the Minor. For the permission of original sin, as committed by Adam, in the order of reason, precedes Christ's predestination, and a fortiori ours, and consequently is prior to reprobation, which either happens simultaneously with predestination, or is posterior to it. Whence such permission cannot be an effect of reprobation, but is an effect of the common providence of the supernatural order, to which pertain some supernatural effects, of which kind is the grace and original justice conferred on Adam in the state of innocence, and consequently the permission of original sin, as committed by Adam.

It is gathered, thirdly, that the permission of actual sin not deleted through penitence is an effect of reprobation, but it is otherwise with the permission of that which is remitted through penitence. For the first permission efficaciously conduces to the end of reprobation, namely the exclusion of the reprobate from glory; but not the second, since sins once dismissed do not return through subsequent guilt, as the Theologians commonly teach with Saint Thomas, Part 3, question 88, article 1.

You will say, it can happen that a sin be remitted to a man in the sacrament of penitence, as to guilt, but not as to temporal punishment, and, before the punishment is discharged, he relapses into sin, and dies: but in such a case, the sin already remitted in

fact conduces to the end of reprobation: Therefore its permission will be an effect of reprobation. The Major is established, the Minor is proved. The end of reprobation is punishment to be inflicted in hell: but that sin is punished in hell, since in this life the punishment owed to it has not been discharged, nor in Purgatory, where only those are purged who die in grace: Therefore it is punished in hell, and consequently conduces to the punishment of hell, which is an effect of reprobation.

I answer that the end of reprobation is eternal punishment, but that sin remitted as to guilt, but not as to temporal punishment, is in that case indeed punished in hell per accidens, but not eternally, as Saint Thomas teaches, Book 4, dist. 22, question 1, article 1, ad 5, and therefore its permission is not an effect of reprobation.

You will insist: If the punishment of that sin were finished in hell, there would already be some remission in hell, and consequently in hell there would be some redemption, and thus it would be false what the Church says: "In hell there is no redemption." But I deny the sequel, because as the Holy Doctor says in the same place, the punishment which is discharged is neither remitted nor redeemed.

It is gathered, fourthly, that since the hardening and blinding of the reprobate, insofar as it is the denial of grace, is from God, and elsewhere in fact conduces to eternal damnation, and the manifestation of divine justice, it has whatever is required, that it be numbered among the effects of reprobation.

It is gathered, fifthly, that the eternal damnation of the sinner is the last and chief effect of reprobation. For predestination and reprobation are opposed to one another, and have terms or effects opposed to one another; whence just as the last effect of predestination is the attainment of glory, so the last effect of reprobation is exclusion from glory, and eternal damnation.

It is gathered, sixthly, that the substance of the reprobate is not an effect of his reprobation, as the substance of the predestined is an effect of his predestination. The reason of disparity is, because in order that something be an effect of predestination, or reprobation, it is required that it be produced, or at least commanded, from its intention: but the substance of the reprobate is not made by God from the intention of reprobation, as the substance of the predestined is made or commanded from the intention of predestination: Therefore the substance of the reprobate is not an effect of his reprobation, as the substance of the predestined is an effect of his predestination. The Major is established; the Minor, however, is persuaded from this, that the glory of the elect is an end super-exceeding their substance, whence that it be commanded from the intention of such an end is quite congruent and fitting: exclusion from glory, however, is

not a perfective end of the substance of the reprobate, whence we have no argument or congruence, that we should assert that God, from the intention of excluding the reprobate from glory, produced their substance.

§ VI

Not all the reprobate are given aid or means sufficient for salvation, but all the just are, when the obligation of some precept is pressing.

The first part is expressly taught by Augustine and his Disciples, as Vasquez candidly confesses, Part 1, disp. 97, chapter 2, in these words: Wherefore I would not doubt that Augustine and his Disciples Prosper and Fulgentius were of this opinion. Behold, certainly Augustine, Epistle 107, to Vitalis, among the twelve chief dogmas of faith which he recounts, establishes these three as to be held with certain faith against the Pelagians: We know that the grace of God is not given to all men. We know that to those to whom it is given, it is given by the gratuitous mercy of God. We know that to those to whom it is not given, it is not given by the just judgment of God. Fulgentius teaches the same, book 1 On the Truth of Predestination and Grace, chapter 15, where he says that God's grace is not given generally to all men, for grace is indeed a gratuitous gift. Likewise Augustine, Sermon 11 on the words of the Apostle, has this: Common to all is nature, not grace. Saint Thomas teaches the same, question 24 of On Truth, article 15, in these words: In nothing are all men found to agree, except in some natural thing. But these would be false, if in the state of fallen nature there were given some sufficient aid, common to all; for all men would agree not only in something natural, but also in something gratuitous and supernatural, and such grace would be common to all, just as nature. Whence the same Holy Doctor, II-II, question 2, article 5, ad 1, speaking of the aid of grace, without which man cannot believe, hope, and love, which is indeed sufficient, says that it is not given to some, in punishment of a preceding sin, at least original, as Augustine teaches.

Reason also supports this: For in the first place it is established that baptism is not conferred on all little ones, which, in the new law, is the unique sufficient means or remedy for the salvation of little ones, as the Theologians teach with Saint Thomas, Part 3, question 68. Nor is it valid if you say that the defect and lack of baptism in those little ones who die without it does not arise from divine providence so disposing, but from the fault or negligence of parents, or ministers of the Church, who neglect the application of this remedy. For this Augustine expressly impugns, On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 12, in these words: What shall I say of the fact that a little one sometimes, before he can be helped through the ministry of the baptizer, expires. For most often, the parents

hastening, and the ministers prepared, that baptism be given to the little one, yet, God unwilling, it is not given, He who did not hold that little one in this life so that it might be given. Whence Prosper, in the poem On the Ungrateful, says: Many, born of holy parents, could not be saved by any zeal of their own. I add that to little ones dying in the mother's womb, human diligence cannot apply baptism: Both because such infants cannot be subjected to the operation of the Church's ministers, also because infants not yet born are not capable of baptism, for one cannot be reborn, unless born.

You will say, from this it is proved indeed that little ones dying in that state lack, indeed, immediately and proximately, but not remotely and in their causes, sufficient aid for salvation; because the mothers could so govern themselves, that the fetus in their wombs would not die, but be born, and be rendered capable of the remedy.

But on the contrary: Sometimes the death of infants in the wombs of mothers happens in such a way, that it is altogether impossible for parents, in a human manner, and according to the course of natural causes, to impede and avoid it; as is clear, first, when, from a fortuitous chance, and in no way foreseen, the pregnant woman dies, a roof falling, e.g., upon her while sleeping, or lightning striking her. Secondly, when, from the weakness of seminal virtue, or corruption of blood, the fetus is generated in such a way, that it cannot be brought to birth; or when the woman herself, on account of a most weak constitution, lacks sufficient power for giving birth. But if you press, and say that in those cases at least in a divine manner, and by miracle, little ones of this kind could be aided. I shall respond that from this it cannot be inferred, that they also have, remotely and in their causes, a means or remedy sufficient for salvation; otherwise we would likewise be said to have sufficient aid for flying, since indeed this could be done by miracle.

This argument, taken from the example of little ones, Augustine believed so convincing, that, addressing the Pelagians, he says: Their mouths shut up your mouths, and their tongues restrain your tongues, who cannot yet speak. Whence, book 4 Against Julian, chapter 3, he infers from this that sufficient aids for salvation are also not given to all adults: For God (he says) is not more benevolent to the most wicked and impious men, resisting with their own will, than to most innocent little ones, who do not resist salvation with their own will, even though they are stained with original guilt. And this is certainly established, first, in unbelievers to whom the mysteries to be believed are not proposed: for how could they believe in Him of whom they have heard nothing? And how shall they hear without a preacher? It is added that, according to Saint Thomas, II-II, question 10, article 2, there are given many negative unbelievers, that is, such in whom unbelief is not a sin: but unless God denies them sufficient aids for believing, they

will not be negative unbelievers, but will culpably be ignorant of supernatural mysteries, because they will be able to believe, and will be bound to it, and consequently in not believing they will sin: Therefore God denies them aids sufficient for believing.

Nor is it valid if you say that although negative unbelievers are not given proximate sufficient aids for believing, and therefore they do not sin in not believing, they are nevertheless given remote aids, by which if they use them well, God will infallibly grant other further ones necessary for believing. It is not valid, I say: Both because to him who has remote sufficient aid for some act, even though he lacks the proximate, the omission is imputed as a fault; because he has in his free power the proximate, and consequently also the act itself: Therefore if to men to whose ears the preaching of the Gospel has not reached, remote sufficient aids for believing are given, even though the proximate ones are denied, it will be imputed to them as a fault not to believe, and consequently they will not be negative unbelievers, but privatively and contrariwise. Also because since the first act in the supernatural order is the act of faith, the first sufficient aid of the supernatural order is sufficient aid for believing, and consequently those lacking this aid lack every supernatural aid, and accordingly also every remote sufficient aid for salvation.

Nor is it only to unbelievers, but also to the faithful, that sufficient aids are sometimes denied, in punishment of preceding sins, as Cajetan and Bellarmine think concerning several blinded sinners, and Augustine and Isidore insinuate: for the former, book 3 of On Free Will, chapter 18, thus has it: This is the most just punishment of sin, that he who, when he could do right, was unwilling, lose the power when he wills it. The latter, book 2 On the Supreme Good, chapter 15, says: Some are so despised by God, that they cannot bewail their evils, even if they should will it. Reason too, which Bellarmine insinuates, persuades this: For sufficient grace consists either in certain holy thoughts of the intellect and pious affections of the will, as the Recent authors teach; or rather, as the Thomists assert, in a certain motion, or supernatural and vital quality, applying the powers of the soul to those acts: it is manifest, however, and established by experience itself, that many blinded and hardened sinners, when they sin, do not always feel nor have those good thoughts in mind, and those pious affections in heart; nor are they always excited by any pricks and goads of conscience; indeed rather they take complacency in sin and delight in the worst things, and in their wounds, which they most intensely love, most often glory: Therefore then they lack sufficient grace.

To say, however, with some Recent authors, that there are sometimes given in man thoughts of which he is not thinking, and pious affections, which are not felt, is an empty fabrication, which Bellarmine solidly refutes, book 2 On Grace and Free Will, chapter 6, in these words: Some say that God indeed perpetually knocks at the door of

the heart, and calls sinners, but that they, intent on other things, do not perceive God's calling. But this response fights most openly with experience itself, for since the calling, the knocking, the drawing, and that excitation of God, is our action, although not free, namely a good thought, and a good desire, suddenly and divinely instilled: How can it be that it not be felt in us, if it is not only in us, but also from us.

From this you will understand that when the Council of Sens, in the decree of faith, says that God's grace is so ready, that not even a moment passes, in which God does not stand at the door, and knock, this must be understood morally, not mathematically, that is, not of every instant absolutely and universally (for not at every single instant does God instill pious thoughts, as experience makes clear) but of any moment, in which a grave temptation presses, or the obligation of some supernatural precept is pressing, for then sufficient aid is not denied to the just, without which such a precept cannot be fulfilled, as is said in the second part of our assertion, which is established both from the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 11, condemning those who say that God's precepts are impossible for the justified man to observe: Also from the Constitution of Innocent X, condemning as heretical those who say: Some of God's precepts are impossible for the just, willing and striving, and grace by which they might become possible is lacking to them. Whence when Chrysostom, Augustine, and other Holy Fathers assert that grace was lacking to Peter, when he denied Christ, this must not be understood universally of a lack of all grace, both sufficient and efficacious, but of the denial of efficacious grace, which, since it is the noblest and most perfect species of grace, is called simply and by antonomasia grace. This the Holy Fathers teach God sometimes withdraws from the just, that He may punish or impede their pride and presumption. Whence excellently Bernard, Sermon 54 on the Canticle: The argument of pride is the privation of grace.

§ VII

The objections are resolved.

You will object, first: God has the antecedent will of saving all men, as was shown in the preceding treatise, chapter 3: but by force of this will, sufficient aids for salvation are given: Therefore such aids are given to all. Whence Saint Thomas, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 159: God, as far as it is in Himself, is ready to give grace to all, for He wills all men to be saved. And on chapter 12 of the Epistle to the Hebrews, lecture 3: Grace is lacking to no one, but He communicates Himself to all as far as it is in Him.

It is confirmed: Christ is the head of all men, even unbelievers, as Saint Thomas teaches, Part 3, question 8, article 3: but it belongs to the notion of a head to influence into its members: Therefore Christ influences into all men, even unbelievers, some sufficient

aids for salvation.

To the objection I answer that God, through the antecedent will of saving all men, gives to all sufficient aids for salvation, if "to give" be taken as it signifies the same as to prepare or offer in common; for He instituted the Sacraments in the Church for all, and for all He sent Christ, and decreed His merits, which are of themselves sufficient for salvation: It is otherwise, however, as "to give" sounds the same as actually to confer, or as it signifies the very intrinsic reception of aids. For under that will are comprehended not only adults, but also little ones, as Augustine teaches, book 4 Against Julian, chapter 8, and it is established from this, that otherwise Christ would not be the redeemer of little ones, since His redemption does not exceed objectively the general will which He has for the salvation of men, as commanded from it; and yet it is established from what has been said above, that little ones dying in the mother's womb lack every aid or means necessary for salvation, since baptism cannot be applied to them, which in the new law is the unique remedy instituted by Christ for little ones. Whence this argument, which among the Adversaries is a palmary one, loses all its force in little ones, to speak with Augustine, whose mouths it shuts, and whose tongues it restrains, who cannot yet speak.

To the confirmation it must be said that Christ is not actually the head of unbelievers, but only in potency, as Saint Thomas teaches in the place alleged, in the response to the 1st, whence it is not necessary that Christ actually influence into them some supernatural aid, but it suffices that He can influence it. And I insist both in unbaptized little ones, and in reprobate adults lacking the use of reason, of whom Christ is the head, and yet no supernatural aid actually influences into them. Whence this argument too loses its force in little ones.

You will object, secondly: There is no sinner, however hardened, who, as long as he lives, cannot do penance for his sins; for as Saint Thomas says, Part 3, question 86, article 1: To say that there is some sin in this life, of which one cannot repent, is erroneous: Therefore to no sinner, however hardened, is sufficient grace for repenting denied.

I answer that man can be said to be capable of doing penance in two ways: First, from within, that is, through a sufficient principle, intrinsically received in himself; and in this way, speaking regularly, sinners are capable of doing penance, by reason of sufficient aid, which, the precept of doing penance being pressing, they receive from God: Secondly, from without, by a potency founded in the power of grace conferrable by God, and in the liberty of free will to good and evil; and in this second way hardened sinners, to whom God sometimes, in punishment of preceding sins, denies sufficient aids, can be said to be capable of repenting, but not in the first. Whence most true is what Saint

Thomas teaches in the place alleged, that it is erroneous to say that there is some sin in this life, of which one cannot repent, namely by intrinsic or extrinsic potency, as already explained.

You will say, in order that someone be inexcusably obligated to some act, he must be intrinsically capable of eliciting it: but hardened sinners are inexcusably obligated to doing penance: Therefore they must be from within capable of penitence, through sufficient aid, intrinsically received in them.

I answer by denying the Major, for someone can be inexcusably obligated to some act, although he lacks intrinsic potency for it, if such defect and lack arises from his own fault. Just as, therefore, a drunk man is not excused from homicide or adultery, which he commits in the very drunkenness which he incurred by his own fault. Nor is a priest who threw the breviary into the sea, to render himself unable to recite the office, exempted from its obligation, until he has retracted that voluntary throwing, through penance. So likewise, although hardened sinners lack intrinsic potency, and sufficient aid for repenting; because, however, they fell into such impotence from voluntary fault, and were deprived of sufficient aid in punishment of preceding sins, they are neither excused from sins, nor exempted from the obligation of repenting. Whence Augustine, book 1 of the Unfinished Work Against Julian, page 119, says that the necessity of sinning is the punishment of that sin which was committed with no necessity.

Saint Thomas delivers the same doctrine, Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 160, in these words: Although those who are in sin cannot avoid, by their own power, presenting or placing an impediment to grace, unless they are prevented by the aid of grace, nevertheless this is imputed to them as a fault, because this defect is left in them from a preceding fault. Just as a drunk man is not excused from the homicide which he commits through drunkenness which he incurred by his own fault.

You will insist: From this doctrine and solution it follows that first-first motions of sensuality, invincible ignorance, and negative unbelief, are sins, since they proceed from a preceding fault, namely original sin, which is voluntary to us in the head.

But the sequel is denied, for as the same Holy Doctor rightly observes, Book 2, dist. 30, question 1, article 2, this distinction intervenes between original and actual sin, that since the first is a certain fault of nature, for it a will suffices in that nature, or in the head of that nature; but the latter, since it is a personal fault, requires the will of the person. Wherefore since the aforesaid are not voluntary to us by the will of the person, but only by the will of nature, or its head, they do not have the notion of fault, but of punishment. Whence the same Angelic Doctor, II-II, question 10, article 1: Unbelief, if it

be taken according to pure negation, as in those who have heard nothing about the faith, does not have the notion of sin, but rather of punishment, because such ignorance of divine things followed from the sin of the first parent.